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uPREFACE
The purpose of this work is to examine in detail the idea of 
community in the work of John Macmurray, a distinguished Scottish 
Moral Philosopher, who wrote primarily during the middle part of 
the twentieth century. As a prolegomena to the examination of 
Macmurray*s use of the concept of community, a review of his life 
and work will be presented as well as an analysis and review of his 
philosophy in teims of the larger framework of philosophical and 
theological thought. This will be followed by a general examination 
of Macmurray* s thinking with special attention paid to his concept 
of religion. After this general introduction, the aim of this study 
will be to examine critically the concept of community which lies at 
the very centre of Macmurray*s thought and can be considered to be 
the central theme of his thinking on religion and ethics. The 
ultimate concern of this study will be to examine closely Macmurray*s 
approach to Christian ethics in the light of the examination that has 
been made of his use of the concept of communityé
in
ABSTRACT
John Macmuxray was a Scottish moral philosopher who wrote during the middle part of the twentieth century and was influenced hut not dominated by many schools of philosophy such as personalism and empiricism. The main task of this study is to examine critically, Macmurray*s concept of community and its importance for his understanding of religion, the self and Christian ethics.
John Maomurray presented three modes of apperception, which are variously labelled, but are most commonly called the scientific, artistic and religious modes. Macmurray considered the first two modes to be negative or inadequate and the third mode, i.e. the religious mode, to be the only positive or adequate mode. The focal point of the mode of religion is the personal relations within the context of community. Macmurray substituted 'I do* for Descartes* *I think* which introduced the assumption that action is primary and reflection is secondary. Macmurray argued that immediate experience is experience uninteràupted by reflection. Immediate experience is broken by reflection, but reflection is necessary since it makes it possible to examine actions without * changing the world*. Macmurray held that the relation between the self and the other within the community is seminal to all other activities and modes of reflection. The relationships motivated by love and in terms of the other, i.e. personal relations, are the basic constituent of community as opposed to society which is . motivated by fear and is based upon impersonal relationships.Maomurray asserted that the religious mode of apperception, i.e. the communal, is central to all human activity and reflection. Macmurray drew the well founded conclusion that man*s whole life is rooted in the religious mode. This places religion in the sphere of every day experience, while dismissing the assumption that religion is confined to rare, subjective and particular experiences. Maomurray also pointed out that religion is beneficial to the community on the practical level, since it contributes to the community*s self-aware­ness. Macmurray rejected the teleological approach and deontological approach to ethics, i.e. the scientific and artistic modes, as a basis for ethics and argued that the communal mode, of apperception was the only adequate perception of ethics. !Die concept of community and its concomitant conceptions of fellowship and the personal *I-Thou* relation are the foundation upon which Macmurray based his explanation and examination of the self, religion and ethics.
Macmurray has placed the concept of community at the very centre of his definition and thinking about religion, the self and Christian ethics. However, I have argued that a completely communal or relational view does not represent adequately or explore fully the concepts of the self, religion and Christian ethics. I have argued that Macmurray*s dependence upon the idea of community and M s  utilisation of the concept of community is threatened by a serious internal contradication witMn the concept of community, i.e. there are two opposing and irreconcilable elements, which are the exclusiveness of the *I-Thou* relation as opposed to the all inclusive nature of the fellowship within the community. In my view the idea of community by itself is inadequate when used to explain completely and to define the self. Macmurray rejected the idea of the *isolated-I* and only considered the self in terms of the *I-Thou*, i.e. in terms of its communal elements.
IV
However, the rejection of the *isolated-I* means that only the instrumental valuation will be applicable, while the intrinsic, unique value of the individual, upon which the instrumental valuation is predicated, is overlooked. I would argue that Macmurray*s emphasis upon the community implies that the community is the primary phenomenon, while reducing the individual to an epiphenomenon. I have argued that Macmurray* s approach threatens to reduce religion to nothing more than a constituent of society, by overlooking the solitary aspects of religion, i.e. the individual struggle and quest. I have argued that a heterocentric,i.e. mainly communal, view of ethics is over-simplified and will lead to questionable conclusions. Heterocentrism presents problems since it threatens to become nothing more than altruism which may lead people to make incompatible and different decisions. Since the basic element in the communal mode of morality is the harmony of the community, one might only apply what may be described as the minimal interpretation of morality. I have argued that Macmurray*s idea of community, when applied to ethics and in particular to Christian ethics, threatens to reduce Jesus* teachings about ethics to simply an anthropological study. There is an inherent danger in trying to understand God in anthropological terms, since one cannot fully understand the eternal in terms of the temporary. Macmurray has over-emphasised the love between neighbours and not given God*s love its central mediating and modifying place in human relations. The theocentric approach cannot be totally defined heterocentrically.
Macmurray* s thought contained valuable insights and it should be carefully studied and utilised. However, there is a danger in viewing things only in terms of community, since the community may well become the principle phenomenon to be investigated. One might say that Christian ethics and the Christian religion is not merely a matter of community, but that the community is an integral part of our understanding of both Christian ethics and the Christian religion.
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John Macmurray is not well known and his philosophy has received
little attention beyond a few doctoral dissertations and passing
references in the works of such individuals as Karl Popper^ and John 
2C. Bennett • This notwithstanding his thinking produces an important 
all-out attack upon some of the central problems of theology and 
philosophy.
In order to understand properly the thought of Macmurray one 
needs to have some general idea about his life which provided a general 
background to his work. Macmurray was bom on February 16, 1891 in 
Maxwell ton, Kirkcudbrightshire into a family that was deeply religious 
and whose lives centred around religious questions^. Macmurray wrote 
in his autobiographical work Search for Reality in Religion that: "My 
parents were at one in a Christian piety which dictated the form of 
family life and determined its atmosphere".^ Shortly after their 
marriage Macmurray* s parents came under the influence of the American 
evangelists. Moody and Sankey. Macmurray*s father grew dissatisfied 
with the Church of Scotland and began to search for a "more satisfactory 
body of Christians"^ with whom they could associate themselves. After 
moving to Aberdeen for the sake of his children*s education, Macmurray* s 
father joined a Baptist, then an evangelical Baptish church and then the 
Plymouth Bretheren. In I909 Macmurray* s father was transferred to 
Glasgow and John Macmurray matriculated at the University of Glasgow.
1. Popper, Karl, The Open Society and Its Enemies (London: GeorgeRoutledge & Sons, Ltd., 1945), Vol II, p.230
2. Bennett, John C. Christian Realism (London: Student ChristianMovement Press, 1941), P*51
3. Thomason, William Paul, "The Bnpirical Basis for Religion inJohn Macmurray* s Philosophy" (Unpublished Doctoral Thesis; Southern Baptist Theological Seminary, 1971)# P«8
4. SRR, p. 5
5. SRR, p.7
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Later when commenting upon this period Macmurray felt that:
"all this religious activity was second-hand and somewhat priggish.
It was the result of the teaching of others, absorbed and elaborated
by a quick and busy mind, rather than the expression of a personal
religious experience".^ However, Macmurray did not doubt the validity
of his parent's experience, but the validity of their doctrinal 
7expression.
There was two important occurrences during Macmurray's years at 
the University of Glasgow. Firstly, he was allowed to take science 
courses, while pursuing his degree in Classics. Secondly, there was 
his involvement with the Student Christian Movement whose influence
QMacmurray later believed to have been "almost wholly for good".
During this period Macmurray while involved in the teaching of a Bible 
study group, applied the methods of comparison and analysis, which he
Qhad learned in his classical studies, to the Bible. This early 
experience was the precursor to Macmurray* s later recourse to scien­
tific methods to examine and test religious belief.Macmurray later 
wrote that during this period he held the hope that: "through testing
and modifications we should arrive at a religion which science need
11not be ashamed to serve?"
In 1913 Macmurray took his first degree and won a Snell Exhibition
to Oxford and in October, 1913 he entered Balliol College. However,
Macmurray*s education was interrupted by World War I, which posed for
Macmurray the problem of pacifism. He decided to join the medical
corps as a compromise. He later accepted a commission in the Queen's 
 >________
6. SRR, p.8
7. Thomason, op. cit., p.9
8. SRR, p.12
9. SRR, pp 13-14
10. Thomason, op. cit., p.10
11. SRR, p . 14
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Ovm Cameron Highlanders in I9I6 and was wounded in the final German 
Offensive in I9I.8, and awarded the Military Cross,
An important incident that dates from this period happened 
when Macmurray came home on medical leave and. was asked to preach 
to a congregation in London. Macmurray recalled that; "I took the 
opportunity to advise the church and the Christians in it, to guard 
ag^nst the war-mentality; and to keep themselves, so far as possible, 
aloof from the quarrel, so that they would be in a position and of 
a temper - to undertake their proper tasks as Christians when the war
15was over, of reconciliations". The congregation reacted to this in 
a veiy negative fashion, since no-one spoke to Macmurray and he was 
made to feel the hostility. This incident led to Macmurray*s decision 
to avoid becoming a member of a Christian church. Macmurray kept this 
resolution until the end of his University teaching career. At the 
end of his teaching career, Macmurray applied for membership in the 
Society of Friends. In any case this did not mean that Macmurray 
abandoned his interest in religion.
Macmurray returned to Oxford immediately after the armistice and
completed a shortened course of Greats after two years.Macmurray
held several important academic posts during his teaching career. He
was the John Locke Scholar in Mental Philosophy at Oxford in 1919* He
then became a lecturer at the University of Manchester. He then went
to the University of Vitwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa, where
he was the Professor of Philosophy. He returned to England in 1922
and became the Fellow and Classical Tutor and Jowett Lecturer in/
12. "Obituary, Professor J. Macmurray, Distinguished Moral Philosopher",The Times. June 2$, 1976, p.17
13. SEE, p. 21
14. SEE, p. 15
- 5 -
Philosophy at Balliol College., Oxford. Prom 1928-1944 he was the
Grote Professor of Mind and logic at the University of London. His
last academic appointment was the Professor of Moral Philosophy at
the University of Biinburgh from 1944 to 1958.^^
Macmurray*s earliest publications included Freedom in the
Modem World (1952) which included essays based upon lectures given 
16on the wireless. Another early work of importance was Interpreting 
the Universe (1935) in which Macmurray dealt with a number of funda­
mental philosophical problems. Macmurray*s main work was published 
under the general title of The Foim of the Personal which came from 
the Gifford Lectures of 1953-1954 given at the University of Glasgow 
and came out as two separate volumes entitled The Self as Agent (195?) 
and Persons in Relation (1961 ). These two volumes constitute his 
major philosophical statement. Other works which were first delivered 
as lectures include Tie Structure of Religious Experience (1926), 
which was the sixteenth series of Terry Lectures at Yale University, 
Religion. Art and Science (I96I), the I96O Forwood Lectures at Liverpool 
University; and the autobiographical work The Search .for Reality in 
Religion (I965) which was the Swarthmore Lectures.
In 1916 Macmuiray married Elizabeth Hyde. Macmurray retired
from the chair of Moral Philosophy at Edinburgh in 1958. Macmurray
18died on June 21, 1976 at the age of 85.
15. Thomason, op. cit., pp.12-15
16. ÎMW, p.7
17* Thomason, op. cit., p.13 /
18. The Times, op. cit., p.17
CHAPTER 2
Review of îfe.aaiixray* s General Philosophical Stance
- 7 -
Macmurray is relatively unknown even within the world of
established academic philosophers and is normally dismissed as
an "eccentric Soot",^ If Macmurray is referred to at all, he is
mentioned as someone who represents a rare British link with exist- 
2entialism. However, Macmurray was influenced by many .schools 
of philosophy other than existentialism. In fact Macmiarray* s 
tendency was to refer to general trends within the history of 
philosophy, such as the logical empiricists or the existentialists, 
Macmurray was influenced by, and dealt extensively with more than 
one school of thought or trend within philosophy; he tended to 
deal with fundamental presuppositions made by a certain school as 
opposed to individual thinkers,^ Notwithstanding these habits, 
Macmurray was influenced by certain major thinkers. It must be 
emphasised that Macmurray cannot be placed in one particular-or:: 
even general group of thinkers.
There are several general points about Macmurray's overall 
philosophical stance that should be established before trying to 
determine and identify the philosophical sources that influenced 
Macmurray's thinking. The most rudimentary and fundamental question 
must revolve around Macmurray's definition of philosophy and collat­
erally what essential qualities he identifies in theology.
Macmurray's definition of philosopl^ includes several basic 
propositions. Thomason has identified four basic motifs involved in 
Macmurray*s thinking about the definition of philosophy, which
1, Conford, Philip, "John Macmurray: a Neglected Philosopher"Radical Philosophy (Spring, 1977) 16 p. l6
2, Conford, op. cit.,p.l6
5. Kirkpatrick, Frank Gloyd, "The Idea of God in the Thought ofJohn Macmurray: Its Basis and Some Implications" (Unpublished Doctoral Thesis) Brown University, 1970) p.17
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includes philosophy as an expression of social consciousness; 
philosophy as an attempt to discover and know reality; philosophy 
as wisdom and philosophy as theology. ^ Macmurray* s understanding 
of philosophy revolves around two pivots: firstly that philosophy
is "the logical analysis of ideas and their systematic inters 
relation and coherence" which is termed the "essence of philosophy"^; 
secondly that philosophy is "reflection upon experience".^ Macmurray 
in an early work defined philosophy as "the attempt to understand
7the meaning of human experience in the world."' Philosophy assumes 
that one makes an effort to understand. These two underlying 
propositions combine to form Macmurray* s definition of philosophy, 
"Philosophy, then, is the attempt to express the infinite in imme­
diate experience through reflection. It would be equally correct 
to say that it is the attempt to express reality. For reality is 
essentially the concrete wholeness which characterises immediate 
experience. Macmurray broadened his definition of philosophy by 
maintaining that: "It is reflection in search of an understanding
of the wholeness of immediate experience, not of partial and isolated 
gaspects of it,” Philosophy is a logical schema of thought for
4. Thomason, William Paul, "The Bnpirical Basis for Religion inMacmurray*s Philosophy" (Unpublished Doctoral Thesis :The Southern Baptist Theological Seminary, 1972) p.17
5. Macmurray, John, "The Inaugural Address: Concerning the Historyof Philosophy" PAS Supp. Vol. XXV Freedom, Language and Reality (l95l) p,12 hereafter cited as CHP,
6. lU p.ll
7. FMW p.106 ^
8. lU pp. 33-54
9. lU p. 34
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Macimirray that is both "concrete and comprehensive,"
A very important aspect of Macmurray*s understand of philosophy
is his identification of philosophy with theology, One might even
go so far as to hold that Macmurray *s philosophy can be considered
12to be the development of a theological position. Philosophy is
for Macmurray the intellectual reflective mode of the "religious
life" in opposition to mysticism as the emotional reflective mode
of the "religious life",^^ Macmurray stated simply that: "Philosophy
is theology", Macmurray criticised post-Renaissance philosophy for
15differentiating itself from theology. In order for philosophy to 
be theology in the proper manner, philosophy must work towards 
greater *community-friendship* in a properly empirical way, i,e, 
it must work for the Christian goal of love.^^ Therefore, philosophy- 
if correctly understood must be seen in terms of theology which in 
turn is dependent upon the concept of community, which illustrates 
the central position that the concept of community plays in the 
work of Macmurray,
A basic characteristic of Macmurray*s style, when referring to 
philosophical influences, is one of making reference to trends and 
concepts as opposed to individual thinkers. An excellent example
10, Macmurray, John, "The Unity of Modern Problems" Journal ofPhilosophical Studies IV:14 (April, 1929) p.l62
11, Nephew, Albert Henry II "Philosophy'is Theology: The Natureand Function of Philosophy According to John Macmurray" (Unpublished Doctoral Thesis: Marquette University,
1970) p.13 t
12, White, L,J, "John Macmurray: Theology as Philosophy" ScottishJournal of Theology (Nbv, 1975) No, 26 p.449
13, Macmurray, John "What is Philosophy" PAS Suppl, Vol. XIPhenomenology Goodness and Beauty (1932) p . 63 cited hereafter as WP., .
14, WP p. 63
13. WP p. 66
16. Nephew,op. cit, p.162
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of this type of thinking, which is found throughout Macmurray*s 
work, is his understanding of modem philosophy, Macmurray con­
ceived of modem philosophy as having been distinguished by two 
distinct phases before entering into a third phase. The first
distinct phase of modern philosophy according to Macmurray runs
17 18from Descartes to Hume, which was the stage of formal rationalism,
19The second stage runs from Rousseau through the German idealists
20with Kant standing somewhere ambiguously in between the two phases.
The primary concept in the second phase of modem philosophy was
21organism as opposed to the "substance" of the first phase. The
emerging third phase is seen as a reaction against the inadequacies
22of the organic analogy of the second phase. This type of treatment 
of modern philosophy is to be found throughout Macmurray* s work and
25it also acts as a basis for his epistemology in The Self as Agent,
The underlying assumption upon which this analysis was based was that 
there are three fundamental groupings of science, i,e, physical, 
biological, and psychological,
Macmurray*s work owes something to a great many different groups 
which includes the Christians, Marxists, existentialists, psycholo­
gists and anthropologists,^^ However, he was not a follower of any
17. Kirkpatrick,op, cit.,p.19
18, Thomason,op. cit,,p,53
19, Kirkpatrick,op, cit,,p, 19
20, SAp,52
21, Thomason, op, cit.,p,35
22. Ibid p,37
23. Ibid p,51
24. Conford, op. cit,,p.20
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particular thinker or group of thinkers, but produced a system
of his own. However, there are two thinkers that stand head
and shoulders above the other thinkers that appear in Macmurray *s
work. These t\-/o thinkers are Kant and Marx.
Without doubt the thought of Immanuel Kant is seminal to
the thought of John Macmurray, The new philosophical form which
Macmurray wished to introduce, i,e, "the form of the personal"
is introduced through an analysis of Kant*s understanding of
the relation between the theoretical and the practical aspects 
25of the self, Macmurray held that the Critical philosophy of 
Immanuel Kant was the 'host adequate of modern philosophies,.."^^ 
which Macmurray treated as the best representative of modern 
philosophy. Macmurray constantly used Kant*s thought as a spring­
board from which he leaped into unexplored and untraditional 
territory, Macmurray regarded Kant as one of the great philoso­
phers and Macmurray stated that Kant was "the greatest of our
27European moralistst*, Macmurray utilised Kant*s thinking as a
starting point when analysing the problems that are generated by
modem philosophy. An example of Macmurray* s involvement with
Kantian thinking is his acceptance that Kant produced a Copemi- 
28can revolution in philosophy by proposing the reversal of the 
relation of subject and object which makes the object dependent 
on the subject, i.e. knowledge depends on the categories of the 
mind of the knower, Macmurray proposed not a reversal of 
subject and object, but of subject and agbnt, i.e. of knower and 
doer. Macmurray takes the self primarily as a doer of actions and
23. Kirkpatrick,op. cit., p. 120




only secondarily as a knower, which changes one from an egocentric
29orientation to a heterocentric orientation.
Kant was for Macmurray an important pioneer, who represented 
the apex between the mechanistic and organic types of philosophy, 
which make up the two basic modes of apperception that Macmurray 
wished to supplant in favour of the personal mode of apperception, 
i.e. the interpersonal or relational conception of the world,
Macmurray.analysed Kant in terms of Kant’s response to the develop­
ment of Romanticism and the Faith philosophy— the philosophy of his 
contemporaries Hamann and Herder— which Kant believed to have 
dangerous implications.^"' Macmurray*s view is that Kant can be 
seen only clearly within the historical context of his admiration 
of Romanticism and his reaction against Faith philosophy, which is
opposed to the normal view that Kant was dealing with certain
52epistemological problems.^ Macmurray appreciated that Kant was 
one of the "band ofpioneers who created the Romantic movement in
55Germany."
Nevertheless, Macmurray did not unreservedly follow Kant, but 
he made use of Kant as a stepping off point or springboard, Macmurray 
criticised Kant’s system for not adequately doing justice to the 
religious aspect of human experience,Kant according to Macmurray,
29. Nephew,op, cit.,p.120




34. Bozzo, Edward George, "Toward a Renewed Fundamental Moral TheologyThe Implications of the Thought of John Macmurray for Christian Ethics" (Unpublished Doctoral Thesis:Catholic 
University of America, 1979)pp•73-74
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slighted religion and based religion upon moral experience.
Macmurray, however, reasoned that religious experience was the
basis of moral experience. Macmurray identified Kant’s failure
with his initial assumption of "I think" which automatically
debars the second pereon and makes the relation impossible.
God is the second person for each individual in the ’I-Thou*
equation. The religious experience according to Macmurray is
based upon the distinction between the first and second person.
The idea of God is the idea of the universal second person
pronoun, i.e. the "universal ’Thou* to which all particular
55persons stand in personal relation.
The second major criticism of Kant’s philosophical system
by Macmurray was that it is radically incoherent in its method
of relating theoretical or reflective activities to practical
56op pragmatic activities. Macmurray proposed to follow the 
Kant of practical reason. Kant is inconsistent according to 
Macmurray because of his failure to insist upon the primacy of 
practical reason.This choice to follow the Kant of practical 
reason is more radical than such a statement would at first seem 
to imply, for it means that Macmurray*s concern is not with the 
problems of dualist philosophy, but with the problem of dualistic 
philosophy itself, i.e. the separation of mind and matter. Macmurray * s 
interpretation of Kant is that Kant "concluded that reason is 
primarily practical;. not primarily, that is to say, the capacity
35. SA p.72
36. Bozzo,op. cit.,p.77$ SA p.63, 67-68} Kirkpatrick,op. cit.,p.29,40
37. Langford, Thomas, "The Natural Theology of John Macmurray"Canadian Journal of Theology. (1966) XII pp.9-10
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to think in terms of distinction between *trae* and * false* but 
to act in terms of a distinction between * right* and * wrong*.
Macmurray*s basic assumptions, that action is primary and 
that religious experience is a matter of the relations between 
I and thou, both come from his reaction to and dialogue with 
Kant. Thematically the *I-Thou* philosophy which lies at the very 
centre of Macmurray*s work, originates in the transcendental
XQphilosophy of Kant. Throughout Macmurray*s Gifford Lectures, 
which is the major philosophical work of Macmurray, one clearly 
hears echoes of the Kantian basis of Macmurray* s thinking, both 
in his agreement with Kant and his reaction to Kant*s thinking,
While Kant was to the forefront of Macmurray*s thought during 
his later years, Marx was to the forefront of Macmurray*s early 
work, Marx is the only other major individual philosophical 
influence that can be seen consistently affecting and influencing 
the thought of Macmurray, Not long after the First World War 
Macmurray was invited to a conference which lead him to undertake 
a thorough study of Marx*s early writings in an attempt to discover 
the relation between Marxism and the Christian tradition,
Macmurray agreed with the presupposition of the conference that the 
study of "communism was a necessary prelude to the understanding of 
Christianity,"^^ Macmurray was convinced by Marxism that: "idealism 
is a dangerous illusion which must be rejected.However,
?8, SA p.80 i
59* Boz250fOp, cit., p,78
40, Langford, op, cit., p,20; SA p,171? PR p.208
41, Conford, op. cit., p. 16
42, 8RR p. 25
45. SRRp.26
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Macmuxray was "not convinced that religion is necessarily a form
of idealism. This led Macmurray to conclude that the basic
error of Marxism was the identification of idealism and religion.
"Marx would have been justified in calling for the reform of
4.5religion but not for its rejection." Nevertheless, ihe influence 
of the early works of Marx was a considerable influence on the 
philosophy of Macmurray in particular in his analysis of the rela­
tion between;theory and practice.
The theories of Marx struck a responsive chord in Macmurray 
and throughout the i950*s Macmurray wrote many books and articles^^ 
in which he praised some of the doctrines of Marx, which he thought 
to be of value, while criticising and revising other doctrines.
One of Macmurray*s main preoccupations during the 1950*s was 
a synthesis of Marxism and Christianity; a preoccupation that is 
to be found in the work of other thinkers, during the same period; 
an example is Reinhold Niebuhr. However, it must be snphasised 
that Macmurray did not * convert* to Marxism and slavishly follow the 
* party line*. Macmurray never identified himself as a Marxist, but
he enthusiastically held some of the more important doctrines to be
49true, and called for a Marxist approach to economic problems. 
However, during Macmurray* s later work there is a marked decline in 




47. CS and PC
48. Nephew, op. cit., p.48 
.49. Ibid, p. 49
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apparent that Macmurray saw the synthesis of Marxism and Christianity
to he an early objective and saw Marxism and Christianity as being
interwoven. Macmurray held that: "within the religion of Jesus
there is to be found the original, though forgotten source of the
main principle of communism.
Macmurray held that Marx saw personal reality as "essentially
social, that it is the reality of personal relationships in sociei^,
and further, that what determines the relation to persons in society
51is the economic reality which they face. " Macmurray agreed with
this assumption and went on to point out that the fall of
Sabbatarianism in Scotland has shown how the economic situation is
'jx the final court of appeal in determining man*s freedom from
52restrictive ideas. Macmurray agreed with the Socialist assertion
55of faith in "freedom and equality". Macmurray held that: "The
way to freedom lies through the control of economic necessity by
54-the development of man's power over nature." Throughout Macmurray*s
work the concept of freedom was one of the major themes and goals.
In his review of Marxist principles Macmurray underlined the
Marxist assumption that: "as a matter of fact theory and practice
55are inseparably bound up, " Macmurray asserted that there is a 
unity between theory and practice, which is a conception that 
permeates his work. Another point of importance for Macmurray was 
the Marxist understanding of society as "not merely the relation of
50. CS p.90 t
51. PC p.50
52. PC pp.50-31
55. Coates, J.B., Ten Modern Prophets (London: Fredrick Itoler, Ltd., 5944), p.188
54. PC p.30
55. PC p .36
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56persons", but as a "process of change". Thus early in Macmurray*s
writings one finds "bfo of his basic assumptions which originated
from his study of Marx, i.e. the unity of action and thought as
well as the view of society as a relational process that is
struggling towards a goal, which for the Marxist is the struggle
57for the control of the means of production. '
Macmurray was certainly influenced by Marx. Coates in his
summary of Macmurray* s thought attributes to Macmurray certain
Marxist attributes one of which is the use of the dialectical method
of thinking. Coates opined that the main attraction of Marx for
58Macmurray was Marx*s attempt to unify thought and action."^  Thomason
on the other’ hand holds that the significance of Marx for Macmurray
was to be found in his recognition of the fact that every philosophy
owed its characteristics to the social conditions from which it 
59arose. This in turn meant that any claim for universality by 
philosophy is feilse.^ ^
This is not to say that Macmurray is in total agreement with 
Marx. There are a number of serious criticisms that are levelled 
at Marx by Macmurray. Macmurray* s criticisms revolved around Marx 
truncated conception of relij^on, which included the opinion that
56. PC p.45
57. PC p.55
58. Coates, op. cit.,p.111
59. Thomason p.22, also Macmurray, John/"Dialectical Materialismas a Philosophy" Aspects of Dialectical Materialism ed.H Levy (London; Watts & Co., 1934), PP 32-55 a-lso FMWpp 68-70
60. Thomason, op. cit.,p.25
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Christianity in its blind devotion to ideals become illusory.
The main criticism of Macmurray is that Marx did not research into 
the social nature of religion and consequently he made the false
62assumption that religion is necessarily idealistic. Macmurray
rejected out of hand the Marxist assumption that religion is in
essence idealistic. Speaking of the religion which is to be
found in the Old Testament Macmurray pointed out that: "For that
religion at least is not idealistic in Marx’s sense, but materialist.
It shows no interest in any other world, but is entirely concerned
with the right way to maintain human community in this world.
The second major criticism of the Marxist approach by Macmurray
is that it overlooks the eternal factor and concentrates upon the
temporal factor. The factor that Marx’s theory overlooks is the
conditioning of progress in the "temporal process by the external ,
factor which religion recognises The Marxist only finds the
significance of life in the process of social development. This
social development for the Marxist is completely dominated by the
economic factor. Bawever, ttiis is only the temporal aspect of human
relationships according to Macmurray. Another aspect of human
relationships is what Macmurray called the eternal aspect of society,
which is the personal communion between persons, i.e. the communal
or interpersonal as opposed to the economic aspect of human social 
65development.
61, Lam, Elizabeth P., "Does Macmurray Binderstand Marx?"The Journal of Religion, XX, N0.I (1940), p.52
62. Conford, op. cit., p.18 
65. PR pp.153-154
64. CS p . 155
65. Coates, op. cit., pp.111-112
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Macmurray* s reaction to Marx varies in his wrks, hut in his 
early works Macmurray considered Marx to he the true heir of the 
Christian tradition. However, Macmurray* s attempted synthesis 
of Marxism and Christianity is suspect since Macmurray did not deal 
to any great extent with fundamental Marxist ideas. Such funda­
mental and essential Marxist ideas as the antagonistic and compulsive 
elenents of the social structure; the interpretation of history in 
teims of class conflict; and the necessity of overthrowing the 
capitalistic system to establish a society free of class conflict
and economic exploitation by the proletariat are not to be found
67in Macmurray* s synthesis of Christianity and Marxism. In fact 
some of these ideas are at odds with Macmurray* s understanding of 
society and community. However,’ the assumption that philosophical 
and theological problems can be understood better within a 
sociological context must lead back to the encounter that Macmurray 
had with Marx.
Macmurray*s treatment of Marx was a mere lifting out of Marx’s 
total system "his objectives and his opposition to theism",which 
were treated as the entire basis of the problem betv/een Christianity 
and Marxism. Macmurray in fact is in direct conflict with certain 
of Marx’s fundamental assumptions. Macmurray’s consistent emphasis 
upon the degree of co-operation within community which actually 
exists in social relationships is in direct disagreement with Marx’s
69stress upon the antagonistic elements in society.
66. Lam, op. cit., p.51
67. Ibid pp.51-52
68. Ibid p . 65
69. Ibid p . 64
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The essential disagreement and incompatibility of Marx’s 
thought and Macmurray*s thought is clearly shoivn when one realises 
that Marx looked for a sudden change in society, while Macmurray 
was writing in the hope of a gradual change, Marxism certainly 
had some affect upon Macmurray’s fundamental understanding of 
philosophy, but he did not really borrow anything of lasting 
value from . . Marx beyond his interest in the unity of theory 
and practice and the social aspects of philosophy and knowledge. 
Although Macmurray was influenced by the thought of several 
philosophers, he cannot be placed in any particular school of
philosophy, Macmurray has connections with such diverse schools
70 71 72of thought as empiricism, existentialism and pragmatism, and
he found areas of agreement within each of these opposing modes
of philosophy, Macmurray agreed with and applauded the strong
stand of logical empiricism and existentialism against the main
stream of traditional philosophy. Macmurray opined that: "These
two contemporary forms of philosophy, logical empiricism and
existentialism, represent, it would seen, opposite reactions
75to the breakdown of the tradition," Both of these contemporary 
forms of philosophy are united in their extreme differences in
that they both rest upon "the decision that the traditional method
of philosophy is incapable of solving its traditional problems,
70# Thomason, op. cit., p.79
71. Jung, Hwa Yol, "The Logic of the Personal; John I%cmurrayand the Ancient Hebrew View of Life" Personalist. XLVII, p.544
72. Thomason, op. cit.,p.79
75. SA p. 27
74* SA p. 27
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Macmurray summarisecL the two positions when he noted that: "the
logical empiricists discard the problem in order to maintain the
meidiod, the existentialists relinquish the method in wrestling 
75with the problem* " Macmurray summarised his estimate of the 
two emerging philosophical schools by stating that: "Existentialism 
has discovered, with sensitiveness of feeling, that the philosophical 
problem of the present lies in a crisis of the personal: logical
empiricism recognises it as a crisis of logical form and method.
76Both are correct, and both are one-sided," Macmurray considered
the crisis to be a personal one, but the problem it presents to
philosophy is a formal one. (Therefore, the problem for Macmurray
is a combination of the logical and personal. The problem "is to
77discover or to construct the intellectual form of the personal".
One can easily see that to place Macmurray into any one cate­
gory of philosophy would be hopeless, but it is helpful to point 
out and summarise Macmurray* s connection with certain schools of 
thought. It is beyond doubt that Macmurray does exhibit certain 
links with empiricism as well as existentialism. Macmurray*s link 
with empiricism is clearly seen in his treatment of experience.
Macmurray assumed like the classical empiricist Locke that exper-
78ience both direct and indirect was the source of all knowledge.
The mind, needs something to work upon and that thing worked upon
79is the given of experience. All knowledge is derived from the
/ '
75. SA p. 27
76. SA p. 29
77. SA p.29
78. Thomason, op. cit., pp.89-90? BEE p.15
79. Thomason, op. cit., p.90
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80"ordinary data of universal human experience". Some have argued
that Macmurray should he interpreted in terms of the empirical
philosophical outlook, Macmurray has two important connections
with empiricism in that he held that experience is the ultimate
source of knowledge and that sensation is an important element 
81in experience. It has been also argued that Macmurray*s
epistemology of agency, which is his reference of knowing and all
its functions to action which itself is practical experience, is
82an cnpirical epistenology. However, such a view is limited since 
Macmurray realised that such unalloyed empiricism leads to scepti­
cism, which led Macmurray to renounce the limitations of sensation, 
However, there are certainly reductionist tendencies in the work of 
Macmurray which can be directly traced to the anpirical side of his 
thinking. It is beyond doubt that Macmurray eschewed the scepticism 
of empiricism and its adherence to sensation, Macmurray*s analysis 
of action and human activities provided for him a way of speaking 
meaningfully about religion and ethics,
It is of great significance that Macmurray gave his most 
explicit expression of his empirical assumptions in The Structure 
of Religious Experience, which is a work that is concerned with the 
nature of religious experience,The reductionist and empiricist 
side of Macmurray* s thinking comes out most clearly when Macmurray 
is dealing with religion, Macmurray in" his search for a scientifi­
cally acceptable view of religion defines religion in terms of the
80. SEA p.15
81. Thomason, op. cit., p.156
82. Ibid, p.157 
85, Ibid, p . 158
84. Ibid,
85. Ibid, p . 91
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connnunity and friendship, which provides a concrete set of
experiences that can he defined as religions. Friendship, i.e.
the *I-!Thou* relationship, and community become the empirical
basis of religion.
Macmurray certainly approved of logical empiricism*s shift
from sensation to action. Macmurray applauded logical empiricism*s
shifting of the focus of logical analysis, "from thought to language"
which avoided the false dualism of mind and body introduced by
Descartes "I Think" by substituting "I say" for "I Thi n k " . T h e
logical structure of importance for philosophy becomes language,
which introduces the concept of You and I, not just the I of "I
Think", Thus for Macmurray "the problem of the form of the personal
88emerges as the problem of the form of communication." On the 
other hand, Macmurray approves of existentialism since it is con­
cerned with the problems of personal experience in its personal
character, which also exhibits the emergence of a religious solution
89to certain philosophical problems.
Macmurray certainly agreed with certain logical empiricist 
assumptions, but he also exhibited existential leanings. Macmurray 
compared his own story with that of Kierkegaard the father of 
existentialism in his autobiographical work The Search for Reality 
in Religion, which is itself reminiscent of Kierkegaard *s o m  works. 
Others have argued that Macmurray*s "exegesis of the personal based 
on primacy of action is an expression of the distaste for *a specu­
lative conundrum* which has been too common in philosophising",





which is "not unlike Soren Kierkegaard",^^
Macmurray certainly approved of Kierkegaard’s, as well as
Comte’s rejection, of the organic approach to philosophy,
Macmurray noted with approval Kierkegaard’s scepticism about the
organic analogy of the self.^^ Like Kierkegaard before him,
Macmurray v/rote a great deal about the problems of religion,
Ho-vvever, Macmurray was neither an existentialist nor an empiricist.
Macmurray was influenced by many other thinkers. Some such as
Buber have had an early and an on-going and deep influence upon 
95Macmurray. Buber’s concept of ’the dialogical’ is in close
harmony with Macmurray’s concept of the "personal"'. Both thinkers
saw the essence of human beings in the ’I-Thou’ relation since for
94.both there is no reality without sharing,The Kantian background 
of Macmurray’ 8 thought fits closely with the ’I-Thou’ philosophy 
of Buber with its roots in the transcedental philosophy of Kant,^^ 
Another philosopher whose thought affected that of Macmurray 
is that of Feuerbach, which dates from Macmurray*s encounter with
96Marx. Macmurray was also influenced to a lesser degree by such
97 98thinkers as Bergson, Durkheim, and as some argue the pragmatism
99 100of Fierce, Dewey, and James,
90. Jung, op. cit. , p.544
91. Conford, op. cit., p.78
92. SA p.82
93. SRR p . 24
94. Jung, op. cit., pp. 537-558
95. Bozzo, op. cit., p.78
96. PC
97. Coates, op. cit., p.101
98. "White, op. cit., p,452
99* Thomason, op. cit., p. 157 
100- Langford, on- cit.. n.10
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Macmurray*s ovm thought owes something to Kant, Marx,
Existentialism, Empiricism, Personalism and several other schools
of thought. Nevertheless, it is impossible for Macmurray to be
accurately placed within any one group of thinkers or even within
several groups of thinkers. John Macquarrie wrote that Macmurray
101"stands apart from the main stream of British philosophy ..." 
Moreover, one might go so far as to say that Macmurray stands 
apart from the main stream of philosophy, but with roots going 
back to several major schools of thought.
101. Macquarrie, John. Twentieth Century Religious Thought 
(London : SCM"^ rës¥^ [Itd77'~ï'965)'”p ' ^
PART II
General Review of Macmurray * s- Approach with Special Reference to His Concept of Religion .
CHAPTER 5 
Religion, Art and Science
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The basic goal of this introduction to Macmurray * s work will 
be to review the general approach and assumptions that Macmurray 
utilises. The secondary goal will be to investigate Macmurray*s 
understanding of religion, which is central to Macmurray*s thinking. 
Macmurray understood the term ’religion* as a dimension of human 
nature or experience that can be compared to two other areas of 
human experience. The three areas of experience, which are also 
called areas of cognition, reflection or activity, are the cate­
gories of science, art and religion. These three modes of apper­
ception appear throughout Macmurray’s work in many forms, and are 
represented in philosophy by the organic, mechanical and personal 
approaches to’ the problems of philosopi^ r, Macmurray began several 
of his works^ by analysing the structure of human experience, and
in doing so Macmurray distinguished between the three types of
2attitude which are different modes of activity add reflection .
Macmurray considered all three categories to be interwoven and
interdependent, but placed religion at the very centre. "Religion,
in the sense in which it deserves consideration, is one of the three
general expressions of rationality. The other two are art and 
5science." The central position of religion is underlined when 
speaking of all three general expressions of rationality. Macmurray 
asserted that: "of the three religion is the basic expression and 
the most comprehensive. The others are*more abstract and in a special 
sense included within religion.
t
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In the early work (Oie Structure of Religious Experience 
Macmurray pointed out that there are three attitudes that are 
empirical in character. These are artistic empiricism, scientific 
empiricism and religious empiricism; the first two of which are 
"partial empiricisms",^ since both of these areas presuppose but 
cannot deal with the group of facts which concern the mutual relation­
ship which is at the centre of the religious field. ^ Macmurray
asseverated that: "religious empiricism provides the synthesis of
7■üie opposite and partial attitudes of art and science..."
Macmurray saw the synthesis of religion not to be only central but
necessary. Religion is necessary since the two partial empirical
modes art and science are in opposition which causes not only
confusion but polarisation. "Cut loose from their unity in religion
the two partial empiricisne (art and science) oppose one another and
produce an antagonism in the field of social activity which is des-
0tractive of order, freedom and progress." This theme of opposition
and synthesis reappears in one of Macmurray* s last works Persons in
Relation, which underlines the continuing and central interpretation
of religion in terms of the opposition of art and science and the
synthetic character of religion. "Religion, we might say, intends
the synthesis of art and science; art and science each intend them-







Another significant insight has to do with the common ground 
of the three modes of reflection or attitudes. Macmurray realised 
that the whole field of experience encompasses the total accumula­
tion of data within which science, art and religion have their 
beginnings. Each of these fields deals with the common set of 
experience differently because of a difference in attitude as well 
as a difference in direction. Vhen seen in terms of attitude "the 
religious man comes to worship, the artist to admire, the scientist
to observe".Macmurray declared that: "They all come to the same
11world of common fact. " This fact underlines not only the common
aspects of all experiences, but the single centre of these fields
of reflection. "The same person may be at once religious, artistic,
and scientific. The three attitudes of mind which we have distin-
12guished can alternate in one and the same mind. " However, there are
within the general area of experience three separate attitudes
each of which concentrates upon a certain group of facts. Macmurray
pragmatically acknowledged that: "we find in practice there are
three fields which overlap to a considerable extent but which have
distinct centres. It is as if the same field of general experience
became organised in three different ways around three different
13centres of interest."
For Macmurray the three general fields or modes of thinking are 
intimately connected. They share the common ground of experience as 
well as the same mind. However, these are three distinct areas that
10. SRE p. 21
11. SRE p. 22
12. SRE pp. 22-23
13. RAS p. 7
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centre upon three different loci* These three attitudes do interact 
and support each other, hut the mode of religious reflection or 
attitude is the central synthesising mode.
In order to more fully understand what is meant by the three 
modes of reflection it will be necessary to investigate all three 
modes separately. However, the purpose and centre of such an 
investigation;, is, as Macmurray pointed out, a comprehensive under­
standing of religion and its connection with other ways of thinking.
"The treatment of art and science will, of course, be designed to 
throw light upon the character of religion. Macmurray distin­
guished between the two separate modes or attitudes apart from the 
one that he labelled the religious mode- Macmurray characterised 
these two modes of reflection in many different ways. The most 
common labels applied to the scientific attitude are practical, 
pragmatic or mechanical. The second mode is commonly labelled as 
contemplative, organic, or aesthetic. Macmurray did not stress 
any particular name, since he pointed out that they are simply terms 
"to call attention to the fact that they are the two attitudes which 
define the field of science and the field of art respectively by the
15different valuation which they impose upon experience to organise it. "
One of "the basic reasons for Macmurray* s investigation of the
fields of art and science is because of the ever present possibility
of religion being confused with them. Macmurray wished to investigate16what he termed the "geography of human life" by which he meant looking 
at the primary reflective activities \4iich are art and science as well 
as religion.
14. SHE p. 29
15. SHE p.30
16. BAS p . 8
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The religious mode is the primary mode and the modes of art
and science are derived from the primary mode of reflection by
the limitation of attention. All of these modes of reflection
17are taken from the one area of practical expression. However,
there are several things that art and science have in common with
religion even though they are limited in terms of orientation as
well as method. Religion intends the synthesis of art and science
whereas art and science each intend only themselves and exclude 
18one another. Macmurray recognised that there was polarisation 
between the two non-religious modes and he concluded that: "art 
intends the determination of the possible, not of the actual... 
Science intends the determination of the actual, not the possible. 
Macmurray underlined the polarisation of art and science in their
intention, which "is in Science intellectual, and therefore factual;
20in art it is emotional and evaluative."
However, art and science have things in common, for example,
both are objective in their reflection, but art is valuational in
its objectivity, whereas science is descriptive in its objectivity.
Since both art and science draw from the same overall pool of data,
which is the whole of experience in the world, they are both, not
unexpectedly, somewhat similar in their approach to this data.
Macmurray stated that;
Both demand an intense and impersonal concentration upon the world. Both have their interest fixed upon the other, not the self. Both extend our knowledge of the world, though in different fashion, and of the two kinds of knowledge it ië that yielded by the insight of the artist that is more important.
17. SA ÿ.188
18. PR p. 176
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There was quite evidently in Macmurray* 8 mind a good deal
of overlap in these two opposing fields of reflection. Therefore,
Macmurray recognised the opposing intentions of science and art;
while also realising the mutual factors in both fields. Macmurray
commented that: 'both art and science are, as a matter of fact
22personal activities", and that "artist and scientist alike are
doing something and the unity of the personal informs the doing.
Macmurray recognised the antagonistic elements that exist
between science and art as well as the mutual elements. When
Macmurray compared these two attitudes, he came to the conclusion
that of the two abstract forms of rationality, "the aesthetic is
primary, the scientific is secondary and subordinate. When
science refers to action it refers only to means; art, on the other
hand, refers to the end of action which includes the means to the 
25end. Another means of comparison is the way in which art and 
science approach an object. Artistic consciousness of an object 
which Macmurray termed "knowledge proper" is distinct frcai the under­
standing of or information about the object, which is all that science 
can offer us. Macmurray*s conclusion is that: "The artistic attitude 
alone enables us to come into contact with the reality of things, to 
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For science things exist only in terms of something else."^^ In
general Macmurray differentiated "between the two solitary modes
of reflection by arguing that: "the value of science is utility-
28value, lÆile the value of art is intrinsic."
The Scientific Mode of Apperception
The first mode of reflection that will be investigated is the
scientific or pragmatic mode of reflection. Macmurray assumed that
29the scientific mode of reflection is the most complete. In fact,
this makes the investigation of science the simplest of the three
investigations. Macmurray posited that:
once science is established in the psychological field, it is in principle ccmplete. There is no further field to which it could be extended. The groupings of the sciences into physical, biological and psychological covers the whole field of phenomena.The philosopher therefore, is at last presented with a science idiich is in principle complete, for his examination and evaluation. 30
Scientific reflection is also termed intellectual reflection.
Macmurray saw intellectual or scientific reflection as having a
31universalising function, and to be the determination of the *world- 
as-means*. "It expresses itself, therefore, in a generalised repre­
sentation of ihe world as matter of fact; in the production of formulae 
which express the recurrent patterns of continuance in experience.
When this is carried out in a systematic way for its own sake, this is 
what Macmurray terms science. In terms of action it provides "an
27. HE p.155
28. EE p. 155
29. Mooney, Philip. "The Notion of Religion in John Macmurray"(unpublished Doctoral Thesis; Fordham University, 
1972) pp.27-28




improvement in our technical knowledge, in particular hy the 
great extension of anticipation which it makes p o s s i b l e , T h e  
on-going task of science by'ineans of systematic intellectual .reflect­
ion and its expression in-generalized information"'is to discover 
what "we may count on, with greater or less probability,.#, as the 
support for our actions or as the means to the realisation of our 
intention.
Two basic themes in Macmurray* s discussion of science or the 
intellectual mode of reflection is the utility value of science and 
the generalising tendency of the intellectual mode. Both of these 
themes appear early in the work of Macmurray. Macmurray in The 
Structure of Religious Experience declared that; "The scientific 
attitude of approaching all data of experience with the feeling 
that things are for use, sees the world as consisting of different 
stuffs that can be used for different p u r p o s e s T h e  other 
recurrent theme is tiats "What is noticeable in the progression of 
this scientific picture is that it moves always away from individ­
uality towards an undistinguishable commonness. The artistic 
attitude, in reflection, moves in the opposite direction towards 
individuality and uniqueness. Macmurray not only underlined the
generalising tendency of science but he also indicated that: "The
37effect of science is to emphasise and accelerate change."
33. SAp.198
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The idea of science as change is again evident in another 
form; the continuous change that science brings about comes under 
closer scrutiny since there is obvious danger in the intentions 
behind the change. "Science provides that kind of knowledge which 
can form the basis for technology: that is to say, for the provision 
of techniques for the achievement of intentions. The major 
objection that Macmurray raised is that: "science increases the range '
of our power. But it is indifferent as regards the objectives of
39action.Science presupposes intentions, but does not evaluate 
them. Therefore, as a dimension of action "scientific knowledge 
is the negative aspect of technology, that is to say, of actions 
regarded as m e a n s . T h e  function of science^  for the community 
is its technological aspect, but it fails to provide guidance about 
the way in vhich ihe techniques should be utilised as well as a clear 
undea^tanding of the outcome of the utilisation of these techniques. 
Science provides the means without providing the technique for under­
standing the ends. Science is in some ways incomplete; in fact 
incomplete in a dangerous way.
The tendency of science to generalise is a strong and continuous 
theme in Macmurray* s work. Macmurray defined science as the "knowledge 
of the other as means", and also pointed out that: "This knowledge 
it represents as a universal system of laws of Nature, which forms 
the theoretical basis for all possible techniques.
38. PR p.182 f
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An interesting and exhaustive study of science as a mode of 
reflection is to be found in Religion. Art and Science in which 
Macmurray amplified the characteristics and limitations of science. 
The first of these is the limitation that science imposes on 
itself in the form of concerning itself only "with matter of 
fact".^^ This is limiting since this presupposes the exclusion 
of the determination of value. The seconilimit of science that 
Macmurray mentioned is "the search for valid generalisation", 
which "is of the essence of scientific enquiry".This means 
that the scientist is not interested in particular things, or 
particular events. The scientist is in search of constants, i.e. 
patterns of things which repeat themselves without change indef­
initely. Macmurray argued that: "The concentration of science 
on what is general or, at the limit, universal, is itself an 
exclusion, as any concentration of interest must be. For 
Macmurray science is limited to the general and constant which 
means that it does not try to provide knowledge of the particular 
since it ignores the individual as an individual.
For Macmurray science is ah activity, since all reflection is
connected with action. He expresses his belief that: "scientific
knowledge is instrumental knowledge; it is the kind of knowledge
45which provides the basis of technological advance." Science is 
a practical activity that looks to the world outside ourselves to 
the material that nature provides for the solution of technical 
problems, which means that people and things are considered to be 
instruments for our purpose. One concentrates upon the means of
42. RAS p.11
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achieving the ends, while ihe ends themselves axe fixed;which
is a return from a different perspective to the problem of the
failure of science to concentrate upon ends as well as means.
In Macmurray*s discussion of the scientific attitude, he
noted that the common term used to express this attitude is
"objectivity". The first component of the scientific attitude
is an "interest in the external world for its own sake".^^ An
older way of expressing this was as the "disinterested desire for
truth".Macmurray felt that there is a need to clearly denote
this human capacity which is labelled "objectivity", when it is
referred to in philosophical terms. Macmurray preferred "to refer
49to it as our capacity for self-transcendence". In terms of the
general idea of the limitation of science this component of the
scientific attitude is also an indicator of limitation. "Thus on
the subject side as well as the object side, science deaands a
limitation to the universal aspect of experience, and the exclusion 
50of individuality. " Consequently, the scientific attitude is ex­
clusively intellectual with the exclusion of emotion, which means 
that science, although motivated by certain emotional considerations, 
is a direct result of this emotional factor, but it "makes no
difference to the result, since it remains the same whatever the 
51result may be". This means also an exclusion of the consideration
52of the ends, since without "emotional factors there can be no valuation",
46. RAS p.15 /
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Hence science in Macmurray*s mind is interested only in events, 
i.e. the things that are understood through their cause, and not 
in actions which are understood through their intentions.
Macmurray* 3 basic objection to the scientific attitude is
53the fact that "scientific knowledge is instrumental knowledge".
This means that to the scientist the world is a means to an end.
This provided the main argument for Macmurray* s objection to
total dependence upon the scientific attitude. Since technology
is a means of achieving some end then the "end is the sake for
54which the action is done". Therefore, the end dictates the
instruments and techniques that will be used, which signifies
that there is an inversion of the ends and means, i.e. means have
become end. This is of course a serious issue which raises the
possibility that power may become an end in itself; this comes
about since it is possible to amass means such as money without
deciding in advance the particular end to which it will be applied.
There is also the fact that the desire for security provides a
strong motive for the collection of generalised power. Macmurray
believed that within any scientifically dominated society "one
could expect to find that power is the effective end of social 
55action". There are two reasons for this. The first is to do
with the continuous increase in the technical capacity which science
creates. There is the exploitation of power simply because "it is
56possible, not because one has a good reason for doing it". The
_________________________ t
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second reason stems from the type of mentality which the admiration
of science enconreiges. The technical mind dominates, which means
that there is a spread of an ’’attitude to life which sees it as a
series of problems to be solved, and for which all problems are
technological, and what is needed for their solution is a ’scientific*
57approach untrammelled by traditional taboos". ’ This is a concentrar- 
tion of interest upon instrumental values which means a growing unaware­
ness of and insensitiveness to intrinsic values. For Macmurray the 
main problem is that we begin to treat human beings "as means to our 
ends or as obstacles to our purposes
The practical, intellectual or scientific attitude for Macmurray 
is the world of the matter of fact, the world of the material with 
objects seen as means, i.e. instruments. Generalisation not in­
dividualisation is the reflective aim of the intellectual mode, with 
the utilily aspect as the most important. The utility aspect of an 
object, be it human, animate, or inanimate, is the only feature to 
be considered. Macmurray found science the most limited reflective 
activity as well as the most dangerous, because of the narrowness of 
the view afforded to the scientist.
The Artistic Mode of Apperception
The second attitude to be considered is the artistic, aesthetic 
or contemplative mode of apperception. Macmurray in evaluating the
scientific attitude had concluded that for science there is only the
59utility value of the object. However, this type of assessment is
I
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not the only type of assessment that is possible. Another 
approach is the attempt to "fill my mind ^th the object; to 
remember or to realise more fully the unique qualities which 
make me single it out as valuable in itself".The value that 
the object has is intrinsic and consequently the attitude toward 
the object is contemplative or emotional as opposed to intellec­
tual.
The contemplative mode of apperception is an extension, i.e.
a fuller experience, since it unifies the experience of valuation
with the apprehension of the matter of fact, keeping in mind that
the experience of valuing something is a fuller experience than
61just the apprehension of the object. Macmurray noted that our 
sense-perceptions are accompanied by our feelings and emotions, which 
indicates the falsity of separately dealing with reason and emotion; 
and the accompanying tendency to "separate them as incompatible 
opposites", which makes us talk as if "we could not think and feel 
at the same time From this comes certain incompatible aspects
of the scientific and artistic forms of reflection. However, one 
can perceive and have feelings about the same object at the same 
time. Emotional reflection, i.e. that vbxoh is at odds with inte­
llectual reflection is "about an object which is before the mind in 
its factual character, either in immediate perception or in memory, 
imagination or thought".The activity of contemplation, therefore, 
includes not only the activity of feeling, but also presupposes the 
factual apprehension of an object as a locus of those feelings.
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The artistic mode of reflection which Macmurray called the 
mode of emotional reflection is rooted in the act of contemplation 
just as the mode of intellectual reflection is grounded in gener­
alisation. The idea of contemplation is, therefore, central to any 
discussion of the artistic attitude or the field of emotional 
reflection. IVhat is central for contemplation is not what can he 
utilised, "but what can be most joyfully contemplated and admired". 
"Beauty is the name we give to that which makes anything good to 
contemplate in its concrete individuality. The artistic attitude, 
therefore, organises the data of experience in terms of beauty. 
Macmurray*s understanding of the emotional reflective activity 
revolves around his conception of beauty, and at a more basic level, 
his understanding of beauty centres upon two predominant points.
One is the actuality of contemplation with the significant modifying 
factor of individuality as the second point of interest.
The process of contemplation is made up of several elements.
The first element is to do with the act of sense-perception. This 
is quite different from -tiae apprehension of or the observational 
use of the senses by science, -vdiich tends towards generalisation, 
but art looks at an object in terms of its being as an individual 
not as a member of a class of objects. The second element of con­
templation is brought about by the fact that the artistic attitude 
is an emotional activity. This means thât the reflective activity 
can be labelled enotional or contemplative. "The statement of liking 
or disliking is an expression of immediate' emotional reaction to an 
object. The object acts, as it were, as a stimulus to my capacity
64. SEE p.28
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for feeling, and I react positively or negatively. This is
followed by the process of valuation which sees the transformation
of the statement "I like it" to "It is good". Macmurray viewed
this process as one in which "I get rid of the reference to my own
experience and transcend myself. Instead of characterising me, my
67judgement characterises the object!’. This means that once one 
is ready to enjoy the object and not to enjoy myself by means of 
the object then one is at the point of emotional self-transcendence.^ 
This means "the activity of enjoyment is contemplation"; a particu­
lar enjoyment that is beyond the self.
Two elements have been stressed and these are the perceptual 
examination and the emotional transcendence. However, there is a
third element in contemplation which is the "activity of constructive 
70imagination". This element of constructive imagination brings in the
other major factor of the artistic attitude which is individuality. For
example, "in the visual arts it is quite literally the construction of
71an image; and this image is the painting or sculpture". However, 
this image is not a reproduction of the matter of fact, which is en­
croaching upon the field of intellectual reflection, but it is an 
appraisal. To appraise the object the artist must isolate the object 
from its relation to other things, which means eliminating the merely 
general element and enhancing the individual!iy of the object. This 
individualisation is central to Macmurray*s understanding of the
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construotion of an adequate image. "Just as science generalises,
so art individualises its object, and through this individualising
presents it (the object) as a self-existing entity, complete in 
72itself." Macmurray defined what he meant by "object" when speaking
of an "object of contemplation" when he averred that: "I mean much
what John Locke meant by an idea-whatsoever is before man’s mind
when he thinks. It must, of course, be something which can be
75exhibited or symbolised in sensual t e r m s . A g a i n  an indication
of Macmurray*s empirical roots.
The contemplative attitude is essential to all artistic activity.
"The essential point, in which the contrast with the scientific
attitude is very clear, is that the subject is individual!sed
equally and reciprocally with the o b j e c t . T h e  artist "sees the
object in its individual uniqueness, and is himself individualised 
75in the process". ' The essential element in the contemplation is 
the individualisation both of the object and the artist.
There is a mature statement of the central issues of the 
artistic attitude in The Self as Agent, which evinces Macmurray* s 
awareness of the pitfalls that exist about the concept of contempla­
tion. "The hall-mark of the aesthetic standpoint is that it defines 
both the true and the good as that which satisfies the mind. The 
proper definition of beauty is î'a disinterested satisfaction",^7 
which is a re-statement of the concept of emotional self-transcendence.
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Macmurray elucidated this point further:
The ground of our judgement is a feeling of satisfaction which refers to the form of what is apprehended. But the pleasure we find in contemplating the beautiful is not the satisfaction of a particular need or interest of ours.It is a disinterested satisfaction. It appeals to us, not as particular individuals, but as cognitive beings. It satisfies the mind. 78
However, there is a warning that is given that applies to the concept
of mental satisfaction. Since there is a tendency to universalise
claims of validity, as opposed to being a matter of private taste,
which explains the tendency to treat the immediate inner conviction
of the beautiful as a guarantee of truth, there is the possibility
of error. "The fatal error is the assumption that truth is what
satisfies the mind."7^
The idea of art as a rational field and a particular type of
reason can be found throughout Macmurray* s work. In one of his
earliest works Interpreting the TTniverse he contended that: "Ration-
80ality is not a peculiar characteristic of the intellect." Macmurray
presented art as a rational attitude, as rational as science.
Macmurray not only considered art to'be rational, but he also identified
the constant aspect of artistic reason that is within art, and
labelled this "emotional reason". "The field in which emotional
reason expresses itself most directly is the field of art. The
artist is directly concerned to express his emotional experience 
81of the world." The concept of emotional reason is intimately 
connected with religion as well as with artistic reflection. Macmurray 
asserted when speaking of both art and religion that: "They are the
82expression of reason working in the emotional life in search of reality."
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But what is emotional reason and how does it appear in art? "The
reason working in our emotional life forces us to take our feelings
as an awareness of things outside us, as a consciousness of the
meaning and value of things other than ourselves. One heccmes
an artist based upon the emotional consciousness of the world.
Art is a way of expressing emotional rationality. Macmurray* s
discussion of emotional reason within art is reminiscent of his
concept of emotional self-transcendence 'vAich is one of the basic
elements of contemplation. A rather Kantian observation about art
as reason is that it is the expression of "our capacity as rational
beings to apprehend the values of things in themselves; not their
value to us but their own right as individuals in the world.
Art is the expression of our rational impulse to delight in the
individual objects that surround us in the world.
Art, however, has its weaknesses and limitations. The rational
and mature aim of a mature art would be to reach "nearer and nearer,
through co-operative efforts of many individuals, to a real emotional
85knowledge of the signficance of real things". Art is still immature 
as is religion and makes the mistake of not realising its limitations.^^ 
There are two immature features within art. The first being its still 
unobtained goal and the second its inability to recognise the limits 
of its territory of reflection.
Both art and science are in Macmurray*s view "objective" and 
"fragmentary". However, -the fragmentary nature of art is deeper than
__________________________________________t_________________________
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that of science, since not only are there many separate disciplines,
hut each artist is separate from the other because of the difference
in individual perception. The objectivity of art is valuational,
whereas the objectivity of science is descriptive.^7 "Each artist
is confined within the limits of his own acquaintance with the world,
88within his individual objectivity." There is a wide gap between
the differing products of art and science. Art produces knowledge
which is the individual’s grasp of reality, whereas science only
gives information about the object. The contemplation of the
individual object in its proper being is knowledge proper which
is the province of art.
The function of science is the manipulation of the material
world, so what is ihe function of art? Macmurray asseverated that
"the function of art ihen is the education and refinanent of sensi­
ngbility. Sensibility is feeling determining an image...." The 
central function of art is for Macmurray the refinement of sensibi­
lities,^^ but there are also the functions of educating the emotions 
and the training of judgement. Art is concerned with "the exhibition
of values, and, therefore, in relation to action, with the choice of 
91ends". There is another subsidiary function which is practical in
nature, which is to "maintain and preserve against the ravages of
92time things which have for us an intrinsic value".
"The artistic attitude is that of the looker-on, admiring and 
loving what it sees, but not participating in the life that it c
- 'y '
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95contemplates, except in imagination, subjectively," Science 
deals with the matter of fact, whereas art deals with the matter 
of intention. Art is concerned with the knowledge of values which 
will develop our capacity for discriminating intuitively between 
good and bad; on the other hand science is related to technical 
activity and knowledge of the matter of fact upon with a technology 
can be based. The field of art is the things of intrinsic value^^
in the universe; the field of science is the things of utility value 
in the universe. Science and art represent the two opposing modes 
of reflection which can be termed the emotional and intellectual 
modes of reflection.
The Religious Mode of Apperception
Macmurray in his treatment of the three modes of reflection 
clearly delinéà'Wd^ the (position in which he placed religion, which 
is clearly illustrated in his introductory remark that: "I have 
therefore chosen for the fom of lectures a consideration of these 
three modes of reflection. The treatment of art and science will 
be, of course, designed to throw light upon the character of 
religion,
As has already been discussed, Macmurray argued that there are 
three modes of reflection, two of which have been discussed, i.e. 
the practical and aesthetic modes. These two attitudes are anti­
thetical and since both attitudes are found in the same mind and 
one or the other attitude can be adapted by a single mind, "then 
there must be an attitude of mind which combines the two antithetical
0 .  RE p. 60
94. HAS p.45
95. Mooney op cit., p . 66
96. RAS p.7
— 48
97attitudes". Without an attitude that combines both of these two
antithetical modes the human mind might well be in continuous
conflict with itself. Religion does seek to combine these two
attitudes, an* example of which is to be found in primitive rituals
which combine the expression of beauty* wi*fch the more practical
objective of maintaining the tribe and securing its welfare.
Macmurray asserted that: "We may, therefore, conclude not merely
that there must be an atti*bude of mind which synthesizes the two
opposites, but -that *bhe activities of religion are rooted in it,
98and are at least one of the forms of its expression."
The religious attitude includes a method of valuation which
is different from the intrinsic and extrinsic values of art and 
99science. The religious valuation is developed because of the 
problems one has in one’s relations wi*bh other persons. The ex­
trinsic valuation fails because it understands -the other person 
only in terms of utility value, which means *fchat all individuals 
would continually try *bo use other individuals for their own ends.
The intrinsic attitude also fails *to establish satisfactory rela- 
•fcions be*fcween people, since the in*brinsic valua*fcion establishes 
only mutual admiration and *tlie desire of one individual to keep 
another individual wi1h him "for the emotional satisfaction of 
watching them wi*th admira*bion".^^^ What is needed in our rela*tions 
wi*th other persons is to recognise according *bo Macmurray that:
"the essential reciprocity of *bhe relationship, is an attitude 
 /____________________
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which somehow contains both of the other two attitudes \Ædle trans-
101cending them both, ” One needs co-operation that is part of the
intrinsic valuation as well as the recognition of another’s worth. 
Therefore, if we are to enter into relations with one another, "it 
has to be in terms of an attitude to one another which is able to 
unite these two attitudes, and so to combine utility-value and 
intrinsic value. This attitude is the religious attitude, and it 
is best expressed in terms such as ’fellowship’ or ’communion*.
We have to enter into fellowship with one another and .so to create 
community. This clearly illustrates the essential role that the 
concept of community has in Macmurray’s thinking.
Macmurray' was careful to discuss the differences between 
religion and art or science, and furthermore he explicitly pointed 
out the differences, thereby hoping to stop any confusion of 
religion with either art or science. Macmurray asserted that: "the 
confusion with science comes frcm thinking of religion and of 
science as competing systems of belief about the world; and the 
confusion with art from reducing religion to a contemplation of 
the ideal". On closer examination the, field of religion is much 
wider than a combination of just the intellectual and emotional 
modes of reflection since it also has characteristics that go beyond 
the artistic and scientific attitude. "In the field of religion, 
each of us appears twice, both as the source of valuation
and as the object of valuation. This alludes
 ——  t
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to a union of immanence and transcendence which is an essential
characteristic of human personality. The scientific and artistic
modes treat things as objects whereas the reciprocal nature of
human relations offers up the union of the transcendence of the
object with the immanence of the object which is the person.
Artistic and scientific reflection are solitary whereas religious
105reflection is reciprocal and mutual.
The differences between science and religion are more easily 
delineated than the differences between art and religion. Macmurray 
discussed science in terms of its differences with religion, whereas 
art is seen as something that is closer to religion, and discussed 
on occasion with religion, although Macmurray clearly warned about 
dangers of confusing art and religion.
Macmurray maintained that: "The proper way of representing the 
relation between religion and science, then is to say that religion 
is the expression of an adequate apperception of our relation to the 
world, while science is the expression of a limited, partial, and 
therefore inadequate, apperception.This is not a criticism of 
science, since the limitation of science is necessary, but it does 
deal with any representation of science and religion as alternative 
ways of apprehending Hie world, Macmurray is of the opinion that 
only the religious mode is comprehensive enough to adequately appre­
hend the world and express our relation with the world.
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Macmurray asserted that: "science and religion are extremes,
and present essentially extreme contrasts. "^^7 Qjhere are four
extreme contrasts that Macmurray underlined: Science like art,
108is fragmentary, WrLle religion is one, like philosophy." Art
as well as science can succeed only throng separation into many
different fields of interest; which is essential for the existence
of science in particular. Macmurray asserted that: "science can
never he the knowledge of this or that scientist, while religion
is always the religion of this or that man. It is always personal.
The idea of the personal as opposed to the impersonal is the main
point of contrast between science and religion. The second contrast
is that science is abstract and religion is concrete. Science must
be abstract, it cannot look at an individual wholeness, and since
concreteness is the "wholeness which constitutes the individuality 
110of things", the generalising nature of science makes it abstract. 
When one begins to analyse and classify one becomes committed to the 
dissolution of the -v o^leness of the individual, since analysis pre­
supposes the breaking up of things into their constituents. The 
other factor of abstraction is generalisation which destroys indi­
viduality. "The moment you generalise you are committed to dealing 
with your subject matter in a special aspect, in terms of what
individuals have in common, in contrast to the specific differences
111which mark their individuality, which make them themselves." This
107. EE p.185





is not a condemnation of science since it is the business of
science to analyse and classify things in general terms. "Any
individual object or person or event is for science merely one of
many —  an instance, an example, a particular fact illustrating a
112general rule, known or unknown." Science is for Macmurray 
descriptive and not explanatory. "The scientific attitude faced
115with fact, always refers it to something else, some other fact."
The third contrast between religion and science is that: "religion
11Ais concerned with value; science is not". Science guards against 
any influence brought about by emotional nature. However, emotion 
is necessary in order to grasp reality. Interest is emotional and 
imposes values which concentrates upon and selects the object. In 
order to be completely general one would have to be completely dis­
interested. Macmurray asserted that: "Science in itself, is strictly
valueless. That obviously does not mean that science has no value,
115but that its value is derived from outside itself." Macmurray 
continued by adding somewhat confusingly that: "The value of science 
is a utility value, not intrinsic as that of religion. Science is in
116fact systematic information, nothing more; and information is for use."
The determination of the value of the information would necessarily be 
outside science and subject to human passions and desires, which is 
properly the province of emotional reflection.
112. REp.186
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The fourth and final contrasting element between science and
religion is the most extreme. • Macmurray asserted that: "science
117is impersonal; religion is personal". ’ This lies at,the heart
of the matter, since the very essence of science is impersonal and
the essence of religion is the personal. Science is concerned
with gaining information while at the same time eliminating the
personal factor from its activities and results. Science wishes
to gain and hold information without personalising it. This is not
possible since reality is in terms of information shared by persons
and in fact science itself is an activity of persons. Macmurray
concluded that: "science is an impersonal means to a personal end.
118Its impersonality is its limitations." However, religion is
unlimited since it is personal. "It (religion) is the whole unity
of reality gathered into the life of a person and so gathering into
its own unity all the subordinate aspects of himself.
Macmurray included the field of science within the field of
religion. He asserted that: "religion has become the personal whole
120of life within which science has its humble but essential place. " 
Science is a search for systematic information about Hie world for 
people to use, on the other hand, religion reaches towards the full 
reality of knowledge, i.e. to the knowledge of God; consequently 
gathering in the fragments of science and making that knowledge real 
because God is individual as well as whole and concrete.
Vhereas science and religion are in extreme contrast in 






and religion are ways of living the personal life— and I mean by
that the life of rational consciousness, the real life of human 
121beings," Both of these attitudes have present within them the
drive toward the natural impulse to fulfill our own being, to be
rational creatures, to achieve personality. Both have within them
the blind urge to reason. However, they are both separate aspects
122of "this search of rational personality". They both try to
express the life of reason within us and attempt to help man to
live in the knowledge of the reality in which he exists. Another
point of contact between religion and art is that both are in the
same stage of development. Macmurray believed that: "in art and
123religion mankind is still in the stage of immaturity." There 
has never been a true art or true religion yet established since 
there is no mature art or religion.
There are many points of contact between art and religion, 
however, Macmurray warned of the possibility of confusion that 
might occur. The confusion arises from Greek thought and in par­
ticular Plato's thought. The substituion df art for religion is 
seen in the spiritualisation of religion, which rests upon the false 
dualism of mind and body, which Macmurray wholeheartedly rejected:
"The purely spiritual, unrelated to the material, and unrealised in 
the material, is purely i m a g i n a r y , A r t  creates in the field of 
imagination, while religion creates only in the field of reality. The 
belief that religion is grounded in mysticism is a form of 
contemplative reflection, and consequently in the aesthetic field, 
Macmurray warned that if we "consider religion to express an emotional 
attitude to the world we are confusing aesthetic with religious
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125apperception.V Although there are points of contact between
art and religion they are two different attitudes. However, there 
is another factor. Both art and science are different from 
religion and yet at the same time, aspects of religion.
The concept that religion is the basic mode of reflection 
from which other modes spring is at the very heart of Macmurray* s 
thinking. Religion is seen as basic to all reflection as well as 
the basis of all activity. Since all human activities take place 
within the context of the community of persons which is the 
province of religion, then "religious activity includes scientific
126activity and artistic activity". Macmurray asserted that:
"Science and art, therefore, live with religion and are derived from
it by a concentration upon one or other of its components. This is
only an analytic; way of stating the fact that science and art are
127made possible by the existence of human communities." The strength
of religion is that even though there is a dissociation of the two
components, i.e. the intellectual and emotional, there is an overall
unity within religion. Religion is able to unify "intellectual and
emotional activity and does not require to withdraw from practical 
128life". However, once these components join in religion they are 
no longer truly art or science.
These two aspects of religion are labelled as ’ritual* and 
’doctrinal* by Macmurray. "The first is the aesthetic in form, the 
second scientific. Of the two aspects, the aesthetic is the positive 
and primary, since it is valuational, and refers to the intention of





action; the scientific is*, secondary and negative, since the means
129presuppose the end." Neither of these two components are art 
or science since they are held together in religion and compli­
ment each other. They both look to the unity of action which 
constitutes reality; one looks to the aspect of fact the other to 
the aispect of value, or the one to absolute Truth and the other 
to absolute Goodness. These two aspects of religion are most 
noticeable when one becomes prominent. Religion may become 
aggressive by turning to the pragmatic aspect which seeks through 
the use of force to reach a perfect community, or by turning to 
the aesthetic aspect and becoming submissive and idealistic and 
constantly referring to a world beyond this world. Ebwever, when 
the ties are loosened within religion which unites the two aspects,
they then "enter upon an independent life of their own and become
150autonomous as science and art respectively".
The unification of the emotional and intellectual aspects of 
religion brings one closer to the primary or central expression of 
religion which is for Macmurray found in communal symbolic action.
This makes religion something more than the unification of the 
aesthetic and intellectual modes of thought since the activity is 
not a mental activity either of emotion and/or thought. This sym­
bolic action "is at once part of the common life of the group of 
persons and an esqpression or symbol of the common life as a whole.
To put it otherwise, it has the form of ritual or ceremonial activity;
151and this activity is itself the primary religious reflection".
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Activity does involve thought and emotion, hut it can unify 
unlike emotional or intellectual reflection. Religion must he 
expressed in action since if one leaves it merely as a matter 
of «notion or thou^t there is always the possibility of ambiguity.
Art and science are solitary pursuits, whereas religious reflec­
tion means dealing with personal relations. Therefore, it takes 
at least two to settle any problem and this is solved by mutual 
agreement. The solving of the problem includes not only the 
«notional and intellectual side of reconciliation, but also 
includes a mutual symbolic act of reconciliation, e.g. such as 
shaking hands. "This is a ritual act, which symbolises the common
intention to take up again the common activity which the estrange-
152ment had interrupted. "
Macmurray*8 concepts of religion and community are intimately
connected and closely interwoven. The basic problem of community
is to overcome fear and subordinate the negative to the positive
155in the motivation of persons in relation. Since this is the 
basic problem of human beings, the primary form of reflection should 
be concerned with the problem of relations. Macmurray defined 
religion as "the reflective activity which expresses the conscious­
ness of community; or more tersely, religion is the celebration of 
154-community!'. Religion is the appropriate form of reflection for
155interpersonal relationships, which fot Macmurray includes the 
other two forms of reflection, since both are rooted in the personal 
which is the proper ground of religious reflection. Macmurray*s 
understanding of community is pivotal to his understanding of religion 
as well as art and science.
152. RAS p. 56
155. PR p. 160
134. PR p. 160
135. Mooney op cit., p.71
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Religion in Macmurray*s opinion is a total and universal
factor in human existence* Religious reflection for Macmurray
is total, "involving every aspect of the person, intellectual,
emotional and practical; unconscious as well as conscious
Religious reflection universalises the central factors in human 
157experience. Religion is a part of all human society, and con­
sequently this is a basic fact about society. Macmurray considered 
the first factor of importance about religion to be "the univer­
sality of religion in human society".
In comparison with art and science Macmurray placed great
emphasis upon religion as the most basic mode of reflection which
is always present in human society. Religion as well as being the
basic mode of reflection is defined as the symbol of community as
well as the way one reflects about community. Religion is basic
to human reflection as well as universal to all human community
and all human relationship. Macmurray summarised his approach to
religion and the function of religion as;
the representation of the community of agents, and of the ultimate conditions of action, both in respect of its means and its ends. Religion, we may say, is the knowledge of the Other as community, and is the full form of reflective rationality. It is the know­ledge which must inform all action for the achievanent of community, and therefore the ground of all really efficient and really satisfactory action whatever.
Mscmurray’s concept of religion focuses upon his understanding of
human community.
156. EAS p. 59
137. SREp .54
138. PR p . 156
139. PR p. 185
CHAPTER 4 
Macmurray* s View of Experience
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Macmu2?ray's conceptualisation of experience is pivotal as well 
as foundational to his thinking. A clear understanding of what 
Macmurray means by experience and the way he approached the ideas 
and problems related to the concept of experience is necessary in 
order to clearly understand Macmurray*s basic assumption and his 
general philosophical stand.
The first concept of importance in Macmurray* s understanding 
of experience is his use of the concept of immediate experience. The 
concept of immediate experience is rudimentary to Macmurray* s percep­
tion; of experience, since for him the primary purpose of philosophy 
is to reflect upon and express in words the unity of immediate ex­
perience. ^ Immediate experience is unexpressed experience as opposed 
to experience that has been reflected upon and expressed. Macmurray 
asserted that: "Immediate experience is by definition experience -vdiich
has not been thought about. It is, therefore, a presupposition of our
2thinking, not something that can be an element of thought." Macmurray 
came close to restating the dictum that anything that is reflected upon 
is first sensed. Macmurray anchored his epistemology in the immediate 
experience of living. "The immediacy of experience consists simply in 
the fact that we are immersed in it, that we are living in it, and not 
setting ourselves against it, as something other than us which we can
1. Bozzo, Edward George, "Toward a Renewed Fundamental Moral Theology:The Implication of the Thought of John Macmurray for Christian Ethics" (Unpublished Doctoral Thesis: Catholic University of America, 1969) p.102
2. lU p.13
3* Macmanus, Ora Roland, "The Concept of the Personal in The Writings of John Macmurray" (Unpublished Doctoral Thesis; Catholic University of America, 196?) p.23
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contemplate and study. Macmurray went to great pains to point 
out that immediate experience is not primitive experience or ele­
mentary eaqperience. Immediate experience is not something that 
belongs to our childhood, nor is it "an unchangeable substratum 
which accompanies us and all men throughout life".^ Immediate ex­
perience is the experience of living and acting and not the exper-
6ience of ^fleeting upon or thinking about living.
An important characteristic of immediate experience and one 
that held great significance for Macmurray is the unity and com­
pleteness of immediate experience. The unity of immediate experience 
is in complete contrast with the disjointed aspects of reflective 
experience. In immediate experience nothing is:
really separate from anything else. Its parts are not *cut off with a hatchet* ; they flow into one another and belong together. Its aspect as knowledge, for instance, is not a separable part of it. It is unified with and coextensive with feeling and action. It is our con­sciousness in living rather than our consciousness of living. In immediate experience we know anything by being interested in it, by desiring it, by loving or hating it, and above all, by doing things with it. The knowledge that we show in playing a game of tennis is part of the activity of playing it. It is not separable either from the playing of from the pleasure in playing which prevades it. These basic aspects of experience —  cognition, conation and feeling —  are fused into a single whole in the living experience.7
When speaking of Kant*s belief in the unity of experience Macmurray
observed that: "The unity of experience as a whole is not a unity of
knowledge, but a unity of personal activities of which knowledge is 
0only one."
4. IÏÏ p. 21
5. lU p.19





Once one stands back and thinks about something, a division
appears between what we are reflecting upon and ourselves. "The
unity and wholeness of living experience is broken. Reflective
experience in contrast with immediate experience is abstract, in-
ccanplete and relative. It is abstract, since it is separated from
the unity of immediate life and becomes a partial and one-sided
expression, which concentrates its energy in one area, thereby making
experience incomplete. For Macmurray, thought, i.e. reflective
experience, is constantly trying to become a substitute for feeling
and act i o n . T h e  source of reflection is immediate experience, and
at the centre of this is the idea that true immediate experience
cannot be a matter for reflection by definition. This does not mean
that one cannot understand the expression of an experience without
having had the experience oneself, but means that someone must have
had at sometime the immediate experience. There is a distinct
difference for Macmurray between thinking about an experience and
immediately having an experience. Once one reflects upon the immediate
11experience one has broken the unity of immediate experience.
The completeness or wholeness of immediate experience is for
Macmurray .illustrated by the expression "the infinite". Macmurray
concluded about the term "the infinite" that:
The term is, of course, a negative term, because it is the reflective expression of seme thing which cannot be given in reflection. The thing itself is more positive than anything else we know. It is in a special sense * the real*. It is simply that something which is one and the same in all immediate experience, which includes it all, in which all
I
9. I U p .25
10. lu pp. 22-23
11. Kirkpatrick, op. cit., p.51
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deteimination and difference appears and to which everything belongs. It is only through the inadequacy of reflection that the infinite seems to lie beyond everything that we can think or do, so that it seems to be the result of adding more and more until we are breathless with the effort. The infinite is the universe in immediate experience. It is given always and everywhere in the finite. 12
The ccMpleteness of experience emphasises the inadequacy of reflection
since the unity of experience cannot be reached in the reflective act
because it contains much that is not a part of the reflective act. It
is impossible to resolve the wholeness of the unity of experience by
recourse to a portion of it, namely reflective esqperience.
Macmurray held that knowledge is only a part of the total unity of
experience. However, knowledge does play a primary role in reflection,
and is in fact for Macmurray the basis of all thought. "Knowledge,
then, is first and foremost that immediate experience of things which
is prior to all expression and understanding.  ^ Knowledge for Macmurray
is unlike Locke’s definition of knowledge in that it is more than the
perception of the agreement or disagreement between ideas. Locke *s
approach may be termed a theoretical conception of knowledge, whereas
Macmurray* s approach to knowledge was much broader. Maonurray clearly
distinguished between two basic types of knowledge from the very
beginning. The primary form of knowledge is practical or immediate
knowledge. "Upon this primary knowledge all reflection and all thought 
15are based." If the full experience of the self is immediate exper­
ience, in which is contained one*s capacities, this means that
12. lU p . 55 '
13. Iïïp.17
14. Thomason, William Paul, "The Snpirical Basis for Religion inJohn Macmurray*8 Philosophy" (Unpublished Doctoral Thesis: The Southern Baptist Theological Seminary, 1972)
P* 95
15. I U p .17
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the capacity to know will be included in the experiencing." Immed­
iate experience entails immediate knowledge. This knowledge is a 
practical knowledge of the world and is presupposed by thought and 
reflection. Therefore Macanurray reasoned that:
all thought presupposes knowledge. It is not possible to think about something you do not already know. It may be true that some things that we know cannot be understood or even described. But it is certain that nothing that is unknown can be described or understood.This is a principle which is frequently overlooked in philosophical discussion. We construct theories of knowledge which imply that knowledge is* the result of thinking, and that it is, therefore, essentially bound up with the processes of reflective activity. The simple observation that you must know some idling before you can think about it completely upsets the equilibrium of all such theories. It is because we know things and are interested in them that we think about them at all.And the reason why we think about them cannot be in order to know them but at the most in order to know them better.
Macmurray advanced the epistemological principle that knowledge
is primarily practical, immediate and unreflective, which is to say
18that it postulates reflection. Macmurray averred that: "we must
always presuppose and depend upon the immediate unreflective knowledge
19vdiich is the foundation of eveiything else." There is, however, a
second type of knowledge which occurs as the result of reflection and
not as a precursor to reflection, which is called theoretical knowledge,
There is the knowledge of immediate experience, and the knowledge which
comes from reflection. Macmurray asserted that: "personal knowledge is
a distinct type of knowledge and also logically prior to impersonal 
20knowledge..." Impersonal knowledge being the knowledge gained from 
reflection, whereas personal knowledge is gained directly from
16. Kirkpatrick, op. cit., p.52
17. TO pp.15-16




immediate experience without the interference of reflection.
Macmurray* s understanding of knowledge is certsiinly broader than 
that of Locke, since for Macmurray the concept of knowledge includes 
a cognitive element of experience which is not to be found in Locke* s 
work. This may be connected with Macmurray* s assumption that man is 
a doer, i.e. man is primarily an agent and not a knower. Macmurray 
held that all knowledge came directly and/or ultimately from imme­
diate experience. Therefore, all knowledge comes directly or in-
21directly from experience and is grounded in immediate experience.
Therefore, someone must have had at sometime personal knowledge of
whatever is being reflected upon or discussed even though one does /v
not necessarily possess the personal knowledge gained from immediate
experience. Experience is the source of all knowledge which refutes
the claim of the idealists that knowledge can come from judgement
alone. "Lastly, I am asserting that it is right to hold against the
Idealist logicians that knowledge cannot be constituted entirely by
judgement, that there must be some kind of immediate experience,
including an immediate apprehension of a cognitive character, to form
22the basis out of which judgement springs." Experience is the 
foundation from which all reflection emerges, which causes one to 
place Macmurray in the empirical tradition.
ITnlike the classical anpiricists experience for Macmurray went 
beyond the senses, he had a broader view of experience, which is clearly 
illustrated by his distinction between reflective experience and
 >__________________________
21. Thomason, op. cit., pp.95-97
22. Macmurray, John, "The Principle of Personality in Experience"PAS (1928-29) XXIX, p.523» hereafter cited as PPB
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immediate or unexpressed experience. While the concept of reflec­
tive experience is not difficult, the concept of immediate experience 
is problematic since to think about or to express experience is to 
destroy the immediacy of the experience. Immediate experience has 
a number of definitive characteristics, the first of which is its 
unexpressed or unreflected-upon state, i.e. immediate experience 
is lived through, but is not thought about, which presupposes our 
immersion in experience. The best example of this characteristic 
of immediate experience is the knowledge one has of another person, 
which is the reason that Macmurray sometimes referred to practical 
knowledge as .personal knowledge as opposed to impersonal knowledge or 
theoretical knowledge. A second characteristic of immediate experience 
is its unity and completeness. To stop and think or reflect breaks 
the wholeness of the living experience. Immediate experience, therefore, 
has as one of its properties a unity which is broken by the abstraction 
of reflective experience. Beflection separates the unity of one’s 
experience into many unconnected parts. Macmurray stressed, neverthe­
less, that immediate experience is not primitive experience, i.e. not 
something that one can grow out of or the elemental substratum that 
exists within all men since it is different for each man. Although 
one can blunt ones capacity for immediate experience by talking and 
reflecting upon it, normal reflection can enlarge ones own feeling. 
Consequently, immediate experience is not just raw experience which 
is totally unaffected by thinking. Immediate experience cannot be 
reduced or limited to just experiences, since sense experience is 
only an element of immediate experience. Sense experience seems to 
presuppose a certain amount of passivity on the part of the agent, 
whereas for Macmurray the activity of the agent is the source of ex­
perience. This underlines the difference between Macmurray* s view
— 6y —
and that of the olassioal empiricists in that Macmurray*s outlook
was essentially based upon action, whereas the view of the classical
empiricists were essentially one of passivity.
The epistemological principles, that have been so far discussed,
point to a general connection between experience, knowledge and
reflection. Reflection is only possible upon what has been or is
24-capable of being experienced by the self. All theoretical con­
clusions or hypotheses about what is possible for activity in the 
world must be verified by being part of the self*s immediate exper­
ience. These are the general principles that apply to all experience 
as well as to all reflection. As has already been noted there are 
different modes of reflection. The purpose of each of these modes 
of reflection is to improve theoretical or impersonal knowledge and 
thus ultimately the action of the self with respect to a more or less 
clearly defined area of experience. The action of *Uie self to a 
certain extent depends for its successful functioning upon whether 
or not the theoretical knowledge improves. The intention behind a 
particular mode of reflection is to reflect upon a given area and 
to provide the self with reliable theoretical knowledge about a
particular area, which is divided by Macmurray into three now familiar
25fields of art, science and religion.
All of these three modes are grounded in the total field of
human experience, therefore, each is related to the other. However,
23. Thomason, op. cit., pp.125-127 ^
24# Discussed in Chapter 5
25. Kirkpatrick, op. cit., pp.72-73
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the different attitudes tend to emphasise different apsects of 
the field of experience, since certain experiences lend themselves 
more easily to one mode of reflection as opposed to another,
Althou^ experience is a unity, and all the reflective activities 
of man refer to the whole of experience, there is in actuality a 
different centre or locus for each of idle three attitudes, i.e. a
26different field of interest.
Since the central mode of apperception is religion then the 
central problem is what can be considered the field of religious 
experience? "What are the normal and universal facts of human ex­
perience out of which religion, as a special kind of human behaviour 
27arises?" Macmurray*s assumption was that someone talks about 
religion and therefore "there is a field of real, direct experience 
out of which religious phenomena emerge, and the way he interprets
ppreligion will reveal the kind of facts which he had in mind". The
problem seems to come from the fact "that it seems impossible to
distinguish any special set of facts which form the field of religion.
All the facts of experience seem to be data for the religious con- 
29sciousness". Which is a general statement of the problem of 
religious experience.
The field of religious experience is more than the whole field 
of human experience of the world around us, since it also includes 
ourselves, Macmurray understood the scientific attitude and the 
artistic attitude in terms of setting the world of eaqperience against 
ourselves, which makes the total of experience an incomplete one for 
the artistic and scientific attitudes. Within religion there is not
26. Thomason, op. cit., pp.l6l-l62
27. SEE p. 19
28. SEE p. 19
29. SEE p.21
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only Idle synthesis of the practical and contemplative, but also the 
broadening of the field by the inclusion of ourselves in the total 
equation of human experience. Macmurray observed that human beings 
are both "transcendent in experience and immanent in it".^^ The 
characteristic of the combination of immanence and transcendence is 
a fact of human personality which is an empirical and natural fact.^^ 
"The union of immanence and transcendence is a peculiar and defining 
characteristic of all personality, human or divine; but it is primarily 
a natural, empirical fact of common human experience.
Another problem of the field of religion is the search for a 
distinct form of valuation that belongs to the field of religion.
The scientific field has the extrinsic, practical or utility form 
of valuation, whereas the artistic has the intrinsic form of valuation. 
There seems to be no further room for another type of valuation since 
the above two forms are not only antithetical, but seemingly leave no 
scope for expansion. This does not take into account that there is 
a primitive and essential character in human experience that has been 
overlooked. Macmurray asserted that: "The primary fact is that part 
of the world of common experience for each of us is the rest of us."^^
We are consequently forced to evaluate one another, and this evaluation 
is reciprocal. The reciprocity of the valuation adds a new dimension.
The valuation of one person by another peraon is different from both 
the intrinsic and extrinsic forms of valuation that are found in science 
and art. The object of valuation in being another person brings in '
f
50. SEE p.58
51. SEE p. 58
52. SEE p.58 
55. SEE p . 52 
54, SEE p.59
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the factor of reciprocity. This sets the central problem of human 
life, and sets the stage for the central problem of religion. "It 
is this central fact to which Jesus drew attention when he said:
’judge not, that ye be not judged; for with what judgement ye judge, 
ye shall be judged, and with Wiat measure ye mete it shall be meas­
ured to you again*. It is the fact that all personal relationships
55are mutual and reciprocal in their very nature.
The full significance of reciprocity can be grasped by seeing it 
in terms of activity, i.e. experience. In the experience of living 
the forces of necessity impose valuation on' things and this reaction 
brings about the relation between ourselves and the things of the 
world. "Religion, the religious attitude, and the religious valua­
tion, with the conception of the world which it organises, are 
forced upon us by the necessity of entering into relation with other 
people if we are to live at all."^^
Macmurray defined the field of religious experience as "the Wiole 
field of common experience organised in relation to the central fact 
of personal relationship".A simpler view is that: "the field of 
religion is the field of personal relations, and the datum from which
58religious reflection starts is the reciprocity or mutuality of these". 
Therefore, the problems of religion are idiose of communion and community. 
"Religion is about fellowship and community, which are facts of direct, 
universal human experience. Consequently, the religious mode of 
apperception focuses upon the field of communal experience. The mutual
35. SEE p.40
36. SEE p. 40




valuation unites the two attitudes of utility and intrinsic valuation. 
The prohlen of valuation raised by religion because of the antitheti­
cal nature of intrinsic and extrinsic valuation is solved since a 
third point of valuation is made possible not only by the combination 
of the two antithetical methods of valuation, but also by the addi­
tional factor Of mutuality, i.e. the mutual or reciprocal nature of 
valuation, which is found in the third form of valuation, i.e. the 
religious.
If an artist is lost in contemplation of an object and comes to
discover that the object is contemplating him then there is a new
awareness which causes a deeper and fuller experience, as well as a
different type of experience. The emotional awareness is mutual and
reason must express this mutual self-revelation of the two persons
40which is defined as communion. Thus contemplation is a solitary 
occupation, whereas communion is mutual personal involvement and is 
a part of the religious mode of apperception.^^
In Religion» Art and Science there is a summation of Macmurray* s 
reasoning which shows the connection between the sharing of experience 
between people and religion. "We start from the empirical fact that 
we are human beings through communication, through the sharing of 
experience. This points to the central fact that human beings 
are essentially social, not in the sense of just living in groups, 
although this is a fact, but by the fact that our thoughts are shared 
which comes from the environment in which we live. "It is that core 
of human existence in which we are in direct contact with one another, 
and into which we enter with the whole of ourselves, and not in virtue
40. Macmanus, op. cit., pp.113-114
41. HAS p. 43
42. BAS p.53
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of this or that particular interest or duty. This is what 
Macmurray termed the personal life as opposed to the functional 
or public life, d^iich cannot be disentangled in reality from one 
another, since the functional or public life is part of the personal 
life. There is a problematic element of the deepest and most basic 
character in the personal life that compels us to stop and reflect 
upon it. "It is the problem of personal relationships; the problem 
of conflict, and enmity, of estrangement and reconciliation."^^
The problems of personal unity point to religion. The function of 
religion is to ’Maintain and extend, to deepen and develop human 
communityReligion arises from and refers to the field of human 
relations, which is characterised by and evinced in the particular 
language that religion employs. "Terms like communion and fellow­
ship; disobedience and forgiveness; love, enmity, estrangement and 
reconciliation are drawn directly from our experience of personal 
relationship and have meaning for us only because of this. The 
foundation of religion is firmly planted in the experience of human 
relations and the communication and contact with other human beings 
and the problems that result from this contact.
Macmurray grounded his empirical view of religion in the concept 
of personal relations. % e  concept of communion and community and 
their concomitant components are all part of the religious experience 
both in terms of activity and reflection, which gives a broad field 
of interest to religious experience. Religion not only is grounded
45. RA.S p.54 
44. RAS p. 54
45. HAS p. 54
46. RAS p.55
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in human experience, hut synthesises the antithetical elements that 
are present when one reflects on human experience. The principle 
underlying the idea of religion is reciprocal contemplation which 
is termed communion by Macmurray. However, the field of religious 
experience is not limited to mutuality, but includes the total field 
of human experience which includes both immediate and reflective 
experience.
Macmurray dwells upon the objective aspects of religious ex­
perience, but he did recognise that there are subjective .elenents 
in religious experience. Macmurray observed that; "The religious 
man comes to worship, the artist to admire, the scientist to observe,
He did contend that there is a subjective ground of conviction, as well 
as an objective one, but he was very wary of the subjectivist's claims. 
5he subjective aspect is the recognition of the fact that there is 
something in the human make up that sparks religious feelings and 
ideas. Macmurray contended that: "Almost without exception, human 
beings experience the sentiments of awe and reverence, with their 
curious intexminglings of love and fear; and these feelings tend to 
find expression in an attitude of worship and adoration. The 
subjective experience has also been called the mystical experience.
The careful study, of the psychology of religion which is referred to 
by Macmurray, and which typifies this approach is Rudolph Otto * s study 
The Idea of The Holy.
47. SHE p.21 >
48. Macmurray, John, "Religion in Transformation" This Changing Worlded. J.R.M. Brumwell (London: George Routledge and Sons, 1945)p.250, hereafter cited as BIT
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However, the subjective approach has definite dangers of which
Macmurray was well aware* The work of Freud was of interest to
Macmurray in reference to the subjective aspect of religion, since
Freud saw religion as a "projection of the child*s experience of 
49family life ••*" Hence %an invents religion as a fulfillment
of a secret and unconscious wish for the security and happiness of
50his days of childhood". This is not unconnected with Marx:*s
criticism that religion takes men*s minds off the present reality
and turns it towards future rewards. Marx consequently concluded
51that religion is a primitive device that is no longer needed.
Macmurray admitted that: "These theories of religion have a measure
of truth in them, thou^ the evidence on which they are based is
very inadequate. They are plausible so long as we think only of
the subjective aspect of religious experience, and imagine that
52religion is wholly produced by psychological forces." Macmurray 
set out to discover \4iat object excites this sense of awe.
Macmurray believed that this object of awe would have two 
characteristics. "It must be above us; beyond our control and our 
full congprehension; and also it must be congruous with us, of our 
own nature, and so personal. Macmurray contended that: "the true 
object of a man’s religion is that which he values absolutely, and 
what it is can only be shown by discovering what it is to which he is 
prepared, in the last resort, to sacrifice everything else."^^ This
49. PR p. 154
50. RIT p.252
51. RIT p.255
52. RIT p. 255
55. BIT p. 255
54. hit p.256
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definition or use of the term religion implies that every man is 
a religious man; it is the thing or the things to which he gives 
a supreme value, and if it is not of supreme value then he is 
practising a false religion. "Its falseness is a practical false­
ness. It cannot do what he expects from it. It cannot, in the 
nature of things, give wholeness and satisfaction to his personal
55life." One must value what is inherently most valuable othery 
wise one’s efforts will be senseless and futile since we are bound 
to the reality of the world outside of ourselves. Macmurray con­
sidered the highest thing of value to be personal; "it follows that 
to order our lives properly and satisfactorily we must value persons 
above all else and sacrifice or subordinate everything else to them".^^ 
Persons are a proper object of reference and the problem of relations 
to one another is the primary problem of practical life and is the 
key to all the other problems. Religion arises from the universal 
practical problems of human relationships and the function of religion
is "to discover, create and sustain the conditions of satisfactory
57human relationship". Macmurray concluded that this:
is why religion always talks in personal terms about personal relations; about man’s relation to God —  that is to say, about the relation of finite persons to infinite and eternal personality —  about enmity and reconciliation, about love and brotherhood. That is why its organisation are ’communions’ and its rituals are rituals of communion. Religion, in other words, is about community; ....^
The field of religious experience is the field of the personal which 
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universal human experience* The religious experience is open to
all; it is not dependent upon any form of mystical experience or
feeling of awe, although this is one of the manifestations of the
religious experience. Religious experience is a fundamental and
primary experience. Macmurray*s thesis is that the centre of the
59field of religion is that of the experience of personality.
Macmurray defined religion in terms of the full emotional and
intellectual reality of mutual relationships with one another and
also in terms of the Other; he is aware that this refers to the
so-called ’perfect* religious experience.Macmurray was fully
aware of the fact that relationships tend to he broken and insecure,
and that one must strive to maintain and increase the fellowship and
trust that is part of the relationship. Macmurray underlined that
this is the main issue for religious reflection. The religious
problematic, which is Macmurray’s term, encompasses the insecure
61and broken nature of human relationships.
There is a direct connection between personality, religious
experience and Macmurray’s understanding of the Other, i.e. God.
Macmurray summed up this connection as follows:
If personality is the bearer of value, and value includes meaning; if mind is an aspect of personality and the personal includes the impersonal, it follows that Abso­lute Reality is personal, the idea of God is, of course, the idea of a personal Absolute. Ve have, therefore, a ri^t to speak of the completest experience of Reality as a communion with God.°2
59. Macmanus, pp. cit., pp.117-118 t
60. PR p. 151
61. Hoffman, J.O., " Religion and Religious Experience in theThought of John Macmurray", Studies in Religion/Sciences Religious. p.1
62. PPB p. 329
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The most complete foim of experience is the religious experience 
and this form of religious experience is communion with the Other, 
i.e. God. Religious experience when defined as personal relation­
ship does not differ markedly from the more common understanding 
of religious experience as communion with God. Macmurray places 
God at the apex of all relationships. The awe of religion is not 
only subjective, but is also grounded in the matter of fact of 
mutual personal relations.
The focus of the field of experience from which religion arises 
is the mutuality of personal relationships.^^ The mutuality of 
relationships between persons contains within it the full significance 
of life. Macmanus opined about Macmurray that: "The mutuality of 
interpersonal relations became for him the touchstone of what was
. truly real. The empirical base on which Macmurray supports religion
65is grounded upon the mutuality of personal relationships.
Macmurray, as has been noted, isolated the experience of knowing 
before reflection, i.e. immediate experience. ' This approach to ex­
perience has a natural affinity with the *X-Thou* model of relation­
ships. Macmurray placed emphasis upon intex^ersonal relations and 
sought to understand and gain access to man’s nature through mutuality,
i.e. ’the b e t w ee n ' a s had Martin Buber.
IKie importance of the idea of interpersonal relationships is 
clearly in evidence when Macmurray asserted that:
65. Thomason, op. cit., p.189 ,
64. Macmanus, op. cit., p.200
65. Thomason, op. cit., p.189
66* Macmanus, op. cit.? pp.200-201
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For I am not alone in the world; there are other agents, and if they will not allow me to do what I desire to do I cannot do it. Moreover, there are few things which I can desire to do, and none that are of personal signifi­cance, which do not depend upon the active co-operation of others. We need one another to be ourselves. This complete and unlimited dependence of each of us upon the others is the central and crucial fact of personal exist­ence • ... We live and move and have our being not in ourselves, but in one another; and what rights or powers or freedom we possess are ours by the grace and favour of our fellovs. Here is the basic fact of our human condition; which all of us can know if we stop pretending, and do know in moments when the veil of self-deception is stripped figcyn us and we are forced to look upon our own nakedness.
Personal relationships are not only extremely important not to say
pivotal, but they are exceptional in terms of other experiences,
because of the added dimension of reciprocity or mutuality. Macmurray
emphasised the importance of mutuality as well as the view that it was
exceptional in his earliest work Interpreting the Universe.
The experience of other persons has an essential quality which makes it different from any other kind of expei>- ience. It is the consciousness of mutual relationship of the meeting of like with like, for in it we find a response from the object at our own level. It is this essential mutuality which forms the essence of our ex­perience of persons. 08
The characteristic that distinguishes all human actions for 
Macmurray is the constant reference of a person to the personal Other. 
Communication between persons is the behaviour that makes up what 
Macmurray calls personal motive. Behaviour is incomplete without a 
response from the Other. "This primary and distinctive character of 
personal behaviour we shall refer to hereafter as the mutuality of the 
personal. It is what we mean when we say that the personal is consti-i*
tuted by the relation of persons. The reference to the personal Other
69is constitutive of all personal existence."
67. PR p. 211
68. ITT p. 126
69. PR p . 69
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The primary importance of the concept of mutuality for
Macmurray can he fully appreciated when one realises that he utilised
the concept in his definition of self-realisation. The process of
self-identity could not and would not go forward in Macmurray* s
opinion if the fact of mutuality were not present- It is only
through the interchange between persons that one finds one's own
70identity and personhood-
Macmurray in his discussion of what he calls the rhythm of 
withdrawal and return, which is his phrase for describing the dynamic 
interaction of persons, makes it clear that an appreciation of one's 
individuality arises from a progressive differentiation of the original 
unity of the 'you' and *1* in a common life and that this common life
71remains as the substratum that is the precursor of individuality. 
Macmurray declared that:
The 'You and I* relation, we must recall, coi^titutes the personal, and both the 'you'and the 'I' are constituted, as individual persons, by the mutuality of their relation. Consequently, the development of the individual person is the development of his relation to the Other. Personal individuality is not an original given fact. It is achieved through idle progressive differentiation of the original unity of the 'You* and 'I'.72
Besides the heterocentric character that is found as a part of mutuality
there is also contained within mutuality the seeds of self-realisation.
"One can only really know one's friends, and oneself through one's
75friends, in a mutuality of self-revelation." One can only fully 
participate in self-revelation within the framework of mutuality. This 
is a direct consequence of the heterocentric character of mutuality.
70. PR p. 211
71. Bozzo, op. cit., pp.259-240
72. PR p. 91
73. PR p. 170
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Heterocentric valuation is the cornerstone of any form of mutual 
valuation. In Idie personal mode of valuation the centre of the 
valuation is outside of oneself. The other is important, not the 
self. "The other is the centre of value. For himself he has no 
value, in himself, but only for the other; consequently he cares for 
himself only for the sake of the other. But this is mutual; the 
other cares for him disintérestedlyiln return.
The heterocentric character of mutual valuation has two essen­
tial elements that are posited by its existence. The first of these
75necessary elements is the equality of the relationship. Equality 
is necessary for mutuality to exist. "For, without equality, there
76can be no mutuality." This does not mean that the persons who are
within the relation are completely equali.e. they do not have as a
matter of fact equal abilities, equal rights, or equal functions.
"The equality is intention; it is an aspect of the mutuality of the
relation. If it were not an equal relation, the motivation would be
negative; a relation in which one was using idie other as a means to
his own ends."*^  ^ Macmurray also simply stated that: "the other is my
equal, my fellow If I meet him, he meets me in the same sense- We
78meet as man to man." Without the presupposition of equality, 
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The second postulate that is contained within the concept of
heterooentricity is that the relationship is carried out freely.
There is no restraint on either person. Macmurray asseverated that:
"they both realise their freedom as agents, since in the absence of
the fear for the self there is no constraint on either, and each can
be himself fully; neither is under obligation to act a part".^^
Without the presupposition of freedom in the relationship as well as
equality, the mutuality that is so necessary for self-realisation as
well as the underpinning for community is not present.
The interdependent and close connection between religion and
mutuality is essential to Macmurray*s understanding of people as
well as religion. "The relationship between persons constitutes their
individual personality, and this mutuality of the personal is the
80basic fact of religion." Not only is mutuality basic to religion,
but the requirements that Macmurray sets down for the existence of
self-identity or personality are similar to the requirements for religion,
Macmurray discussed religion in terms of the community of persons and
81commented that friendship is "the fundamental fact of human life".
He went on to say that the "capacity for communion, that capacity for
entering into free and equal personal relations is the thing that makes
82U S  human, it is the rock on which personality is built". The hetero­
centric presupposition of equality and freedom underlie personality, 
community and religion.
79. PR p. 158 ,
80. EB p.225
81. RE pp. 62-65
82. Ibid.
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The final question that must he asked has to do with the possi­
bility of mutuality breaking down and the subsequent actions that 
would stem from this deterioration. When one denies one's intrinsic 
relation with others, one is bound to feel frustration. To deny re­
lationships with others brings about the accompanying feeling of self- 
annihilation. Frustration comes about since mutuality is denied only 
in its intentional form and it still remains as a matter of fact. Any 
attempt to negate mutuality in action is counter to the fact that 
mutuality is constitutive of my personality.^^ Mutuality as matter 
of intention, i.e. choice, may come into conflict with mutuality as 
a matter of fact, which brings about frustration. Macmurray realised 
that: "Now, in general, the personal relation is unavoidable, since 
the personal is constituted by the personal relation; and the refusal 
of mutuality is the frustration of personal existence absolutely."®^
On the practical level not only does the refusal of mutuality bring 
about the inabiliiy to understand others, it also brings to a half 
self-realisation.
The concept of mutuality is a central one for Macmurray in that 
it not only serves as the basis of human relations, but also as the 
basis of human personality and religion. The concept, however, is 
not simply a term that can be reduced to one's relationships with 
another. The concept of mutuality has many mitigating and complicating 
factors. For example there are two conceptions of mutuality, i.e. the 
mutuality of intention and mutuality of fact, which includes the 
substratum of personality. The experience of mutuality is a special 
form of experience, since the object is conscious of being observed
83. Bozzo, op. cit., pp.224-225
84. PR p.73'
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as well as observing the subject. This quality makes mutuality 
foundational and the primary ground of experience, i.e. human 
personality which is also ihe focus of the religious mode of 
apperception.
Macmurray* s assumptions about and analysis of religious ex­
perience differed in some ways with more commonly held assumptions 
about religious experience. Macmurray seemed to be at odds with 
the idea that religious experience as such exists as something dis­
tinctive and rare; he conversely seemed to posit that religious 
experience is not only seme thing common, but essential to human life. 
H.D. Lewis in Our Experience of God remarked that:
If a religious experience makes possible, as may well happen, insights very markedly different from those we normally enjoy or brings with it powers which neither the agent himself nor others commonly exercise, then it will distinguish itself more sharply from other experiences and be more easily de­limited. But in no case, except perhaps preternatural ex­periences, will there be an obvious discontinuity, but rather a merging into appropriate sequels and the general change in the tenor of living.85
Hot all agree with Lewis* assumption that religious experience is some­
thing slightly appart from everyday experience. C.H. Whiteley in 
response to Lewis* assumption stated that:
If we are to put religious experience into a special category, as we might put aesthetic or erotic experiences, and inquire into their properties, we assume that, as experiences, they have a special character or combination of characteristics which groups them together and marks them off from secular experience; *the experiences which are properly religious* says Professor Lewis, *are distinctive and specific*. Now it seems to me that the great majority of religious exper­iences, in this wide sense of the expression, have no such character.®
84. PR p.75
83. Levds, Heywell D., Our Experience of God (London: Collins, 1974) 
p. 145
86. Santoni, Ronald B., (ed.) Religious Language and the Problem of Religious Knowledge. H.D.‘Lewis and C.H. Vhiteley "The Cognitive Factor in Religious Experience" (London:Indiana TTniversity Press, 1968) p. 258
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Although "Whiteley took a more moderate view of religious experience
than did Professor Lewis, he still considered religious experience
to be exceptional for a different reason.®^ V/hiteley wrote that;
"Religious experiences are rare, and therefore unfamiliar; we do
not know our way about them as we do about the everyday world, and
88we do not have the same amount of guidance from other people."
Both of these positions, i.e. Professor Lewis* and Mr Vhiteley*s, 
seem to assume that religious experience is something that is 
beyond or above the world of everyday living. Macmurray went to 
great pains to divorce himself entirely from the concept of a special 
or distinctive character as a part of the * religious experience*. 
Macmurray did not in fact set aside a certain group of experiences 
as those \4iich are religious only. Macmurray assumed that there is 
a locus or centre of interest around which each particular attitude 
or mode of reflection centres its investigation. However, Macmurray*s 
understanding of immediate experience and the central experience of 
mutuality makes it impossible to break experience into categories, 
since such an attempt at categorisation by definition disrupts and 
destroys the wholeness and unity of immediate experience, or put the 
religious experience in a special category. One may only differen­
tiate between the different modes of reflection, i.e. different ways 
of viewing experience.
Macmurray acknowledged the existence of the subjective experience 
as being of interest, but not as the centre of the religious experience. 
There have been several theologians in the history of the study of
87. Ibid p.258
88. Ibid p.259
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religious experience that have considered the subjective experience
to be the key to religious experience. For example, there was
Fredierich Schleiermacher's concept of the "feeling of dependence"
which underlay his understanding of the experience that points to 
89God* Macmurray himself mentioned Rudolph Otto as an example of
a well known theologian that made use of the concept of subjective
experience to define religious experience. Otto claimed that the
feeling of awe or reverence which he labelled the ‘numinous* is at
90the core of religion.-"^  Otto maintained that the sense of the numi-
fibus lay at the root of religion and he distinguished this state of
mind from any other state of mind. Otto referred to the combination
91of 'awe* .and 'good'as 'holy'.
Macmurray did not believe that psychological forces were at the
92centre of religious experience. Macmurray posited that man*s feelings
are not developed in a vacuum but are affected by the forces that
surround him. They are developed in relation to the actual world in
which one lives. Gilbert Ryle has pointed out that when one talks
of * experiences * one tends to treat mental events as being part of
the same general type as physical events, consequently making what he
95terms a general category mistake. Ryle's analysis of mental events 
as opposed to physical events illustrates one of the weaknesses of the 
subjective approach to religious experience. Another criticism of the
89. Schleiemacher, Friedrich, The Christian Faith* (Edinburgh:T.T. Clark, 1928) p.1? I
90. Otto, Rudolph, The Idea of the Holy,(London: Oxford UniversityPress, 1925) p.6
91. Ibid pp.6-7 _ . r . ’ . ;
92* RIT p. 253
93. Ward, Keith, The Concept of God* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1974) pp. 19-20
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subjective approach comes from the realisation, that the experiences 
of a person are shaped by his beliefs, consequently the feeling of 
awe may be only part of one's desire for belief in God.^^ qq© should 
not,/ therefore, deal only with an inner mental state, but also with 
the object or the physical event. Macmurray tried to find the 
physical events that were connected to the religious state of mind.
He concluded th^t these physical experiences or events were centred 
around the experience of mutuality; this 'in between* in human re­
lationships is a physical experience that is connected to the inner 
mental state. Not only does this.mental state have an empirical 
basis which is mutuality, it is also the basis of one's communion 
with God. One is then talkii^ about an actual occurrence that is 
directly connected to an inner mental state of mind. Macmurray 
thereby hoped to avoid confusing the events of the mind with external 
events since the external event leads to the mental event.
However, there are dangers in the stand that Macmurray chose to 
adopt. Macmurray*8 field of experience is so broad that his definition 
comes dangerously close to being without limits. One might say that 
Macmurray has broadened the field of religion to such an extent that 
one can no longer point to anything vAiatsoever and call it religion.
In doing so the impact of religious experience is no longer present,
i.e. the feeling of being gripped by some experience that is beyond 
the self and not part of the self. Macmurray has placed his emphasis 
upon the religious attitude, thereby removing hopefully some of the 
problems that arise from looking for specific religious experiences, 
but has he left room for the revelatory experience? Is there in fact
94" Penelhum, Terence,;Religion and Rationality, (London: Macmillian, 1971) p.176
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in Macanurray * s scheme a method by which one can receive and under­
stand revelation? Revelation for Macmurray seems to be the ever 
present personal experience enlightened by a particular attitude.
In the investigation of experience in particular religious 
experience, the experience of mutuality is of great importance. 
Mutuality is 'the between' in the relationship, which makes up the 
central content of not only the religious experience, but human life, 
in that it. is idle central experience in human relationships which is 
the foundation of each individual's self-realisation. Religious 
experience is bound up with a clear understanding of mutuality and 
the concept of personal relationships, vÆiich are part of the concept 
of community.
The next step in the chain after Immediate experience according 
to Macmurray, is the reflective experience. To understand more fully 
what Macmurray means by religion one needs to look at the reflective 
experience or activity.
CHAPTER 5 
Macmurray* s View of Reflection
- 89 -
The concept of immediate experience is closely linked, one 
might even say intertwined with the concept of reflection. Macmanus 
points out that 2fe,cmurray*s primary aim in his analysis is not the 
understanding of immediate experience itself, but the analysis of 
the nature of reason. ^ This naturally leads us to Macmurray*s 
approach to, and understanding of reflection.
When undertaking an investigation of Macmurray*s approach to 
reflection one is confronted with several avenues that lead to 
Macmurray*s theory 6f reflection. The main sphere of concern centres 
around the concept of reflective activity, but there are three areas 
that are of special interest. The first area of particular interest 
has to do with reason as the capacity for objectivity with the accom­
panying issue of the interdependence of reason and emotion within 
reflection. The second region of interest in Macmurray*s analysis of 
reflection concerns the characteristics of thinking, which includes 
Macmurray*s concepts of verification, unity-pattem and symbolism. The 
third area and one of special interest, has to do with the correlation 
between religion and reason.
The analysis of immediate experience by Macmurray is aimed at
2understanding the nature of reason, and this is emphasised by the 
interdependence of reflection and immediate experience. The q^ uality 
of the immediate eaperience not only depends upon the actual experience, 
but also upon the reflective experience of the person, which underlines 
the connection between reflection and Immediate experience. The activi­
ties of reflection are motivated by the fact ,that our memories of action,
1, Macmanus, Ora Boland, "The Concept of the Personal in the Writings ofJohn Macmurray" (Unpublished Doctoral Thesis % The Catholic University of America, 196?) p.204
2. Bozzo, El ward George, "Towards a Renewed Fundamental Moral Theology:The Duplications of the Thought of John Macmurray for Christian Ethics" (Unpublished Doctoral Thesis: The Catholic University of America, 19&9) p.252
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i.e. the immediate experience and its mental component practical 
knowledge, are incomplete and fragmentary. Macmurray maintained 
that: "The rational activities of reflection are efforts to extend, 
and in extending to correct where necessary the fragmentary content 
of immediate memory. As has already been noted earlier, the re­
flective experience, unlike immediate experience which is unified, 
is fragmentary in nature. The reflective experience introduces a 
division between tb.e thinker and the object.^ However, reflection 
is a necessary element, since one confronts failures in concrete 
activity for which immediate experience provides no means of over­
coming. One of Macmurray*s pivotal assertions is that: "Thought 
• 5begins in doubt". Macmurray considered action to be primary and 
thought to be secondary, and consequently normal thinking is only 
an interruption of the process of living and its justification "can 
only lie in its capacity to remove the cause of the interruption, so 
that the completeness of spontaneous life may be restored".^
For Macmurray thinking is an activity which brings about no
7change in the world. Thinking is an action that is not an action.
"The activities of reflection, since they are not action, but "doings" 
of the Subject, make no difference to the Object. They merely
0determine for the Subject in idea what is already determinate in fact. "
3. SA p.171
4. Macmanus, op. cit., p.23
5. lu pp.36-57 '
6. IÏÏ pp.38.-39
7. Kirkpatrick, Frank Gloyd, "The Idea of God in the Thought of JohnMacmurray" (Unpublished Doctoral Thesis: Brown University,
1970) p.57
8. SA p . 171
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Macmurray pointed out that at the root of the distinction between 
real or concrete activity and reflective activity lies the distinc­
tion between images and things. Hawever, the distinction is not 
that simple or clear cut, since the image of an object is a guiding 
factor in our perception of that object. Macmurray pointed out
that: "The image of anything guides perception in the search for the 
9thing." Consequently, thought is an activity since it is a part of 
experience and all experience is active, but it is not a 'true* 
activity since it changes nothing in the world. Thought manipulates 
images as action manipulates things. Thought and action are inter­
dependent, but in Macmurray*8 opinion thought is secondary to action. 
There are some problems connected with this assumption since action 
cannot determine itself and needs some factor to determine which
series of actions to undertake; this factor is reason. So can one
11say that thought is secondary to action? One needs to point out 
that even, though action is determined in fact; it is determined by 
intention, and this determination is within the province of reason.
The interdependence of thought and action in Macmurray* s thinking 
makes the subordination of one factor to another somewhat tenuous.
What is Macmurray*s conception of reflection, i.e. what is his 
definition of reason? Macmurray believed that reason when considered 
only within the sphere of cognition is the capacity for apprehending 
or discovering truth. He asserted that: "Reason in the field of cog­
nition, is our capacity for knowledge, and shows itself in the distinc-
__________________________________________ f__________________________
9. lU p.42
10. Thomason, V.P., "The Empirical Basis for Religion in John Macmurray*sPhilosophy" (Unpublished Doctoral Thesis; The Southern Baptist Theological Seminary, 1972) p.140
11. This problem is more thoroughly covered in Harris, S., "Thought andAction" Review of Metaphysics (1959)» Volume 12 pp.449-461
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12tion between truth and error." However, Macmurray assumed that
reason is primarily practical, and did not consider reason to be
bound up with those activities which are only concerned with the
requirements of knowledge. Macmurray expressed the wish to "cut
reason loose frcan its limitation to the field of cognitional activity,
15and take it as the characteristic of personal activity in general."
Macmurray wanted to remove reason from the confines of pure thought
and to broaden the definition of it. Macmurray considered reason to
be the "capacity for objectivity, and to say that it is the possession
of this capacity which distinguishes the persons from whatever is sub-
personal."^^ Macmurray asserted that:
The definition of reason which seems to me most satisfactory is this. Reason is the capacity to behave consciously in terms of the nature of what is not ourselves. We can express this briefly by saying that reason is the capacity to behave in terms of the nature of the subject, that is to say behave objectively. Reason is thus our capacity for objectivity. ^5
The capacity for objectivity is the capacity to stand in conscious 
relation to that which is not ourselves and recognise it as such. 
However, this does not constitute rationality; what constitutes ration­
ality is the fact that on top of the consciousness of the relation of 
that which is not ourselves there is the additional factor that we 
must be conscious of the apprehension of what is not ourselves.
Reason is then idie capacity in man to stand in conscious relation to 
what is external to himself and to be able to recognise this relation. 
Rationality involves all that enters into this relationship and this
17includes both the emotional aspect as well as the intellectual aspect.
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The inclusion of the emotional aspect with the intellectual aspect 
of thinking is essential not only to Macmurray* s conception of re­
flection, hut to his basic understanding of reason. Macmurray 
assumed that reason is not only the awareness of the intellectual 
or cognitional side of thought, but also the emotional aspect of 
thought as well. Macmanus states that: "It is in recognising that 
immediate experience is a whole that is composed of these two elements
that Macmurray is able to lay the foundation to develop his concept of 
18the personal." Macmurray was convinced that if one leaves out the
emotional aspect of thought, that not only will this lead to the errors
that are the result of intellectualism, but that the one-sidedness of
intellectualism will destroy the community. Since communal living is
necessary for the future of Man, Macmurray went to great lengths to
19point out the wider limits of reason.
"Rationality is not a peculiar characteristic of the intellect.
20It is equally characteristic of the emotional life. " Macmurray
argued that rationality cannot be reduced to just the intellect, but
must include the emotional. The tradition, that was inherited from
the Greeks and Romans contains deleterious influences, and leads one
to regard the emotional life of man as dangerous. This in itself sets
up a dualism that is not only unwanted, but also detrimental since it
splits the whole of rationality into two separate parts, i.e. reason 
21and emotion. Macmurray averred that limiting man to "Wie theoretical
life is harmful, since one concentrates upon the theoretical and there-
22by neglects the experience of living. Macüurray decried the influence
18. Macmanus, op. cit., p.205
19. Ibid
20. Iïïp.151
21. Macmanus, op. ci-É^ ., pp.60-6l
22. Bozzo, op. cit., p.112
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that is found in the Western tradition which stems from the dualism • 
of the Stoics which divides Reason and Passion, which has an inbred 
prejudice against emotional involvement in action. Macmurray con­
cluded that: "When this practical dualism becomes theoretical by
\the substitution of a theoretical for a practical intention, we gen­
erate the modem dualistic attitude in which reason is the unemotional 
and purely logical activity of the mind..which produces knowledge;
while emotion is the source of error through the prejudice which
25is inseparable from it."
If one accepts Macmurray* s definition that reason is the capacity 
for objectivily then one has to look more closely at the possibility 
of including emotion in the field covered by the term rational. 
Macmurray made the point that our feelings "refer to what is outside 
them, to some object about which they are felt, why should they not 
refer ri^tly or wrongly to their object just like thou^ts?"^^ 
Macmurray assumed true thoughts to be those correctly referring to 
reality and false thoughts to be those that do not refer to the real 
nature of the object. Feelings have the same function, i.e. false 
feelings do not have any true relationship to the object to which 
they refer, while true feelings do correctly refer to the object to 
vÆiich they refer. These parallel definitions underlie Macmurray*s 
assumption that reason and emotion are both part of the total field 
of rationality. Macmurray defined reason as the capacity for objec­
tivity which is the capacity to stand in conscious relation to that 
which is outside of ourselves. Emotion shaires this capacity to stand 
in conscious relation to that which is outside ourselves. Macmurray 
admitted that emotions are often likely to be subjective, but he also
23. PR p . 52
24. RE p. 25
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argued that the intellectual side of thought can he subjective.
Thoughts as well as feelings can be true or false, depending whether 
or not they are properly related to the world to which they refer. 
Macmurray maintained that: "emotions are capable of exhibiting the
quality of reason, that they may or may not fit the objective world
25to which they consciously refer". The intellectual phase of re­
flection as well as the emotional phase of reflection are the only 
two phases of reflection open to the solitary agent according to 
Macmurray» and both have their inception in sense-perception.
Macmurray defined the intellectual mode as "a generalised represen­
tation of the world as matter of fact; in the production of formulae 
which express the recurrent patterns of continuance of experience".
The emotional phase of reflection is defined as an activity of re­
flection which "moves towards a greater particularisation of the repre­
sentation and by this it expresses a valuation of what is represented 
as an end in itself".
Macmurray*s assumption that reason is emotion and intellect 
implies that man is objectively conscious of an object both emotionally 
and intellectually. Furthermore, Macmurray maintained that the basic
capacity of objectivity is found in the ©motional, while the intellec-
28tual phase can be considered to be subsidiary to the emotional. This 
point of view follows logically from Macmurray*s epistemology which is 
based upon the assumption that immediate experience and human relation­
ships lie at the centre of knowledge. Such knowledge is primarily
25. UTp.132
26. SA p. 198
27. SA pp. 198-199
28. KB p.75
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emotional since it is the feeling of the experience that initiates
a persoifs awareness of the object of conem. From this emotional
response stems intellectual knowledge, i.e. theoretical knowledge,
which is dependent upon the emotional response, and is consequently
subordinate to the emotional. The intellect guides and directs human
29activity, but emotion lies at the core and essence of human life. 
Macmurray maintained that: "The emotional life is not simply a part 
of an aspect of human life. It is not, as we so often think subor­
dinate, or subsidiary to the mind. It is the core and essence of 
human life. The intellect arises out of it, is rooted in it, draws 
its nourishment and sustenance frcm it, and is the subordinate partner 
in the human economy.
As has been previously pointed out the cessation of action occurs 
with the beginning of reflection. Reflection is an activity, but a 
type of activity, consequently a part of experience, that does nothing 
to change the world, i.e. it is real in that it exists, but not active
in terms of changing the existence of the world. Thou^t or reflection
31exist to overcome the obstacles that confront activity.
Ideas and images can function in two different ways. They can
serve as guides to perception or they can manipulate images or symbols
32in order to anticipate future events.^ Dnages are reductions of the 
perceived objects, which may also include symbols which are reduced 
general images.This means that one substitutes symbols for the unity
29. Bozzo, 6p. cit., pp.253-255 '
30. RE p.75
31. Thomason, op. cit., p.146
32. nr pp.40-42
33. Thomason, op. cit., p. 147
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of the immediate experience to form a symbolic or conceptual 
relational unity or schema which represents the unity of immediate 
experience ; Macmurray referred to this as a unity-pattem?^ Thought 
is a matter of description and the manipulation of images \Ædch in 
turn tries to go beyond present events. Macmurray has stated that:
"If I am in difficulty, for example, about how to achieve a certain 
end, I may suppose it achieved and then fill in, in imagination, the
various steps which will connect my present situation with the situa-
35tion which I have imagined. Thought as supposai is not entirely 
free, however, to presuppose anything whatsoever. There are limits 
imposed on thought, which are derived from the unity-pattem, which 
has been derived from experience. Suppositions are limited by the 
unity-pattem, since one must return to action. This leads directly
36to the problems that surround verification of thought. Macmurray
in his analysis of reflection utilised three important concepts, vdiich
are symbolism, unity-pattem and verification.
A concept of importance is Macmurray* s principle of verification.
37Since the purpose of thought is to return one to practical action , 
verification of thought is primarily a retum or referral to action. 
"Verification is primarily a retum from thought to action, in order 
to find in the immediate experience of concrete activity a justifica­
tion for accepting the conclusions which have been reached through the 
manipulation of ideas in the thought processes. "Hie implications 
are far reaching since it implies a distrust of speculative thought
__________________________________________ t________________________
34. Kirkpatrick, op. cit., p.58
35. IÏÏ p.56
36. Thomason, op. cit., pp. 149-150
37. Ibid p . 150
38. lU p.74
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which also infers that thought alone, however correct, cannot
39guarantee its own conclusions. Another inference is that the 
testing of a conclusion may only he carried out in action. The im­
plication is that action, even thou^ it can disprove a conclusion, 
can never prove it, which has far reaching implications. Macmurray 
believed that all thought is rational and subject to verification, 
which applies not only to the sciences but also to all other intel­
lectual endeavours including philosophy. Verification, when viewed 
in terms of Macmurray* s overall characterisation of thought, follows 
quite naturally since one is driven to thought at the beginning because 
of doubt arising from interrupted action, which causes one to manipu­
late ideas and images in such a way as to anticipate the consequences 
of possible actions in the future by means of various supposais. The 
whole exercise is carried out in order to retum ultimately the thinker 
to action. The thinker's retum to action and consequent verification 
or lack of verification of his conclusions are an integral part of the 
total schema.
Macmurray emphasised the practical function of thought, which is 
illustrated by his use of the terms * adequate * and 'inadequate* when 
applied to thought as opposed to the use of the terms * true* and * false*. 
Macmurray stated that: "An idea or system of ideas cannot in itself be 
either true or false. . But it can be adequate or inadequate to the 
function which it was designed to f u l f i l . T h i s  is directly linked 
to Macmurray* s assumption that knowledge "in so far as it is the result 
of the processes of reflection, does not involve certainty".Macmurray
39. ro p. 75




in using the terms 'adequate* and 'inadequate* removed the conno­
tation of certainty which might result when using the terms * true ' 
and 'false*. Certainty can only he found in immediate or practical 
knowledge and never in theoretical knowledge, i.e. knowledge that 
comes from reflection. This applies to all thought even thou^t 
that is found to be adequate and is confirmed in action. Macmurray 
stated that: "The failure of an experiment ' disproves the truth of 
the theory on which it was based, but the success of an experiment 
does not prove the truth of anything. Nevertheless, even thou^ 
certainty is not possible for any theoretical conclusion, this does 
not mean that the verification of an idea from action by experiment 
in a particular situation does not supply a perfectly valid ground 
for an increasing confidence in our conclusion. The belief that an 
idea is adequate or true is subject to verification in the action of 
the self.^^ At the heart of Macmurray* s epistemology is the concept 
that neither thought nor experiment can guarantee truth. Thought 
cannot provide knowledge tiat is certain and fixed; only immediate 
experience can in any possible way offer such guarantees. Thought 
provides only theoretical knowledge. The purpose of the verifica­
tion or reflection is not to guarantee the truth of the assertion 
brought about by reflection, but to link reflection with action.
It must be pointed out that the principle of verification as proposed 
by Macmurray is considered to be tenuous by some since it is basically 
a theory of assent which is based upon Bishop Butler's idea of
r
43* Kirkpatrick, op. cit., pp.62-63 
44* nr p.76
45* Kirkpatrick, op. cit., p.63
46. Macmanus, op. cit., pp.36-37
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converging probabilities, \4iich. is no more than a recognition of 
the fact that common sense is normally correct.
There are, however, certain necessary aspects that one must 
attempt in order to make thought adequate^ such as insuring that 
thou^t is internally non-contradictory. The laws and rules of 
logic attempt to bring about the internal unity of thou^t. This 
unity of thought is necessary since thought cannot hope to properly 
represent the unity of immediate experience without it^ Macmurray 
asserted that:
The' absence of contradiction, the maintenance of consistency, the securing of strict implication in the relation of conse­cutive stages in the thought-process are all aspects of this effort to maintain the unity of structure in a system of ideas from which we start, throu^ the whole process of activity until the conclusion is reached. The preservation of this structural unity is not a complete guarantee, as we shall see. But without it there is little likelihood that the conclusion will be true. Within the thought-process itself it is the only guarantee. All other guarantees lie beyond the process of thinking itself.49
The purpose of philosophy in Macmurray* s view is to reflect and to
express the unity of immediate experience. However, Macmurray laid
stress upon the fact that no unity-pattem may ever reproduce wholly
the unity of immediate experience, since reflective activity is only
a fragment of reality as immediately experienced, and therefore can
never hope to provide a complete representation of the wholeness of
immediate experience. Nevertheless, even though- -the unity-pattem
cannot give the wholeness of the immediate Experience it does play
an essential role in thought. The unity-pattem is a stimulant to
thou^t since a set of symbols alone cannot in itself lead -fco new
47. Ibid p.208 .
48. Kirkpatrick, op. cit., p.58
49. lU p.60
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ideas, but needs to operate within some schema, form or set of
50relationships in order to be productive. This schema must be 
presupposed and this is the unity-pattem.
TJnity-pattems serve as a way for one to interpret the 
world and one's self and the interaction between the two. Macmurray ihas
offered us three types of unity-pattem. The first two types are
\
the traditional ones, that are to be found in modem philosophy.
The first and foremost of these unity-pattems is -tiie mathematical
51or mechanical unity-pattem or model. The mathematical unity- 
pattem "arises from the necessity of manipulating physical objects 
and is, therefore, adapted to the representation of reality so far
as reality is stuff to be used, or to put it more technically, so
52far as reality is material". !Hie second unity-pattem in terms
of which the world and experience has been interpreted is the organic
55or biological unity-pattem, which bases its conception not on the 
material but upon growth and life. Macmurray wrote about the organic 
unity-pattem that: "it is in the phenomena of life, and particularly 
in the processes of growth, that this spontaneity of inner self- 
determination directed development seems, at least to be characteri­
stically manifest. Its key-concept is not substance, but organism,
54and its problem is the form of the organic." The organic unity is 
55felt as opposed to the calculation of the mathematical unity.
The third unity-pattem is that of the personal, which Macmurray 
considered to be a better alternative than the mechanical .or organic
50. Macmanus, op. cit., pp.28-32
51. HaddoK, Michael Bruce, "Action and Religious Knowledge : The Personas Agent in the Thought of John Macmurray. (Unpublished Doctoral Thesis:, Duke University, 1970) pp.52-53
52. lU p.85
53* Haddox, op. cit., p.59
54. SA p.33
55. IUn.110
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uni ty-pattems, since these uni ty-pattems inadequately represent 
the experience of personality. Macmurray maintained that the mathe­
matical and organic uni ty-pattems failed to represent the world 
properly since neither of them adequately represent personality which 
is the focus of immediate experience.Macmurray argued for the 
inclusion of the thinker within the unity-pattem, thereby making 
this unity-pattem closer to the unity of immediate experience.
"It is only when we reflect upon our experience of persons that we 
ourselves, including our activity of reflection, come into the 
picture. So long as we are reflecting upon matter or life, we our­
selves, as persons stand outside the aspect of reality towards which
57our thought is directed. " Since thoughts about ourselves enter 
into the reflective experience, the unity-pattem meant for life and 
material is no longer adequate. This is a clear re-statement of 
Macmurray*s basic temary modes of apperception with the personal and 
religious posited as the primary mode or unity-pattem.
The unity-pattem is essential for reflection, but the unity- 
pattem in turn provides only a form or pattern for symbols. Symbols 
come not only from the reduction of images, but from a generalised 
reduced image. Macmurray averred that: "In a wide sense of the term, 
all images may be said to be symbols since they are substitutes for 
the things of which they are images. But usually, we employ the word
in a narrower sense, to mean something that represents another thing
58 59without having an obvious resemblance to it." Words are symbols ^
__________________________________________ t_______________________
56. Haddox, op. cit., pp.69-70
57. IÏÏ pp.124-125
58. ITJ pp.44-45
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which can be said to be both general and reduced images. The value 
of symbolic representation combined wildi a schema or unity-pattem 
is that it provides for the self at the moment of withdrawal from 
action with a set of ideas that can be manipulated in various ways 
without disturbing the order of the world.
The courses of action, that are purposed by the manipulation 
of the symbols, that are logically connected or held together by an 
intemal unity-pattem, represent the unity of the self's experiences, 
which makes up theoretical knowledge, which is different from the 
immediate or practical knowledge that is gained from immediate exper­
ience without any reflective activity being involved.Macmurray 
held that one too easily identifies reason with our capacity for 
knowledgeOne, therefore, has knowledge in action, which is our 
primary knowledge,and knowledge that comes from reflection.
The process of abstraction is also conceived of in terms of the 
reduction of images into symbols.This reduction of images can be 
called a focusing of attention on what is common to or similar to 
several images. Macmurray maintained that this "selectiveness of 
attention underlies and accounts for those characteristics of re­
flective activity which are traditionally referred to as 'abstraction' 
and 'generalisation'. Reflective abstraction is a negative 'taking 
away', a taking away which in fact takes nothing away.^^
60. Kirkpatrick, op. cit., p.60
61. Ibid ^
62. OS p.56 
65. SA p. 169
64. IÏÏ p.43
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A central area of interest for Macmurray was the connection
between religion and reason. Macmurray did define religion in terms
of reason as "the reflective aspect of a universal human experience,
the experience of living in relation to one another". Religion is
the universalisation of the central factors of human experience, Wiich
means that; "religion is the primary expression of reason in human
life". Nephew summarises Macmurray*s position as maintaining that:
"the rationality of man is the foundation of religion, and it is
through his rationality that man can construct a personal life which
is fulfilling, a life style which is fulfilling for the individual
and for the society".Religious reflection is a withdrawal from
activity as is all reflection, but it withdraws to seek the solution
to the problem of mutuality. Religion as reflective activity aims
70at the practical action of bringing people together.
Religion is the primary and the fullest expression of rational­
ity more so than either science or art. Religion is more comprehen­
sive as an expression of rationality because "the relation of a person
to other persons defines a limited field, it is a field in which the
71object includes all general factom in our experience". It is only 
in the full relation of one person to another that rationality can 
completely express its own nature. Macmurray understood religion as
66. SHE p. 48
67. SRB p.54
68. Nephew, Albert Henry, "Philosophy is Tieology; The Nature andFunction of Philosophy According to John Macmurray" (Unpublished Doctoral Thesis : Marquette University, 1970) p.111
69. Ibid p.112
70. Thomason, op. cit., p.209
71. RE p. 197
- 105 -
an expression of rationality in its fullest sense as well as being 
"the drive to achieve rationality in our relations with our fellows 
Since reason is primarily practical, one finds in the field of personal 
relationships the expression of rationality which is to be discovered 
in the behaviour of men and wonen with one another.Macmurray again 
has asserted as he did when discussing religion in terms of experience 
and the various modes of reflection, that religion is central. The 
central theme is that: "reason as religion must restore that community 
of Nature and reintegrate man with man and mankind with Nature, at a 
higher level. Vi thin this task fall the other expressions of human 
rationality, and only in their relation to it can they have any signi­
ficance".'^^ Macmurray is again reiterating the central theme that 
places the concepts of religion and community at the focus of his 
philosophy.
When one assumes that religion arises out of the primary fact of 
the mutuality of personal relationships, then there are, according to 
Macmurray, certain facts that must follow. The first is that religion 
as a primary fact of human existence cannot be separated into a single 
compartment isolated from the rest of human existence. Religious re­
flective activity is primarily a practical activity since it aims to 
bring persons into communion with one another, which implies that
everyone must be included since religious reflection must be carried
75on by each individual in his communion with others. Macmurray under-
72. RE p.199 
75. RE p.211
74. 08 p . 40
75. Thomason, op. cit., pp.208-209
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scored the central position of religion and community when he 
asserted that: "the key to the nature of personality, and so of
76reason, lies then, in the nature of friendship".
Macmurray understood the mutuality of human relationships to
he the key difference between the relation between subject and object
and between person and person. Macmurray asserted that: "since the
activity of relation between persons is mutual, the primary aspect
of religious reflection is also mutual. Since the primary activity
of any form of reflection is the expression of the given fact, the
primary activity of religious reflection is the mutual expression
77of the experience of mutual relationship." The symbols of religious
78reflection are the symbols of community, which denote the mutual 
relationships within the community, and for that matter the mutuality 
of the community as a whole. Rationality for Macmurray is disclosed 
in his analysis of personal mutuality, which includes both the emotive 
and intellectual types of reason, which finds the interpersonal life 
of the community to be its primary field of activity. At the highest 
reaches of rationality one finds the capacity for self-transcendence 
and the accompanying desire to centre one's concern around another. 
Macmurray* s radical heterocentric approach is compatible with Christian 
teachings, since selfishness and self-interest are seen as signs of
79immaturity and consequently of failure in the attainment of rationality.
The two main thrusts of Macmurray's understanding of reason are in 
terms of reason as a whole, i.e. as both emotional and intellectual. 
 /________________________
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Macmurray not only understood reason to be a fairly wide and all- 
encompassing term for thought and feeling, but he also anchored 
the whole of thought by attaching it firmly to action. The overall 
practical approach of Macmurray towards rationality fits in with 
the central theme of religion and interpersonal relations.
CHAPTER 6
God as The Transcendent Other
- 109 -
In order to truly understand Macmurray*s concept of religion, 
one needs to examine his thinking about God. Macmurray* s thinking 
about the idea of God revolves around several factors, which are 
necessarily influenced by elements of his rather singular epistemo- 
logical approach and particularly by his emphasis upon the concept 
of the personal which leads to Macmurray* a singular assumption that 
the primary mode of reflective rationality is religion. ^ One would 
expect the primary concern of religious reflection to be with the 
knowledge of God or in Macmurray*s nomenclature the universal personal 
Other. The data for this reflection comes from the immediate exper­
ience of the mutuality of personal relationships. Religious reflection 
as in the case of all reflection arises from a failure in action, 
Macmurray posited that religious reflection "arises from a failure in 
personal relationships, and its reference, as a symbolic activity, is 
to personal relationship". Macmurray took this a step further by 
arguing that religious reflection "aims at knowledge of the personal 
Other in mutual relation with oneself; it is for the sake of the life 
of active personal relationship; its function is, therefore, to under­
stand the reason for the failure so that the relationship may be resumed
2in a way that will avoid failure in the future". Religious reflection 
universalises its problems by making use of the idea of a universal 
person to whom all agents stand in an individual relationship. The 
universal person is "the idea of God, and religious knowledge is rightly 
described as the knowledge of God. Such knowledge will apply universally 
to all instances of personal relationship".^!
1. PR p. 167
2. PR p. 168
3. PR p. 169
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Macmurray rejected the traditional idea of God and in particular 
the one to he found in the traditional philosophical proofs of God*s 
existence.^ Macmurray maintained that: "The God of the traditional 
proofs is not the God of religion".^ The God represented in the 
•traditional proofs* rests upon a dualism of thought and action which 
Macmurray vehemently rejected.
One of Macmurray* s most fundamental epistemological assumptions 
is that knowledge presupposes experience. Something must be at least 
capable of being directly or indirectly experienced in some way if one 
is to understand it. The idea of God as developed by Macmurray can be 
experienced or is at least capable of being experienced.^ Kirkpatrick 
maintains -ttiat the experience of God "is primarily the experience of
7standing in relation to a universal personal Other". The idea of God 
is an idea of the Other which one should be able to conceive of as being 
experienced in some way,® or it will not be possible to have knowledge 
of God since knowledge presupposes experience. Macmurray did not discuss 
the explicit experience of God beyond his description of the experience 
of the Other which is an experience that is found in personal relation­
ships. Macmurray spoke of the experience of God as being one that is 
founded upon the experience of mutuality. Macmurray stated that: "In 
religion is the mutuality between the self and another which is the 
object of reflection. The universal, therefore, must be a universal 
person to whom the self stands in universal relation. The idea of God
4. PR p.206 ^
5. PR p. 207
6. Kirkpatrick, Prank Gloyd, "The Idea of God in the Thought of JohnMacmurray" (Unpublished Doctoral Thesis: Brown University, 1970)p. 80
7. Ibid p.81
8. Ibid p.82
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as the universal Other is, therefore, inherent in the act of religious 
reflection"./ Macmurray maintained that the universal Other could not 
be denied since it exists in experience and to deny the universalisa­
tion of the concept of the Other would be to deny the act of reflection. 
"The universal cannot be denied, since to deny it would be to forbid 
the act of reflection, while it is only through the act of reflection 
that the denial is possible. The existence of God cannot, therefore, 
be rationally denied, since it cannot be denied without self-contradic­
tion."^^
There are several implications that one can draw from Macmurray* s
epistemological principles which can be applied to the concept of the
experience of God. The first of these implications is that the expeiv
11ience of God must be related to the self*s other experiences. This
is derived from Macmurray* s assumption that all experiences are a
unity, which is to say that the experiences of a person are not made up
of many different parts but have a wholeness or a completeness which is
12only broken by reflection. Furthermore, this also implies the inter-
15relation of all experiences, and consequently that the experience of 
God is related to all other experiences. Ttie conceptual representation 
of experience must itself strive to be a unity, since the concepts 
represent a unity namely the unity of experience. The idea of God or
9. SRB p.80
10. Ibid
11. Kirkpatrick, op. cit., p.87
12. lU p.23
13. Kirkpatrick, op. cit., p.90
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the experienced universal Other must, therefore, be represented
with a unified schema or matrix. Kirkpatrick points out that this
implies that the idea of God under consideration could be subject to
the principles of l o g i c . T h e  criteria of conceptual unity does not
prove an idea, or for that matter the testing of any idea does not
totally verify it, however, it does give reasonable grounds for belief,
and it is in Macmurray* s nomenclature an adequate idea. The theoretical
knowledge of God and the manipulation of the idea of God adheres to the
same rules and criteria which are applicable to the development of any
i d e a . T h i s  does not mean that God, himself, is subject to the rules
and criteria of the development of ideas, but only that our conception
of God is subject to these principles of logic. The idea of God like
all other types of theoretical knowledge is subject to verification by
immediate experience. The idea of God is constantly modified by the
change in one*s knowledge of any experienced Other and is also limited
17by possible future experiences of God.
Macmurray*8 understanding of God revolves around the idea of the
Other. Macmurray universalises the idea of the Other or the Thou of
18the *I-Thou* relation and labels this God. Therefoi^, the concept 
of the Other is important to the understanding of Macmurray* s conception 
of God. As has been noted self-realisation is dependent upon a relation 
with another, which shows the importance of the Other. Macmurray 
maintained that: ' "behaviour is incomplete ydthout a response from one 







of personal behaviour we shall refer to hereafter as the mutuality
of the personal. It is what we mean when we say that the personal
is constituted by the relation of persons. The reference to the
personal Other is constitutive for all personal existence”. The
basic characteristic of the Other is further underlined when Macmurray
argued that: "If we did not know that there ^ e  other persons we could
know literally nothing, not even that we ourselves existed. To be a
person is to be in communication with the Other. The knowledge of the
Other is the absolute presupposition of all knowledge, and as such is
20necessarily indemonstrable". The knowledge of the Other is the basic
knowledge which enables us to beccane persons which in turn makes us
able to act, reflect and know. Since the knowledge of the Other is
a priori ' to all things that make up the person than it cannot be
demonstrated by using such things which themselves are based upon the
21knowledge of the Other, e.g. reflection. Therefore, Macmurray con­
sidered the knowledge of the Other to be beyond the reach of deduction 
and demonstration, although it is certainly a part of immediate exper­
ience.
Macmurray in his examination of the concept of the Other declared 
that: 'tMy first discrimination of the Other is into a number of diff­
erent persons all of whom are in communication with me and with one
another. The Other acquires the character of a community of which I am
22a member". The primordial relationship with the Other begins with 
the mother-child relationship. The baby lives from the very beginning 
in relation to others. The important philosophical point is that one
19. PR p.69
20. PR p.77
21. Haddox, Michael Bruce, "Action and Religious Knowledge: The Personas Agent in the Thought of John Macmurray" (Unpublished 
Doctoral Thesis: Duke University, 1970) p.147
22. PR p.77
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cannot see the structure of personal existence in terms of the
23individual, i.e. as if the person was not a separate entity.
Another basic assumption that one can infer from Macmurray*s con­
ception of the Other is that knowledge of the levels of reality 
issues from our basic knowledge of persons, which differs from the 
normal assumption that reality is known from the physical, organic 
and personal in that order.
One of Macmurray*s basic philosophical principles is that one 
interacts with immediate experience which is a unity. Therefore, 
the Other must not only be a part of the unity, but also personal, 
since it is irrational not to assume that the other is an agent, i.e, 
that the Other acts intentionally in relation to the self as agent. 
Macmurray concluded that:
In action, I know that I exist as agent, and that the Other exists as resistance and support of my action. The rule governing the process through which I seek to determine the character of the Other is this: I must determine myselfand the Other reciprocally, by means of the same categories. Whatever formal character I ascribe to the Other, I must ascribe to myself, and vice versa. If I determine the Other merely as body, I must ...determine myself merely as body; if as a system of energy, then I must determine myself recipro­cally as a system of energy. But I know that the energy I exert in action is intentionally determined, and this I express by saying that I am an agent who does things, and whose acts are not merely events which happen. Consequently I must characterise the Other in the same terms, as an agent acting intentionally in relation to me. If I determine my­self as agent and the world as a system of energy which is impersonal, then I conclude, irrationally, that I am the only agent, and that I am not part of the world in which I act.^ o
25* Haddox, op. cit., pp.147-148 
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The other that I encounter is not only personal, but also part of
the whole of immediate experience. Macmurray reasoned that in man's
immediate experience of other persons he comes into contact with God
27as the "infinite of the personal".
The basic position that Macmurray maintained is that the univer­
sal Other -tiiat one encounters in immediate experience is the 'infinite 
of the personal* which is God. Macmurray universalised onefe interac­
tions with other persons beyond the interaction with a ccanmunity of 
persons. Macmurray assumed that; "The immediate experience of per­
sonality is the experience of infinite personality in finite persons, 
and so it is the experience of God as the personal absolute, as the 
unity of persons in relationship; it is iiie knowledge of that person­
ality 'in whom we live and move and have our being* as St Paul put it 
long ago". The interaction with the other is the primary point of 
self-realisation for Macmurray as well as the primordial experience 
in our lives. He took this a step further when he included the assump­
tion that: "God as infinite personality is the primary natural experience
of all persons. One might almost say, if it were not for the traditional
29limitations of language, that God is the first perception". This 
conception reappears in a slightly different form when Macmurray pointed 
out that our dependence upon what is not ourselves is the "core of our 
reality".
Man encounters God in the experience of the finite relationships. 
Man meets God at the personal level through the reciprocal mutuality 
of the personal.However, the generalisation and universalisation
27* Mooney, op. cit., p.185
28. lU p. 158
29. RE p.228
50. RE p.219
31. Mooney, op# cit., p.191
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of these relations within a community of persons of group of persons 
leads to Macmurray*s basic conception,of God. This is easily seen 
in his use of the terms 'the infinite Personal* and '-üie universal 
Other*. Both of the terms stem from Macmurray's belief that all 
knowledge is centred around the mutuality of the personal. The recog­
nition of the interdependence of people is at the very centre of 
Macmurray*s conception of God, ^Aich as the infinite personal, stems 
from man's encounter with the finite personal. The existence of God 
cannot be questioned, since the infinite of the personal is continuously 
disclosed through the experience of finite relationships which cannot 
be denied. This is illustrated by Macmurray*s understanding of the 
concept of incarnation.^^ Macmurray stated that:
God is the term which symbolises -üie infinite apprehended as personal, and it derives, as indeed it must, frcan our immediate experience of the infinite in finite persons.The idea of incarnation, which in one form or other appears in all immediate religions, merely expresses the fact that our awareness of the personal infinite comes to us, and can only come, in and through our awareness of finite per­sonality* ^2
For Macmurray the conception of God provides the basis of all personal 
relationships, and has a further function that is of importance, which 
is the idea of God as symbol.
If one once again harks back to Macmurray's epistemological 
principles one should recall that the purpose of reflection is the 
reduction of images into symbols and the consequent manipulation of 
those symbols.The whole aim of reflection is to reconstruct the 
wholeness of experience by the use of symbols within a matrix. The
51. Mooney, op. cit., p.191
52. lU p.124 
55. HJ p.44
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purpose of religious experience is to recover the wholeness of the 
personal experience. The symbol of God is the universal symbol of 
the Other, i.e. the infinite personal, which is the universal symbol 
of the accumulation of personal relations.
The notion of God arises when the self intends to represent sym­
bolically the unity of the community. Macmurray queried the formal 
representation of community. "How can a universal mutuality of 
intentional and active relationship be represented symbolically?" 
Macmurray concluded that: "only through the idea of a personal Other 
who stands in the same mutual relation to every member of the community. 
Without the idea of such a universal and personal Other it is impossible 
to represent the unity of a community of persons, each in personal 
fellowship with all others".Kirkpatrick poses a crucial question:
"Is this referent to be "üiought of as merely the community itself, or
as an ideal set of ends, or is it to be thought of as some Other who
57stands over against the community?" The symbol must at least hypo-
•58thesise an existent reality behind the symbol, since without ilie 
assumption of a real person behind the symbol one is attempting to 
manipulate and understand an avowed empirical reality using a non­
empiric al symbol. Kirkpatrick concluded that the concept of the Other 
in relation to the self does not mean the self in relation with the 
community. "It is not possible to think of the unity of relationship 
through the symbol of community itself as if the self could think of 
its relation to community as a relation to some Other. Community as
55. PR p. 164
56. Ibid
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such is not an Other, even though it can act as a single intention. 
Kirkpatrick goes even further and concludes that the intention of the 
community can only be determined and grounded in and by the idea of 
the Other over against the community as a w h o l e . T h e  next question 
of course revolves around tke idea of the Other as to the Person of 
the Other. Can the Other be more than an idea; can it be represented 
as a symbol, as an actual experience of an actual person? Some would 
argue that the Other is not only personal but is a person.
If one looks closely at the principles of Macmurray* s epistemology 
it causes one to realise that one cannot experience the Other as
'the personal' or as 'personhood', since both of these terms are
abstractions. Since the universal Other must be in reciprocal relation
and since this cannot be an abstraction, it must be as a person. The
highest category the self has for categorising its experiences including 
that of the Other is the Personal category. Therefore, one would expect 
the Other to only be experienced and known fully in terms of the personal. 
Since the Other is always considered to be the basic and the highest 
category of interpretation,. the personal category is the one in 
which one would experience, act with and reflect upon the Other. Since 
one cannot think in terms of the personal with a Person, it is consistent 
to see the experience of the Other as an experience with a Person. Since 
persons can be experienced directly and indirectly the self can therefore 
experience God.^^
Macmurray as has been pointed out, rejected the conception of God 
that is to be found in the 'God of the tradijtional proofs*. Macmurray 
also objected to the form of question that leads one to postulate
39. Ibid, p.150
40. Ibid, p . 151
41. Ibid, p. 158
42. Ibid, pp.160-166
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the *God of the traditional proofs* the question being "does God 
exist?Macmurray considered the expression of the question to 
be in the wrong form; he wished it to be expressed in the form "Is 
what exists personal?" A more complete form of the question would 
read "Is the universal Other from which the community of persons
distinguishes itself, and which is the same for all persons, a personal
’ 4-5or an impersonal Other?" An even more generalised form of the
question has to do with whether the world is personal or impersonal,
i.e. all things which are beyond ourselves. "For the difference
between a personal conception of the world and an impersonal one is
a difference of apperception, and modes of apperception may be more
or less adequate.Macmurray concluded that impersonal apperception
was inadequate since it only dealt with "what simply happens, as opposed
to the personal which deals with what is done".^ ^^  Actions are the
realisation of intentions, whereas events are from causes. If one
'conceives of the world as a series of events which has no intention
then one falls into self-contradiction, since persons are a part of
the world and they have intention behind their acts, i^le events do
not. Macmurray averred that:
There is, then, only one way in which we can think ourrelation to the world, and that is to think it as apersonal relation, throu^ the form of the personal.We must think that the world is one action, and that its impersonal aspect is the negative aspect of this unity of action, contained in it, subordinated within it, and necessary to its constitution’. To conceive
43. PR p . 207 »
44. PR p. 215
45. PR p.215
46. PR p.216
47. PR p. 221
—  120 —
the world thus is to conceive it as the act of God, the creator of the world, and ourselves as created agents, with a limited and dependent freedom to determine the future, which can he realised only on the condition that our intentions are in harmony with His intention, and which must frustrate itself if they are not.^G
Macmurray also noted that such a conception is fully theistic as well
as religious, and goes on to point out that pantheism is only an
extension of the organic conception of the world and has nothing to
4.9do with the personal, i.e. religious, conception of the world.
The final notion of Macmurray that needs to he examined is his 
conception of God as Agent which follows from the conception of God 
as Person. Macmurray assumed that a person to he a person must also 
he an agent. 3he notion of an agent and person are abstract con­
cepts when applied to the self. The notion of the self as agent is 
an abstract concept which sets forth the implications of acting. The 
notion of a person on the other hand is an abstraction introduced to 
deal with the self in relation to other selves. The dual conception 
of the self goes another step by introducing the fact that the abstract
concept of agent is away from other selves, while person is in terms of 
51other selves. Macmurray did not directly speak of the contrast
between God as Agent and God as Person, but Kirkpatrick in his study
commented that: "God as Person would then refer to the God who, as
an Agent, has acted in such a way that He has revealed a particular
character or 'personality*. The concept of God as Agent would refer
to what God must be in order for Him to be able to reveal himself in
52this particular way". Macmurray stated that: "The universal Other
48. PH p.222
49. PR p.223
50. Kirkpatrick, op. cit., p.191
51. Ibid, pp.192-194
52. Ibid, p . 195
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must be represented as a universal Agent whose action unifies the ' 
actions of every member of the community, and whose continuing inten­
tion is the unity of all their several intentions'*.^^ This introdu­
ces the concept of God as "üie unifier of the intentions of the communi-ty. 
Since a community is made up of persons in relation there needs to be
a way to unify the intentions of the persons without negating the
54freedom of any of the persons. The notion of God as Agent arises
when the unity of intentions within the community needs to be symboli-
55cally represented. The universal Agent then not only symbolises the
unity of intention, but also has to be thought of as having the power
to control the world in which his actions take place to such an extent
that his intentions will be realised.
Macmurray has always understood the idea of God to be central to
the conception of religion and religious reflection. Macmurray very
early in his writings stated that:
The whole of religion is rooted in the idea of God. It seeks and claims to find experience of God, both theoret­ically as knowledge, and practically, as fellowship and communion. However varied may be the diversities of religious belief and of religious practice, however many coloured and motley the conceptions of the nature of the Divine, all religion centres in the practical belief that supreme reality is God.57
Macmurray not surprisingly puts God into the centre of all things 
that are religious. The symbol of religious reflection is God. God 
is the term that symbolises the immediate experience of the infinite 
apprehended as the personal universal agent. That is to say God is
55. PR p. ' 164 '
54* Kirkpatrick, op. cit., p.196
55. Ibid, p.197
56. Ibid, p.208
57. Macmurray, John, "Objectivity in Religion" in Adventure : TheFaith of Science and the Science of Faith.ed. Streeter,Bumet H. (New York: Macmillan, 1928) hereafter cited as OR, p.181
58. Mooney, op. cit.,, p.85
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not only scsneone that one can he in relation to, hut also someone
that acts and whose intentions can be i^cognised as being behind
those acts. For Macmurray religion claimed that: "the supreme and
only absolute reality of the universe is a personal God,...."^^
God is not only a symbol of interpersonal relations, but is a unity-
symbol of the infinite personal that represents the unity of all men
60in personal relationships. Macmurray stated that: "God is the 
unity of the whole; and making that knowledge real because God is 
individual and concrete —  the absolute of personality.
59. OR p. 214
60. Mooney, op. cit., pp.85-86
61. RE p.192
CHAPTER 7 
Jesus Christ as Religious Genius
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Macmurray* s understanding of Gk)d centres upon personal relations, 
mutuality and reciprocity, i.e. those things that are the core of 
community. Macmurray*s perception of Jesus Christ, one can assume, 
should also follow the same path and concentrate on personal relation­
ships and community.
Mooney assumed that Macmurray* s notion of religion finds its 
ultimate verification in the immediate experience of Jesus of Nazareth. 
Macmnirray's notion of religion, which emphasises the heterocentric 
motivation and intention necessary to inter-personal action, is 
mirrored in his interpretation of Jesus* life, mission and teachings. ^ 
One must also keep in mind that Macmurray* s view of Christ was deeply 
affected hy his desire to synthesise Christianity and Marxism. Conse­
quently, in some works such as Ten Modem Prophets. Macmurray*s inter­
pretation of the religion of Jesus is labelled as a 'creative, revolu­
tionary type*. However, Macmurray*s interpretation of Jesus was 
basically a communal view.
The religious spirit meant to Jesus the intention to create through love, a universal human fellowship of free creative persons. Jesus taught that it was God's purpose to create, through the agency of loving service of individual human beings, such a universal fellowship, which would be the kingdom of God on earth. Jesus never for a moment doubted that God's purpose would be achieved. Hence the apocalyptic element of Christ's teaching, the confident prophecies of the redemption of human society. The special importance which Macmurray attaches to Christian as compared to Greek and Eastern teaching is based on his belief that we do not find in Greek or Eastern thought any such expression as we find in Jesus* teaching of the intention to create a universal human fellowship or any such belief that such a fellowship can be achieved.
1. Mooney, Philip, "The Notion of Religion in John Macmurray". (Unpublished Doctoral Thesis: Pordham University, 1972)p.226
2. Coates* J.B., Ten Modem Prophets (London: Frederick Miller Ltd.,1944) p. 106
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For Macmurray the ideas of Jesus revolve around the concepts of
personal relations, reciprocity, fellowship and communal relations,
Jesus* origins were firmly rooted in the Hebraic tradition and
He expanded upon them. He was the type of religious genius that
discovered certain basic truths. These truths, according to Macmurray,
have to do with the relationships between men.
Macmurray defined Christianity in terms of Jesus* life and works.
It is what Jesus did to human history by his life and death rather than what he said about it that matters when we come to define Christianity. His works consists not in what he told men they ought to do but in what he did to men.Christianity is primarily the movement which Jesus founded rather than the doctrines that he taught, and one of the reasons \Ay such controversy can arise over the interpretation of his teachings is that he was well aware of this, and behaved accordingly.^
This is in direct agreement with Macmurray* s assumption that action 
proceeds reflection. Macmurray fundamentally believed that Jesus* 
teachings are best understood in terms of the community of believers 
that evolved from his life and work, i.e. his activities. Macmurray*s 
interpretation of Jesus* work, in terms of the community he founded, 
closely follows Macmurray* s belief that the communal is primary, whereas 
the doctrinal part of religion is secondary. This underscores once 
again the importance of the concept of community in Macmurray*s philosophy, 
Macmurray explained Jesus* fundamental teachings in terms of the 
one to one *I-Thou* mutual relationship between two persons. Macmurray 
interpreted Jesus* teachings as a view of human society which was "based 
neither on the blood-relationships of natural affinity, nor on the 
organised relationships of political or ecclesiastical groupings, but 
simply on the practical sharing of life between any two individuals 
on a basis of their common humanity".^ Macmurray explained Jesus*
3. CHp.4
4. OS p . 67
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conception oft the world in terms of the pure *I-Thou* relationship 
which is devoid of the intricate and over-complicated web of social 
and impersonal relationships.
Macmurray viewed Jesus not in terms of an isolated individual 
confronting the problems of mankind, but as the culmination of events 
and the climax of Hebrew History, i.e. as part of the Hebrew community. 
Macmurray believed consequently that: "Christianity is essentially
5Jewish". Macmurray asserted that: "Jesus is at once the culminationgof Jewish prophecy and the source of Christianity". It was in Jesus 
that the development of Jewish culture was completed and the concomitant
7development of Hebrew experience into a universal force in human history.
"It was in Jesus that Judaism became a universal religion through the
discovery of its implications, and this discovery was the culmination
of a long process of historical development."
Macmurray certainly understood and interpreted Jesus* life in
terms'of the Hebraic prophetic tradition. Macmurray viewed Jesus as
"a Jewish Prophet, knowing the function of a prophet was to understand
more deeply and to express more effectively the meaning of the prophetic 
otradition".*^ Macmurray*s conviction that Jesus was the culmination of 
the Hebraic Prophetic tradition directs once again one's attention to 
Macmurray* s underlying dependence upon the concept of community and 
personal relations in his explanation of religion and the religion of 
Jesus.




9. Macmurray, John, "The Philosophy of Jesus" Quaker Monthly. (Jan 1978)Vol.52:1, p.11 cited hereafter as QM
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Macmurray held that:
Unlike the Greek and European Philosophies, which are theoretical, Hebrew thought would yield a practical philosophy# Its central problem would be the problem of evil, not of knowledge* It would also be a personal philosophy, in which persons are agents, and since an agent must have an 'other*, they are necessarily in relation. As persons in relation, they form communities which have a moral structure. The ultimate reality must biwC- à person^ infinite,', ' that is, God; and in a philosophy of action, he must be the absolute agent. This means that he is the beginning and the end; as the beginning he is the creator, both of the finite agents and of the world; in which they live; as the end, he is the personal unity of the achieved community of agents. 1^
Hebrew tradition and thought depended upon a clear idea of social
history, i.e. of commun! 1y action. Religion for Macmurray can only
be understood in terms of the events that take place within community.
Although Macmurray held that the Jews looked to history, he also
realised that: "the Jews never lost the sense of family relationships
11as the basis of society." Jewish society can consequently be under­
stood only in terms of community not in terms of society and nationality. 
Therefore, Macmurray maintained that: "Ve understand Jesus as the fully 
mature expression of the Jewidi consciousness; as the final unfolding,
in clear consciousness, of the implications of the Hebrew conception
12of the significance of social history".
Macmurray held that Jesus noticed no difference between social 
organisation and religion since the main characteristic, of the Jewish 
religious conscious is that the distinction between the social and the 
religious does not arise. "It is an integral consciousness, for which 





the Hebrew prophets, could not make a religious assertion without
making a demand upon social behaviour.
Macmurray* s insistence upon the communal aspect of the Hebrew
Tradition is clearly apparent in his assertion that:
... the process of Hebrew development became the process of discovering the spiritual basis of human community. Ve can trace in the succession of the Hebrew prophets the gradual deepening of the conception of social righteousness, not as an abstract ideal but as the structure of inner relationship between men which creates and maintains the community of socieJ. life, and which is the basis of all social fulfillment.The culmination of this development of real religion from its primitive immaturity was the work of Jesus. In him Hebrew religion came finally to self-consciousness, and the inherent meaning of the demand of religious reason was recognised. 14
Macmurray not only wrote about Jesus in terms of Hebraic tradition,
but also in terms of what might be called a religious genius. Macmurray
in one of his earliest essays used the term * spiritual genius* when
referring to a person who had disclosed the singular and distinctive
characteristics that were exhibited by Jesus in his life and work.
Macmurray asserted that Jesus was a religious genius who lead the Hebrew
community to self-consciousness.
Here lies the task of the religious genius. He is the individual in whom the consciousness of the meaning of religion is achieved at any stage in human development and through whom it is mediated and made available to humanity as a whole. He is indeed the mediator between God and man. Be is the interpreter to any society of men on the stage of community which they have achieved. He is the Word that expresses, and so realises in conscious­ness, for others as well as for himself, the meaning of the religious impulse as it has expressed itself in the creation of community. That consciousness, that expression in the world of the prophet, is the condition of any further advance in the achievement of community. It turns mere communiiy into conscious community of communion, and in doing so sets life free for a fuller achievement. But now the condition of this further achievement depends not
13. CH p.45
14. CS p. 61
15. Macmurray, John "Objectivity in Religion" Adventure; The Faithof Science and the Science of Faith ed. B.H. Streeter (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1928) p.205, hereafter cited as Adven
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merely upon the consciousness of the religious genius, but upon the sharing of that consciousness by his society* ... His experience has to become a shared experience, the common experience of the society. ...In becoming conscious of the significance of the community which has been realised in his own society, the religious genius removes the limitations of its particularity, and makes it available, not merely for his own but for a wider society. In the development of religion as a whole, there comes a point at which the full significance of the religious impulse is realised by one individual human being, and so becomes universally available for all men. He can then realise consciously —  in idea —  the complete nature of the religious life, the full meaning of the religious impulse in man. This, to my mind, is the significance of the personality of Jesus in history. He was the religious genius who realised the meaning of the community achieved through their history by his own people —  the Hebrew race; and in realising it he made available the univeraal meaning of religion for all time and for all people.
Macmurray considered Jesus to have been a religious genius that made
certain religious discoveries that He shared with the society in which
he lived. "The discovery which Jesus made was the discovery that human
17life is personal." "It is the self-discovery of his own essence as a
18human being and, therefore, the discovery of the essence of humanity. "
Macmurray went on to point out that: "the discovery of the essence of
humanity is the discovery, not merely of what human life ought to be,
but of what human life will be when the work of God in history is 
19completed." Macmurray believed that: "Jesus discovered the intention
of God for man, which is the end of the process of history, the Kingdom of
20Heaven which is to be established on earth". However, how does Jesus 
translate the essence of humanity into concrete terms? "Jesus defines 
the nature of human life both negatively and positively. Negatively
1 HE ,pp240-242 
17. CH p. 55
18.,' OH p. 57
19.. CH p . 58
20. CH p.58
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he defines it hy denying the validity of form of human life which 
21 ■axe not personal." Jesus rejected what Macmurray also rejected,
namely the organic relationship, i.e. Jesus made "the discovery that
22human life is not organic in its essential character". Jesus
denied that the organic type of relationship can he the basis of
human community. "In other words, he (Jesus) denied IJiat human
23community can be based upon blood-relationship. " The basic
discovery of Jesus is that: "a group of human beings who have no
blood-relationships to one another can be a human unity if its
members make, it so" . Blood-relationships, i.e. organ!c" relationships,
are for Macmurray a matter of fact, while personal relationships are a
matter of intention. The basic discover is that: "human nature cannot
25be defined in terms of natural fact, but only in terms of intention".
The basic intention -ttiat forms community is the heterocentric one of 
intending to help the other and the mutual one of having a common 
purpose. Macmurray*s definition of Jesus as a religious genius is in 
terms of his discoveries about canmunity.
Macmurray not only presented Jesus as a Prophet in the Hebraic 
tradition and as a spiritual or religious genius but also as a man with 
a mission. Macmurray realised that Jesus* mission was one that 
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"to conquer fear in the hearts of men and replace it by confidence
and trust to relieve us from life on the defensive, and replace it
by a life of freedom and spontaneity; to make life rich and full in
place of the thin and anxious existence to which our fear condemns 
27us". Macmurray believed that the main -tiieme of Jesuô* mission
had to do with the difference between faith and fear which is the
mortal sickness from which men suffer. "Men need to be saved from
their fear, and liberated into faith. The task is to re-establish
a universal trustfulness in human relations, in the place of the fear
28that distorts and destroys life." One must remember that faith
for Macmurray is "the natural condition of human consciousness" and
29something that has "no sense of isolation". Faith for Macmurray
30is the trust and confidence between persons in communal relationships. 
Macmurray summarised Jesus* mission as one of teaching men how to 
live together and to avoid isolation.
Macmurray did not strictly acknowledge that Jesus was God in 
human form. However, he felt that the hypothesis that Jesus was the 
incarnation of tlie Divine personality was closer to satisfying the 
known conditions than any other hypothesis. "The claim that Jesus 
of Nazareth is the incarnation of the Divine personality, is in fact, 
as we have already discovered, a claim that the human personality is 
universal. " Macmurray continued "it implies that all life and all 
nature can be understood in the light of His personality; that in terms 
of Him the practical problems of the unification of the world*s activity 
can be completely achieved; indeed that the^  kind of personality Jesus
27. Macmurray, John To Save From Fear (London: Friends Home Service Committee, I964) P*5* hereafter cited as TSFP
28. TSFF p.5
29. CS p . 109
30. TSFF p. 10
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31was stands behind the whole unitary process of reality". However,
for Macmurray the incarnation of God in a human personality, i.e. the
32incarnation of God in Christ is a hypothesis and not a dogma.
Macmurray* s reason for settling for this hypothesis instead of
another about the person of Christ is highly revealing. Macmurray
maintained that* "Better an anthropormorphic view of reality than a
33hylomorphic or even a biomorphic one". However, are these the only 
choices? Cannot there be an element of * theomorphism* in the equation 
in the sense of thinking in terms of God’s revelation, which was 
formed by God.
Macmurray surmised that Jesus is the paradign of the coming 
maturity of man*s religious consciousness. Jesus* mature religious 
consciousness meant that: "he recognised his mission as the establish­
ment of the KingdcM of God among men, the creation of the Kingdom of
Heaven on earth. It meant that he became clearly conscious of the
34-methods by %diich this was possible". The final mission of Jesus 
was the "preparation of the band of his faithful disciples to stand 
t o g e t h e r a n d  the setting up of the missionary community. Macmurray* s 
third view of Jesus as in the case of the previous two interpretations, 
basically focused upon Jesus* communal interpretation of humanity. The 
task which Jesus ordained for his missionary community was the creation 
of the universal community. However, Macmurray stressed that this was 
not just a spiritual community, but an earthly community that was 
universal. Macmurray, when speaking of Jesus* religious task of
36"creating a universal communion among men''-'^  ^concluded that:
31. ADVEN p. 207
32. ADVEN p . 215
33. ADVEN p . 215
34. RE p. 248
35. QM p . 30
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The task was no othei>-wordly task. It was not the creation of the Kingdom of Heaven in Heaven. There was nothing mystical or particularly ‘spiritual* in it. It was the task of creatingconscious community among all men eveiywhere --  nothing less;and necessarily included all the conditions, economic, political, and personal, which are involved in this.^'
Macmurray centred his interpretation around the idea of man*s immediate 
experience on earth. Consequently, Macmurray refused to consider the 
Kingdom of Heaven as something that has ideal or other-worldly signifi­
cance. Does such an anthropological interpretation of the idea of the 
Kingdom of Heaven reflect the total significance of Jesus* concept of 
the Kingdom of Heaven? Does not such a view limit the message as well 
as Jesus* understanding of man? Macmurray has limited Jesus* understanding 
of man hy confining him to the assumption that: "Religion is about 
society".Religion and any tzrue religious statement for Macmurray 
must be in terms of community and/or society. Therefore, Jesus as an 
example of mature religious .consciousness must necessarily deal mainly 
with the community. Macmurray stated that: "The purely spiritual which 
it seeks is the purely imaginary, a ghost world without substance or 
shadow." Macmurray asserted concretely that: "Jesus came to proclaim, 
not a way to escape the world, but the coming of the Kingdom of Heaven 
within it. Christianity is concerned with an earthly world which is 
eternally perfect. Not only does Macmurray limit the study of religion 
to community and its associated concepts, but to real community,', not ideal 
community. It is as if Macmurray wished to make the study of religion a 
matter confined to sociology and anthropology. Ultimately Jesus was not
a spiritual or theological genius^,but a sociological or anthropological 
genius for Macmurray.(%; r - - ; - / rÿ r ' ? -' ‘ ■ 5 . ' • 5 ,*» / .. ' _ / I ' . . . . . .  - . . . .
37. RE p.249 " ' "
58. Macmurray, John, A Challenge to the Churches: Religion and Democracy (London: Kegan, Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., Ltd., 1941) p.17 hereafter cited as CC
39. SRR pp.59-60
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Macmurray*8 identification of the KLi^om of Heaven with a 
worldly universal community is starkly revealed in his early works.
"The Kingdom of Heaven becomes the universal community of mankind 
based on the sense of unity between man and man, and expressing
40itself in the sharing of the means of life to meet human needs."
Community for Macmurray rested "upon a basis, of common humanity".
This reduces the Good News of the Gospels to the fact that all men 
have their humanity in ccsamon and not upon the fact that our salvation 
does not depeM upon our limited selves and the limits of mankind, but 
upon the powerful and loving being, God. Macmurray overlooked the 
spiritual power of Christianity as represented in the Holy Spirit in 
his efforts to anchor the Christian religion in immediate experience. 
Christianity is not only like the Hebraic tradition rooted in the 
material, but it goes beyond the material and Immediate experience.
Macmurray deduced that religion is primarily concerned with the 
communion of persons, consequently he presumed that it is concerned 
with social development. Macmurray maintained -tiiat religion is con­
cerned with social development, since "only by the establishment of 
the Kingdom of Heaven through the process of social development can
%  the conditions for the full and universal expression of personal
^ -:| communion be achieved". Jesus* teachings as interpreted by Macmurray
are based upon the experiences of ’Mutuality, of friendship, or communion 
between man and man"^^ which lie at the cbre of any religion for Macmurray. 
Macmurray*8 interpretation of Christ’s life and works is anthropocentric 
as opposed to theocentric. *
40. OS p.67




Macmurray postulated that Jesus discovered that human nature 
can only he understood in "terns of intention". Therefore the 
basic question that Macmurray asked was "what is the intention of 
God in history?" Not only what is the intention of God, but what
is necessarily "man*s real intention --  the intention which expresses
his real nature as part of the world" and the intention that: "unifies 
human action and integrates human nature". Macmurray believed that 
the intention of God was "a universal community of mankind based on 
love, freedom and equality.
Macmurray summarised Jesus* concept of faith in terms of trust 
between individuals. Macmurray rejected the interdependence of the 
concepts of mystery and faith. Macmurray maintained that: "a will 
to believe in mystezy" is a manifestation of fear.^^ Macmurray under­
stood not only faith, but God*s intention and creation in purely con­
crete terms in particular in terms of the communal aspects of man.
"God acts in history as Creator of Man, The intention of this creation
is known  a universal community of persons, with freedom and equality
48as its structural principles of relationships."
The central place held by the concept of community in Macmurray*s
conception of religion and Christianity is sharply illustrated when
Macmurray noted that:
Even at the worst, the idea of the unity of persons in relation remains as the core of religion.The language of Christianity bears the same testimony.The various sects and denominations are "communions".The central rituaO. of Christian worship is the "cele­bration of &)ly Communion". Terms such as "reconciliation"t
44* CE p.65 
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and "atonement", which are central to Christian theology, show the preoccupation of religion with those things which produce and perpetuate strife and enmity with removing the obstacles to friendly and harmonious group-life and the achievenent of satisfactory society.The most cursory reading of the New Testament will show how central to Christianity is this preoccupation with social unity and social unification. ... practically, its mission is to seek to realise the family unity of mankind.49 -
Macmurray went to even a further extreme when he maintained that:
"Christianity is inherently a revolutionary religion seeking the
achivement of a world community. It is about a new society that has
to be brought into being through the transformation of existing 
50societies." Macmurray went even further in his discussion of the
Hebrew's rejection of Jesus* teachings when he claimed that: "The
Hebrew ccanmunity to whom Jesus appealed to undertake the task was not
51prepared to sink its individual identity in a universal fellowship."
This hints that a hope and condition of Christianity is one of * sinking* 
into universal community. This hints at the extreme danger that is 
presented by an uncritical use of a collective/communal approach to 
the individual.
Not only is the core and intention of the Christian religion seen
by Macmurray in terms of community and human relations* but he also
limited ethics to the same sphere. Macmurray maintained that the
ethical teachings of Jesus was a realistic attempt to answer the question:
"What conditions must be fulfilled by any actual community if it is
52extended without limits and so becomes an inclusive fellowship?"
Macmurray*s understanding of the teachings of Jesus and the ethical
}conceptions of Jesus as well as the life of Jesus is based upon his 
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Macmurray* s approach demand an anthropological instead of a theo- 
logicial answer to all questions? Does Macmurray in removing the 
concept of mystery demand a physical instead of a metaphysical answer 
to all questions? A study of Macmurray*s understanding and use of 
the notion of community will certainly be revealing. Macmurray* s 
dependence upon the concept of community to explain religion makes 
an examination of the concept of community vital.
PART III
An Examination and Critique of Macmurray* s Conception of Community
CHAPTER 8
An Introduction to Macmurray*s Conception of Community
- 159 -
The understanding of Macmurray’s approach to, use of, and 
interpretation of community is seminal to not only his understanding 
of human nature and his conception of religion, hut to a clear under­
standing of his total philosophy. This is illustrated hy Macmurray*s 
perception of Gk^ d with its dependence upon his conception of community. 
Macmurray*s understanding of and conception of community as well as its 
opposite society is central to his total philosophy since within the 
framework of both of these groups, one finds personal and impersonal, 
relationships which is the central theme in Macmurray’s work.
The areas of primary concern that will he investigated will include 
Macmurray’s perception of both community and society, since society sheds 
light upon community, as well as. the interface that exists between these 
two differing conceptions of society. The first area to be examined 
will be Maomurray's conception of ccmmunity, since Macmurray*s assump­
tions about community lie at the very heart of his philosophy.
In Macmurray*s discussion about 'the original knowledge of the Other*, 
which is based upon his assumptions about the mother-child relationship, 
he first pointed out that the first knowledge of a child is the knowledge 
of the personal Other, i.e. the Other who responds to my cries and cares 
for me.^ Macmurray considered this to be the "starting point of all
knowledge" for a child and it must be "presupposed at every stage of its
2subsequent development". Macmurray also concluded that: "My first dis­
crimination of the Other is into a number of different persons all of 
whom are in communication with me and with one another. The Other 
acquires the character of a community of whifch I am a member. The 
community then starts within the family circle which afterwards becomes
1. PR p.76
2. PR p.76 
3* PR p. 77
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a model for all communities. This primary discrimination of the Other 
underlines the realisation that there is a group of persons in 
relation to one another and in personal relation to a group and also 
as individuals to each other. ^  This brings to the fore two basic 
elements that are necessary for the existence of community. The two 
elements are the need for two or more persons and for these persoi^ 
to be in personal relation with one another.
Community is a group of two or more persons that are held together
by personal relationships. This group is the material from which a
5fellowship or community arises. Macmurray declared that: "The members
of a community are in communion with one another, and their association
is a fellowship."^ This community is made up of members in positive
relation to one another which is the basic structural elements within
community. "The structure of a community is the nexus or network of
the active relations of friendship between all possible pairs of its 
7members•"
This fellowship is constituted from, as well as maintained by 
0mutual affection. This means that not only is the community held 
together and created by mutual affection, i.e. love, but also that the 
motivation behind the actions within community should be based upon love.
4. PR p.78
5. Kirkpatrick, Frank Gloyd, "The Idea of,God in the Thought of JohnMacmurray" (Unpublished Doctoral Thesis: Brown Universiiy,
1970) p.131
6. PR p. 146
7. PR p.158
8. PR p. 158
9. Largo, Gerald Andrew, "The Concept of Community in the Witings ofJohn Macmurray: A Study of the Implications of John Macmurray* s Concept of Community for Roman Catholic Liturgy" (Unpublished Doctoral Thesis: Mew York University, 1971) PP. 275-276
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Therefore, the positive motivation that is to he found in community 
is love* Macmurray defined, love as "the motive of actions in which 
we expend what is ours upon something or someone other than ourselves 
liove then has a heterocentric hase, which is an important pragmatic 
element in community* Without the positive motivation of love there 
could not and would not he any community in terms of Macmurray* s coW- 
pi^hension of community. Since mutual affection is the motivation 
behind cammuniiy, and that within community each considers the other 
the centre of value, the value of a person within a group is not placed 
with himself, but on the other. The heterocentric character of the 
group does not aim towards fusion of the selves, but the unity of 
persons.
Community not only presupposes that there is a group that is held 
together by personal relationships, but it also posits the distinctive 
heterocentric character of being held together and created by mutual
love and affection. Community can be viewed as a harmonious inter-
11 - 12 relation of persons which is an end in itself. This is one of
the ways in which Macmurray differentiates society from community in 
that a society should have a common end towards which to strive, where­
as a community needs no common goal in order to exist. One might say 
that within community, in place of the ccanmon goal there is the motiva­
tion of love. The intention of a community or the purpose of a
15community is the sharing of a common life;'
10. Macmurray, John, "Freedcm in the Person Nexus" in Freedom; ItsMeaning ed. by Nanda, Ruth (Anshewm, New York;Harcourt Brace & Co., 194^) p.186, hereafter cited as FPN
11. Kirkpatrick, op. cit., p. 131
12. FPN p.187
13. Jeff ko, Walter George, "John Macmurray* s Logical Form of the Personal;A Critical Exposition" (Unpublished Doctoral Thesis;Fordham University, 1970) p.13%
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Another chaxacteristic that community presupposes is the unity
of persons within the group. Community for Macmurray is a unity of
persons as persons.The unifying factor in community is the
personal one of mutual affection. Macmurray when discussing the
differences between community and society maintained that:
A community, on the other hand, rests upon a different principle of unity^ It is not constituted* by~a common purpose. No doubt its members will share common pur­poses and co-operate for their realisation. But these common purposes merely express, they do not constitute the unity of the association; for they can be changed freely without any effect upon the unity of the group.Indeed it is characteristic of communities that they create common purposes for the sake of co-operation instead of creating co-operation for the sake of common purposes. It follows from this that a community cannot be brought into existence by organisation. It is not functional. It is not organic. Its principle of unity is personal. It is constituted by the sharing of a common life.15
This fellowship is maintained as well as created by mutual affection.
This heterocentric grouping is an end in itself since the unity of
persons is not for a purpose but something that is brought about within
the purpose of sharing a common life.
The community is not self-sustaining, but must be constantly
intended and maintained by the persons within it. Ideally the
17community is inclusive of all persons, but this is only in terms of
an ideal, since Macmurray recognised that there were practical limits
to a community. Macmurray realised that: "The number of persons who
can form a real community is limited by the quality or depth of the
18community between them." Macmurray realised that with the influx 
of new persons into the community the quality, i.e. the depth of mutual 
affection can be threatened. Therefore, the community cannot pragmat-
14. Ibid
15. OF pp.56-57
16. Kirkpatrick, op. cit., p. 120
17. Ibid p . 151
r%a
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ically be inclusive of all persons, since the influx of a great
many people might threaten the very existence of the community by
destroying the personal nature of the group* Macmurray realised
that as a community reaches hi^er levels there is a move towards
the inclusion of more people. Macmurray was aware of the existence
of these two opposing forces within -ttie community. "It is true both
that the smaller size of the group the easier it is to attain a high
level of fellowship, and also that the higher levels of fellowship
are impossible except through the extension of the numbers of persons
who are united. Macmurray at first presupposed that the solution
came about with an increase in the economic interdependence of the 
20community. However, this does seem to threaten the personal moti­
vation that is the basis of community. Macmurray suggested that:
"The tem 'wblch. mediates between the extremes of this seeming paradox 
is an economic term. The degree of community depends for its reality 
upon the intensity of economic interdependence, and that depends 
mainly, thou^, not altogether, upon the numbers co-operating in
21functional interdependence for purposes of economic production."
This solution to the paradox presented by the conflict between the 
constant need for an all inclusive community and the need for a limited 
community containing a h i ^  level of fellowship seems to undermine 
Macmurray* s basic approach to community which demanded that community 
should have no purpose beyond that of sharing the common life. The 
introduction of an essential economic factor into the community means 
that other purposes besides mutual affection motivate the community,
19. cs p.156
20. CS p . 136
21. CS pp.136-137
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The solution to the prohlen of conflicting needs lies outside the
economic interdependence of the community. The conflicting needs
may he seen as necessary since one always needs to have a constant
influx of new persons into the communi ty since there is a constant
loss through death etc. However, the two potential needs of the
community;; do form a constant source of weakness.
However, Macmurray proposed another solution to the conflict
set up by the constant need for the inclusion of people and the need
for a small intimate community in order to maintain a highly, personal
level of relations within ttie community. Macmurray proposed that:
In a group the full realisation of the potentiality of fellowship is limited, and the larger the group the severer must be the limitation. This does not mean that in the larger communities fellowship is less real, or that it differs in its essential character. In the larger fellow­ship the full intention remains latent and potential, as it were, and is fully expressed only in the direct relations of its members, each to e a c h . 22
However, this solution seems to imply that i^e only true community is 
the *I-Thou* of two persons with the problems of egoisme a deux.
However, the larger fellowship only has, as Macmurray declared, a latent 
and potential character, since it rarely acts completely as a community, 
since such harmonious action between a great many people is difficult. 
Nevertheless, large communities are either only a matter of potential, 
which means they do not entirely exist in reality or that larger commu­
nities are more imperfect since they exist partially as a matter of 
potential unlike small communities.
There are two other structural factors in Macmurray ^ s description
jof community. Macmurray pointed out that: "a personal relation is a 
relation between equals, and it exists for the realisation and expression




can. therefore assume that equality and freedom are necessary to 
community. Macmurray averred that: "equality and freedom are con­
stitutive of community . . . which means that along with the other 
factors such as mutual affection a community must uphold in practice 
the precepts of equality and freedom.
What are the limiting factors to human community according to 
Macmurray? In terms of the family it takes more than just the animal 
blood tie to make up a community. The limiting factor is what the 
human beings within the community make of it; consequently the
family is only a community when the persons within the family intend
25it to be a community. The actual blood relationships within a 
family are consequently secondary to the community aspect of the 
family. Consequently, the family does not impose a limit upon community. 
"The intention to enter into community with others beyond the limits of 
the * natural community* is the basis for the enlargement of human
26community. " The basis of a community is then the intention to enter 
into community.
Community as More Than Family
The most basic unit of the community is the family and in particular 
the mother-child relationship. Macmurray used the family as a reoccuring 
example of the community. Consequently, a closer examination of what 
Macmurray understood to be tdie family and how these affected his under­
standing of community is necessary.
24. CHp .67
25. RE p.111
26. PR p. 158
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Macmurray* 8 presentation of the concept of community begins 
in Persons in Relation with his examination of the mother^child 
relationship* For Macmurray the term *mother* does not have an 
organic but a general personal denotation. "It refers to the adult 
person who cares for the baby. From this caring cernes the 
primary perception of the Other. The * mother* will be the primary 
or central figure for the child and other persons in the beginning 
will be subsidiary to the *mother*. In what Macmurray termed the 
* original community* the * mother* is the personal centre.
Also in reference to the family there is another basic relation­
ship that needs to be mentioned, that of marriage. Although Macmurray 
did not specifically state that marriage is necessary to the family he 
gave it communal characteristics that are also necessary for the 
family. For Macmurray marriage is a personal relationship depending 
upon equality and freedom. An ideal marriage is motivated by mutual 
affection as well as friendship. Although Macmurray did not specifi­
cally refer to marriage as one of the necessary factors in a family,
28he certainly gaye marriage the same characteristics as community.
The mother-child relationship as well as the relation between man and
woman made up the two central relationships which make up the family,
which is the paradigm of the family. It should be noted that both are
*I-Thou* relationships.
"The family is the original human community and the basis as well
as the origin of all subsequent communities. It is, therefore, the
29norm of all community, so that any community^is a brotherhood. " "The
27. PR p.75
28. EE pp. 108-105
29. PR p. 155
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primitive human community is the family  the kinship group. It
30is the original unit of co-operation." Macmurray used the family 
as a model for community. In fact the family provided a model for 
the perfect community since an ideal family is created hy mutual 
affection and maintained hy mutual affection, which is the constant 
underlying positive motivation. Macmurray in his discussion of the 
family as community stated that: "They care for one another suffic­
iently to have no need to fear one another. The normal positive 
motivation is usually sufficient to dominate the negative motives 
of self-interest and individualism."^^ The ideal family as community 
is completely positive in motivation and lacks the negative motivation 
of fear, while fear is the primary form of motivation in society. The 
more a society approximates the family the closer it comes to being a 
community.
It must be noted that we have been referring to an ideal family. 
There are certain economic and social functions that are carried on 
within the family structure that make many families less than true 
communities.For example, if a family is kept together for purely 
financial reasons then the family can no longer be considered a genuine 
ocmmtunity since the negative motivation of fear is dominant, which 
means that there is a motivation other than that of sharing a common 
life.
In Maaniirray*s analysis of the family as community, positive moti­




32. Largo, op. cit., pp.242-243 
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like that of friendship, which is a type of love, is termed mutual
affection by Macmurray. All communities are positively motivated,
consequently, an examination of mutual affection is of direct
interest in Macmurray* s analysis of and use of the concept of community.
Macmurray considered a general intention to be a unifying action
within a group. The intention within the group "maintains the personal
34.unity of any group of agents; ..." The intention of every human
being is to enter into fellowship, since we can only be ourselves in 
35fellowship. The intention behind the group, therefore, must be
fellowship which can only be motivated by mutual affection. This
intention towards fellowship, makes up the unifying factor in the
group. Not only does this unify the group it also makes it something
more than a group of agents. Community is only fully realised as a
matter of intention. "The inter-relation of agents is a necessary
matter of fact* But it is also a necessary matter of intention."
For it is not enough to be a part of the group of persons, "he must
57know that he is a member of the group ..." However, in order for 
a community to exist and to constitute something beyond a group, there 
has to be a heterocentric motivation, i.e. an intention brought about 
by mutual affection with the other put before the self.
The positive intent or motivation of a community is based upon 
love in the form of friendship. "A community is for the sake of friend­
ship and presupposes love,"^^ In community the members are in communion
34. PS p. 119
35. CE p . 61
36. Mooney, Philip, "The Notion of Religion in John Macmurray"*(Unpublished Doctoral Thesis: Fordham University, 1972)p . 209
37. PR pp. 119-120
38. PR p. 151';
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to such a degree that the group constitutes a fellowship.The 
seminal importance of love in a community, for Macmurray, is evinced 
in his analysis of Jesus* statement * love your enemies*. Macmurray 
believed that: "The statement *love your enemies* presupposes the 
true community does not exist and is a precept defining at once the 
character of the personal community and the direction of activity 
which intends to bring it into existence.Love as the precursor 
to community has an all inclusive character. It is prepared to act 
as if everyone is a possible member of the community both friend and 
enemy. Macmurray believed that love is the "first condition of any 
practical effort to create community \4iere it does not yet exist".
Love is the starting point for community and is the basic constitu­
tive element in the setting up of community. Love and friendship are 
the beginnings of any effort to establish a personal community. A
community must be started with "the intention to establish mutual
42affection where it does not yet exist".
As has already been noted Macmurray deduced that love is primarily 
a motive for actions which are heterocentric in character. Love is 
also necessary for the acquisition of knowledge about other persons.
"My knowledge of another person is a function of my love for him; and 
in proportion as my knowledge is a function of my fear for him, it is 
illusory or unreal. Knowledge of another persons comes through the 
revelation which comes from the trust that is inspired by love. Fear 
destroys the trust that is needed for mutual, revelation, whereas ; love 
creates the trust that is needed for mutual revelation. The implica-
59. Largo, op. cit., p.245
40. GH p . 67
41. CHp .67
42. CH p . 68
45. FPM p.186 
44. PR p. 170
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tions of the heterocentric character of love is far reaching and is 
seminal to Macmurray*s approach to faith, courage, confidence and 
trust.
The love that is necessary to bring about community is found
within the family, which is the originator of mutual affection.
However, Macmurray pointed out that the existence of love does not
necessarily mean that a family is a ccmmunity, but it is a beginning.
Love is the beginning for community, but it is not the only element
that is necessary for the existence of a community. A group based
upon love as opposed to fear has within it certain basic elements
which can go on, to become a community. Love is the basis of community
and the heterocentric element distinguishes the persons within the
community who exist for others, from society which is based upon the
existence of the self and not the other. Macmurray succinctly stated
48that: "Love is for the other; fear is for the self". Love is "the 
positive ground motive of personal activity", which is defined as "the
49capacity for self-transcendence, or the capacity to care for the other".
Love is t auto logically defined as the "positive motive which sustains 
every fom of human fellowship
Love sustains human fellowship which is an essential element in 
human community. Macmurray labelled the association of persons within 
a community as a fellowship. %  stated that: "The members of a community
51are in communion with one another, and their association is a fellowship." 
45* Mooney, op. cit., pp.222-224
)■46. Macmanus, Ora Roland, "The Concept of The Personal in the Writingsof John Macmurray" (Unpublished Doctoral Thesis: The Catholic University of America, 196?) p.l66
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Macmurray pointed out that: "since such an association exhibits
the form of the personal in its fully positive personal character,
it will necessarily contain within it and be constituted by its own
52negative, which is society". A fellowship also contains within
it certain facets that are also contained within a society. Part
of Macmurray*s description of community is based upon its opposition
with society. There are two types of association within a fellowship.
The two types of association that are within fellowship are labelled
as * friendship * and * co-operation*. In society there exists only the
association that is based upon co-operation. Macmurray maintained
that friendship and co-operation are "partly independent of one
another", but he also asseverated that: "friendship though it cannot
be constituted by co-operation for a common purpose, necessarily
53generates such co-operation". This does not just mean that there 
is co-operation motivated by love within fellowship. Macmurray posited 
a distinctive difference between the combination of the two types of 
association as opposed to co-operation by itself. The combination of 
friendship and co-operation is beneficial. The association of friend­
ship is not constituted by a single purpose, therefore, "it permits
54-of a change in purpose". There is also the advantage that "the 
common ends which are worked for and the co-operation for their achieve-
55ment are together means to maintaining and deepening the friendship".
The two types of association found within fellowship as opposed to the 
singular co-operation of society means that there is not only the added 
flexibility of easily changed purpose within the context of co-operation, 
but also the deepening of the binding element, i.e. friendship.
52. PR p. 146 
55. PPM p. 188
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Community, i.e. fellowship, denands direct personal relations,
since without this type of relation there can he no friendship. "But
community can only he actual in direct personal relations, since we
can only be actually in fellowship with those whcM we know personally.
Any unity within fellowship is personal. Macmurray maintain that: "A
unity of fellowship is personal. It is a unity of persons as persons;
and each member of a fellowship enters it with the whole of himself,
and not in respect of a particular interest which he happens to share 
57with others." Society on the other hand unifies individuals because 
of particular interests and skills.
Macmurray made a rather far reaching assumption when he maintained 
that human beings only find self-realisation within community, and that 
"we can only be ourselves in fellowship, as a mutual caring for one 
another, it follows that the intention to enter into fellowship is im­
plicit in every human being and in every human activity".However, 
Macmurray did not take into account the fact that even though most human 
beings find themselves in fellowship, that others are acting in reaction 
to fellowship and do not wish to be in fellowship. Some people only 
reveal their true feelings away from all other persons and groupings.
Besides the combination of the associations of co-operation and 
friendship within fellowship there is the existence of direct personal 
relations which implies that there are certain intrinsic components 
operating within fellowship. Since personal relations are a part of 
fellowship, one would expect to find mutual reciprocity within fellow­
ship, Macmurray has stated that: "the essential condition for realising




59fellowship is a mutual reciprocity". This signifies the realisation 
on both sides of the existence of the recognition of the other and the 
subsequent recognition of the need for a mutual approach to the common 
life. At the same time there is the realisation that even thou^ the 
persons are bound together by mutual reciprocity within the context of 
the fellowship, there is also the need for the individual to be them­
selves.
Another factor that is connected with fellowship that is necessary 
for the on-going existence of fellowship is the "complete realisation 
of the self through a complete self-transcendence ". One needs not
only the complete affiimation of one's self, but also the mutual affir­
mation of the other and -tiie reciprocity that exists between two persons 
in relation. Macmurray maintained that; "The ground of fellowship is 
common humanity". The common intention of two people that meet 
together is to enter into fellowship which assumes that the path of 
least resistance is fellowship. Macmurray asserted that: "the natural 
tendency of any two human beings who meet one another is to enter into 
fellowship, irrespective of all differences whether of age, sex, race, 
nationality, social condition, natural ability or any other simply as 
human beings".Macmurray assumed that ihe only thing necessary for 
fellowship is common humanity. One must question this assumption since 
in order to realise fellowship some fonn of communication is necessary. 
It is significant that Macmurray failed to grapple with the dividing 
aspects of language.
_ _ —  ■ —  t - ' '






In personal relations there is the need not only for personal 
reciprocity and self-realisation within the personal relationship, 
but also the need for freedom and equality. Community necessarily 
presupposes freedom and equality as constitutive elements. The 
existence of community, i.e. fellowship, posits the existence of 
freedom and equality, since equality and freedom are necessary for 
the creation and continuing existence of community and continually 
necessary elements within the relations that compose community.
These two precepts are essential to the structure of community as 
has already been noted. Therefore, Macmurray*s discussion and ideas 
about the precepts of freedom and equality will shed light upon his 
understanding of community.
Vhen Macmurray assumed the presence of equality in a direct per­
sonal relationship, he is not thinking of equality as a matter of fact, 
but as a matter of intention. Persons in order to achieve unity must 
relate as equals. "This does not mean that they have, as matter of 
fact, equal abilities, equal rights, equal functions or any other kind 
of de facto equality. The equality is .intentional: it is an aspect of 
the mutuality of the relation. If there was no equality between 
persons then there would only be negative motivation whereby one person 
would be constantly using another as a means to his personal ends. 
Macmurray rejected the idea of equality of'persons in a mathematical 
or material sense and for that matter he rejected the concept of an 
ideal equality. It does not contain the recognition of differences 
between individuals; "it is precisely the recognition of difference 
and variety amongst individuals that gives meaning to the assertion 
of equality. The statement that all men are equal means that any claim
63. PR p. 158
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that one man or one class or type of man is superior or inferior 
to another is, as a matter of fact, quite untrue.Without the 
assumption of equality human relationships are impossible, i.e. 
one becomes subordinate to the other, thereby making society the 
only possible foim of grouping. Equality is, therefore, a necessary 
constituent of community since it is necessary for the maintenance 
of the *I-Thou* relationship. Macmurray understood friendship to
65be "essentially a relation between equals". Personal equality 
overrides but does not remove differences between persons. Personal 
equality means that: "any two human beings whatever their individual 
differences, can recognise and treat one another as equals, and so 
be friends It is necessary for equality to be present in order
for friendship or any other type of *I-Thou* relation based on 
mutual affection to exist. Macmurray did not try to remove the problem 
of the differences between individuals, but recognised that the 
differences were involved in strengthening human relations. Equality 
is necessary for a personal relationship, but once this relationship 
is established "the differences between the persons concerned are the 
stuff out of which the texture of their fellowship is w o v e n " . T h e  
differences enrich the relationship since there is an increase in those 
things that may be shared between the two persons. However, the 
greater the difference, the greater the difficulty in establishing the 
relationship between two persons. "The greater the fundamental diff­
erences between two persons are, the more difficult it is to establish 
a fully personal relation between them, but; silso the more worthwhile
64. CH pp.74-75
65. CP p . 51
66. CP p . 51
67. OH p.80
68. EE pp. 104-105
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,^9the relation will he if it can be established and maintained.
A factor that Macmurray failed to mention is that if a community
is totally alike the chances on the practical level for survival
is lessened since all would want to do the same things and would
have only the skills for the sane type of thing, whereas if there
is a large amount of difference within the community the individuals
will have many different talents to apply to each situation and
problem that arises within the group, thereby strengthening the
community as well as the interdependence between the individuals
within the community.
With the creation of mutual affection the principle of personal
70equality is raised to the level of intention. Equality is a matter
of intention within community. Therefore, true mutual communion 
71implies equality. To destroy the qualitybetween individuals would 
mean the destruction of the heterocentric character of the relation, 
since one would be trying to make use of the other, thereby removing 
the communion between individuals.
The destruction of equality causes the possibility of the subor­
dination of one individual to another to arise which makes injustice 
72possible. Equality is the centre of justice, which suggests that 
justice is eanier to maintain in a truly personal community. Macmurray * s 
description of community appears" to have an intrinsic moral or ethical 
element within the structure. Not only does the necessity of the inten­
tion of equality presuppose certain ethical norms, but the element of 
freedom also presupposes that the community has an ethical norm built
69. EE p. 105
70. CH p. 69
71. EE p. 227
72. PEpp.189-190
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into the structure. Denial of freedom or equality not only denies 
community but can also be interpreted as an immoral or unethical 
act.
There is a close connection between the need for freedom and
the need for equality in the community. This close connection is
illustrated by the assumption by Macmurray that the principle of
love in community expresses itself in the principle of equality,
73but also in the principle of freedom • Macmurray defined the capa­
city for ccHumunion in terms of both freedom and equality. "That 
capacity for communion, that capacity for entering into free and 
equal personal relations ... Freedom and equality are strictly
correlative and reciprocal; there is no freedom without equality
75and there is no equality without freedom. There is a need for an
investigation into Macmurray*s use of the concept of freedom and how
he applied this concept of freedom to community.
There are a number of types of freedom within Macmurray* s overall
conception of freedom that are to be found throughout his work.
However, Macmurray formulated a fairly broad definition of freedom,
which revolves around the negative definition of absence of restraint
or around the more positive definition of acting spontaneously.
"Freedom means absence of restraint, and the presence of restraint
comes with the recognition that one is prevented from doing what one 
76intends." The more positive approach is represented by Macmurray*s
statement that: "Freedom means freedom, not something else; and to
77live freely means to live not by rules but spontaneously."
75. GH p.71 
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However, ihe problem of Macmurray*s definition does not end
with such a simple definition, since Macmurray identified and defined
several types of freedom. Macmurray identified and defined absolute
freedom as "simply our capacity to act —  not to behave or to react,
78but to foam an intention and seek to realise it". Another simple
definition is offeared vdiich "is the ability to caanzy out our chosen
79purposes; to do what we please". However, Macmuazray realised that 
freedom is arelative, which meant that Macmuazray was fully aware that 
absolute freedom lies beyond our pazesent achievements. The concept 
of relative fazeedom as the second type of fazeedom intazoduces the 
practical recognition that freedom is always opposed by such things as 
the desiaze .in man for security. It is the combination of conscience 
and impulse.The thiazd type of freedom that is to be found in 
Macmuazray*s work is that of personal freedom. "Personal fazeedom' 
includes with it an economic freedom, which is concerned with our 
azelation to the material world, a social fazeedom, which is concerned 
with the organic inteaz^ azelation of people in the life of society, and 
also the spiritual freedom of thought and emotion, which is its pecu­
liar characteristic." Macmuazray presented three different views or
types of fazeedom that come under the headings azelative, absolute and 
82personal or moral. The main type of fazeedom that conceazns community 
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The freedom of anything is its ability to eaqpress its own nature to the full without constraint, human freedom is the ability to express this peculiar property which belongs only to human beings —  the ability to live spontaneously (that is, from themselves) in terms of the other (that is, for and in and by what is not them­selves). Only when we live in this way can we be free; for only then do we express our nature in action. 5
The positive and negative definitions that were offered for free­
dom, i.e. absence from restraint and spontaniety, contain Macmurray*s 
two basic ways of viewing personal freedom. The explanation of free­
dom as the lack of restraint is certainly the ideal definition, but it 
is too absolute. Macmurray*s definition of freedom as spontaneous 
action in terms of others is the one that.is immediately applicable to 
the community.
When personal freedom is,seen in terms of heterocentric spontan­
eous action then one has a relative, communal and personal definition 
of freedom. However, Macmurray certainly did not seem to settle for 
any firm definition of freedom but tended to use several. Nevertheless, 
the type of freedom that is of interest is the type which can be found 
operating within the community which is moral^^ or personal freedom.
There is no doubt, whatsoever, that Macmurray considered freedom 
to be an essential constituent of community. Macmurray declared that 
within a community, persons could "realise their freedom as agents, 
since in the absence of the fear of the self there is no constraint 
on either, and each can be himself fully; neither is under obligation 
to act a part".^^ Freedom in the community situation is the ability 
to be oneself which is to act spontaneously which presupposes thet
absence of fear. The lack of fear within a community is necessary 
since it means that there is a chance for the existence of freedom.
83. PMWp.184
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Fear destroys freedom. Macmurray asserted that: "It is obviously 
untrue to say that we are free to do as we please, if we do not 
know what we want to do, and all of us often find it very difficult 
to know what we want to do. Again, even if we know what we want to 
do, we may be afraid to do it, and our fear may be a constraint 
within us. Tiis fear is a deep and primitive fear of the unknown 
and this unknown can include other people since they can never be 
completely k n o w n . I f  this fear comes about then the relationship 
may be destroyed and the love which makes up the community is over­
come by the fear that has destroyed freedom and in its turn the 
community is destroyed. Freedom is also destroyed by the creation 
of personal opposition between persons. Macmurray asserted that: 
"personal opposition destroys freedom, because it means that a man's
actions are dictated by his enemy. To be ont the defensive is to be
88incapable of freedom of action". Another destructive factor that
will suppress freedom is the inability to maintain equality. Macmurray
tenaed this the will to power which has it origins in the inequality
89•vAiich overwhelms freedom.
The loss or destruction or even the failure to reach a condition 
of freedom within the canmunity brings about, the loss of the condition 
within the group that calls community into existence.
86. FMW pp. 172-175
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The primary condition which must be fulfilled if we are not to be frustrated, is that the relations which bind us together into community, and which form the basis of the possibility of human co-operation, should be right.Thus the root of frustration and unfreedom in human life is the existence of enmity and estrangement between us.If the relations between individuals in any community qq are not harmonious, then its members must be frustrated.
Enmity and estrangement for Macmurray come from the introduction of 
fear and/or inequality which destroys freedom and in so doing dis­
mantles the community. "The crux of the problem of freedom is the 
overcoming of estrangement and hostility in the relations of persons,
always provided that we do not interpret this in a dualist way to mean
91merely getting rid of certain feelings."
Macmurray wished to remove the motives behind the behaviour vhich
is referred to by the terms 'hostility', 'enmity' and 'estrangement*.
Freedom is a matter of motive or intention in human actions. Freedom
is the creative force of mutual affection raised to the level of in- 
92tention.
The field of freedom is to be found in the personal life. For
Macmurray this goes far beyond the fact that people ou^t to be free
in their personal life, it means that "without freedom there can be
no personal life. The personal life is ...., just that life in which
93we are seeking freedom in our relations with one another". A result 
of trying to achieve personal communal relations is freedom. The free­
dom of each individual is dependent upon that of others. "Human freedom
can be realised only as the freedom of individuals in relation; and the







95a pazoduct of "right personal relations". One of the factors of 
the right personal relationship is that of equality vdiich again 
illustrates the interdependence of freedom and equality. An assump­
tion that underlies Macmurray*s statement that: "Beal freedom is 
always proportionate in a society to the equality between its members. 
Freedom is dependent upon our relation with others and is consequently 
a product of a true community and is necessary in order to have the 
community function. Freedom is part of the definition of community 
in Macmurray*8 analysis.
The two major constitutive elements of friendship, and therefore 
of community, are equality and freedom. In order for there to be 
friendship there must be a relation between equals not in the functional 
sense of equality, but in the personal sense of equality. Personal
equality is that which overrides but does not ignore the differences
97between human beings. The second constitutive element of friendship 
is freedom. There is no imposed unity upon the persons. It is depen­
dent upon the free activity of all persons concerned. It brings about
the complete freedom of self-expression and self-revelation which is
98not only mutual but unconstrained. Freedom is more negative than 
positive since it denotes the lack of something whereas equality has 
a more positive inclination.
The main underpinnings of fellowship are mutual affection, equality 
and freedom. The act of fellowship in turn gives rise to the community 
as a v4iole. What makes the difference bétween the act of fellowship 
and a community is that the individuals witliin it act together and are 
united by a common life. However, community is distinct from society,





since within community the individuals act together and join in 
the activities of fellowship. The individuals within the ocmnunlty 
are not only sharing a common life but are conscious of the common 
life. "In any actual community of persons, then, there is not merely 
a common life, but also a consciousness of the common life, and it 
is this consciousness which constitutes the association, a personal
99association or community. "
Macmurray realised that there is also a tension between those 
individuals in a group that see themselves as individuals only and 
those that see themselves as part of a group. It is the life of the 
individual which makes up the common life, but Macmurray deduced that 
we can only be human in terms of community. All members of the group 
need to be conscious of the group. "What constitutes the humanity of 
the human group is the consciousness of each member that he belongs 
to it; and the intention, which prevades all his activities to realise 
his membership, even if it must be, at times, in anger and revolt.
The tension felt by some individuals, which is only a sign of the 
seminal character of the community, when the self becomes the centre 
of its own consciousness is of importance. This egocentric conscious­
ness aims at individual self-realisation, which is an impossibility 
according to Macmurray*s hypothesis about human nature. Macmurray 
maintained that:
Now individual, self-realisation is an impossibility.Selfhood is inherently mutual, and it is only in relation­ship with others that the self has any reality or can express it. Individualism, in which the individual self becomes its own end, is incompatible with the nature of action, in which the end must lie outside the self. The impulse of self-realisation is an impulse to spontaneous action. But the concentration upon the self negates the basis of action. 1^1
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has already been encountered in Macmurray*s discussion of the
connection between community and religion.
One of the continuing themes within Macmurray’s work is his
search for the human experiences and/or activities that will provide
the empirical basis for religion, Macmurray proposed four basic
general facts that must be accounted for by any religious theory.
The first is the universality of religion in human society. The
second is that there are analogous forms of religion ,in animal life.
The third is that religion has been the matrix from which all "the
105various aspects of culture and civilisation have crystallised".
The last general fact that must be accounted for is that "religion 
is, in intention, inclusive of all members of the society to which 
it refers, and depends on their active co-operation to constitute 
it"$^^^ Macmurray considered these characteristics to be best accoun­
ted for and understood when one considered religion in terms of personal 
relations, in particular those personal relations within a community of
107peinons,
Macmurray *s perception of religion is certainly intimately con­
nected with and dependent upon his assumptions about community,
Macmurray considered religion to be "the reflective activity which
expresses the consciousness of the community; or more tersely, religion
I08is the celebration of communion". Religion is the celebration of the 
consciousness of community as well as the "symbol of the mutual conscious­
ness of community, Macmurray presented this theme in several ways and
104, PR p , 151
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throughout his works. In one of his earlier works he stated that:
"The consciousness of forming a group-unit, or being a human society,
which is inherent in every real society, is itself religious, whether
109this is recognised or not." Macmurray stressed the importance of
religion bringing into being the self-consciousness of the community
throu^ its members, and the necessity of this self-consciousness for
the existence of the community and the individuals within the community.
Macmurray wrote in a later work that:
The core of religion, from its very origin, is the * cele­bration of community* --  the expression and glorification.of the consciousness of fellowship. Since all the aspects and all the activities of the common life meet in this consciousness of fellowship —  for they are its content  religion is all-inclusive. Its objective correlationis the whole content of human experience and human activity.In its central function, it brings to conscious (sic) theimplicit human intention of unity in fellowship --  withits principles of equality and freedom. It maintains the intention of consciousness, deepens and strengthens it, and directs it towards its day-to-day realisation in the co-operative activities of the group. As an expression of conscious reflection, it enlarges the field of fellow­ship in time; linking the living with their dead and with the generation of unborn,
This gives the group a meaning beyond that of the present individual
members that constitute the group.
Religion for Macmurray is about community. Macmurray has simply
111but pointedly stated that: "religion is about community". He has
also just as dognatically stated the converse that : "Every human community 
112is religious", Macmurray constantly returned to the closely inter­
woven components of community and religion. Moreover, the religious 
expression of community consciousness in primitive community was of 
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Macmurray first examined in detail the different aspects of
rituals and ceremonies that are to be found in primitive religions,
"Ritual activities have to be carried out according to a traditional
115pattern which prescribes every detail," This in turn not. only 
strengthens a sense of belonging by doing things together, but also 
connects the tribe wiidi the dead and unborn, "So the tribe is felt 
as a unity of which its present members are merely the transient 
representatives,The rituals and ceremonies of the tribe "inte­
grate; "the individual participants with one another and with their 
unity. They are made conscious that they belong to the great family,
and that they must maintain its way of life and transmit it unbroken 
115to the future ", The common life, that religion brings to conscious­
ness, expressed and confirms the co-operation which constitutes the 
daily life of the tribe, "It is both natural and inevitable that
religious rituals should be specialised for reference to one or other
116of those forms of co-operation," An example being the gathering
of food or the raising of children, which are seen in primitive
fertility dances and such rituals that are concerned with the changes
of the seasons; the modern day practice of marriage can be classified
as an example of the specialised rituals which bring to the conscious
level the co-operation within the communily that such activities
demand, Macmurray contended that: 'Primitive religion is tribal, and
its ceremonial is an expression of the tribe as the unity of its 
117members." A primitive tribe is a group of people \iho as a matter
of fkct live a common life. However, not only is any group made up of
115. SRR p . 51 
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members as a matter of fact, but each member intends and should be
conscious of being a part of the unity* Macmurray concluded that:
The reflective aspect of this is that he not merely is a member but knows that he is a member* In virtue of this knowledge he can act in association with the others either willingly or against his will; he can be either for the community" or against it. The unity of any community of persons is constituted and maintained by the will to community in its members.3^ ®
It is the religion of the tribe which centres around the corporate a,cts
of the members of "the tribe and celebrates the fellowship of the tribe*
"The effect of this ceremonial is to bring to consciousness in all
participants "their union wi"th one ano"ther, and to associate this with
rejoicing,
There are two themes in Macmurray* s analysis of "the interdependence 
of religion and community. The first centres around and upon the aware­
ness of the community which brou^t about the rituals of religion. The 
second "theme is that religion symbolises "the community for "the members 
of the group, "To celebrate anything is "to do some"thing which expresses
symbolically our consciousness of it and our joy in being conscious of 
120it," Primitive religion is concerned witli intentionality, "it has to
symbolise its objectives; consequently its primary expressions' are
121ri"tual activities in which all members of the community share".
These religious rituals have a meaning beyond themselves, i.e. beyond
the present immediacy of common experience, they represent what is hoped
for and what is feared. Religion has "the 'subjective function of making
people aware of the enjoyment of fellowship, i.e. consciousness of
community and at the same "time the objective^ side v^ iich is a "technique
122for the achievement of common intentions through representations".






Each individual that participates in the ceremonial celebrates his
connection with the common life. He has by participating recognised
himself as a member of the community, dependent upon the community.
Macmurray believed that: "all members of the community are united in
the same symbolic action; and this act is an expression and realisa-
125tion of personal relationship". However, only the worship of God,
i.e. the Other, the Creator, and the Father which is only to be found
in mature religion can fully express and represent the personal rela-
124tionship that are to be found in community. Consequently, the .
religious celebration that carries the most meaning is that which
symbolises the Other, i.e. the representation of the mutual reciprocity
of personal relationships, is the worship of God. The worship of God
in Macmurray* s opinion is the ultimate symbol as well as the ultimate
recognition of community. The worship of God agrees with Macmurray*s
definition of the celebration of communion. Macmurray defined the
celebration of communion as a something that involved "communal
reflection in which all members of the community share. It must find
its expression in a common activity which has a symbolic character,
with a reference beyond itself; an activity undertaken not for its own
125sake, but for the sake of what it means or signifies".
There are two aspects of this celebration which includes the
celebration of the common life and secondly the dependence on the 
126natural world. Although Macmurray recognised that primitive religion
celebrated the co-operation between nature and man, which he interpreted
127to be actually between nature and iiie.;community, he emphasised the 
co-operation of man with man. Mature religions considered the relation
123. HAS p.59
124. HAS pp.58-59




of man with man and man to God as one unit. Mature religion does
not tend to separate these two relations within religion into two
separate categories. However, as Macmurray*s definition of religion
illustrates, the man with man relation seems to dominate his thinking
about religion, as illustrated by the following statement:
The religious issue in human life is the relation of man to man in the common life, an issue ■vhich is summarised and made universal as the relation of men to God the per­sonal absolute. !Rie task of religion is to produce and to sustain in us that structure of emotional motive, and therefore that system of habitual action in the daily round of the common life, that alone can make social life possible and can keep it unified and harmonious.Only religion can create and msdntain the community of the personal life of mankind; for religion alone speaks direct to the emotions of the common man in the commonlife.128
There is little doubt that the concept of community played a dominant 
role in Macmurray*s thinking about religion. Macmurray visualised uni­
versal religion in terms of universal brotherhood and the drive towards
129a single universal community. Macmurray wrote that: "The religious 
demand is a demand for universal communion in a universal community.
Mature religion would be the satisfaction of this demand through the
130creation of communion, and of community as the condition of communion. " 
Macmurray in fact assumed that communion with God not only Is totally 
inseparable from communion with man, but also hinted that the communion 
between men is a pre-requisite for communion with God or at legist an 
example of man*s greater communion with the Creator. Macmurray averred 
that: "there could be no distinction between religion as communion with 
God, and the social community of man. There can be no whole without itsI’parts; and a communion with God which is not a communion with man, is no
131communion at all, but is refusal".
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In demanding that community he the defining characteristic 
in understanding religion and the religious impulse, one encounters 
a paradox* Macmurray was aware "tiiat this anomaly existed:
It is important also to recognise that this demand for communion which is the religious impulse in man is necessarily absolute* It is without limits* It comes into operation wherever there is the absence of complete community. It cannot be satisfied within limits. It must realise itself ujfirversally; or remain unrealised and unsatisfied. This dictates its goal, which can be nothing short of the complete integration of all human beings in community and of humanity with the world in •vdiich it lives. But in the time process towards this unrecognised goal there are contradictions which arise.The pressure towards complete communion has many aspects.Ve may find that completeness in one direction makes for incompleteness in another. If communion extends to a large number of persons its inner completeness —  its intensity —  may tend to be l o s t .
However, be introducing limits one makes it impossible to reach the 
universal community. The utilisation of community as the primary mode 
of apperception for investigating religion may have forced Macmurray 
into an unnecessary paradox, since ideal community does contain the 
seeds of an antinomy, i.e. its inclusive nature is at odds with 
the exclusive nature of its basic component the 'I-Thou* relation.
Nevertheless, Macmurray*s conception of the task of religion as 
involved with the strengthening of personal community is a useful and 
enlightening one. Macmurray recognised that the celebration of commu­
nity is a means of strengthening the will of the community. Macmurray 
opined that: "The function of religion is , then to mobilise and strengthen 
the positive elements in the motivation of its members, to overcome the 
negative motives where they exist, to prevent the outbreak of enmity
and strife, to dominate the fear of the Other and subordinate the
155centrifugal to the centripetal tendencies in the community." ^  Macmurray 
perceived the task of mature religion to be the creation of personal
132. RE pp. 238-259 
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conmrunity, not an ideal or spiritual community but a concrete and 
material type of community of this w o r l d . ^34
The understanding of community for Macmurray is ..inseparable 
from his conception of religion and the task of religion, since the 
creation of community is a part of the religious task. Community 
is not only a set of definable characteristics which lifts a group 
to a level higher than society; it is also fundamental to Macmurray* s 
understanding of the nature of man as well as his assumptions about 
the idea of God. Community lies at the root of Macmurray* s compre-
fhension of religion and religion at the same time is at the very 
heart of Macmurray* s conception of community.
154. RE p. 257
CHAPTER 9
A General Critique of Macmurray*s View of Community and Society
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Macmurray* s conception of society is directly linked to his 
understanding of community, since his explanation of society is in 
terms of his assumption that society possess certain characteristics 
that are antagonistic to community. In Christian ethics, especially 
in so far as it is concerned with relations between human beings, 
the understanding of human groups moves between two poles, which are 
represented by F. Toennies classical dichotomy of Gemeinschaft (community) 
and Gtesellschaft (society). One pole is the intimate, personal group,
i.e. community, which is understood sis being "intimate, private and
exclusive living together".^ The other pole is Gesellsohaft. i.e.
2the * public life* or the functional associations of mankind. 'Macmurray 
also knowingly or unknowingly worked within this framework using these 
two general categories, i.e. personal and impersonsil relations. Within 
contemporary Christian social ethics one finds one or the other of 
these categories being favoured. The ethics of the communal, inter­
personal understanding, i.e. of Gemeinschaft. stresses the importance 
of the church as a community of believers which resembles the general 
approach of such thinkers as P.3). Maurice and Paul Lehmann. On "tiie 
other hand some contemporary thinkers stress the associational or 
functional, which is an attempt to apply the doctrines of the church 
to the conflict between states and to other impersonal structures; an 
approach which resembles the preoccupations of Eeinhold Niebuhr. ^ 
Macmurray undoubtedly favours the Gemeinschaft interpretation of religion, 
and works within a modified form of Toennies* dichotomy of human groups.
1. Toennies, Ferdinand Gemeinschaft und Gesellsohaft: Ahandlung desCommunisms und des Socialismus also Ebapirischer Culturform (Leipzig: Fues*s Yerlag, 1887) trans. P Loomis (London; Routledge; Kegan Paul 1955) P»53
2. Ibid
3. Gustafson, James "Society" A Handbook of Christian Theology (NewYork; The World Publishing Ccmpany, 1958) p.353
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Macmurray presupposed a dichôtomy that closely paralleled the 
dichotomy of Toennies. This approach raises two problems. Firstly 
it appears to lead to a false division of human groups into two con­
trasted groups or categories. Secondly, it seems to imply a misunder^
8tending of human relationships, in order to make this division 
possible, i.e. making human relationships rigid as opposed to fluid.
One must first analyse Macmurray* s use of the term ’society* and
contrast this with his use of the concept of ’community*. Macmurray
used the term ’society* in two contrasting ways. The first way being
in a general sense^, which for the moment does not concern this analysis,
which refers to all human groups. The second use of the term ’society*
is a more specialised use of the term, since it represents a particular
type of human group, one of two major groups, the other being community.
Macmurray distinguished between these two types of groups by defining
5society as a group "united in the service of a common purpose".
Macmurray contrasted this definition with that of community which is 
"united in the sharing of a common life".^ However, Macmurray* s diff­
erentiation of the two terms is flexible, since the two principles are
7not exclusive. "Society may be a community". Macmurray clearly
asserted in Conditions of Freedom his conception of society:
A Society, in this sense, is a group of persons co-operating in the pursuit of a common purpose. The common purpose creates the association; for if the purpose should disappear, the society will go into dissolution. It also dictates the form of association; since the members must co-operate in the way which will secure the common end; and the ideal form for such an association is the form which realises the common
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purpose most efficiently. Each member has his place in the group by reason of what he contributes, in co-oper- eration, to the pursuit of the common end. He is a member in virtue of the function he performs in the group; and the association itself is an organisation of functions.Thus, though the members are persons, and the group is an association of persons, the members are not associated as persons, but only in virtue of the specific functions they perform in relation to the purpose which constitutes the group; and the society is an organic unity, not a personal one. This organic, functional, impersonal Character remains even where the common purpose is necessary and permanent.®
Macmurray*s definition of society has its main purport only when con­
trasted with ccsnmunity. "We can contrast these two types of human 
unity by calling the first type —  the personal and religious —
’community*, and the second type —  impersonal and functional —
9’organised society*."
One might go so far as to say that Macmurray*s conception of 
community determines his definition of society. TMs brings to the 
fore one of the problems which one confronts when examining Macmurray’s 
use of the terms ’society* and ’community*. The terms ’society* and 
’community’ are ways of classifying different human groups or unity 
as well as elements within each group. This confusion between the 
two is illustrated by the frequently quoted sentence that: "Every
11community is then a society; but not every society is a community".
The confusion between ’society* and * community* as labels for groups 
as well as characteristics or principles within group activities is 
apparent. Macmurray did tend to emphasise one or the other of these 
two uses. Macmurray wrote that: "A society may be a community, but this 
is not necessarily so; and even where both principles are effective in 
the same group, they may be effective in very different degrees. But
8. CP pp.35-36
9. HAS p. 67
10. Jeffko, Walter George "John Macmurray*s Logical Form of the Personal"(Unpublished Doctoral Thesis: Pordham University, 1970) p.144
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12the principles themselves are radically distinct". Macmurray 
also wrote that: "We should use the term ’society* to refer to those 
forms of human association in which the bond of unity is negative 
or impersonsil; and to reserve for the contrasted forms of associa­
tion which have a positive personal relation as their bond, the teim 
15’community*." It is not clear from Macmurray*s use of the terms 
’society* and ’community* whether he intended to describe two con- 
trsisted human groups or two principles that can be applied to all 
groups.
Society
There seems to be three defining characteristics that fom 
Macmurray* s conception of society when contrasted with community.
The three primary properties, that are exhibited by society, are 
those of being impersonal, functional and negatively motivated, i.e. 
motivated by fear. Society is generally referred to as being nega­
tively motivated throughout Macmurray’s work, and is accordingly part 
of the negative mode of morality. The relation between the members 
of a society are functional; "each plays his allotted part in the 
achievement of the common end".^^ Society because of the functional 
aspect of the relation of its members has an organic fom; "it is an
organisation of functions; and each member is a function of the 
15group". The underlying interpretation of society revolves around
16the idea that society is for the ’sake of protection* and this pre­
supposes the motivating force of fear. The three properties of society
 _____________________________________ f____________________________
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emphasised by Macmurray are the impersonal character of the relation 
between members of the social group; the negative motivation of the 
members which is based upon fear; and finally the functional relation 
between the members of the group and the functional aspect of the 
individual for the group as a whole. For Macmurray the social life 
is maide of associations which are not personal and therefore are 
functional# By functional Macmurray means that: "the place of the 
individual is determined by his function in the group, by the par-
17ticular service which he renders to the general purpose of the whole"# 
Macmurray in his discussion of the impersonal, negative mode of 
human grouping presents two different types of negative mode. Society 
has two different dispositions. These are the submissive or contem­
plative mode and the pragmatic or aggressive mode, which are both types
18of the overall negatively motivated group that is called society.
This represents two different ways of interpreting society. Once 
again Macmurray has returned to his ternary modes of apperception, 
i.e. Religion, Art and Science, with two negative attitudes and a 
positive attitude.
The pragmatic form of society is the first modal differentiation 
to be examined. The pragmatic form of society tends towards the iden­
tification of the state with society and includes within it the basic
19ideas of ’power* and ’law’. Macmurray maintained that: "Thomas Hobbes, 
the father of modem political theory, provides an almost perfect
20example of an analysis of society in the pragmatic mode of apperception". 
The origins of the pragmatic apperception of society stems from the 
Roman tradition. The Romans "invented the State as we know it. They
17. RE p.102
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did this by conceiving law as technology for keeping the peace, and
by unifying in one society, by the administration of a homogeneous
law, backed by force, peoples and tribes who were in most other
21respects, and especially in culture heterogeneous".
Macmurray*s understanding of the pragmatic disposition centres
upon Hobbes* understanding of the nature of the state. Macmurray
wrote of Hobbes* analysis that it reveals that: "the persons who
compose society are, by nature, isolated units, afraid of one another,
22and continuously on the defensive". The extremes of negative moti­
vation are embodied in the pragmatic or aggresive mode. Hobbes 
maintained that since man is rational he realises that it is necessary 
to be united in a society. "To act rationally is to use the right
means to secure his ends, and secure them with the least expenditure 
25of energy. I' This is taken one further step. "Action involves co­
operation with the Other, and it is impossible to live rationally
24-unless this co-operation is forthcoming." This realisation brings 
about a general agreement which limits the general aggressiveness in 
accordance with an agreed upon plan. Society is reason in contra­
distinction to nature. The unity of society is created by construc­
ting the state, which provides the social bond even though this bond
25is an external one. The power of the state defends the individual 
from the self-interest of his neighbours. Hobbes* approach as 
summarised by Macmurray was that: "Its members are negatively charged
21. PR p. 133 ,
22- PR p. 134
25. PR p.135 
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particles which mutually repel one another. To hold them together
an ’impressed force* is required, strong enough to overcome their
26centrifugal tendencies." The Hohbesian formulation is the com­
pletely logical approach to society which is mirrored in actual 
society \ihen the intentional is displaced entirely by the practical.
"The pragmatic mode of society, then is society maintained by power, 
and it identifies society with the State, ... It conceives the
structure of society in terms of law —  whether moral or civil law —
27and its maintenance is achieved by power." This is the mechanical 
or scientific conception or apperception of society.
e -"vlThe antithesis of the pragmatic, mechanical approach is the
contemplative mode which can best be understood according to Macmurray
when one searches through the criticisms that have been levelled at
the Hobbesian thesis, i.e. in reaction to the pragmatic mode. Macmurray
concluded about Hobbes* approach that: "The criticism may be put most
stringently by saying that Hobbes is wrong in thinking that there is
nothing in human nature to act as a bond of unity between man and 
28man. " The basic error of the Hobbesian thesis of society revolves 
around his fallacious assumptions about human motivation. Hobbes had 
unrealistically stressed the self-seeking component of human nature as 
well as the countervailing force of human reason. The idea of men 
continually calculating their social relationships. in terms of self- 
interest, i.e. a war of all against all, cannot be accepted as the 
normal state of affairs,
" '    I I ■ ' ' ' '
26. PE p. 137
27. PH p. 137
28. PE p. 138
-181
The antithesis of Hobbes is to be found in the works of 
Rousseau and the Romantic movement. Rousseauism is anti-Hobbesian 
and consequently "finds the bond of society in man’s ’animal* 
nature and the source of hostility and-conflict in reason".This 
approach is organic since the assumption is that society is not one 
actual thing, but in the process of becoming. "For being organic 
it grows, and its present tensions and conflicts only appear to 
contradict this. Progress is then seen to be inevitable; it is 
a natural process, and the conservative effort to bring about stabi­
lisation is the negative phase of the tension by which socieiy 
progresses. However, since one has not reached the ideal but exists 
in society at the present state of development, there still exists 
the desire among the members of the society for the realisation of 
the idealised end. "Our frantic efforts to resist the actual and to 
escape from its tensions and conflicts arise from the desire to have 
the future harmony here and now. The solution is to identify with 
the ideal end, and identify our individual wills with the general 
will of society, then we will find satisfaction in performing our 
own function in the social whole. Macmurray* s summary of the 
Rousseauistic'thesis was that;
We will act from our general will as members of society, willing the general good, not from our particular wills as individuals seeking vainly to secure their immmediate individual interests. And since our being is really a social being, and our existence as independent individuals is an illusion, the general will is our real will, and our will for private self-interest is only a distorted appear­ance. 52
29. PR p. 140
30. PR p. 140
31. PR p. 141
32. PR p. 141
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The contemplative mode of society 2?equires that the individual
submits to the general will. Macmurray concluded that such an
approach mi^t bring about a divided self, "The self that apper-
ceives life in this fashion is an isolated and therefore a divided 
33self. " There is the dualism of the self as spectator and the self 
as participant.
The Rousseauistic thesis is based upon the negative apperception. 
The members of Rousseau’s hypothetical society are isolated indi­
viduals, since the artistic mode stresses the single human being.
The basic question raised by such a thesis for Macmurray is whether 
the unification of the members of an association can be accomplished 
without the individual losing his identity when he is immersed in the 
general will. Macmurray concluded that: "It is possible to have such 
a society by mystical self-identification with the whole of which I
34.form a part. Mysticism for Macmurray is an essential element in
all contemplative and aesethic reflective experiences. Macmurray
defined mysticism as "self-identification with the whole, with the
35other that includes one self ..." The contemplative society is 
based upon the voluntary capitulation of the individual to the whole 
as being opposed to the individual being forced by coercion.
Both of these modes of society are "ambivalent expressions of 
the same negative motivation".^ One can be transformed into the 
other. An example of this transformation'Is the ease in which the 
democratic state is transmuted into the totalitarian state. Both of
i
35. PR p. 142
34. PR p. 145
35. PR p. 145
36. PR p . 145
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these modes or forms of society are in complete contrast with the 
positive mode of apperception of human unity, i.e. community.
Macmurray maintained that our whole social tradition is based 
upon a negative apperception presented by these two negative modal 
differentiations of society.
There is, however, a basic omission in Macmurray* s discussion 
of the two modal differentiations of society. Macmurray failed to 
explain how each mode contributes to the overall negative aspect of 
society. Macmurray did not indicate in what way these modal differ­
entiations combine in the general fabric of human groups. Macmurray 
did not spell out how the two modal differentiations combined and
contrasted with community. Although Macmurray did indicate that "the
57reality of community implies society in both forms". Jeffko after 
commenting upon this deficiency, then tried to extrapolate from the 
clues contained within Macmurray* s writings vhat elements in community 
contrast with the two modes of society. The pragmatic mode contrasts 
with the general principles within a community and the contemplative, 
mode contrasts with the common good of the community, or the common 
desire to live together. However, Macmurray* s failure to offer a 
clear correlation between the elements in ihe two modes of society 
and the positive mode of community is a clue to the difficulty of 
drawing boundaries between different human groups, since each group 
contains all the necessary elements to become either personal or im­
personal. Any set of categories, vhich are applied to any form of 
human unity is apt to be either so imprecise as to be useless or it 
will be too rigid, and consequently it will.distort the reality of 
human groups.
37. PR p. 176
38. Jeffko, op. cit., pp.152-155
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An example of the imprecision of Macmurray* s categories is
his understanding of the perfect or ideal State, which shows he
favoured the integration of the Rousseauistic and Hobbesian modes
of society although there is no direct evidence that he favoured the
general integration of the mechanistic and organic conceptions of
society. Macmurray averred that: "the State is a set of technical
59devices for the development and maintenance of law". However, 
in a more Rousseauistic vein Macmurray maintained that: "The State 
is, thus, the central institution of society; that is to say of the 
functional association of a human group. It is organic, not personal. 
A free society depends upon all members of the society being able to 
meet together. Since the possibility of anarcly comes into being 
with large numbers of people the state becomes a device to escape 
anarchy. However, Macmurray clearly rejected the idea of the ’collec­
tive-individual* or the *state-personality*as being destructive. 
Macmurray combined the two negative modes, i.e. Macmurray assumed that 
the mechanical aspect of the state could help the voluntary forms of 
self-government. He gave equal weight to both the contemplative and 
pragmatic modes of society. Macmurray saw the need for the existence 
of both devices, i.e. the mechanical mode of society and the voluntary 
self-government of the organic mode of society, in particular, in his 
theory of the state. Macmurray did find the separate contrasted cate­
gories of society rather restricting when describing his theory of the 
ideal state.
39. PR p. 198
40. CP p.35
41. OH p. 216
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One should not only look at the types of societies Macmurray
proposed, hut also at his conception of the negative motivation
behind society, i.e. fear. All societies are based by definition
upon a negative motivation which is essentially fear.^^ Negative
45motivation is the fear of the other. Therefore, fear not love
determines society. Fear in animals is in terms of the perception of
the immediate danger being confronted. Fear in the human is not
instinctive as in animals, "but a pervasive attitude referring to
the whole range of possible danger which the foresight of rational
knowledge reveals to consciousness".^ Macmurray maintained that:
"Fear, as a personal motive, is at once fear of the other and fear 
45for oneself. " ■ Both love and fear are constitutive of the relation 
between persons. Love and fear are part of the same set of opera­
tions within the relations between persons. Thé.original motivation 
of the personal is bipolar; love and fear are "the positive and 
negative poles of a single motivation".Macmurray*s presupposition 
that fear and love are part of the same overall set of relationships 
brings one back to the question of whether or not groups are different 
or Aether there are certain factors that are more dominant within 
each human group. The singular emotional source of fear and love as the 
motivating forces within human groups makes the classification of 
human groups in terms of a dominant factor feasible without actually 
separating the groups into two different categories. Within every 
group love and fear exists and the possibility for both always exists.
42. Jeffko, op. cit.,p.131 





Therefore, one has room to doubt Macmurray*s proposal that assumes 
a basically negative or positive motivation for a particular group, 
since both are found within a single relationship, which means that 
the pivotal element for determining whether a group is a society or 
community is very imprecise or misleading.
Macmurray realised that societies like communities produce 
religions or pseudo-religions, but he maintained that the religions 
were warped since they were based upon fear instead of love. The 
pragmatic society creates a religion that produces a "spiritual tech­
nology; an aimouiy of devices to control the forces which determine 
practical success or failure, but which are beyond the reach of ordinary 
human power; a set of ritual devices which placate the hostility or 
enlist the favour of the d i v i n e " . O n  the other hand the contempla­
tive apperception creates a religion, that is "idealist or 'purely 
spiritual*. Such a religion tends in various manners to be other­
worldly for it is characteristically the representation of an ideal
48community which is hoped for and imagined, but not intended in practice". 
Religion in both cases since it is based upon fear becomes unreal. This 
enlightening analysis demonstrates the constructive aspects of Macmurray*s 
understanding of society. However, this analysis fails to indicate 
whether this is a classification of certain 'pseudo-religious groups* 
or a recognition of certain religious deviations. Once again the 
question of whether Macmurray is discussing two separate principles 





The basic question that remains unanswered is whether Macmurray
conceives of society and community as two different types of human
groups as did P. Toennies or whether these two principles are really
manifestations of different factors within all groups. Toennies
divided groups into two rather rigid types, i.e. into 'community* and
'society* (sometimes referred to as association). The determining
factor is what type of will is manifested; the former group is founded
upon the vital or essential will while the latter rests upon the
49rational or utilitarian will. A parallel set of factors that resemble
Macmurray*s two basic categories of personal and impersonal.
Toennies wrote that: "The Group which is formed through this
positive relationship is called an association (Verbindung) when
conceived of as a thing or being which acts as a unit inwardly and
outwardly. The relationship itself, and also the resulting association
is conceived of either as real and organic —  this is the essential
characteristic of the Gemeinschaft (community); or as imaginary and
mechanical structure —  this is the concept of Gesellsohaft (society).
Within the category of Gemeinschaft fall family life, village life and
town life and within the category of Gesellsohaft fall city life,
natio n a l l i f e  and cosmopolitan life which includes trade, industry and 
51science. Toennies also presented two different views of human will. 
There are for Toennies two meanings for the term * will * : "Each repre­
sents an inherent whole which unites in itself a multiplicity of
'
49. Stark, Werner Social Theory and Christian Thought (London:Routledge & Kegan ipaul Ltd., 1958) pp.6-7
50. Toennies, op. cit., p.35
51. Ibid p .119 .
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feelings, instincts, and desires. This unity would in the first 
case he understood as a real or natural one; in the second case as 
a conceptual or artificial one. The will of the human being in 
"^ he first form I will call natural will (Wesenwille) ; and in the 
second form rational will (Ettrwille)Vesenwille forms the 
basis of Gemeinschaft, whereas Kurwille provides the foundation 
for Gesellsohaft.
Macmurray in some ways paralleled Toennies* understanding 
and categorisation of society. Toennies divided groups, according 
to whether or not one or the other type of will was present, while 
Macmurray did so in terns of what type of motivation was present.
The problem revolves around whether or not Macmurray meant as did 
Toennies, to fit each group in human society into a particular cate­
gory, or whether Macmurray intended to stress the differences within 
each group and the principles operating within each group. There are 
differences between Macmurray *s approach and Toennies * approach for 
example in their views of the State. Toennies has a mechani­
cally oriented Hobbesian view of the State, whereas Macmurray combined 
the Rousseauistic and Hobbesian view of the State^^ which is directly 
due to Macmurray*s utilisation of more categories than Toennies. There 
are, nevertheless, similarities between both men's approach to the 
classification of groups, such as the division between intimate and 
utilitarian groups. There are several criticisms that have been 
levelled at Toennies that are also applicable to Macmurray*s bifur­
cation of human grouping, Johannes Messner^in Social Ethics: Natural 
Law in the Western World considered the emphasis of Toennies to be misleading 
in his distinction between community and society, i.e. Gemeinshcaft 




The pair of categories in the form invented by him (Toennies) can hardly be maintained from the point of view of social philosophy or even of empirical sociology. Purposes also have an essential deter­mining influence on 'communities* —  that is, the existential ends —  especially the latter of the free selective will of their members. On the other hand, the employers and employees of a firm may go beyond the mere fulfillment of their individual functions and form a community in the true sense, if their co-operation is instinct with mutual trust a M  if all common concerns are settled in concert, that is, if the principles of justice and charity govern their co-operation. In fact, all functional associations are at least indirectly connected with existential ends, and hence each 'society* is subject to demands which do not permit it to constitute itself and to act solely in accordance with arbitrary will. This does not mean, of course, that, for instance, the workers, managers, directors and shareholders in a company need cultivate affection for one another, but it certainly implies that their relations must be in­spired by mutual respect, justicej and benevolence, and thus be guided by a spirit of partnership.^^
Macmurray's conceptualisation of groups divided in terms of fear and 
love admits such a criticism since neither of the two forms are en­
tirely free of either feature, although Macmurray*s dichotomy does 
not seem to be as rigid in his proposed cateogires as Toennies. 
Messner also makes a practical objection to Toennie^ categories. He
pointed out that the term 'society* "in the wider sense comprises all
55social forms, both true communities and functional associations". 
Messner noted the confusion between the two uses of the term society 
in Toennied work since it denoted both a ^neral field and a specific
category. Macmurray also caused some confusion when using society in
56both ways which could lead to misrepresentation. The danger of any 
rigid dichotomy between society and community lies in the ever present
54. Messner, Johannes Social Ethics: Natural Law in the Western "World(London, St. Louis: B Henider Book Co., 1958) p. 101
55. Ibid pp.101-102
56. Jeffko, op. cit., p.151
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possibility that one might place a group into the negative or
positive mode of apperception for marginal reasons and then conclude
that the group was either evil or good because of it being placed
in one or the other of the modes* Bow rigid is Macmurray*s dichotomy
and is Macmurray of the view that groups or principles are separate
or part of the same general phenomenon? Macmurray stated that:
"Every community is then a society; but not every society a 
57community. " This implies an interdependence or interplay between 
the two categories, even though he is willing to isolate society 
from community, although he is unwilling to postulate a community 
wi'tihout a society* If one postulates a society without a community 
or the aspect of a community then some societies can be construed 
as being totally evil since they are motivated by self-interest 
combined with unrealistic idealism and fear —  such a belief seemed 
more realistic during Hitler’s dominance of Europe* However, as Messner 
points out it is not possible to say that any functional association 
or society is totally negative * It would se^ more realistic to assume 
that even though there are two distinct principles or factors in 
operation within each group, the extremes of Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft 
do not exist. Macmurray certainly did not advocate a rigid system of 
categories such as those of Toennies* However, he did seem to wish to 
classify a particular group as either ’community* or ’society* which 
makes these categories more than just principles*
How did Macmurray’s understanding of ’society’ and ’community’ 
compare with certain thinkers within the fiçld of Christian Ethics?
As has been noted Macmurray falls somewhere between the negative view 
of society in general, i.e. one that is completely dominated by self-
57* PR p * 146
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interest as in the work of Reinhold Niebuhr, and Paul Lehmann’s 
more positive view of human groups. These two views represent 
two poles within Christian Ethics; one dominated by the idea of 
community and the other dominated by the idea of the self-interested 
individual in society.
Reinhold Niebuhr adhered to the thesis that "group relations 
can never be as ethical as those which characterise individual 
relations".Niebuhr maintained that any social co-operation larger
59than the most intimate social group requires "a measure of coercion".  ^
Although Niebuhr favoured the mechanical approach to society he appre­
ciated the existence of the voluntary elements within society. "While 
no state can maintain its unity purely by coercion. Where the factor.of 
mutual consent is strongly developed, and where standardised and 
approximately fair methods of adjudicating and resolving conflicting 
interests within an organised group have been established, the coercive 
factor in social life is frequently covert, and becomes apparent only 
in moments of crisis and in the group’s policy towards recalcitrant 
individuals. Yet it is never absent.Niebuhr viewed the problem
as being "The increased power of collective self-interest compared 
with individual self-interest".^^ Niebuhr saw within any group a real 
potential for evil. "A distinction between group pride and the egoism
58. Niebuhr, Reinhold Moral Man and hnmor^ Society (New York; CharlesScribner’s Sons, 1952) (1960) p.85 hereafter cited as MMIS
59. MMIS p. 5
60. MMIS pp.5-4 '
61. Niebuhr, Reinhold Man’s Nature - and His .Communities (London:Geoffrey Hies, }966) P• 47 ‘
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of individuals is necessaiy, furthermore, because the pretensions 
and claims of a collective or social self exceed those of the in­
dividual ego*"^^ Niebuhr also pointed out that; "The group is more 
arrogant, hypocritical, self-centred and more ruthless in the 
pursuit of its ends than the individual.
Paul Lehmann represents the other end of the spectrum, since 
he considered the solution of the problem of Christian Ethics to 
be solvable in terms of the existing fellowship (koinonia) of 
Christians. Lehmann considers morality to be communal as opposed 
to an individual matter.Lehmann has a positive approach to the 
group in particular the Christian fellowship, i.e. koinonia:
In the koinonia a continuing experiment is going on in ■ytie concrete reality and possibility of man’s inter­relatedness and openness for man. In the koinonia ethical theory and practice acquire a framework of meaning and a pattern of action which undergird the diversity and the complexity of the concrete ethical situation with vitality and purpose.
Macmurray offered a way of reconciling these two approaches by 
showing the two separate elements of community and society that are 
present in society in its general sense. The ’society’ represents the 
Niebuhrian conception of the group, whereas ’community’ contains the 
basic elements of Lehmann’s koinonia* Although this separation does 
have its attractions one should note the lack of any real separation 
in terms of one group from another, i.e. one being pure Niebuhrian and
62. Niebuhr, Reinhold The Nature and Destiny of Man (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1941) V0I.I, p.208
65. Ibid *-
64. Long, Edward Le Roy, Jr., A Survey of Christian Eh tics (New York:Oxford University Press, 196?) pp.158-159
65. Lehmann, Paul L. Ethics in a Christian Context (London: SCM. Press
Ltd., 1965) p . 151
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the other being a pure koinonia» Macmurray*s thesis did tackle 
constructively the opposing problems of group perfection and im­
perfection* However, Macmurray did try to place some groups within 
one category, however, such a drastic separation does present 
problems. However, there is also the possibili-ty with Macmurray*s 
presuppositions about human unity to approach all groups as having 
the potential for self-seeking and self-giving, if the categories 
are treated as principles. Macmurray recognised the underlying 
negative and positive aspects of human relations that are to be 
found within the groups that make up human unity. If one were to 
modify Macmurray* s statement to read that all communities are, socie­
ties and all societfes are communities • in potential, then this
would be closer to the Christian view thàt man has an equal potential 
for good and evil in all situations.
There are two fundamental weaknesses in Macmurray* s thinking 
about community. The first is his rather ambiguous use of the two 
contrasted categories of ’society* and ’community*, since he neither 
makes them simply principles nor- actual divisions within human groups. 
If one assumes that Macmurray was proposing two divisions of human 
groups with one having two sub-divisions, in -vdiich one may place par­
ticular groups, then one is confronted with the impossibility of 
placing actual groups into rigid categories since actual groups display 
both sets of features used in dividing them into classes. One also has 
the added danger of assuming that these categories do determine whether 
a group is evil or good. Classification of human groups except in the 
cases -vdiich are themselves removed from normal human existence, fails 
to work.
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However, if ’society’ and ’oommuiiity’ are viewed as representing 
two principles, one is left to face the inherent paradox contained 
within the definition of community* Conmrunity must be all inclusive 
since it is based on love and yet it is built upon the exclusive 
’I-Thou* relation, that is weakened by each person that is included 
in the communal group.
Community is forced to become society because of its need to 
include other members and it consequently destroys direct relations. 
All human groups or associations beyond the most rudimentary must be, 
using Macmurray’s principles; ; societies. Each group may contain 
elements of community, but it can never become a proper community. 
However, true community is necessary in order to achieve total free 
co-operation and true friendship. "We cannot realise community in 
practice nor can we dispense with it."^^ Commuhity becomes an unreali- 
sable ideal, which is in direct opposition to Macmurray*s aim, which 
was to find an empirical foundation for zreligion.
66. Harris, Errol E, "Review of John Macmurray’s Persons in Relation in International Philosophical Quarterly (Sept. 1962) Vol.2 No.5, p.480
CHAPTER 10
A Critique of Macmurray*s Communal View of the Self
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Macmurray*s conception of the self is intimately interwoven 
with his conception of the community, since he defined the self 
in terms of the mutual, relational aspect of human nature. There­
fore, an investigation of the community in terms of the way it is 
associated with the conception of the self will he helpful in a 
general critical investigation of Macmurray*s theories about 
community. The partial inability of community to fully explain 
the human self, an assumption that lies at the very roots of Mhc- 
murray’s thought, reveals the precariousness of Macmurray*s employ­
ment of the concept of community as the primary focal point in his 
explanation of human nature.
The most fundamental question one must ask about Macmurray* s 
conception of human nature with its stress upon the communal is . 
whether such a dependence upon the evolutionary process of self- 
realisation through mutual, reciprocal relationships ignores the 
uniqueness and the isolation of each individual from his fellows. 
Macmurray in his definition of the self considered the essence of 
the self, when reduced to its basic essentials to be centred ppon 
human relationships. Macmurray*s understanding of the self, which 
depends upon his conception of community, is defined in terms of the 
concepts of mutuality and reciprocity, which inevitably stresses the 
interdependence of human beings. However, the value of such an 
assumption is questionable, since it slurs over the uniqueness of 
the individual as well as the problem; of isolation that affects 
each person. ,
Does Macmurray deny, by reducing the self to elements which are 
basically relational, the uniqueness of the individual? Is the in­
dividual merely a product of the personal and mutual inter-relationship 
with other persons and groups of persons? Does Macmurray* s approach to 
the self neglect the unique, individual side of the equation while
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over-stressing the relational, social side of the equation? Does 
the *I-Thou* relation fully explain the self?
For Macmurray the isolated self is an abstraction and does 
not exist in any other way; a dismissal that has been noted by John 
Macguarrie # For Macmurray the self is a product of reciprocal 
relationships and has no meaning outside of those relationships. In 
one of Macmurray*s earliest works this point of view is starkly 
expressed. "The self is one term in a relation between two selves.
It cannot be prior to that relation and equally, of course, the re­
lation cannot be prior to it. *1* exist only as one member of the 
*you^ and I*. The self only exists in the communion of the selves." 
Macmurray limited his definition of the self to the sphere of the 
relations between two or more persons* In one of Macmurray*s later 
works he consistently maintained that:
Individual independence is an illusion and the independent individual, the isolated self, is a nonentity. In ourselves we are nothing; and when we turn our eyes inward in search of ourselves we find a vacuum. Being nothing in ourselves, we have no value in ourselves; and are of no importance vAiatever, wholly without meaning or significance. It is only in relation to others that we exist. ^
This type of approach echoes the work of Hume. In A Treatise of Biman
Nature Hme contended that:
... when I enter most intimately into what I call myself,I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never catch myself at any time without a per­ception, and never can observe anything but the perception.When my perceptions are r@noved for any time, as by sound sleep; so long am I insensible of myself, and may truly be said not to exist.4 /
1. Macguarrie, John Twentieth-Century Religious Thought (London: SCMPress Ltd., I965) p.20?, hereafter cited as TCR
2. lU p.157
5. PR p.211
4. Hame, David A Treatise of Human Nature (London: Oxford University Press, 1968) p . 252
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Home took great pains to point out that there is no direct or
immediate experience of the self. Macmurray, however, wished to
base his^conception of the self upon experience, i.e. a particular
experience. Therefore, Macmurray chose to base his conception of
the self upon the only experience that he considered applicable which
is the personal relationships with other persons. In The Self as
Agent Macmurray underlined the communal nature of the self. "If then
there is to be a self there must also be another in space and time.
5The self cannot exist in isolation. " Macmurray rigorously maintained 
that the self does not exist outside of the *I-Thou* experience, i.e. 
the immediate experience of the mutual, reciprocal relation with another. 
Although Macmurray, unlike Hume, maintained that the self is more than 
just a group of passing experiences, there is still a danger in con­
fining the apprehension of the self to mutual, reciprocal relational 
experiences, which are concentrated in the community. Prondizi in 
The Nature of the Self maintained that:
Numerous other instances can be offered as evidence of the existence of * something more* than the experience, a plus which can be reduced neither to an experience nor to the experiental. ' stream which we usually call the *self*. Be­sides learning, decision and repentance, many other psycho­logical facts namely promise, self-respect, hope, humilia­tion, dignity, worry, ... something pemanent exists which  ^explains the possibility of anticipating future experience...
In confining his definition of the self to the experience of the other 
through relation, i.e. to the community when viewed at its most basic 
level, Macmurray overlooked the * something more* or the *plus* aspect 
of the self. However, this does not in any^way discount the fact that 
the self has, as a primary component, the relational experience. Never­
theless, such a one-sided view of the self is bound to raise questions 
about the veracity of Macmurray*s approach*
5. SA p.142
6. Prondizi, Risieri, The Nature of the Self; A Functional Interpretation(London; Oxford University Press, 1953) 9*125 "
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The *I-Thou* or relational unierstending of the concept of 
the self is not confined to Macmurray. The school of thought that 
considers the relationship between I and the other to be of seminal 
importance is sometimes labelled the personalist school. There are 
a number of thinkers in the personalist school of thought that have 
an affinity with Macmurray. Macmurray has been classed by commenta­
tors as a personalist, i.e. Macmurray*s thinking is concurrent and 
in agreement with the personalist approach although it is separate 
from the mainstream of personalism. Peter A.Bertocci*s definition 
of personalism illustrates that Macmurray did employ some of the 
same te m s  and frames of reference as the personalis ts. Bertocci' 
centres his definition of personalism around the * self-existent* 
person >^ch he defines in a similar way to Macmurray who also has 
as his focal point the personal. Bertocci considers the person to 
be "a complex unity of activities ... Further, a person is a self- 
conscious agent, free within limits to develop in accordance with
7ideals of truth, love and of aesthetic and religious sensitivity",
Macguarrie loosely categorises Macmurray with the rest of the person-
alists, although he is aware that Macmurray is * somewhat apart* from
the other writers, that centre their work around the concept of
8personsü. being, such as Martin Buber and Nicholas Berdyeav. Maurice 
Friedman holds that Macmurray*s thought significantly paralleled Buber’s 
thought without influencing it or being influenced by it. However, this
9does not do full justice to Macmurray*s own analysis of his development.
7. Bertocci, Peter A., "The Perspective of a Teleological PersonalisticIdealist" in John B Smith’s Contemporary American Philosophy (London; George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1970) p.249
8. TCR p. 206
9. Vos, Kenneth Duane, "The Contribution of Bdnond Cahn, H. RichardNiebuhr and John Macmurray to the Ethics of Responsibility" (Unpublished Doctoral Thesis; Columbia University, 1972)pp.189-190
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Macmurray in his Swarthmore Lectures acknowledged his early debt to 
Martin Buber to whom he turned to in his search for religious insight. 
"I found myself in these things much closer to the prophetic insight 
of one of the very greatest of modem thinkers, Martin Buber.
Buber and Meatd
Macmurray*8 and Buber’s ideas coincide in their approach to the
self. Macguarrie noted that: "like Buber, Macmurray thinks that an
11isolated self is an unreal abstraction". Paul Pfuetze notes the
connection between Buber, Mead and Macmurray. However, it is outside
the scope of this paper to investigate the full degree of agreement
or disagreement between Macmurray* s philosophy and the philosophies
of the personalists. Nevertheless, it will be profitable to compare
Macmurray*8 philosophy with that of Martin Buber, an well as with the
thought of George Herbert Mead, a leading social behaviourist.
Mead’s thought conforms wiih Macmurray*s thought in severeil ways.
A critical question for Mead, Buber, and Macmurray is whether an
individual becomes a self in and through relations, or whether an
12a priori self enters into relations with other selves. The self
for Macmurray is a product of relationships since one only exists in
13terms of the relational. The self only comes into being after the 
encounter with the other. Macmurray rejected the idea of an a priori 
self. "The self does not first know itself and determine an objective; 
and then discover the other in carrying opt its intention. George 
Herbert Mead, like Macmurray, maintained that: "The self is something
10. SRRp.24 ^
11. TCR p.207
12. Pfuetze, Paul The Social Self (New York: Bookman Associates, 1954)pp. 515-514, he rafter cited as SS
15. PR pp. 17 and 211
14. SA p. 109
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lAioh has a development; it is not initially there at birth, but 
arises in the process of social esqperience and activity, that is, 
develops in the given individual as a result of his relations to 
that process as a whole and to other individuals within that
15process." Pfuetze points out that Mead is not very convincing
or consistent in his demonstration of the exclusively social
character of the s e l f . B u b e r  on the other hand seems-to put
the emphasis neither upon the individual nor upon the social when
searching for the fundamental reality of human existence. The basic
reality for Buber is ’man with man’ which focuses the investigation
17upon the ’between*. Buber asserted that: "The view >Jiich estab­
lishes the concept of the * between* is to be acquired by no longer 
localising the relation between human beings, as is customary, either
within the individual soul or in a general world which embraces and 
18determines them." Although there is an element of ambiguity in
Buber* s writings on this subject, his position is best summarised
as follows : "a person does not first exist as an individual form
and then enter into communication with others. It is rather in that
19communication that he becomes or is a person. V John Macmurray* s 
thinking parallels Buber* s and Mead*s concentration upon the re­
lational feature of the self. Macmurray*s, Mead’s and Buber’s views
15. Mead, George Herbert, Mind. Self and 'Society: From the Standpointof a Social Behaviourist (Chicago and London: Chicago University Press, 1974) (first published 1954) p.155 hereafter cited as MSS
16. SS p.251 . ''
17. SS p.251
18. Buber, Martin, Between Man and Man (London: Kegan Paul, 1947)trans. by Ronald G-. Smith, p.205, hereafter cited as BMM
19. SS p . 251
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revolve around the dialogue of the self and the other, i.e. the 
•I-Thou*. It must be noted that Macmurray*s twofold approach to 
relationships, i.e. the personal and impersonal relational types, 
is very close to Buber’s categories of *I-Thou* and *I-It*. Buber’s 
and Mead’s general position which is almost equivalent to Macmurray*s 
position is that: "vdiat is uniquely characteristic and constitutive 
of the human world is something that takes place between one person 
and another in community. Man’s essential nature is not grasped 
from what unfolds in the individual’s life, but from the distinctiveness 
of his relation to things, to other living beings, and (Buber would
pC iadd) to God".
Macmurray*s assertion that: "Without an other there can be no 
21self", lies somevAiere between Mead and Buber. Mead’s premise is
that: "For social psychology, the whole (society) is prior to the part
(individual), not the part to the whole; and the part is explained in
22terms of the whole,^not the whole in terms of the part." This 
logically follows from idle perception of the individual in purely re­
lational terms. By stressing the relational, one introduces the tend­
ency to consider the whole of society before-, the individual, which 
could have deep ramifications for any ethical system based upon such
an understanding of human nature. Mead concluded that the self was
25basically a social process. Buber on the other hand did speak of 
an ’a priori to relations’ -vhich recognised that something exists
before the contact with the other. Buber recognised that there was at
\least a potential that existed before the relationship. Macmurray did
20. Pfuetze, Paul B. "Martin Buber and American Pragmatism",in Schlipp,P.A. and Friedman, M. The Philosophy of Itotin Buber London: Cambridge University Press, 1967) pp.529-520 hereafter cited as PMB
21. SA p. 142
22. MSS p.7 
25. MSS p . 178
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not seem to concede the possibility of an ’a priori to relations’,
since for him the very basis of the self lies in the activity
surrounding the reciprocal relationship with a vacuum preceding
this relationship. Macmurray has concluded that the knowledge
of the other furnishes the very basis of experience as well as the
self. Macmurray was convinced that: "To be a person is to be in
communication with the other. The knowledge of the other is the
absolute presupposition of all knowledge and as such is necessarily
indemonstrable."^^ Macmurray at times comes close to Mead’s point
of view that the individual is a product of the social situation in
^^ch he finds himself. Macmurray like Mead, tended to disregard or
even dismiss the self as subject. Mead stated that: "The individual
enters as such into his own experience only as an object, not as a
subject; and he can enter as an object only on the basis of social
relations and interaction, only by means of his experiental transac-
25tions with other individuals in an organised social environment. "
The basic question for Macmurray as well as for Mead and Buber 
revolves around whether or not one can assume that there exists an 
antecedent self or only an antecedent society. Paul Pfuetze proposes 
the third alternative of a ’twin-bom’ approach, i.e. a simultaneous 
emergence of society and self.^^ Macmurray certainly would have 
agreed with the antecedent view of society although he would not have 
rejected out of hand the * twin-bom’conception of society and the 
self; he certainly would have rejected the idea of an antecedent self.
' ' " " "  .......- - - . II - - ■ - f
24. P R p . 7 7
25. MSS p . 225
26. SS p.249
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One telling criticism of Mead’s’social antecedent explanation*
of the self lies in his confusion of the conditions of knowledge,
27which includes self-knowledge, with the content of knowledge.
Mead maintained that:
The individual experiences himself as such, not directly, but only indirectly, from the particular standpoints of the individual members of the same social group, or from the generalised standpoint of the social group as a whole to which he belongs. For he enters his own experience as a self or individual, not directly or immediately, not by becoming a subject to himself, but only in so far as he first becomes an object to himself just as other indivi­duals are objects to him or in his experience ; and he becomes an object to himself only by taking the attitudes of other individuals towards himself within a social environment or context of experience and behaviour in which both he and they are involved.
These remarks are echoed in Macmurray’s denial of the existence of
the self as subject and his conception of mutuality. Mead seemed
to be assuming that all there is to be known about oneself is what
is available to others, and that one can acquire knowledge of oneself
only by taking on the attitudes of other. However, such an assumption
is questionable. Hamlyn in his criticisms of Mead stated that:
It is true that the existence of a social context is necessary for the initial acquisition of knowledge about oneself, it may sometimes be true that one can get toknow certain things about oneself only through the atti­tudes of others, and it may be true that our own attitudes to ourselves may be considerably influenced by the atti­tudes of others. None of that, however, adds up to the point that Mead seems to want to make ——  the knowledge go of myself is simply the knowledge that others have of me.
27. Hamlyn, David "Self Knowledge" in Mischel, Theodore The Self:Psychological and Philosophical Issues (Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1977) P-190
28. MSS p.158 *
29. Hamlyn, op. cit., pp.190-191
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Mead confused the conditions of knowledge with the actual content 
of the knowledge, i.e. the knowledge itself. The knowledge of 
self and the accompanying self-realisation which Ifeicmurray saw as 
dependent upon others may come about through the presence of others, 
but that is not to say that the knowledge itself is vholly dependent 
upon others, since to assume this means that the self is only the 
by-product of a social construction. Social factors are of great 
importance to the self and the realisation of the self, but one needs 
to recognise that something exists other than the social*
Mead implied that life is basically social in everything. Al­
though it is quite correct to maintain that the social aspect of man 
permeates the totality of human existence, one must also realise that 
the totality of human existence is not confined to its social and 
communal origins. For example, just because one is involved with the 
other in the acquisition of knowledge, this does not necessarily 
mean that the other is the primary source of knowledge. Remy C. Kwant
presupposes the au.tonomy of the individual is necessary for the acqui-
50sition of knowledge. Macmurray unequivocally stated that: "to know
is to apprehend the other, which implies that knowledge is dependent
upon the : other contextually as well as conceptually. Kwant points out
that: "others may have helped us by raising the issue or by formulating
the question very sharply. But such services are incidental, for there
is a question of a genuine understanding.only if we make a judgement
52because we ourselves see the truth of the matter," Kwant maintained 
that: "For in and through socieiy man obtains the materials of his
50. Kwant, Remy C. Phenomenology of Social Existence (Pittsburgh, Pa. : Duequesne ïïniversiiy Press, 1965) p.61
31. PR p.166
32. Kwant, op. cit., p.61
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scientific pursuits, his artistic achievements, his value judge­
ments and his work. But he is dependent in the way in which he 
takes up these materials* So far as understanding and insight 
are concerned, as well as genuine artistic vision and judgements 
of value, he rises above the bonds of his social b e i n g . S o c i e t y  
is the condition of knowledge and only part of the context of know­
ledge and not its content. The ambiguity of Macmurray* s understanding 
of knowledge, in particular his conception of self-knowledge, is from 
his confusion of the context and content of knowledge. This calls 
into question his comprehension of the self, which lacks a clear 
awareness of the necessity of' the autonomy of the individual in the 
processes of cognition and understanding, which is necessary for self- 
knowledge. Macmurray like Mead undervalued the autonomy of the 
individual which must exist along with the individual’s dependence 
upon the other, otherwise one’s thinking and actions are nothing be­
yond one’s encounter with the other, which means that one is in danger 
of being thought of as part of the social mass with no difference from 
the social mass.
If one deals only with the relational aspect of man, it makes the 
recognition of the importance of the autonomy of the person, i.e. his
Iindependence, a source of difficulty. Macmurray held that the person has 
his being in the relationship with the o t h e r . M e a d  and Macmurray to 
a lesser extent, failed to appreciate as .did Buber that: "neither self 
nor society is the fundamental fact of human existence; the individual
55and the community are equally primordial axj.6. correlative entitities".
Buber unlike Ifead and Macmurray, seemed to posit a transcendental
56’subject’ as a prior condition of relations. Buber was cognizant 
55. Kwant, op. cit., p.61
54. PRp.17
35. PMB p.552
36. SS p. 251
- 206 -
that the ’single one* is threatened hy the collective nature of 
37the community* Macmurray with his rejection of the self as sub­
ject and the definition of the self in terms of the other does not 
seem to offer sufficient safeguards against the inherent dangers in 
the collective nature of the community.
Macmurray’s Rejection of the Antecedent Self
The seeds of Macmurray’s rejection of the antecedent self lay 
in his rejection of the self as subject and the subsequent over­
dependence upon the relational interpretation of the self.
In his assumptions about the self as a product of social rela­
tionships Macmurray has made one telling fallacious assumption in 
the process of dismissing the possibility of the existence of the 
self as subject. Macmurray maintained that: "In actuality, the 
solitary Self can only mean the self in reflection, self-isolated 
from the world, withdrawn into itself. This is the Self in self-
58negation, the negative aspect of selfhood or the Self as subject."
In Macguarrie’8 essay about Macmurray, he stated that the error of
traditional philosophy for Macmurray "was to take as its starting
39point ’I think’ —  the self as subject". The desire on Macmurray’s 
part to replace ’I think’ with the new starting point of *I do’, i.e. 
the self as agent, leads him into disregarding and repudiating the 
existence of the self as subject. The concept of the self as agent 
and Macmurray‘s repudiation of the self as subject is a cornerstone 
of Macmurray’s thought. Macmurray averred that:
I
57. BMM pp.66-67
58. SA pp. 141-142
59. TCR p.206
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The self as subject then is not part of the world it knows, but withdrawn from it, and so, in conception, outside it, or other than its object. But to be part of the world is to exist, while to be excluded from the world is to be non-existent. It follows that the Self exists as agent but not as subject.
Macmurray envisioned the self only in terms of its relation to the
world, i.e. only in tenas of external relations and since the self
as subject is not part of the external world, it does not exist.
After rejecting the self as subject one cannot see any possibility
of Macmurray being able to accept the concept of the self as
existing before the self as object. One must ask Aether Macmurray*s
conclusions about the non-existence of the self as subject is valid,
since such an assumption completely repudiates the possibility of an
antecedent self, which admits the possible primacy of the group over
the iidividual self.
Although it follows that the self as subject cannot know of its
existence, it does not follow that the self as subject does not exist.
Macmurray*s denial of. the self as subject rests upon an incorrect
inference. D.D. Raphael in his critical essay and review of The Self
As Agent granted that the self as subject "is not a part of the world
that it knows. NevèiH^èlèss, 'Ès^haêl: goes on to' assert that:
There is much of the world as a whole (the world of which the Self as agent is part) which the Self as subject does not know. So the fact that the subject is not part of the ’world it knows’ (i.e. of that section of the world as awhole which it knows) does not imply that it is not partof the world as a whole, i.e. that it does not exist.42
Macmurray’s desire to avoid falling into the trap of dualism leads him
into another repudiation of the self as subject. Macmurray declared
40. SA p . 91
41. SA p . 91
42. Raphael, D.D. "Book Review of The Self as Agent" in The PhilosophicalQuarterly (1959) IX No. 56. p.274
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that:
If then we attempt to represent the Self through the mathematical unity-pattem, the result is necessarily a dualism of mind and body, that is to say, of the Agent-self and the Subject-self. The Self can be represented either as a physical system, or as a mental system, and these two systems exclude oneanother.45
This lead to Macmurray*s assumption that: "formally the Self as 
subject is the negation of the self as agent, and since it is by its 
own activity that the Self withdraws from action into reflection, 
its subject-hood is its self-negation".44 p.p. Raphael has pointed 
out that this negation is a product of Ifecmurray’s dialectical 
approach, which hopes to unify the positive and negative in a syn­
thesis, but not a valid representation of reality. Raphael remarked 
that Macmurray* s dialectical logic erroneously required that: "the 
positive and negative (thesis and antithesis) should be successive, 
and therefore it cannot represent the Self as both agent and subject
at the same time. Yet an adequate form must do this, since when we
45act we know that we act with thought." Macmurray*s erroneous
assumption that the self as subject does not exist can be adequately 
expressed as the self as subject does not know of its existence. 
Macmurray in denying the existence of the self as subject is only 
left with the self as agent which implies that the self may be con­
sidered only in terms of the self as object, i.e. in terms of the 
*I-Thou* relation brought about when the self comes into contact with 
the other. Macmurray incorrectly presupposed that the self as subject 
does not exist, thereby making it impossible for him to presuppose an 
antecedent self. However, such a presupposition of non-existence is
43. SA p.96
44I SA p . 96 - ' ‘ -
45i-, Raphael, op. cit., pp.274-275'
- 209 -
incorrect in that one may only maintain that the subject does not 
know of its existence; therefore there is still the possibility 
of the existence of an antecedent self.
The rejection of the antecedent self induced Bozzo to conclude 
that Macmurray maintained that: "The common life remains as the 
necessary preduring substrate of individuality."^^ Nevertheless, 
the community is not the only substratum of the individual. There­
fore, one needs to uncover the identity or at least a hint of the 
identity of the self as subject, i.e. the self before or beyond the 
relation, since the relational apprehension is inadequate to explain 
the total actuality of idie self. C.A. Campbell recognised the danger 
of confining any explanation of the self exclusively to the relational. 
Campbell concluded that:
... it is the sub.iect-mind. the identical *1* of self- conciousness, which we are trying to account for; and by the route suggested is plainly impossible. For as we have already seen, cognition of relationships, and indeed cognition of any kind v^atsoever, presupposes an identical subject conscious of its own identity.It follows that the ‘relational* way of explaining self-identiiy can only be in terms vhLch presuppose the very thing it is purporting to explain,47
This inadequacy in the relational approach leads Macmurray to conclude
48that: 'Tersonal individuality is not an original given fact". A con­
clusion, that C.A. Campbell foresaw, which itself contradicts the 
possibility of society, since society depends on the original given 
fact of unique individuals for its existence. Macmurray*s position 
stems from the belief that the individual "discovers himself as an
46. Bozzo, Edward George, "Toward a Renewed Fundamental MoralTheology: The Implication of the Thought of John Macmurray for Christain Ethics" (Unpublished Doctoral Thesis: Catholic University of America, 1969) p.240
47, Campbell, C.A. On Selfhood and Godhood (London; George Allen
and Unwin Ltd., 1957) P«79
46. PR p . 91
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49individual by contrasting himself". In reality he does not
discover the self, but only the self as agent, i.e. the self as
object. Macmurray in limiting the self to the self as agent
ignores the self as subject which is the original building material
of the individual. C.A. Campbell remarked that: "What we are trying
to account for is the identity of a self not for some external
observer, but the self itself; the identity of the self as subject,
not its identity eis an object —  which the self, qua self, just is 
50not." Macmurray*s conception of the self in terms of the community,
i.e. in terms of one*s intimate, personal relations with the other,
falls short, since it fails to provide or even suggest a basis for
anything more than an external view of the self, which leaves little
room for the 'intrinsically unique individual.
Macmurray* s definition of the self stemmed from his assumption
that the self as subject did not exist, but that only the relational 
51existed. Macmurray defined the self only in terms of being a part
of the reciprocal relationship with the other.
The idea of an isolated agent is self-contradictory. Any agent is necessarily in relation to the Other. Apart from this essential relation he does not exist. But, further, the Other in this constitutive relation must itself be personal. Persons, therefore, are constituted by their mutual relation to one another. *1* exist only as one element in the complex *You and I*.?2
Macmurray saw the relational^as the only basic constituent of the self,
"The thesis we have to expound and to sustain is that the self is
constituted by its relation to the Other; that it has its being in
55its relationships ..." Macmurray failed to take into account the
49. PR p.91
50. Campbell, op. cit., p.79
51. PR p.17
52. PR p.24 
55. PR P.17
(a) see footnote 64 p. 243
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underlying doubt that debilitates all communication; as well as 
the doubt surrounding the sharing of experiences by two persons# 
Macmurray inadequately dealt with the reality that the self qua self 
is isolated by its very nature, i.e. one might say that the self 
is ’trapped in its own skull’. R. Niebuhr in The Self and the 
Dramas of History in his discussion of the self in dialogue enu­
merates as his first premise that:
The self faces the other self as a mystery which can never be fully penetrated. It can surmise about the internal life of ihe other self by way of analogy with its own internal dialogue. But -these analogies are usually misleading because the dialogues, vhile very similar in form, may be very dissimilar in content.54
Macmurray, although recognising -that there are problems with rela­
tionships, did not adequately diagnose the deep effect of this doubt
or ’mystery’. W.T. Stace has dismissed any logeai justification by
55social instinct or any o-ther irrational feelings, since one also has 
a feeling of isola-tnon from other men. The social instinct does 
not prove -the existence of other minds and other individuals, which 
still leaves -the feeling of underlying isolation. One cannot: ignore 
-the feeling of isolation -that comes in-lx> conflict wi-th the social 
ins "bine t. The social instinct does not ob-viate the feelings of iso­
lation that exist, nor do mu-tual relations remove -the isolation of 
the self. One must realise there always will be an element of mu-lnal 
exclusion in all human relationships, C.C.J. Webb in Our Knowledge of 
One Ano-ther al-though arguing for the inadequacy of the term mu-bual
54* Niebuhr, Reinhold, The Self and -the bramas of History (London: Faber and Faber L-td., 1956) p.42
55. Stace, V.T., The Theory of Knowledge and Existence (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1952) pp.195-196
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exclusion was still forced to admit that one is involved in ’tautual 
exclusion in > so -far as from first to last I am not you and you are 
not
Macmurray* s strictly relational view of the self with its 
accompanying rejection of the isolated self and/or the self as 
subject threatens to make the integrated individual into nothing 
inore than a part of the group, as opposed to a separate individual 
which depends upon the group.
Macmurray*8 stress upon the self as relational threatens to 
invalidate the fundamental uniqueness of each individual self.
Macmurray in his eagerness to reject the isolated self has over­
looked or disregarded the uniqueness of the individual. Within 
the context of the community the uniqueness of each individual 
can be kept to the fore, since each individual is involved in a
singular combination of social relations like the peculiar combina-
57tion of genes with which he begins life. However, by placing too 
much stress upon the relational, i.e. the communal, one mi^t de­
preciate the uniqueness of the individual by coming too close to 
the collective idea of the self, which has severe ethical ramifi­
cations. Relationships have as an a priori condition the unique 
quality of each individual, as is demonstrated by the bereavement 
for a specific individual after death. If the uniqueness of the 
individual was not a fundamental quality* of the relationship, then 
the community would easily take the place of the iddividual that was 
lost. A person is irreplacable for the communily and is unique in
terms of the community as well as in terms of his genetic structure.
56. Webb, Clement Charles Julian; "Our Knowledge of One Another"from the Proceedings of the Briiish Academy Vol.XVI(London: Humphrey Milford, 1930) P - 1 6
57. Ginsberg, Morris, Essays in Sociology and Soci^ Philosophy(London: William Heinemann Ltd., 1956) p.157
58. Farmer, Herbert H. God and Men (London: KLsbet & Co. Ltd., 19#) p.43
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Hume saw the self as a succession of perceptions while 
Macmurray threatened to reduce the self to a succession of mutual 
experiences. As James Pratt maintained the self is something
59essentially unique and sui generis not something that we can visualise. 
The possibility of the a priori self as subject, i.e. something that 
comes before the community and its relational aspect, must be consid­
ered, since the essential, unique quality of the individual cannot be 
understood totally as a succession of mutual relational experiences.
Haddox concluded that Macmurray*s approach helps to establish 
the uniqueness of the individual. However, in a revealing comment 
in defence of Macmurray*s stand against solipsism he betrays the 
danger of placing too much emphasis upon the relational at the expense 
of the autonomous, unique self. According to Haddox the theoretical 
standpoint, i.e. solipsism "fails to do justice to our knowledge of 
other persons, not as *I*s* (where all persons including myself are 
identical and the token *1* is used to denote an entity) but as ’you* 
in your concrete uniqueness.Haddox following Macmurray*s lead, . 
places the emphasis upon the other and not upon the self in establishing 
uniqueness, i.e. the external observed object is unique not the self qua 
self, which makes uniqueness a quality of the other not of the self. 
However, the quality of uniqueness is part of the individual and not 
just a part of the *I-Thou* encounter. The *1* and the *Thou* must 
both be unique in order for a mutual personal relation to be possible.
The concept of the supreme uniqueness of the individual has been 
advocated by Max 8timer and P. Nietzsche.; Buber although basically 
re'laiïional in his approach, sympathises with the concept of the * single
59« Pratt, James B. Personal Realism (New York: Macmillan Company, 1957) p . 502
60. Haddox, Michael Bruce, "Action and Religious Knowledge: The Person as Agent in the Thought of John Macmurray" (Unpublished Doctoral Thesis: Duke University, 1970) p.145
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one* or the ’unique one*, i.e. der Einzige. Stimer and NLetzsche
Commended > the concept of egocentrism* Both Stimer and Nietzsche
61aimed at the hipest possible exaltation of the individual* Max
Stimer radically rejected the collective ideal and absolutely
endorsed the individual* Stimer maintained that: "For me, nothing
is above Me*** My object is neither good nor bad, neither love nor
hatred, my object is my own —  and it is unique* Stimer ended
his work The Steo and His Own with the following radical exaltation
the individual:
I- am owner of my own might, and I am so when I know myself as unique. In the unique one the owner himself returns into his creative nothing, of which he is bom* Every hi^er essence above me, be it God, be it man, weakens the feeling of my uniqueness, and pales only before the sun of this consciousness. If I concem myself for myself, the unique one, then my concem rests on its transitory, mortal creator, who consumes himself, and I may say; all things are nothing to me* ^
Kierkegaard, although he was vehemently opposed, to certain of Max
Stimer*s ideas,^^since Stimer totally rejected the idea of the
65individual as a ’vessel of God*, would have agreed with Stimer*s 
basic tenet* Kierkegaard treated the individual as the ultimate cate­
gory* Kierkegaard like Stimer, worked out in detail, the meaning of 
der ELnzige (hiin Enkelte)* However, such a stand eliminates any 
possibility of the relation between the self and the other being the 
ultimate category* A person, therefore, has "no essential relation
61* Chatterton-Hill, George, The Philosophy of Nietzsche (London:John Ouseley Limi ted, 1912 ( ) pp.24O-24I
62, Ibid
63* Stimer, Max (psued*) (Johann Casper Schmidt), The Ego ^ d  His Own;The Case of the Individual gainst Authority (New York: Libertarian Book Club, I965) trans S*T* Byington, p . 366
64. SS p*192
65* Stimer, op* cit., p.5^5
66. MacIntyre, Alasdair (Alexander Chalmers) A Short History of Ethics (London: Eoutledge and Kegan Paul, 19&7) P-217
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... 67except to himself". It would seem that such an outlook would be 
rejected out of hand by Buber. In fact Buber gives it a sympathetic 
hearing since he rejects the collective ideal, which only represents 
for him an attempt to escape the loneliness of each individual by 
becoming immersed in a group. However, one cannot overcome man’s 
isolation so simply.There is a disagreement between Buber and 
Kierkegaard about the extent to which one must reject the collective
69idea, i.e. ’the crowd*. Kierkegaard held that a crowd is ’untruth*.
Kierkegaard held that ’the single one* should be "chary about having
to do with ’the others’, and essentially should talk only with God
70and with himself —  for only one attains the goal". Kierkegaard
71believed that only the individual receives the truth. The truth 
depends upon autonomy which is dismissed by the collective ideal and 
conception of man. Macmurray in sidestepping the concept of uniqueness 
and by laying stress upon only the relational aspect of the self does 
not adequately combat the dangers of the collective conception of man.
It must be recognised that Macmurray is referring to the assumption 
that the self is dependent upon the Other for existence. However, 
such a bald statement does not adequately take into account the solitary 
self which is connected with the relational or social aspect of the 
self. Macmurray* s denial of the existence of the solitary self except
72as something that exists only as a theoretical standpoint, overlooks 
the numbing and overpowering isolation that one feels even when one is 
immersed in a group. Macmurray has overlooked, the solitary nature of
67. BMMp .41
68. SS p . 191
69. Kierkegaeird, Sf^ ren A. TOie Point of View (London; Oxford UniversityPress, 1939) trans, Valter Lowrie, p.112
70. Ibid p . 115
71. Ibid p . 119
72. SA p. 142
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man's communion with God, something that Kierkegaard emphasied.
The concept of der Einzige is of importance, since it points to 
the uniqueness of ultimately entering into a complete relation­
ship and communion with God. Macmurray has failed to recognise the 
dangers of the collective nature of the group, although he did not 
advocate the collective; he failed to counter the numbing assertion of 
the group or even the other over the 'I'. Macmurray did not, moreover, 
sufficently deal with the feelings, problems and the actuality of 
the isolation of the individual.
Macmurray failed to adequately take into account that even 
though one is permeated by the relational^ and social; one is also 
isolated as a singular individual irrespective of one's relational 
connections. . By depending upon the concept of reciprocity within 
a relationship to define the self, Macmurray ignored the necessary 
presupposition of the unique individual and thereby threatened to 
reduce the self to a product of action and reaction. Macmurray con­
sidered the idea of resistance to be important in his explanation of 
the self in terms of the other. "The possibility of action depends 
upon the Other being also agent, and so upon a plurality of agents 
in one field of action. The resistance of the Self through which
73the Self can exist as agent must be the resistance of another self,"
This, however, threatens to reduce the universe to "an interlocking
74mechanism in which change, novelty, and creation have no place,"
Carr in The Unique Status of Man pointed out that such a reduction 
of things to action and reaction are found among the behaviourists 
in psychology (e,g. Mead) and among the d^terminists and naturalists
73. SA p. 145
74. Carr, Herbert W., The Unique Status of Man (London; Macmillan and
Co. Ltd., 1928) p.191
(a) see footnote 64 p. 243
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in eHiics. If the self is only considered in terms of resistance 
one threatens the freedom of the individual, which together with 
equality is a foundation stone in Macmurray* s conception of the 
community. By confining the concept of the self to the communal 
alone one threatens the concept hf "the ccmimunal, as well as intro­
ducing a certain degree of ambiguity, not to say inconsistency, 
into one’s conception of the self* The self must be more than the 
resistance to the other; it must be more than a product of communal, 
i.e. mutual and reciprocal, relationships.
The conception of the self vdiich is-confined to the relational 
aspect of man’s nature favours the concept of the antecedent society. 
In fact Macmurray defined the self exclusively in terms of the commu­
nity and limited too closely his understanding of the self to the 
relational aspect of human nature, thereby undermining the uniqueness 
of the individual. Although Macmurray*s understanding of the self as 
relational is of great value, the limitations imposed by a purely 
communal approach to the self misrepresents human nature. Buber, 
unlike Mead, was ambivalent about the question of whether or not one 
should presuppose an antecedent self or an antecedent society. Mead 
believed that self was a ’bio-social emergent*, i.e. something that 
requires the relational to become a self. Buber, on the other hand, 
maintained -fâiat the self only comes into existence when it enters 
into communication, but still presupposed a Kantian transcendental 
’subject’ as a prior condition of relations which lends support to 
moral and religious concerns. Buber admitted that to claim that the 
community came first would be a matter of pure speculation.*^^
75. Car, op. cit., p.192
76. SS pp.251-252
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The Christian tradition tends to picture the individual as 
alone when facing God. Nevertheless, each individual is judged 
in terms of relations each nian had with his fellow beings as well 
as with God. This combination of the solitary and inter-relational 
aspects of man is illustrated by the passage from Matthew Chapter 
25, which tells of the coming final judgement. The Son of Man 
divides the individuals into two groups according to their rela­
tions to other men. However, each man is judged. The Gospels 
not only deal with the relational aspect of man as in Christ’s 
command to love your neighbour as yourself, but they also offer 
a view of the isolation of each man from other men, which is 
starkly illustrated by Jesus’ solitary prayers on the Mount of 
Olives in Luke Chapter 22.
lEtie relational approach to the human self is enlightening, 
yet without a firm basis for an autonomous, singular and solitary 
aspect of the self; it only provides an incomplete representation 
of the self. Can one justifiably presuppose a self that is an 
antecedent to the encounter of the self And the other, i.e. the 
nascent community? Is there some a priori apsect of the self that 
has been overlooked?
John Baillie in Our Knowledge of God assumed that something 
exists before the first encounter with the other.
Our knowledge of other minds is not merely a derivative from our knowledge of other bodies or of our minds or of both together,- but is itself a primary and original mode of consciousness of equal right wi-fch these others and having lived them, a character of sui generis. Expressing it in Kantian language, we may say lihat the conception of socie-ty is not a posteriori but an a priori concep-fcion.It need hardly be said -that this logical priority does not imply the chronological priority of the conception of society to actual social experience, still less any­thing that could be called ’innateness’. Ve cannot posses the conception of otherness prior to our first encounter
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with another yet that conception is not inductively derived from the encounter, hut is called into being on the occasion of it and constitutes to it the very characterwhich would be required as the basis of such an induction;just as the conception of tridemensional space, though it could not be present in my mind prior to my first encounter,but is given with it as the necessary condition of itstaking place — - that is as the necessary condition of myapprehending the body’s solidity*'*
John Baillie posited the existence of someihing or at least the poten­
tial for something before the first encounter with another ihat is a
precursor to the relational* Buber also suggested the presence of a
78Kantian transcedental ’subject’ that is a precursor to relationships. 
Niebuhr also posited something before the encounter of the ’I’ and 
the other.
Human individuality, being a product of spirit as well as of nature, is subject to development. Primitive man is inserted with comparative frictionless harmony into the ’primeval we’ of group life. He emerges from this group consciousness only gradually as an individual. But what emerges is an original endownent, present from the beginning. The uniqueness of this special endowment is ^ proved not only by the fact that it develops in human life only, but by the character of primitive existence.
Niebuhr presupposed not only the presence of an 'original endownment 
but was also cognizant of the importance of such an a priori assump­
tion to the uniqueness of the individual. The a priori conception of 
otherness before the initial encounter as seen by Baillie, as well as 
the clear assertion of Niebuhr of an ’original endowment’ leads to 
the possibility of both men allowing for the possibility of an ante­
cedent self. One must immediately ask what is the ’original endow­
ment’? In his discussion of the self as subject D.B. Raphael was 
quick to point out that the self as subjecft was not part of the world
77. Baillie, John, Our Knowledge of God (London: Oxford University
Press, 1939) P.512
78. SS p.251
79. Niebuhr, Reinhold, The Nature .and Destiny of Man. Volume ISiman Nature (New York: Charles Cribner’s Sons, 1941) 
p.56
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that the self knows, which must also apply to the antecedent self.
However, there mi^t he an indication of what is at least on the
material plane a manifestation of the ’original endownent’, Noam
Chomsky in his discussion in’Trohleras of Knowledge and Freedom"
surmised that a system of knowledge and beliefs "results from the
interplay of innate mechanisms, genetically determined maturational
processes, and interaction with the social and physical environment"*^^
Chomsky also advanced the premise that language results from a
similar intei^lay of "initially given structure of the mind, matura-
81tional processes and interaction with the environment". Language 
is a particular and fundamental part of human knowledge for Chomsky,
The conception of the self which was favoured by Macmurray seems to 
include not only the interaction with the environment specifically 
the other, but also includes certain maturational aspects such as 
those outlined in his understanding of the development of the self 
in his discussion of the mother-child relationship. However, Chomsky 
included a third component that comes into play in language and otber 
forms of human knowledge which is the "given structure of the mind", 
which may be the physical manifestation of the ’original endownent*. 
Language may well be dependent upon not only the social and matura— 
tional components but also upon an initially given structure of the 
mind which is affected by biological and other such factors, and this 
may also be applied to the concept of thet self. The "given structure 
of -tile mind" is the pre-programmed structure of the brain. This 
initial pre-programming of each mind hints^ at "Wie intrinsic unique 
self of each individual.
80. Chomsky, Koam, Language and Mnd (New York: Harcourt. Brace &World, Inc., 1968) p.25
81. Ibid p. 25
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C# A* Campbell in his differentiation of the self and the
person also sheds light upon the conception of the antecedent self*
Campbell stated that:
The view to which we are being led, then, is that self- identity is a much wider conception than personal iden­tity. But though ’self* and ’person* must be quite sharply distinguished, it is vital to bear in mind that they do not designate two different beings. They desig­nate one and the same ontological entity in two different aspects. The self may function when the person does not, but the person cannot function when the self does not.The person ^  the self, qua functioning in terms of its definitive and normal character. Indeed -üie person, so far from being an entity different from the self, may be said to be something which the self gradually tends to become. The self starts upon its career with a variety of native instincts, impulses and capacities closely dependent upon its association with a particular animal body. Throu^ the self’s actions upon and reactions to its physical; and social environment on basis of these given propensities and powers, the relatively stable system of dispositions we call its ’character’ is grad­ually built up, and the self grows into what we call a ’person’
Campbell understood idiat the child becomes a person, but always was 
an antecedent self.^^ The self becomes a person.Campbell arguing 
for the distinction between personal identity and self-identity 
pointed out that psychotherapy in the case of multiple personalities 
aims at the restoration of an integrated personality by breaking down 
the barriers that have subconsciously been erected to separate the 
two detached groups with the mind which are two personalities not two 
selves. Campbell averred that: "The successful therapy seems to pre­
suppose that the ’two persons’ are different manifestations of a
85single entity, the ’one self’." The self for Campbell differs from 
the self of Macmurray since Macmurray’s self comes only through the
82. Ibid pp,88-89 
85. Ibid p.86 
84* Ibid p.89
85. Ibid p.92
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maturation process of reciprocal relations and other personal 
experiences which has no place for the antecedent self or even 
Niebuhr*s’original endowment*. Campbell maintained that: "self- 
identity is a much wider conception than -üiat of personal identity#
The ’person* is the self only in so far as the latter manifests 
itself in general accord with the relatively stable set of dispo­
sitions "Wiich it acquires in the course of its experience and which 
constitutes what is commonly called ’character’ ë Macmurray’s 
view of the self is equivalent to the ’person  ^in Campbell’s termi­
nology, which limits the self to the relational and personal ex­
perience while not allowing the possibility of the anchor of the 
antecedent self.
The main objection to Macmurray’s dependence upon a solely 
relational and experiential model of the self centering upon the 
communal comes from Uie possibility of such a stand weakening the 
conception of the intrinsic uniqueness of the self. The relational 
’self-other’ is a necessary part of the process of maturation and 
self-knowledge, but the totality of the self cannot be confined to 
the social and communal aspects even though these permeate the whole 
self. However, this is not an attempt to reassert a transcendental 
self, but idle recognition of the pre-programmed and a priori con­
stituent of the self from which each intrinsically unique self origin­
ates and continues to become. However, .the intrinsic uniqueness of 
the self is threatened by Macmurray’s emphasis upon the communal 
nature of the self without the recognitior^ of a unique and a priori 
antecedent self, even though Macmurray denied the possibility of 
two selves being identical
86. Ibid p.95
87. PR pp. 19, 24
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The danger is that one might easily reduce individuality 
to an incidental element which is to he found only in the ’lower*
Q Qlife of the body. The self is not something that can be reduced 
to something that is inserted into the body or mind. The self is . 
not inserted into the mind by originating only from one’s initial 
relation with one’s ’mother’ in Macmurray’s terminology. Admittedly, 
as Macmurray recognised, man is imprisoned by circumstances and is 
a product at least partially, of those circumstances and in par­
ticular those of community. Nevertheless, "the self is the spring
of life by lAhich the individual is given its specific character as 
89a human being", i.e. its unique individuality. The subject self 
becomes the later basis for the self as object, and it provides the 
a priori, intrinsic uniqueness that is part of each person even before 
one encounters the other.
Although the relational aspect of the self is an important 
constituent of the self, one cannot overlook the presence of the 
’original endowment’. Macmurray’s rejection of the solitary self 
must lead to the assumption that Macmurray rejected the concept of 
der Einzige and the reality of the isolation of the self from the 
other. Macmurray*s rejection of the antecedent self and der Einzige 
brings closer the dangeis of the collective idea of human relations 
or at ihe very least Macmurray failed to temper the collective out­
look, which makes individuality incidental. Macmurray by reducing 
the self to its communal elements has threatened the singular, auto­
nomous and intrinsically unique aspects of man that are to be found 
in every individual.
88. Piper, Otto A., Christian Ethics (Londons Thomas Nelson and
Sons Ltd., 1970) p.55
89. Ibid p.54
CHAPTER 11
A Critique of the Communal View of Religion
—  225 “*
Macanurray’s explanation of the self centres upon the 
community and the personal elements that constitute community, 
i.e. the external relation of the self and the other. Macmurray’s 
explanation of the self, while sufficient in terms of the matura­
tional processes of the self, has overlooked the concept of the , 
antecedent self, thereby endangering the concept of the individual 
as an intrinsically unique being. Macmurray did not only look to 
the community for his basic explanation of the self, but he also 
looked to the community for his basic explanation of religion.
Macmurray posited that religion was to be best understood in terms 
of community. There is a close connection between Macmurray’s con­
ception of the self and his conception of religion. "The religious 
activity of the self is its effort to enter into communion with the 
Other. The connection being the focus upon the relation with the 
Other in community. Macquarrie in his summary of Macmurray* s position 
also notes this connection: "It is in the consideration of the commu­
nity of personal selves that he states his view of the function of 
religion, already foreshadowed in the idea of the world as one action." 
Macquarrie also notes that religion for Macmurray "celebrates and 
expresses the unity of persons in fellowship, and this in turn is
possible only in a world informed by the unifying intention of God
2as the supreme agent." Macmurray understood religion to be communal 
although this activity was motivated by,God, which is in opposition 
to Kierkegaard’s point of view that Man stands in relation to God 
and "should be chary about having to do wj.th * the otherà ’, and 
essentially should talk only with God ...".^ Macmurray in general
1. SRB p.47
2. Macquarrie, John, Twentieth-Century Religious Thought (London:Press, Ltd., I965) p.207, hereafter cited as TOR
5. Kierkegaard, Sj^ ren A. The Point of View (London: Oxford Univer­sity Press, 1939) p.115, hereafter cited as PV
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held the view that "religious e3q)erience occurs in a situation 
where each person becomes closely identified with the other 
members of the g r o u p A l t h o u g h  Macmurray did recognise the 
place of God in his explanation of religion, he concentrated his 
analysis of religion upon this external relational or communal 
side. Macmurray ad.vanced an anthropological or at the very least 
an empirical view of religion which only in passing combines with 
the overall motivating force of God. In making religion essential­
ly \ a group or communal activity did Macmurray overlook or under­
estimate certain other features necessary for religion?
Macmurray*s definition of religion revolved around-his concept 
of community just as his definition of the self revolved around his 
conception of community. Macmurray asserted that: "For at the 
heart of religion there lies an activity of communion or fellowship. 
Unless we have persons in relation there is no fellowship; for 
whatever else fellowship entails it entails a union of togetherness
5of separate individuals." Macmurray not only considers religion to 
be relational^ but he strongly dismisses the possibility of religion 
being something for the autonomous individual, with his denial that 
any type of contemplation can be considered as religious since 
this "is a withdrawal from fellowship, and so from the experience 
which constitutes the central point of religious experience".^
7Macmurray*8 basic hypothesis is that: "^ligion is about community".
Another variation of this hypothesis is that: "religion is the cele-
8bration of communion". In Macmurray*s general analysis of religion,f’
4. Desmonde, William H. "Mead, George Herbert" Encyclopedia ofPhilosophy (London: Collier-Macmillan Limited, 1967) p.252
5. BAS p.47
6. Ibid
7. PR p. 159 
.8. PR p.162
(a) see footnote 64 p. 243
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there are four general facts that are applicable to all religions;
all four contain direct references to the social and/or communal
9nature of religion. Since Macmurray* s understanding of religion 
centres around the concept of conammily which itself centres around 
reciprocal relations, it is not surprising to find religion spoken 
of only, or primarily in te m s  of personal relations. Macmurray 
averred that: "Religion is what a man makes of his personal rela­
tionships. Macmurray although cognizant of God’s function in
religion understood religion in communal terns, and reduced the
11field of religion to the field of human relationships.
Since Macmurray’s analysis of religion is basically communal, 
the close connection between community and religion suggests an 
affinity with the ideas of Hnile Durkheim and Georg Simmel. George 
Simmel posited that a group has the tendency "to assume the fom of 
the transcendental and to equip itself with religious emotional 
values which might be caused by the fact that this synthesis of in­
dividuals into a higher fom of group unity- must only too often seem
like a miracle to the more or less lucid consciousness of the 
12individual. " However, Macmurray did not merely assume that religion
was primarily a product of the transcendent unity of community.
Durkheim assumed that the essence of religion was a social phenomenon,
which contained the premise that religion had as its object the wor-
15ship of society itself. Durkheim’ s assumption that society is central
to any interpretation of religion does have some connection with 
Macmurray*8 approach to religion. Durkheim presupposed that society
9. PR pp.156-157
10. RE p. 225
11. IÏÏ p . 135
12. Simmel, George, Sociology of Religion (New York: PhilosophicalLibrary Inc., 1959) trans. by Roesenthal, Curt, p.71
13. Phillips, Dew Z. Religion without Explanation (Oxford: BasilBlackwell, 1976) pp.90-91, hereafter cited as RWE
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is not just the sum of individuals, but a peculiar ent i t y . O n e
of Durkehim’s primary assumptions concerns the notion of a totem,
i.e. something that symbolised the community. Durkheim noted that:
But we know that the centre of the cult is actually elsewhere. It is the figurative representation of this plant or animal and the totemic emblems and symbols of every sort, which have the greatest sanctity; so it is in them that is found the source of that religious nature, of which the real objects represented by these emblems receive only a reflec­tion.Thus the totem is before all a symbol, a material expression of something else. But of what?From the analysis to which we have been giving our attention, it is evident that it expresses and sym­bolises two different sorts of things. In the first place, it is the outward and visible form of what we have called the totemic principle or God.But it is also the symbol of the determined society- called the clan.^
Totemism in terms of primitive religion is understood as a social
phenomenon intertwined with religion. Totemism for Durkheim was
a fundamental element in the primitive form of religion. Durkheim
in his search for the essence of religion also believed that there
was something eternal in religion from which society must affirm
itself. In fact, according to Durkheim, society and religion are
so closely interwoven that religion and society should be regarded
as the matrix out of which other human activities, including science, 
16have grown; a view that is reminiscent of Macmurray* s assumption 
that the religious mode of apperception is primary. Durkheim saw 
the ideas of religion and society to be essentially the same. Un­
questionably Durkheim considered religion to be a social phenomenon 
with society as the controlling force behind the individual* *®ut 
from the moment when it is recognised -that above the individual there 
is society, and that this is not a nominal being created by reason,
14. TOR p. 156
15. Durkheim, Emile, The Elementary Forms of Religious Life (London:George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1976), trans, by Swain, Joseph W., pp.205-206
16. TOR pp.156-157
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but a system of active forces, a new manner of explaining men,
17becomes possible*"
Macmurray paralleled Durkheim*s approach to religion in two
important ways. Durkheim emphasised the connection between the
symbolic affirmation of community and religion. Durkheim in his
explanation of cult noted that:
This is because society cannot make its influence felt unless it is in action, and it is not in action unless the individuals who compose it are assembled together and act in common. It is by common action that it takes consciousness of itself and realises its position; it is before all else an active co-operation. The collec­tive ideas and sentiments are even possible only owing to these exterior movements which symbolise th^, as we have established. Then it is action which dominates the religious life, because of the mere fact that it is society which is its source.
Durkheim concluded that the external activity of the group, i.e. the
symbolic activity of the ritual, is the dominating force in religion.
Macmurray also postulated the central importance of religious
activity for community. Macmurray maintained that religion "is the
19reflective activity which expresses the consciousness of community... " 
The communal activity of the ritual was central to Macmurray’s under­
standing of religion. Macmurray asserted that:
The members of a primitive community do in./facti like a common life; but they also perform in common certain ritual activities which express their consciousness that they live a common life and their joy in the know­ledge. This celebration of their fellowship is their religious activity; and since it symbolises or expresses their common consciousness of the community life, such activity is an activity of reflection. 20
Reflective activity for Macmurray is symbolic and refers beyond itself.
Macmurray closely coupled religious actiVity and communal celebration.
Macmurray did not consider this to be the totality of religion, but he
17. EPHE, p.447
18. EPEL p.418
19. PR p . 162
20. PR p . 162
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assigned to religious activity a central role in the community. 
"Religious ceremonial, therefore, is never merely an expression • 
of the consciousness of communion, it is also a means for sus­
taining it. It expresses at once the sense of community and the
fear of its failure; and in so doing it strengthens and sustains
21the unity that it expresses," Durkheim*s assumption that the
to tea, which is the symbol that is found within primitive religion,
dominates religious activity, is shared by Macmurray. Macmurray
assumed that: "Religious reflection in its primary and central
expression, has the form of symbolic action, and this action is
itself communal. It is as part of the common life of a group of
persons and an expression or symbol of the common life as a whole.
To put it otberwise, it has the form of ritual or ceremonial
activity and this activity is itself the primary religious re fie c- 
22tion. " Macmurray also pointed out that: "Primitive religion is
tribal, and its ceremonial is an expression of the tribe as the
unity of its members. The religious ceremonial expresses the time-
unity of the pesons who compose it, both the living and the dead
23and the yet unborn."
The totemic principle, i.e. the symbol of community is for
Durkheim something that symbolises two different things; one is
God and the other is the clan. Macmurray also assumed that there
is a connection between the community and God, who is called the
universal, personal Other. Macmurray identifies the author of the
24world with the personal author of the community.
21. SRB pp.67-68
22. HAS p.55
23. OS p. 32
24. PR p. 165
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The second area of affinity between the outlooks of
Macmurray and Durkheim centres around the assumed interdependence
of religion and society (or community in Macmurray*s terminology).
Durkheim* 8 basic assumption is that religion is the worship of 
25society. Durkheim asserted that: "If religion has given birth to
all that is essentially society, it is because the idea of society
is the soul of religion. Dùrkheim also stated that: "religious
force is nothing other than the collective and anonymous force of 
27the clan..." Macmurray assumed that primitive religion "centres.
in those corporate acts in which its members celebrate their fellow-
28ship in the common life". Macmurray maintained quite simply that:
29"all religion is the expression of community". Durkheim simply
considered the essence of religion to be social. Macmurray in his
search for àn «apirical base has selected the communal aspect of
religion and used it as the fundamental material from which an
understanding of religion may be obtained. God for Macanurray
threatens to be reduced to the symbol that is necessary for community.
The basic aspect of community that constitutes the empirical base for
31religion for Macmurray is the mutuality of personal relationships, 
therefore God is defined as the Universal personal Other.
25. RWB p . 90
26. EFEL p . 419
27. EPEL p.221
28. RAS p.60
29. OS p . 52
30. Kirkpatrick, Frank Gloyd, "The Idea of God in the Though of JohnMacmurray: Its Basis and Some Implications" (Unpublished Doctoral Thesis: Brown University, 1970) p.141
51. Thomason, William Paul, "The Enpirical Basis for Religion inJohn Macmurray*8 Philosophy" (Unpublished Doctoral Thesis: The Southern Baptist Theological Seminary, 1972) p. 189
30
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Macmurray was somewhat ambiguous about the dependence of the 
community upon religion and religion’s dependence upon the community. 
However, Macmurray did not posit the presence of an antecedent 
society in his discussions as did Durkheim, but seems to have favoured 
a * twin-bom’ approach. One must always keep in mind that Macmurray 
was reacting against the communist/Marxist presupposition that religion
is an ideal; by advancing the premise that religion is real when
‘ 52expressed in terns of community.
However, Macmurray relied upon a relationally oriented approach
to describe religion. Moreover, it has been suggested that Durkheim
35is basically a relationalist in approach, which suggests a further
fundamental affinity between Macmurray and Durkheim.
Simone Veil in a general appraisal of the whole French School
of Sociology remarked that: "The French School of sociology is very
right in its social explanation of religion. It only fails to explain
one infinitely small thing; but this infinitely small thing is the
grain of mustard seed, the buried pearl, the leaven, the salt. The
infinitely small thing is God; it is infinitely more than everything.
Macmurray seems at times to overlook the overriding and infinitely
important and central place of God when discussing religion. Macmurray
on one occasion leaves God out of the formula and asked his readers
35to think of religion as a human activity. After removing God "for 
the moment" Macmurray opined that: "Religion, therefore, is reason in 
human nature ^ creating the community of persons —  recognising and 
achieving the unity of all personal life.*'^  ^ Although Macmurray did
32. CS p.35
33. Stark, Vemer, The Fundamental Forms of Social Thought (London:Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1962) pp.237-238
34. Veil, Simone, Selected Essays 1934-43 (London: Oxford UniversityPress, 1962) trans and chosen by Rees, Richard, p.213
35. RE p . 62
36. Ibid
-  233 ~
not reduce God to a mere totem as did Durkheim, he did find it 
useful to reflect upon religion as a purely social phenomenon.
It must he recognised that there is a distinct danger in over­
stressing the social, -v^le straying from the theocentric view 
of religion in favour of the heterocentric or anthropocentric; 
since it threatens to reduce religion to an institution, just 
another element or part of the social group, merely a meihod of 
examining human relations.
One criticism of Durkheim which is also applicable to 
Macmurray is that of D.Z. Phillips in Religion Without Explanation;
"Durkheim, where religion is conceimed, seems to want to explain
37a social movement by reference to the notion of society,"
Durkheim wanted to argue that the ideas that people share in society
including the ideas and beliefs about religion can be explained in
tems of social bonds that they c re a t e . T h e function of all
beliefs for Durkheim is to express and make possible an experience
39of social solidarity. The reductionist approach of Durkheim has 
certain inherent problems in that the expression of social solida­
rity is created and maintained by religion, but at the same time 
religion is a social movement. One is presented with a problem of 
logical priority. One cannot reduce religion to community as 
Durkheim did and tautologically maintain at that same time that 
community is a product of religion. Macmurray came close to re­
peating Durkheim* s logical fallacy which is illustrated by Macmurray* s 
assertion that religion is the expression of community taken together 
with his definition of the unity of community in terms of religion.
One cannot reduce religion merely to a social phenomenon while 
believing that society is a product of religion,
37. RWE pv90 
, 38. RWE p.92
39. RWE p.94
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The social explanation of religion is unbalanced, since 
it only considers one aspect of religion. Ginsberg noted in 
his article "Durkheim*s Theory of Religion" that such a one­
sided analysis of even primitive religion is invalid.
Prom a psychological point of view it is very doubt­ful whether even primitive religious experience can be said to have no other content than society. It is surely unlikely that men can ever be completely indifferent to the dangers, and benefits of the natural environment which is the condition not only of their own lives but of the group of which they are members. No doubt primitive man was not in­terested in abstract speculations about the mysteries of the universe. But he needed something to cast out fears, allay bewildement and solve perplexities and this in various ways religion supplied. Thus the religious consciousness, even in its elementary forms, must have included something more than the feeling of group solidarity.^
One cannot reduce religion to an instrument that brings about group 
solidarity or group unity. Macmurray, although not specifically 
attempting to limit the field of religion to group solidarity, over­
looks, by not striking a balance between the communal and autonomous 
aspects of religion, the guiding force of religion to the solitary 
individual when faced with the facts of his environment beyond the 
community. Macmurray by depending upon a communal explanation of 
religion with its emphasis upon mutuality has produced an uneven 
explanation of religion, which has the tendency to consider only the 
empirical, outward elements while ignoring the solitary aspects of 
religion, Macmurray*s hypothesis that the fieHof religion is per­
sonal experience is vague \^en taken together with his limiting 
assumption that the focal point of personal experience is mutual 
relationships, i.e. community. C.C.J. Webb suggested that the social
40. Ginsberg, Morris, ’Durkheim*s Theory of Religion" in Essays in Sociology and Social Philosophy Volume I (Melbourne : William l^inanami Ltd., 1956) p.239
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experience althou^ similar may be two different sensations.
One only obscures the issue, however, by presupposing such a 
bifurication, since as Macmurray rightly pointed out religion 
can be understood at least in part in terms of group activity. 
Ifevertheless, one should be well aware that religion is more than 
just a part of a matrix of religion and society.
One danger of -the communal approach is that God becomes a by­
product of the matrix of society and religion. Another is that 
religion when defined in terms of personal relations becomes limited 
to only a public concern in which the individual has little part.
Webb pointed out ihat: "A ’group theory* of religion, which ascribes 
or tends to ascribe a genuinely objective reality on to what the 
individual experiences when influenced by the * collective represen­
tations * which he possesses as a member of a group —  such a group
religion is unable to account for individual religion and must in
42the end see it as an illusion." Macmurray considered individualism
to lead to a rejection of religion in complete disagreement with
Webb. "The opposite attitude, which is the core of. real atheism,
expresses itself in that individualism which makes a man feel alone
43and isolated in a world against which he must defend himself."
Allport■directly contradicts Macmurray*s thesis that religion 
by definition is basically mutual. Allport concluded that: "Yet 
the focusing of a religious intention throu^ prayer does not in­
variably require this sense of mutuality. In at least two great 
religious systems, both derivatives of anpient Hinduism, no assump­
tion is made that any supernatural powers are affected by worship
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or supplication* Allport in fact diametrically opposes
Macmurray*s hypothesis hy placing the solitary aspect of religion
before the social component, although Allport certainly does not
deny the communality of religion. "For the great majority of
people the solitariness of the religious quest beccmes a burden.
They long to fuse their religious insight with those of their
fellows under a common set of symbols. Indeed in many cases they
45first learned these insights in the company of their fellows."
Individual belief, however, is a presupposition of religion with 
religion a presupposition of community. Allport then pointed out 
that from this fusion of individual beliefs in community there 
develops ritual and dogna. Ritual serves to intensify the com­
parable attitudes and sentiments of all individuals that partici­
pate, as well as improving and socialising the inadequate intellectual 
formulations of the individual. The social constituent of religion 
in Allport’s view only strengthens and builds upon the individual 
religious quest. However, there is always present the fact that 
deep inside, the individual may likewise know that the meaning he
46derives from the dogma is not identical for him and for all believers. 
Allport follows in the footsteps of Whitehead who also considered 
religion to be primarily solitary. Not surprisingly Macmurray dis­
missed Whitehead’s solitary view of religion.
By recognising both the solitary constituent of religion and 
that religion is part of the social matrix, Allport has gained a 
great deal more flexibility in his overall perception of religion. 
Religion as Macmurray believed is to do with mutuality, but it is
not confined to mutuality, i.e. community. The attraction of thescommunality of religion is that it can be empirically validated, but
44. Allport, Gordon W. , The Individual and His Religion (London:Constable Publishers, 1951) p. 14945. Ibid p. 151 46'. Ibid
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this empirical validation is limited to the interaction of society
with religion. Religion does not, nor should it, simply become
the function or product of mutuality; thus making it the offspring
of the community and reducing it to a public concern. One should
realise that mutuality is only one of the areas in which religious
experience manifests itself. Macmurray* s understanding of the
connection between mutuality and religion is extremely enlightening,
but his rejection out of hand of the solitary elements in each man’s
religious quest is rather reactionary, although it naturally follows
from his rejection of the autonomous aspect of the self. One cannot
appreciate the full import of religion if one fails to recognise the
importance of the autonomous, solitary religious quest.
Macmurray’s rejection of the individual as the primary source
of religious experience and his rejection of the Whiteheadian thesis
about religion is total. Macmurray stated that;
The individualist tends naturally to think of religion as a private and individual matter, as an idiosyncrasy of peculiar people vAiich concerns themselves alone. This merely reflects his own abnormal state of mind. The truth is precisely the opposite. Religion is the primary mani­festation of the social character of human nature, and it is concerned wiidi society, not with the individual.^ '
Macmurray dismissed the idea of a person as an isolated individual
standing before Christ. Macmurray was cognizant of individualism only
in terms of a reaction against the social nature of religion.
Clearly, then, the notion that reli^on is ’an individual matter’ concerned with the ’salvation of the individual soul’ is an abstraction; produced, we may guess, by the desire to extrude religion from the social field. We need not elaborate this point further; we shall take it for granted in vdiat is to follow* Religion is not in­dividual but social. It is not about the individual but about society. Its concem with the individual is with his relations to other persons and so with his sociality.Unless this is recognised there is no hope of understanding eiidler religion or society.^
47. Macmurray, John, A Challenge to the Churches : Religion and Democracy(London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co. Ltd., 1941) p.17 hereafter cited as CC
48. CS P.. 21
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Macmurray limited his understanding of religion to the social 
aspects and completely rejected the conception of religion as a 
solitary quest. It must he noted in passing that the terms 
social in this context centres around the common life, which is 
understood only in terms of the *I-Thou*. The twofold use of 
society has already been noted and in this case leads to a certain 
degree of ambiguity, since Macmurray uses the tem both in refer­
ence to the entirety of human groups and to a particular impersonal 
type of group. Macmurray in this context is referring to the 
totality of human grouping.
In the light of Macmurray* s rejection of the individualistic 
notion of religion, his opposition to Whitehead’s approach to 
religion is not surprising. Macmurray noted that: "When Professor 
Whitehead says that religion is what a man does with his solitari­
ness he is saying what is almost the reverse of the truth; although
he is, unlike many philosophers, moving in the right universe of 
49discourse." Whitehead’s assertion is idiat: "Religion is what the 
individual does with his solitariness."^^ Macmurray, however, mis­
takenly insisted upon contrasting the individual with the ’corporate’, 
i.e. communal, conception of religion. Macmurray opined that:
This dictum expresses a modern tendency to emphasise theindividual aspect at the expense of the corporate; atendency which flows from and strengthens the individualism of much of our Western outlook. But individualism, like the idealism which tends to accompæay and complete it, is finally incompatible with religion, if only because it is incompatible with the inherent relatedness of personal life. The individual phase of personal relation, the necé­sar ry withdrawal into the self and so^  into solitariness, refers to the return to the community and is for the sake of that return. Its religious aapect must always have relation to corporate religion if it is to function re­ligiously. In formal terms, a relation to God which is
49. RE p.223
50. Whitehead, Alfred North, Religion in the Making (Cambridge:University Press, 1926) p.l6, hereafter cited as EM
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not a relation to my neighbour is unreal. The with­drawal of the individual into religious solitude, into prayer and meditation, into self-examination and self­dedication, is an affirmatiog^of his personal depend­ence, not an escape from it.
The whole premise is impaired and permeated by Macmurray*s insist­
ence that the social is pre-eminent, i.e. the community comes before 
all else, in all religious questions. Macmurray failed to realise 
that man’s relationship with God can overcome man’s basic isolation, 
since any relation with another human being must have an element 
of mutual exclusion, whereas the element of mutual exclusion is 
not a necessary part of one’s relationship with God. Also, one 
does not represent reality adequately, if one is not aware of 
the isolated struggle each man has within himself which affects 
his relation with God as much as his relations with man, Macmurray 
failed to recognise the importance of religious solitude and 
the autonomous, singular religious quest which will not fit 
into any set of presuppositions that are primarily relational, 
Whitehead’s thesis, that religion is what a man does with 
his solitude, forces the communality of religion into a subordinate 
position. This, Macmurray admitted, is a reversal of his approach 
to religion, Whitehead maintained that: "In the long run your chara­
cter and your conduct of life depends upon your intimate convictions," 
He also maintained that; "Religion is the art and theory of the
internal life of man, so far as it depends on the man and himself
52and on what is permanent in the nature of things." Whitehead did 
not overlook the social component of religion. "Social facts are of
51. RAS p. 69
52. RM pp. 15-16
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great importance to religion, because there is no such thing as
absolutely independent existence." However, Whitehead observed;
"That all collective emotions leave untouched the awful ultimate
fact, which is the human being consciously alone with itself, for 
53its own sake. " Whitehead in a complete transposition of 
Macmurray* s premise made the communality of religion a by-product 
of the solitary religious struggle. "Collective enthusiasms, 
revivals, institutions, churches, rituals, bibles, codes of be­
haviour, are the trappings of religion, its passing form. They 
may be useful, or harmful; they may be authoritatively ordained,
or merely temporary expedients. But the end of religions is beyond 
54.all this." ^ William James also tended towards a solitary or auton­
omous view of religion. James asserted that: "Religion, therefore, 
as I now ask you arbitrarily to take it, shall mean for us the 
feelings, acts and experiences of individual men in their solitude,
so far as they apprehend themselves to stand in relation to whatever
55they may consider divine." The concept of religion as a product 
of man*s actual isolation does have merit; although it is as falla­
cious as a completely communal approach if it overlooks the dependence 
of man upon man as a continuous factor in human life.
Whitehead realised that religion was to a certain extent a social 
phenomenon and admitted that the "primitive phase of religion" was 
dominated by "ritual and emotion" which .could be dealt with as 
essentially a social phenomenon.Whitehead and Macmurray represent 
two sides of the same coin. If one realises that religion is deeply
53. RM p.16
54. RM p.17
55» James, William, The Varieties of Reli^^ous Experience (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1908) p.31
56. RM p.23
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interwoven in the fabric of human nature, one should not be sur­
prised to find that it appears as a fundamental feature in both 
the social and solitary constituents of human life. Karl Eahner 
held that there were two basic lines of self fulfillment that are
the essence of human nature. For Eahner man "is a being who turns
57back unto himself". Eahner heis pointed out that there is an
advantage of the two balancing one another, i.e. the solitary and
the inter-relational. . B.ahner averred that:
Gathering and scattering, entry into oneself and going out of oneself, belong to each other essentially. And vÆiat constitutes a true human being and Christian is that he entrusts himself freely to both these basic movements, as both under the direction of one same God, and serene in this creaturely confidence, refrains from making either of them an absolute.58
The totality of human nature as understood in terms of being under and 
through the direction of God with God placed in the central position 
keeps both the social and autonomous from becoming absolute.
If one favours the theocentric approach to religion as opposed 
to the anthropocentric or heterocentric approach, one accepts that 
one faces God on at least two levels. A person faces God as an in­
dividual who is alone and faced with his own death unleavened by his 
relations with others and his responsibility for specific acts, but 
concurrently the person also faces God as one person that exists with 
and is to a large extent a dependent and responsible part of the re­
lational matrix, i.e. one is dependent upon and responsible for one's 
communal and social context. One can easily admit that human nature 
as well as religion is a complex, intricafe and interrelated expanse 
that cannot be simply explained. Although, Macmurray* s insights are
57» Eahner, Karl, Christian in the Market Place p p .90-91. cited inBozzo, Edward George "Toward a Renewed Fundamental Theo­logy: The Implications of the Thou^t of John Macmurray" (Unpublished Doctoral - Thesis : Cahtolio University of 
America, 1971) P.248
58. Ibid
(a) see footnote 64 p. 243
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helpful, one cannot simply consider religion in primarily rela­
tional terms witb. iJie stress upon mutuality. Simmels and Durkheim's
conception of religion both as a product of a group and the more
59appealing conception of the group as a product of religion  ^does 
not take into account the isolated and complex nature of man's 
religious experience, nor does Macmurray*s basic understanding of 
religion as dependent upon community.
The theocentric analysis of religion insures that one does not 
at any time run the risk of reducing religion to a particular aspect 
of human nature or activity, lÆdch is the dangerous path Macmurray 
treads in his overriding concern to make the communal primary. 
Macmurray*s abandonment of the concept of the solitary religious 
struggle erroneously sets aside the autonomous judgement of each 
individual to believe or not to believe. The leap of faith is not a 
product of one's relations with others, but a solitary, separate, 
private and individual decision to believe that must be made by the 
individual. Without the autonomous judgement of whether to believe 
or not to believe one cannot have faith.
Although .Macmurray considered the field of religion to be the 
whole field of common experience ; ^ ^his focus upon inter-personal 
relationships and the activity of mutuali ty^ ^ le ads one to conclude 
that religion originates mainly from a relational,^ i.e. communal 
field, of experience. Macmurray in fact threatens to reduce his 
conception of God to little more than our experience of one another, 
i.e. a matter of personal,reciprocal, and^.empirical experience.
This ignores the fact that one's relations with men do not even 




(a) see footnote 64 p.243
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relations, but one's relation with God does ultimately overcome 
and offer an end to one's isolation. The basic problen for religion,
63according to Macmurray, is that of inteivpersonal relationships,
Such an enphasis threatens to reduce religion to something depen­
dent upon human beings with no reference to God, Macmurray's 
conceptualisation of religion may lead one to conclude that the 
community is a separate entity that is ultimately the object of 
woa^hip and God is nothing more than a label for this entity,
Macmurray in concentrating upon the social aspect of religion has 
failed to realise the underlying importance of the solitary religious 
quest. By abandoning the solitary constituent of religion, one also 
abandons the individual's faith which underlies all worship. The 
individual must have faith, which comes for each man with the making 
of a choice whether or not to have faith in God, By abandoning the 
social constituent of religion one no longer has an eapirical basis 
for religion threatening to let it drift into illusion. Only by 
assuming that religion is primarily theocentric can one avoid making 
religion a study of human nature alone, i.e. anthropocentric, which 
allows a component of human nature to dominate all oidler aspects of
religion. Religion can be viewed both as a solitary and a communal 
64or relational activity, but in reality it contains elements of both, 
but this alone does not explain religion.
63. SA p.75
64. Macmurray used the term ’relational’ in a specific and limited way. The term ’relational’ is interchangeable with such terms as ’inter-rela-? tional’ and ’mutually relational’. The term ’relational’ would not apply in this limited context to such things as plants, animals or other material objects outside the mutually relational scope. The term ’relational’ can mean more than social, since it can include all rela­tionships between men and also the relationship between man and God.
PART IV




The ultimate and primary area of interest for this study 
centres around Macmurray*s theory of morality, and its connec­
tion with Msicmurray's dependence upon the idea of community.
Macmurray*3 method of philosophy is fundamentally dependent upon 
his conception of and use of the relational or communal orienta­
tion that permeates his thou^t. Consequently the focus will he 
upon the connection of Macmurray*s understanding of ethics with 
his ideas about community and its concomitant elements of mutuality 
and personal relations with the other.
Macmurray*8 understanding of morality and/or ethics posited
the existence of a choice between at least two courses of action
\diich includes the assumption that idiere is a distinction between
the two courses of action. The making of the choice implies means,
motive and intention. There are two interrelated motifs in Macmurray*s
discussion of morality. The first of these two motifs has to do with
the choice between two distinct courses of action. Action is a choice
for Macmurray, which implies that the distinction between 'right*
and 'wrong* is inherent in the nature of action. The choice which
is manifested in action is the realisation of intention. Macmurray
assumed that; "to act is to realise intention, but it is also to
2enter into relation with the Other".
The second motif revolves around the other which is an inherent 
property of action, i.e. that action inevitably involves relations to 
the other^, not only in terms of another as persons, but also in terms 
of the person as a tool. To act is to realise one's intention with
1. Bozzo, Edward George, "Towards a Renewed Fundamental Moral Theology:Y The Implications of the Thought of John Macmurray for Christian Ethics" (Unpublished Doctoral Thesis; Catholic University of America, I969) P.I90
2. PR p.113
3. Bozzo, op. cit., p . 190
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with the help of the other.^ By its very nature action not only
contains the choice and the necessary distinction, hut also the
intention which is carried out with the help of the other.
Morality is not merely a matter of choice, or even choice with
intention, but morality for Macmurray is intention as constituted
by the mutuality of the Other, which by definition limits the
other to another person, not to just another object. Morality
assumes not only that there exists a choice through action, but
also the intention to act with the Other. The concept of mutuality,
which is basic to Macmurray* s thought and the driving force behind
his conception of community and personal relations, is also basic
to his perception of morality.. The heart of morality for Macmurray
is not the choice between right and wrong. The essence of morality
lies in the relationships of persons and the intention that foms 
5action. Macmurray introduced the idea that the epistomologically 
oriented procedure is an inadequate, negative or false form of 
morality, whereas the ontological approach- to morality is adequate, 
positive or true.
Morality as a Matter of Intention
The first fundamental principle, that sheds light upon Macmurray*s 
conception of morality, is his distinction between right and wrong, 
which is the process of valuation which is an inherent constituent 
of action, Macmurray wrote that: "Since action is choice, the dis­
tinction between *ri^t* and 'wrong* is inherent in the nature of 
action."^ Macmurray noted that: "knowingly to actualise one of a
4. PR p.113
5. Bozzo, op. cit., p.165
6. PR p.112
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number of possibles, and in doing so to negate the others, is 
to characterise the act that is so performed as right and the
7others as wrong". Eight and wrong for Macmurray are primary 
distinctions, since they are a product of action, >hich is 
itself primary; whereas true-false distinctions are secondary, 
since they are a product of reflection.^ Macmurray asserted 
that:
Action is primary and concrete, thought is secondary, abstract and derivative. This must mean that the distinction between 'right* and 'wrong*, which is con­stitutive for action, is the primary standard of validity; while the distinction between 'true* and 'false* is secondary. In some sense, thou#i not necessarily directly, it must be possible to distinguish between 'ri^t* and 'wrong* before distinguishing between ‘true* and 'false*, and so without reference to the truth or falsity of a judgement, and to derive the latter from the former. 9
However, the distinction between ri^t and wrong is not a moral dis­
tinction, since the essential feature of personal inter-relatedness, 
which is found with the context of the community, is missing. There 
are two ways in which one might act rightly or wrongly which are not 
moral distinctions. These two forms of nonnmoral distinction between 
right and wrong, which is a return to Macmurray* s two negative modes 
of apperception, are labelled by Macmurray as 'aesthetic* and 
'technical*. Macmurray held that there are two modes of appercep­
tion of right and wrong that are non-moral. Macmurray asserted that 
there are "two ways in which action can,he wrongly performed, either 
through a misapprehension of the Other —  by misunderstanding the
10situation, for instance —  or through the^  lack of skill in operation".
7. SA p. 140




Conversely, Macmurray assumed that:
Acting li^tly, therefore, we may say, is either a matter of efficiency or a matter of style; and we may note that both criteria can be used in the valu­ation of action, and that which of the two standards is the subordinate one will depend on whether the end or the means is subordinate in the intentionaliiy of the action.
"Neither of these two modes of ri^tness is moral", since technical
rightness ", is a matter of efficiency and aesthetic rightness is a 
12matter of style, i.e. neither art nor science offers a moral judge­
ment. Although the rightness or wrongness of action is a constituent
15of a moral action and judgement, and is primarily a moral distinction,^ 
in itself for Macmurray it does not constitute the determining factor 
in moraliiy. •
ORie second fundamental factor, which is inherent in action, is
15
the realisation of intention, and the motive that stimulates the
action. The terms 'motive* and 'intention* are sometimes confused, 
however, Macmurray clearly differentiated between the two terms. 
Macmurray traced the confusion between the two terms to the assump­
tion that the theoretical is primary. Macmurray stated that:
The distinction between motive and intention is difficult, and indeed impossible, for any philosophy which accepts the primacy of the theoretical, and takes its stand upon the 'cogito*. For the motives of our actions are not thought, but felt; and if we represent then as thought, they become indistinguishable from intentions. ^ °
Both motive and intention are grounded in action and are precursors
to action. Macmurray assumed that action was defined by intention
II 17which involves knowledge as a déterminant of purposeful movement. "
11. PR p.114
12. Ibid
13. Jeffko, op. cit.. p. 164
14. PR p.113




However, this assumption has as its premise that there is a
negative which is a %otive consciousness which determines pur-
18posive behaviour without knowledge, as relation to stimulus".
"Intention, therefore, presupposes motivation, and a complete
account of action involves the consideration of its motivation
19as well as of its intention,"
Every action has a motive and every intention to act must
contain a motive. Every action has a motive, but is not deter- 
20mined by a motive. Macmurray averred that: %otives do not
determine action. Nevertheless, all action contains necessarily
an element of reaction to stimulus, without which it would be im- 
21possible," . Motive is the stimulus to action, however, it does 
not determine the action but only stimulates or catalyses action.
In general motive signifies something that in general effects 
movement, which has its equivalent in the scientific application 
of the term 'energy*. In terms of organic behaviour a motive is 
that which accounts for the release of potential energy in response 
to a stimulus. When a primitive organism reacts in fear the re­
action is defensive, which brings about the avoidance of danger, 
and is a motive. The organism does not know that it is in danger 
or for that matter what the danger is. Macmurray consequently 
concluded that the organism's "response to stimulus has a motive,
but no intention; and this motive awareness accounts for the re-
22action, and determines its character".
An example of such a reaction to a stimulus is the habitual 
patterns which make up a person's character. Macmurray held that: 
"Habits are, in fact, those tendencies to respond to particular
18. Ibid19. Ibid , .b?. Jeffko,'op.■cit., p.99, Bozzo, op. cit., pp. 183-18421. SA D. 19622. SA OP. 195-196
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types of stimulation in determinate ways which have been 
established in the agent in the process of practical experience. 
Macmurray defined a person's character as "the systems of habits in 
an i n d i v i d u a l T h e s e  automatic responses which make up a person's 
character are then bound up with the concept of motive and not with 
the realisation of intention.
However, this is not the central source of motivation, although 
this does illustrate the breadth of the stimulus and response 
definition of motive. The motive is the direction of "physical
25energy" which is a spasmodic or automatic response. Macmurray con-
26ceived of all motives as being emotional with a negative and posi­
tive pole. The positive personal motivational pole is love, whereas
27the negative motivational pole is fear. The isolation of the basic
poles of motivation should be understood as the extremes of a wide
28intervening spectrum of emotions. Both poles of motivation are
operative in all personal action, since the negative and positive
29poles are complementary. Macmurray noted that: "both the positive 
and negative motives are operative in all personal action. It is 
for this reason that we have described the original motivation of
the personal as bipolar, and 'love' and 'fear' as the positive and
negative poles of a single motivationPersonal motivation is 
more than just an organic impulse, which would restrict love to 
an erotic impulse or sexual impulse, and fear to panic. Love and 
fear as personal motive are not just panic and sexual impulse, but
23. BS p . 247 "
24. 8A p . 196
25. BS p . 242
26. RE p . 23
27. PR p . 71
28. Bozzo, op. cit., P.I69
29. Ibid p . 275
30. PR p . 70
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controlled behaviour which with the personal other is a step 
towards communication, with its concomitant possibility of 
mutuality. The single motivation is found in the combination of 
love and fear brou^t about by the personal other, since one not 
only loves the other, but also fears the other. Both motives 
refer to the personal relationship between the personal other 
and the self, thereby reducing both motives to a "single moti­
vation".^ **
Up to this point motives have been examined. However, though
every action has a motive, one may also intend an action. The
absence of intention for Macmurray obviates the question of mor- 
52ality arising. Consequently, the first factor, that merits 
examination, is Macmurray*s understanding of intention and his 
approach to the connection of intention and its collateral factor 
of attention. Since every action has a motive, but can only be 
determined by intention, what place does attention play in 
Macmurray* s conception of intention? Attention is the directing
55factor in our knowledge of the situation in which one is acting.
Intention is the practical aspect, whereas in Macmurray* s terms
attention is the reflective aspect of the determination of direc- 
54-tion of activity. Macmurray held that:
We intend a modification of the Other, to be determined by our agency. We attend to a mode of the Other which is already determinate in order that it may reveal to us the structure of its determination. Thus 'intention* and 'attention* refer respectively to the forward looking and the backward looking aspects of knowledge in action, to anticipation and memory.
51. PR pp.69-70
32. Bozzo, op. cit., pp.183-184




Macmurray maintained that: "in action, we select in attention 
what is relevant to our intention, or rather what we consider 
to he relevant".What is not attended to, and therefore out­
side of intention, is a matter of response to stimulus, i.e. 
motivation.
Attention refers to our apprehension of a situation at the 
point of action, which is necessary for the formation of our 
intention before we act. However, a matter of misapprehension is 
not an immoral act in itself, since it is only a lack of skill. 
Intention is a pivotal point for morality. Intention is the 
process of "looking forward" that one does before action, which 
directs action. Particular actions are determined by the par­
ticular intentions, which a person-forms, from moment to moment 
in terms of his valuation and discrimination .of his situation. 
Intention is the determination of action guided by attention; the 
whole being propelled by motive.
Macmurray stated that; "Auy intentional activity moves from
39the present towards the future." Each specific .action is deter­
mined by an intention. However, Macmurray made plain that the 
intention is not equivalent to the end of the action. Macmurray 
asserted that intention is in the action, and is not fully deter­
minate. The analysis of actions into means and end is reflective 
and presupposes that the action is both complete and successful. 
Our actions are necessarily planned in advance. This means that
"action is not teleological, but intentional".^^ One cannot limit
r
36. S A  p .  173
37. P R  p .114
38. S A  p .198 
3 9 „  B S  p .215
40. S A  p .  1 7 5
41. S A  p .150
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the determination of action to a mere analysis of the ends and
means. Telos is different from the concept of intention in that
it is applicable only to the "description and comprehension of
organic behaviour".Although intention is a matter of looking
forward, it is not just a matter of looking for the end. Inten-
43tion is prospective, whereas Telos is retrospective.
Intention is more directly linked to knowledge than motive.
Only persons can act with intention and as we have seen only in
terms of knowledge. When one acts without knowledge one is only
referring to the habitual pattern, which is not a matter of the
intentional, but of the motivational. The negative of ihtention
is the habitual motive of character and the knowledge or interest
of attention. Intention consists of the subordinate components
of knowledge and motive. ^  A particular action in being determined,
in terms of it being forward looking, becomes "the cutting edge of
45consciousness in action",
A clear and more comprehensive impression of Macmurray*s per­
ception of the terms intention can be obtained by contrasting and 
comparing the term intention withi the term motive. It must be 
realised that for Macmurray the moral character of an action is 
partially dependent upon its intention but not upon its motive.
The first distinction is that motives need not be conscious, 
whereas intention must be conscious.Secondly, intention operates 
only within the personal modes of existence, whereas motive has a 
broader and more general application, sipee one finds motives in
42. ' Ibid
43' Jeffko,'op. cit. p.102
44. Vos, Kenneth Duane, "The Contribution of Binond Cahn, H. RichardNiebuhr and John Macmurray to the Ethics of Responsibility" (Unpublished Doctoral Thesis; Columbia University, 1972) p. 230
45. Ibid
46. Jeffko, op. cit., p. 98, SA p . 195
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all three fields of existence —  material, organic and personal
Thirdly, motive is a matter of impulse and emotion,^ whereas in-
49tention is fully rational. Fourthly, on the personal level, 
motive is a matter of feeling whereas intention is much more com­
plex* Intention involves the agents apprehei^ion of the situation 
(attention); his discrimination and evaluation of the 'alternative 
ways that he can act and finally the actualisation of the chosen
alternative. Fifthly, on the personal level, motive is a general
50disposition, whereas intention is particular, although it must
he pointed out that certain intentions can be labelled as general.
A 'general intention* is the intention that remains the same for
each succeeding particular intention, even though the ' general
intention* is the same f for'each of: the : actions. In a letter to
Walter G Jeffko, Macmurray cast further light upon his conception
of a general intention. A general intention directs a number of
51subordinate and particular intentions. The general intention is
practical and is a form of particular intention. One might say
that there is a 'general* or 'larger* particular intention directing
several subordinate levels of particular intention.
Finally, motive is the negative aspect of intention, Macmurray
asserted that: "What determines an action is its intention; but we
shall be prepared to find that the motive of an action is contained
52within the intention as its negative aspect. " . In summary, motive
is unconscious or conscious feeling, amotion or impulse on the
/47. Ibid
48. RE p. 23
49. Jeffko, op. cit., p.98
50. Jeffko, op. cit., pp.100-101, SA p.198
51. Ibid pp.103-104
52. SA p. 195
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material, organic and personal level; whereas intention is 
conscious, deliberate, rational and only on the personal level.
The importance of intention is that it is a necessary part 
of the definition of morality, as is the personal. Maomurray - 
believed that moral 'rightness* or 'wrongness* resided in inten­
tion,^^ although this is not the only element in morality, it is 
a necessary element in the moral equation, Macmurray assumed that:
"An action is defined by its intention, and its absolute ri^tness
55must lie, therefore, in the rightness of its intentions."
Morality as a Matter of the Relation with the Other
AliJiough, the rightness of an action lies in the intention, 
the moral rightness of an action demands tbe inclusion of the rela­
tionship between persons, since intention may only operate within 
the personal sphere. Macmurray concluded that: "the moral rist­
ress of an action, it might be widely eigreed, rises from the fact 
that the actions of one person affect, either by the way of help 
or hindrance, the actions of others. The intention of one par­
ticular agent is inherently related to the intention of the other, 
which means that: "the morality of an action is inherent in action 
itself, and does not supervene in cases where a particular action
has consequences which impinge in a critical fashion on the lives 
57of other people". Consequently, one must have both the intentional 
and relational present since both are necessary for morality.
Morality is only within the field of the personal. The moral order 
has not been reached if one remains at the biological or physical
53. Jeffko, cop. cit., p.99
54. PR p. 120
55. PR p.116
56. Ibid
57. PR p. 117
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level "For morali'ty refers to the structure of personal re­
lations which unites the members in a community of agents, and
59personal relations are necessarily reciprocal." The final and 
most fundamental principle for Macmurray is the familiar one, 
which is termed either relational, personal or communal.
If one calls the harmonious inter-relationships of agents 
a community, then one might say "that a morally right action is 
an action which intends community". In terms of intention 
this means that one is morally right, if the particular intention 
of his action is a subordinate intention to the general intention, 
"to maintain the community of agents, and wrong if it is not so 
c o n t r o l l e d T h e  ultimate general intention, therefore, is the 
intention of a universal community. Moreover, the highest form 
of morality and the ultimate goal or moral philosophy is the
62creation and maintenance of a universal or overall community. 
Macmurray in a letter to Walter G Jeffko, maintained that: "Any 
'moral philosophy* which I could take responsibility for would 
rest upon the conviction that the rightness of actions depends 
upon a reference to the creation of universal community;...
Since personal relations is the groundwork from which mor­
ality springs, morality is intimately connected with the communal, 
and the relational.The social nature of a moral action is in­
herent in the action since the action ,of one agent is inherently 
related to the action of another.
58. Jeffko, op. cit., p.166
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Macmurray from the he ginning held that ’Moral relations 
are dependent on the absolute value of the human being, as a 
free human spirit • • • The concept of freedom is important 
to Macmurray* s conception of morality since the concept of the 
free person in a mutual relationship is the cornerstone of 
Macmurray*s philosophy, Macmurray stated that; "This inter­
relation of agents, vÆdch makes the freedom of all members of 
a society depend upon the intentions of each, is the ground of 
moredily* An even more concise statement is "My freedom 
depends upon how you behave. Macmurray from the very beginning 
held that there was an intimate, inter-relation and interdependent 
connection between the concepts of freedom, mutuality, morality 
and the personal, since they are all necessary for the existence 
of community. Macmurray in Freedom in the Modem World stated 
that: "Freedom, which is the basis of morality is a matter of 
spontaneous self-expression in action. ... The core of human freedom 
lies, therefore, in our capacity to be ourselves for other people. 
Morality is, therefore, the expression of peo^onal- freedom. The 
interdependence of freedom, morality and mutuality within the 
community is seen in the statement that: "If the relations between 
individuals in any communiiy are not harmonious, then its members
must be frustrated. They cannot raise their intentions. They 
70cannot be free."
Macmurray stated that: "Friendship, therefore, is the essence 
71of morality." As in the case of the self and religion, Macmurray
66. BE p.135
67. PR pp.118-119
68. PR p. 119
69. FMWp .207
70. CH p . 72
71. FMWp .209
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is assuming that community or fellowship is the essence of 
morality. Communality lies at the very heart of Macmurray* s 
explanation of morality, as it did in his explanation of the 
self and religion. The iriter-connected concepts of mutuality, 
personal relations and fellowships, i.e. community, plays an 
integral part in Macmurray* s explanation and definition of morality.
Macmurray concentrates his discussion of morality upon the 
three categories of apperception which in turn yields three modes 
of morality. Therefore, any examination of Macmurray*s three 
modes of morality must start with an examination of his three cate­
gories of apperception.
The Three Modes of Morality
All perception involves apperception since perception involves
72selection and interpretation. Apperception is not so much a
75difference in thought as a way one thinks or methods which one
uses to think. There are certain universal and necessary forms
of apperception which "bear the same relation to the empirical
forms as do the categories in the Kantian theory of empirical
concepts".These categories are a priori concepts that determine
the general form of all our experience. Macmurray held that:
In reflective or theoretical activity they determine the form of the questions we ask, and to that extent the form of the answers we find; yet they do not de­termine the answers. Similarly, our three universal and nece^ry dispositions are presuppositions of the possibility of action as such; and as *a priori* motives, determine the way in which we apperceive the Other in action, as our practical response to the situation as we apprehend it. For this reason we may call this original system of apperception • categorical* and its three determinations * categories* of apperception. «5
72. PR p.111
73. SRRp.56
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These three categories of apperception give rise to the three 
ways of life or thought which in turn have their ov/n* *moral* 
structure. There are three distinguishable 'modes of morality* 
that are rooted in these three categories. There is one posi­
tive apperception and two negative types of apperception.
Macmurray called the positive apperception 'communal* and the 
two negative types, which have already been mentioned in passing,
respectively * contemplative *, which is the submissive form, and
76'pragmatic* which is the aggressive form. As has been noted 
throughout this study, these three different modes of appercep­
tion appear and reappear throughout Macmurray* s work and are 
variously labelled as the scientific, pragmatic or practical mode; 
the artistic, aesthetic or contemplative mode; and the personal, 
communal or religious mode. Each of these ways of thinking or 
attitudes, which Macmurray entitled the three 'categories of
apperception*, are ways of looking at the world through different 
77coloured lenses. Therefore, as one would expect, the three 
different categories of apperception inUtum to yield three modes 
of morality, as in the case of Macmurray* s examination of society 
in which three different apperceptions of society gave rise to
78three different sets of ideas about the totality of human society* 
The first mode of morality that is identified by Macmurray 
is that which comes from apperceiving the world in a mechanical 
way or in a physical way. Macmurray characterised this as the 
'pragmatic* mode of Persons in Relation; ^ whereas in Freedom in the 
Modem World, w h i c h a n  earlier work,! he : characterised this as
76. Ibid
77. Nephew, Albert Henry, "Philosophy is Theology: The Nature andFunction of Philosophy According to John Macmurray" (Unpublished Doctoral Thesis: Marquette University, 
1970) p.113
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the mechanical mode of morality. The pragmatic mode of morality 
is a negative mode of morality which was termed in Freedom in the 
Modem World a false mode of morality, i.e. an unreal morality.
The pragmatic mode of morality takes as its central presupposi­
tion that the material —  the life of action —  is real. The 
problem presented by the conflict of wills, is solved in this 
category of apperception by aggression, which is an effort to 
overpower the resistance of olhers within the group and compel 
them to submit. This makes the goal for life the appropriation 
of power, which reduces the relations between agents to one of 
competition, in particular the competition for power. "The
problematic of action becomes the effort to achieve my own purpose
79in the face of resistance from the other." However, since the
agents are interdependent there must be a limit to an agent's
power if there is any possibility of maintaining unity in society,
i.e. a systematic co-operation between agents. Consequently one
needs a mode of morality that fits in with this way of viewing
human co-operation in society.
The pragmatic mode of apperception and morality is a matter
of technological efficiency which is manifested by a pragmatic 
80mentality. Moreover one would expect a technological or mechanical
solution to be offered to the problems of maintaining the harmony
within society by this mode of morality.-
Bach individual has his own intention which he is determined to realise. His problem concerns the means to realise it in the fact of resistance; it is efficiency in action that determines right and wrong. Now the technique for maintain­ing a harmony of co-operation in society is law, conceived
79. PR p. 147
80. PR p. 114
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as a means for keeping the peace. The pragmatic mode of morality will then he conceived as obedience to law —  to a moral law which the individual imposes upon himself, and through which he secures the uni­versal intention to maintain the community of action.It will be a morality of self-control, of power over the self, limiting its own freedom for the sake of maintaining the community.^
Morality is expressed in terms of will-to-power in this mode with
obligation, duty and a set of rules or principles as the limiting
82factors to the use of each individual's power.
This mode of morality is very familiar and has its origins,
lilc 
84
83as far as Western Philosophy is concerned, in Stoic phi osophy
and its clearest historical expression in Ancient Rome.
The essence of such a mechanical system of morality supposes 
that goodness is equated with obedience to a moral law. Macmurray*s 
objection to this negative mode of morality is that; "Such a 
morality is false, because it destroys human, spontaneity, both in
85thought and in feeling, by subjecting it to an external authority." 
Someone is telling another before hand what to think and consequently 
what way he is to act. Macmurray objected to the assumption that 
morality is composed of obedience, since the responsibility for one's 
actions should not become someone else^ s, since this denies one's 
freedom. "If there were such a thing as a moral law then a per­
fectly good man would be an automation, a mere robot, with no human 
86freedom at all." Such a material or mechanical system as the 
pragmatic mode of morality, by concentrating upon obeying the law,
81. PR p. 125
82. Ibid
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makes a human being behave as if he was a material object, which 
obeys laws. Macmurray naturally objected to this approach, since 
it simply "makes the mistake of thinking that human nature is the 
same as material nature’*. Of course it is not. "Material nature 
is free in obeying laws. Human nature is bound or enslaved in 
obeying laws.
Although Macmurray held that law and legality are inappropriate 
for morality, he did not completely reject the use of moral princi­
ples. Moral principles for Macmurray are outwith a so-called
88system of 'moral law*•
The negative antithesis to the 'pragmatic* mode is the 'contem­
plative * mode. The contemplative mode has been referred to at 
various times as organic, aesthetic, social or artistic. Macmurray 
depicted the contemplative mode as the second of the negative modes 
of apperception,'which he labelled less ambiguously as the second 
false mode in his earlier work Freedom in the Modem World. For
the contemplative mode the real world is the spiritual world, and
89actual life is immaterial or unreal. Macmurray identified the
contemplative view of the world with the organic representation of
90the world. Macmurray originally identified the social or contem-
91plative mode of morality with the organic approach. The main 
thrust of Macmurray*8 examination and analysis of the contemplative 
mode revolves around three different conceptions. Since for the 
contemplative mode the real world is the life of the spirit, the 
life of thought and imagination seeks self-realisation in the private
87. FMWp.191
88. FMWp.192
89. PR p. 123
90. PR p. 115
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92and isolated world of thought and feelings. An agent, that
exists within the 'contemplative framework*, has only a minimal
amount of time and energy to spend upon the practical life, since
a predominant amount of his time and energy will be directed to
a life of reflection and contemplation,^^ The ' contemplative
individual* in order to apply a minimal amount of energy to the
life of the group ’taust conform in practice, and make the practical
life a means to the inner life of the mind". This is only made
possible if "the practical life can be made automatic, a matter of
routine and habit, which supports as a whole a deliberate 'and
intentional life of reflection, contemplation and ideal construe- 
94-tion". This calls for the establishment of a common form of 
95life. Macmurray deemed the contemplative mode possible if;
there is established a common form which, is unchanging, within whichthe activity of each member is adjusted to that of the others automatically. The form will be of an organic type, a system of social habit, in which the activity of each member is functionally related to the activity of the others, so that the practical life of the society is a balanced and harmonious unity, a system of social habit. To maintain this each member must have his function in the common life; he must be trained from childhood to recognise the social pattern and his own function in it, and to develop the system of habits which makes conformity to it a second nature.
• . The 'second;principle .that-differentiates the ■ '.contemplative* 
from the other modes of morality is the idea of form. Macmurray
considered 'stylistic rightness* to be the underlying aesthetic
97element in the contemplative mode. "’The contemplative mode of
92. Jeffko, cop. cit.,p.168 
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95. Bozzo, op. cit., p.206
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98morality is then a morality of good form. " The standard for
the mode of morality is aesthetic and must be felt. "It is a
kind of beauty or grace in social relations, a matter of style,
99of balance, of tact and poise." The contemplative mode, unlike 
the pragmatic, cannot be reduced to a set of rules; it rests upon 
insight and intuition.
The third principle that is of importance, which is stressed 
in Macmurray’s early definition of the contemplative mode of 
morality, is the subordination of the individual to society.
Maomurray viewed our function in society as being one of taking 
our place in the social organisation and devoting ourselves to our 
task. "So the ideal of social service arises, and social morality. 
The voice of social morality talks always of service, as self-devo­
tion and self sacrifice. "Our duty is to serve oidiers, to serve our
101 102 country to serve humanity." Human goodness is common goodness.
Maomurray has several objections to this second negative or
false mode of morality. Maomurray believed that when society is
placed before the personal, the spontaneity of the individual is
limited. Social morality in any form as opposed to the communal
is false, since it inevitably subordinates human beings to a social
organisation. There is the danger that morality can be reduced
105to nothing more than a set of manners, thereby destroying 
morality. There is one obvious danger that Maomurray did not stress.
98. PR p. 124 
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The contemplative mode divides the person between the public and
the private world neither which can become a basis for authentic
.. 106 action.
This mode of morality has its classical exposition in Plato*s 
107Republic and its clearest historical expression among the 
108Ancient Greeks.
The final mode of apperception which will be dealt with.
is the only positive mode of apperception or less ambiguously
the only true mode of morality. This is the personal, religious
or communal mode of morality.
Maomurray stated that a morally right action is an action
109which intends community". Rot surprisingly the only positive
mode of morality is the communal. The communal mode is the hetero-
centric mode, i.e. the mode which makes the centre of reference of
the agent the personal other. "To act rightly is then to act for
110the sake of the Other and not for oneself." In the first two 
false or negative modes one. apperceives deeds in terms of technique 
or in terms of style. However, the true or positive mode has for 
its central point of reference the other. Maomurray in his collec­
tion of talks entitled Freedom in the Modern World has, as the 
centre of his concept of *true morality*, the notion of friendship; 
the idea of existing for the other is central to both heterocentrism
and friendship. "Morality or human goodness is essentially a matter
111 . 1 1 2  of friendship." "Friendship is üie essence of morality."
106. Vos, op. cit., p . 205
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Friendship or community combines with intention to form the
basis of Maomurray*8 conception of *true morality*. The objective
for the personal mode of morality is the maintenance of "positive
personal relations between all agents as the bond of community".
The normal expression of this mode is *thou shalt love thy neighbour*
or *love your enemies*.
It would strictly be correct to call this mode of morality
Christian. However, Maomurray believed that one should not label
this as the Christian mode, since one of the two negative modes
has also been labelled as Christian. The clearest historical
115expression of the communal mode is the ancient Hebrews. Maomurray 
admitted that this type of morality was transmitted to Europe via the 
Christians.
The Communal as the Mode of True Morality
Maomurray presented three categories of apperception which 
are almost identical in three of his works. In Persons in Relation 
and Freedom in the Modern World he labelled these three categories 
as either mechanical or pragmatic; social or contemplative; and the 
positive mode as pen^onal or communal. However, there is also 
another ooourence of this thteme in The Clue to History, which uti­
lises the categories of Roman, Greek and Hebrew. Maomurray, through­
out his work, has consistently put forward three categories of apper­
ception which also appear as three modes of morality. Moreover, 
Maomurray consistently advocated only one true or positive mode of 
morality which has as its essence either^ friendship, mutuality, 
community or fellowship, which are manifestations of the hetro- 
centrio approach to morality.
113. PR p.122
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At the centre of Macmurray*8 discussion of true or positive
morality is the concept of community and its concomitant concepts.
Macmurray* s central thesis revolves around the fact that persohhood
is only truly revealed in community. Therefore, the assumption
that communal morality is the only fitting type of morality to
he applied to personal relationships is consistent with Maomurray*s
overall approach.
The moral problematic arises from the conflict.of wills.
Morality, no matter what mode of apperception is being .applied, leads
to an effort to resolve this conflict of wills. Therefore, one
117can say that morality is essentially social, i.e. involved with 
relations. However, one does not find true, positive morality 
because one is merely involved in a social situation. The defini­
tion of a morally right action is one that intends community as
long as a communily is defined as a "harmonious interrelation of 
118agents". The general intention of each individual within a
group defined as community, should be a unifying one. Maomurray
formulated it in this way:
Any act of any agent is an expression of his own freedom.But if the world is one action, any particular action determines the future, within its own limits, for all agents. Every individual agent is therefore responsible to all other agents for his actions. Freedom and re­sponsibility are, then, aspects of one fact. The inten­tion of any agent; is, however, relative to his knowledge of the Other. His responsibility cannot extend beyond his knowledge. Consequently, whatever he does is morally right if the particular intention of his action is controlled by a general intention to maintain thj^gommunity of agents, .- and wrong if it is not so controlled, ■ —  : . •Not;.pnly,is,.moral order found within the community, since morality
is iimftedrtoi’the personal which is found in the community, but
it Is also restricted to the community in terms of its intention.




The only morally right, general intention that overrides other
intentions is the intention to maintain communiiy. Community
is the essence not only of the correct mode of morality, hut it is
also the primary intention that is applicable within the true
mode of morality* Communiiy is at the very centre of Maomurray*s
understanding and explanation of morality. Maomurray maintained
120that: "Any human society is a moral entity." The very exist­
ence of relationships witMn any group is enough to present a 
moral problem. Therefore, one can act morally only when the 
conflict of wills is conquered. Maomurray is uncompromising in 
his identification of morality and commuai 1y. This is because 
true morality is possible only within the community, which is 
where there is no conflict of wills, since the other com^s before
the self. Morality as we have seen expresses the necessary and
121universal intention to maintain the community, nevertheless, 
the approach to morality, which considers morals only in terms 
of human relationships, has a single primury general intent, i.e. 
the unity of community, which is not the primary expression of 
morality for Maomurray. "The full realisation of the moral inten­
tion can only be reached in a relation between two persons in
which each cares wholly for the other, and for himself only for
122the sake of the other. " The definition of morality in terms 
of the other as the centre and not the self as central, is the 
basic requirement of community and morality, which makes these 
two aspects of human activity inseparable.
The term heterocentric best characterises Macmurray’s moral 
philosophy, since it includes the communal and intentional aspect
120. PR p. 128
121. PR p. 189
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that Maomurray required to he present in true and positive types 
of morality.
The essence of morality for Maomurray is the intention of
putting the other before the self, in other words being hetero-
centric in your intentions and consequently heterocentric in
your actions. This includes the general intention of harmonious
relationships between agents in the community. Negatively
motivated action is * egocentric *, while positively motivated
action, which has the centre of reference outside of oneself,
123is ‘heterocentric*. Heterocentrism is placed in reference to 
Macmurray* s bipolar concept of personal motivation next to the 
positive pole of motivation.
The communal mode is heteirocentric, whereas the pragmatic 
and contemplative modes are egocentric.Heterocentrism for 
Macmurray defines the intrinsic nature of true or positive morality, 
whereas egocentrism represents the intrinsic nature of false or 
negative morality. Considering Macmurray* s dependence upon the 
empirically valid fact of human relationships for his explanation 
of religion and the self as well as society and the community, it
is not unexpected to find that true morality is explained in terms
of personal relationships, i.e. he tero oentri cally, whereas false 
morality is explained as a matter of the isolated self, i.e. 
egocentrically.
Macmurray defined or explained positive or personal morality
by the use of two terms. The first term^was * friendship * which
was used in Freedom in the Modem World to designate heterocentric 
. types ' of relationships. The second term used in Persons in Relations 




of these terms seem to he interchangeable, since vdien one 
examines the relationship between two friends or the basic 
structure of community, one finds the same phenomena in operas 
tion, i.e. the combination of mutuality, reciprocity and hetero­
centrism. An apt illustration of this is found in Macmurray* s 
analysis of communi-ty:
If then, we isolate one pair, as the unit of personal community, we can discover the basic structure of community as such. The relation between them is positively motived in each. Each then, is hetero­centric; the centre of interest and attention is in the other, not in himself. For each, therefore, it is the other who is important, not himself. The other is the centre of value.
He tero centri sm lies at the very centzre of Macmurray *s understanding 
of personal community. Not only is heterocentrism central to 
Macmurray*s conception of community, but it is also central to 
his conception of real religion. "Beal religion is heterocentric. 
Man in relation to another and in terms of the other is real for 
Macmurray. The isolated individual, on the other hand, who is 
‘egocentric* is not real and has no place in Macmurray*s concep­
tion of positive morality and religion.
In a letter to Walter G Jeffko, Macmurray starkly revealed this 
complete identification of true morality and heterocentrism. 
Macmurray wrote that:
Any ‘moral responsibility* which I could take responsi­bility for would rest on the conviction that the right­ness of action depends upon a reference to the creation of universal community; and that a totally moral activity would be totally he tero centric, totally concerned with 'the Other* and with myself only as ^necessarily involved with the Other. ‘The creation of community is the end of action* mi^t be a formulation I should accept. '
125. PR p. 158
126. PR p. 170
127. Jeffko, op. cit., p . 166
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There is little doubt that Macmurray saw the concept of morality 
to be defined only in terms of the community or even more funda­
mentally in terms of heterocentrism. Therefore, only human re­
lations can be judged morally and only heterocentric actions can 
be judged to be morally right.
Macmurray as has been observed before in his desire to iden­
tify and utilise an empirically acceptable basis for his thinking 
about morality and religion, has focused upon the community. 
Macmurray confined his definition of morality to the heterocentric 
and communal while relegating the concept of love to the position 
of motive for actions, but love itself without the intention of 
community and the accompanying force of heterocentrism is believed 
to have no moral force.
CHAPTER 13
A General Examination and Critique of Macmurray*s View of Ethics
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Before comparing and contrasting Macmurray* s theory of ethics 
to Christian Ethics, it is necessary and will he constructive to 
compare and contrast Macmurray* s heterocentric approach to a num­
ber of philosophical theories about, and systems of, ethics. Since 
it is outwith the scope of this study to compare Macmurray*s theory 
of ethics to all the contemporary and classical theories of ethics, 
the analysis will be limited to attempting*.to place Macmurray*s 
theory within the general framework of philosophical and theological 
thinking.
Macmurray*s threefold modal approach to ethics closely approxi­
mates other meta-ethical attempts to produce a comprehensive survey 
of ethics, and gives a legitimate point of direct comparison with 
which to begin our investigation. The ternary method of H. Richard 
Niebuhr closely resembles Macmurray* s three modes of morality.
H. Richard Niebuhr labelled his three categories of ethics teleo-
logical, deontological and responsive.^ The first two categories
are the usual ethical alternatives which are also labelled as *goal-
2seeking* and * rule-obeying*. Paul Ramsey also proposed a similar 
threefold system of classification, Wiich is based upon the nomen­
clature of William K< Erankena. Ramsey identified the two familiar 
categories of deontology ^(moral duty) and teleology (goal to be achieved) 
as well as proposing a third category which he entitled *agapism*,
3i.e. the normative theory of Christian ethics. Vos has also iden­
tified Macmurray*s threefoHmodular method as teleological, deonto-
I. Outka, Gene H. and Ramsey, Paul, Norm and Oon*bext in ChristianEthics (SCM Press Ltd.: London, 1968) p.342
2. Ibid
5. Ramsey, Paul, Deeds and Rules in Christian Ethics (ScottishJournal of Theology Occasional Papers No. 1I) (Oliver and Boyd: Edinburgh, I963) p.2
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logical and dialogical.^ The first two categories are frequently 
characterised as teleological and deontological, but there is no 
consistent term used for the third category. Long utilises three 
motifs which are simply and concisely entitled deliberative, pre­
scriptive and relational.^ Macmurray*s three modes of morality 
can be characterised as yet another ternary set of categories for 
classifying different types of ethical approaches. The teleological 
category concentrates upon the end of an action or the consequences, 
wherethe deontological category concentrates upon the means or 
the rules to be obeyed.
The Deontological and Teleological Modes of Morality
Macmurray *s pragmatic mode of morality corresponds'.to the deon-
tologxcal category of ethics. Macmurray wrote that: "The reference
in science to action is to its aspects as means; that of art is to
its aspect as end;..."^ The pragmatic mode of Macmurray focuses
upon the scientific part of human thought. The pragmatic mode of
morality centres upon the technological aspect of morality which
concentrates upon the actual methods or means used. The focus of
the pragmatic mode is to be found in the techniques of maintaining
harmony. Macmurray asserted that: "The pragmatic mode of morality
7will then be conceived as obedience to law — ..." The pragmatic
mode of morality is a re assertion of the deontological category, i.e. 
* rule-obeying*.
4* Vos, Kenneth, Duane, "The Contribution of Edmond Cahn, ÏÏ. Richard Niebuhr and John Macmurray to /•ttie Ethics of Responsibility" (Unpublished Doctoral Thesis: Columbia University, 1972) p.254
5. Long, Edward L. A Survey of Christian Ethics (Oxford UniversityPress: New York, 19&7) P«ix
6. PR p. 177
7. PR p. 125
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The second mode of morality is the contemplative mode
which closely resembles the teleological category. The contem-
0plative mode concentrates upon the morality of good form and
9stylistic rightness. The organic whole of the action is the
10important aspect of * aesthetic* morality. The end of an 
action, the goal sought becranes the decisive factor. Speaking 
of the contemplative mode, Macmurray asserted that: ’Moreover, 
it is judged from the standpoint of the spectator; since the 
agent must concentrate his attention on the end, and the style 
of his activity, resting upon skill already acquired, is a matter 
of habit.
Macmurray rejected both the teleological and deontological 
mode of morality as false or negative. The only true mode of 
morality for Macmurray is the third mode of morality which he 
called the communal mode of morality. Macmurray *s third mode of 
morality loosely corresponds to the * response ethic* of H. Richard 
Niebuhr; the * relational* motif of Edward L. Long; the *agapism* 
of Paul Ramsey; and the *dialogical* alternative of Martin Buber. 
The heterocentric approach of Macmurray falls into the same cate­
gory as the contextual and situational approaches to Christian
‘ Ti
15
12Ethics. It is comparable to Niebuhr’s *ethic of response* with
its focus upon one*s response to the other person.




12. Long, op. cit., pp.117-164 
15. Outka, op. cit., p.542
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Macmurray*8 rejection of the teleological and deontological 
mode is worthy of consideration, since it is foundational to his 
atteapt to present an ethic that is neither based upon * goal- 
seeking* nor on * rule-obeying*. However, one may ask did Macmurray 
truly rise above the problems presented by teleology and deontology?
Also one may ask did Macmurray need to reject completely these two 
approaches to ethics? Did Macmurray need to reject or did he 
manage to supplant the teleological and deontological procedures?
The contemplative mode of morality is the category variously 
labelled as the *goal seeking* mode of morality or the teleological 
ethical type. The teleological ethicist generally holds that: "our 
,only duties have reference to ends and are to produce value, or 
perhaps to distribute it in certain ways".^^ The most notable 
form of teleological ethics is utilitarianism.. Utilitarianism in 
some ways resembles Macmurray* s communal approach as well as his 
contemplative mode of morality. However, the concept of hedonistic 
utilitarianism was rejected out of hand by, Macmurray. Macmurray 
recognised that: "People have always sought for some way of life 
in which pleasure could be increased and pain avoided, and the whole 
philosophy of utilitarianism is an elaborate effort to persuade us 
that it is possible. The maximum of pleasure with -tiie minimum of
15pain for the greatest number of people is the ideal of utilitariansim. " 
However, Macmurray has confined his rejection to only one type of 
utilitarianism’, i.e. hedonistic utilitarianism. Whereas, idteal 
utilitarianism allows other things to be held as tlm *good* that
A'
is the thing to be sought, such as personal mutual relations or
14. Lacey A.R. A Dictionary of Philosophy (Routledge & Kegan Paul:London, 1976) p.60
15. RE p.47
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16aesthetic experience. So one might easily fit Macmurray*s 
heterocentrism into the utilitarian framework, which would mean 
that the goal to he sou^t is that of perfect community and the 
greatest good to be sought would be heterocentric personal rela­
tions. Such an ideal utilitarian type of approach to community
has already been proposed by one of the fathers of utilitariansim.
17Francis Hutcheson .was one of the sources of utilitariansim, 
and his theories closely resemble some of Maomurray* s thinking 
about ethics, which demonstrates the rather indistinct line betvreen 
the contemplative and communal modes of morality. Francis Hutcheson 
held'that ^ virtue was basically a motive of pure benevolence. 
Hutchenson concentrated upon the other and rejected the egocentric 
approach found in hedonism. Hutcheson considered the concern for 
one's own well-being in itself to be morally neutral (as opposed 
to Macmurray*s assumption that it is negative). For Hutcheson .
virtue consisted of a concern for the well-being of others, i.e.
•fthe motive of benevolence. ?and a concern for the moral character that
18will produce the motive of benevolence. Such an approach produces 
two questionable assumptions which can also be identified in 
Macmurray*8 ethical theories. The first assumption, that Hutcheson, 
makes, is that man is capable of motives that are rational and of 
disinterested good will. The second assumption is that benevolence 
is the basis of all moral virtue. The two assumptions that parallel 
those of Hutcheson in Macmurray*s thought are, firstly, that man is 
capable of rational and disinterested concern for the other and that,
16. Lacey, op. cit., p.60
17" Copies ton, Frederick, A History of Philosophy (image Books:Garden City, New York, various dates) Volume 5 Part I p.95
18. Garnett, A. Campbell, Ethics: A Critical Introduction (The Ronald Press Co.: New York, I960) p.155
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secondly, the communal or the relational is the only sourceIof virtue. Does Macmurray*s theory of ethics too closely con­
fine true or real moral problems to the community?
However, Macmurray did not assume that happiness or any 
other type of good action should be the end product of all moral
action. A right or wrong act for Hutcheson is determined by its 
19consequences. Macmurray certainly would not have advocated such
a teleological assumption. Macmurray* s theories cannot necessarily
be construed to mean that the other* s good is the important factor,
but it can be interpreted to mean that the other person should come
before the self, thereby possibly eliminating the teleological
overtones. However, if one maintains that the end product of a
moral action is the harmony of the community; then one can easily
slip back towards the teleological stance, which makes Macmurray*s
theory vulnerable to the usual deontological objection; that every
form of teleological ethics by concentrating upon the end of an
action, falls prey to the false assumption that if a consequence
20is sufficiently good it will justify the means. • Macmurray was 
at pains to avoid this error. "But this is incorrect, since what 
we are judging is an action; and the end, considered without refer­
ence to the means taken to achieve it, is not an action at all but 
a state of affairs.
Macmurray attempted to divorce the concept of the end from the 
concept of intention, thereby removing Any possible teleological 
bias. Macmurray successfully separated the concept of intention
from the concept of * goal-seeking*, according to Vos, since Macmurray




22. Vos. op. cit., p.240
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intention "is determined progressively in action. Macmurray
warned his reader that: "intention is not to be Confused with
end, or a common intention with a common end, or a continuity
of intention with the persistance of a determinate end".
Macmurray also pointed out that: "The end is no longer intended;
it merely constitutes the last event in the process isolated in
attention, though the ground of this isolation is the fact that 
25it was intended." Macmurray divorced the idea of the end from 
the intention by assuming that the 'end* was a part of reflection 
as opposed to intention in action. However, the end is not only 
something that is part of reflection, it is part of the action 
in that it is the consequence of the action and the goal or direc­
tion of the action. If an action heis direction and the action is 
intended the two overlap. Means for Macmurray is something that 
is determined by the end. "The means is discriminated, and chosen, 
from amongst alternatives; but only for the end, and not for itself. 
Certainly Macmurray *s attempts to remove the threat of action as 
determined by ends and replace it with the determination of the 
internal progression of action is praiseworthy, but it overlooks 
the fact that the consequences of an action are a part of the action 
itself. Macmurray* 8 assumption that intention is a part of the 
practical, whereas the end is a part of the theoretical, is helpful 
in understanding his concept of intention, but it is not totally 
satisfactory when one comes to look at the *end* in terms of the
27reflective as well as the pragmatic, i.e.fbe as good and as ideal;






Although Macmurray totally rejected the validity of the 
teleological mode of ethics, one must remember that Macmurray 
drew rather a vague line between his concept of contemplative 
morality and his concept of communal morality, particularly in 
his early work Freedom in the Modern World. Macmurray did not 
advocate a basically teleological approach, but there are simi­
larities. A teleological ethic would advocate the setting up
of community harmony as a goal, and it would designate the prin-
28ciple of loyalty as the underlying principle of community.
Macmurray held that heterocentrism was the underlying principle 
behind community. However, one must be aware that there is a 
constant dan^r of the harmony of community being construed as 
a goal, which would be sought sometimes at the expense of others.
Macmurray*s mode of communal morality overlaps with his con­
templative mode, whereas his rejection or denial of the pragmatic 
mode of morality is complete. Macmurray completely rejected the 
deontological approach to ethics, while retaining a teleological
2^bias. Deontological ethics is the * rule-obeying* type of ethics,
30i.e. one that rests upon moral duty. William Frankena identified
two different types of deontology, which he labelled as act-
deontology and rule-deontology. Act-deontology assumes that basic
judgements concern obligation, i.e. moral; duty in tems of a parv-
ticular base. Rule-deontology assumes that the standard of right
51and wrong is to be found in formal rules. Deontology can either 
revolve around the obeying of rules or the judgement of obligation.
28. Garnett, op. cit., p.575 
29* Outka, op. cit., p.342
30. Ramsey, op. cit., p.2
31. Frankena, William K. Ethics (Prentice-Hall. Inc.: Englewood
Cliffs, N.J., 1963) p . 15
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H. Richard Niehuhr classified deontology as ‘man-the-citizen* 
who asked "what is the law and lÆtat is the law of life".^^ A 
deontological theory of ethics is one which sees at least some 
acts as obligatory regardless of their consequences. The philo­
sopher who emphatically enunciated such a theory was Immanuel 
Kant. According to Kant, objectively right behaviour can be 
inspired by a number of factors such as benevolence, but the 
only fact that makes it a morally correct solution is respect 
for the moral law. This is an excellent example of the difference 
between Kant's thinking about ethics and that of Macmurray, even 
though Macmurray was influenced by Kant.
Macmurray rejected the pragmatic mode of morality which has
34as its '.centre the obedience to moral law. Macmurray in defining
the pragmatic mode of morality —  combining rule-and-act deontology
—  noted, that: "it will be expressed in terms of will, obligation
and duty, as a set of rules or principles, which are the same for
all, and which limit for each the use of his own power to do what 
35he pleases".^ The state and society are concerned with obligation, 
but it is not truly a moral problem for Macmurray, since it does not 
directly apply to personal relations within the community.
Macmurray certainly believed that the community demanded of the 
individual a certain amount of responsibility. Vos identifies 
Macmurray*s idea of responsibility with' H. Richard Niebuhr's idea 
of accountability. Macmurray* s understanding of responsibility with
32. Niebuhr, H. Richard, The Responsible Self: An Essay In Christian'iMoral Philosophy i Harper and Row, Publishers : New York, 
1963) p.60, hereafter cited as RS
33. Olson, Robert G. Bicyclopedia of Philosophy (Collier-MacmillanLimited: London, I967) Vol.II p7342, hereafter cited as EP
34. PR p. 125
35. Ibid
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the community is a type of accountability and not obligation,
The idea of reciprocity as presented in Macmurray* s work cer­
tainly does not depend upon any other criterion than man*s 
mutuality# However, Macmurray* s idea of obligation in community 
seems to be one of accountability vbich does not exclude the 
possibility of negative force. The anticipatory elanent is not
one of wishing to help the other, but one of fear, i.e. fear of 
57being mistaken.
Macmurray rejected the idea of moral duty, since he reasoned
that the concept of duty is something that is motivated by fear;
therefore, duty is no longer applicable to morality. Newbigin
commented upon Macmurray* s dismissal of the concept of duty as a
mechanical, i.e. pragmatic, awareness of the world vdiich is imposed
58upon the emotional life by the pressure of fear. Newbigin main­
tained that: "The intellect brings us knowledge simply of what is 
the empirical world around us; the very essence of the sense of
duty is that it claims to mediate awareness of what is not yet but 
59ought to be." Newbigin identified Macmurray*s failure to under­
stand the importance of conscience with his misconception of obligation. 
However, Macmurray did clarify his position in Persons in Relation by 
identifying conscience with moral apperception.^^ However, Macmurray 
failed to realise that duty was more than just mechanical awareness 
motivated by fear. As Newbigin pointed 'out duty also contains a 
feeling of oughtness, or a sense of obligation. This leads to Newbigin * s 
second objection. "Secondly we must observe, the sense of moral
56. Vos, op. cit., pp.259-240 
37• Ibid
38. Newbigin, J.E. Lesslie, Christian Freedom in the Modern VorldStudent Christian Movement Press: London, 1937) p.45 hereafter cited as CFMN
39. C F m  p.43
40. PR p. 121
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obligation and the fear of consequences of action are most 
emphatically not the s.ame thing. Newbigin called into doubt 
Macmurray*s dismissal of duty as purely a product of the fear 
of consequences. Ne\^lgin saw Macmurray*s understanding and 
dismissal of the concept of duty to be incorrect, since duty 
is not merely scmething that can be reduced to a matter of fear. 
Since duty is a concept that is part of the, pragmatic mode of 
morality, it is basically negative in motivation.
Newbigin went so far as to maintain that without a common 
sense of obligation the possibility of communion is no longer 
possibleRelationships, according to Newbigin, depend upon 
ind.ependence and obedience. Such-an interpretation, moreover, 
is close to Vos* interpretation of Macmurray- Vos. labelled the 
two elements in personal relationships as freedom and accounta­
bility.^^ There is little question that Maqaurray has to a 
certain extent recognised and made use of the concept of obliga­
tion in the form of accountability or responsibility. However, 
his interpretation of duty ais intellectual and mechanical awareness 
motivated by fear is not a completely satisfactory account of 
what obligation mi^t be, however, this interpreation is not 
fully developed in Macmurray* s philosophy. Obligation does exist 
in a community and it is a necessary part of community, but one 
cannot have hate or fear as the motivating force behind community. 
Newbigin questioned quite ri,^tly the wisdom of Macmurray*s 
reduction of the imperative of duty or qbligation to fear, which 
ignores the positive effect of duty within community.^
41. CïMtfp.45
42. C R W  p.75
43. Vos, op. cit., pp.239-240
44. CFMW p . 76
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Macmttcray by subordinating the concept of obligation to one ' 
of accountability or'responsibility of one person to another in 
a negative way, leads one to dismiss the concept of obligation 
which in itself might be a positive motivating force. Obligation 
is more than just the accumulated "residue of social training not 
making itself felt automatically as the voice of conscience".^5 
Obligation is a need within aperson, Vhen presented with a choice 
and having picked the best alternative, to carry out the best al­
ternative.^^ In personal relationships, the sense of obligation 
is the need to carry out the best alternative in terms of the other. 
One, therefore, can have a sense of moral obligation within Macmurray*s 
ethical framework if one feels the need to continue supporting the 
community and feels the need to help the other out of love, both of 
vhich are the best alternatives. A sense of heterocentric obliga­
tion is necessary in order for one to carry out the proper choice. 
Obligation is more than a matter of fear, it is the thrusting force 
and need for the implementation of the best type of action.
The Third Category of Ethics
Vos sees the ethics of response mediating between the ideas 
of the utilitarians and Kant.^^ However, such a view mi^t lead 
to the view that Macmurray*s communal mode is nothing more than a 
synthesis formed from the thesis of teleology and the anti-thesis 
of deontology. Macmurray wisely decided’ to try to reject both the 
teleological and deontological views of morality, and then he tried 
to determine morality in terms of personal relations, lÆich resembles 
H. Bichard Niebuhr's concept of ethics as one of response, i.e. a
45. Bertocci, Peter A. Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion(Prentice-Hallÿ Inc.: New York, 1955) P*241, hereafter cited as PR
46. PR p . 246
47. Vos, op. cit., p . 242
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dialectical view of ethics. However, Macmurray did not wish 
to ameliorate between deontological and teleological ethics. However, 
one might be; led "to believe that Macmurray is trying to 
mediate between the * goal-seeking* and * rule-obeying* aspects
of morality, • because he seasonable entirely to remove these concep­
tions from his theories about ethics. His concept of intending 
community retains vestigial teleological assumptions. His idea of 
the .accountability of the individual to the community has vestigial 
deontological assumptions. However, the main thrust of Macmurray*s 
work is towards a third type of ethic that denies and tries to 
overcome the problems presented by the deontological and teleo­
logical approaches.
Macmurray, although retaining traces of the deontological and 
teleological elements, has opted for the third category of ethical 
thinking. . Anders Nygren first identified in 1923 a third type of 
ethic which he called the dispositional as opposed to the well- 
known types, i.e. the legalistic and the purposive schools of thought.
Nygren favoured the third or dispositional interpretations of ethics.
48%rgren classified Christianity as a dispositional form of ethics. 
However, as we have seen he was one of many to favour such a ternary 
system of classification. H. Richard Niebuhr characterised the 
three areas as *man-the-maker* (teleology), * man-the-citizen* 
(deontology), and *man-the-answerer* (relational).For our pu3>- 
poses considering Macmurray* s overall approach one can safely label 
Macmurray*s communal ^proach as an example of the relational or 
third category.




A general definition of the relational ^or third category 
of ethics is rather difficult, although one might loosely iden­
tify any discussion of ethics in terms of situation, persons and
50context as being relational or dialectic. However, the concept
of response vhich is mutual and reciprocal is the centre of any
relational type of ethics.
H. Richard Niebuhr held that the relational contained the
central concept of an interpreted response. Niebuhr considered
two elements, other than those of interpretation and response,
to be of importance in his description of relational ethics. Niebuhr
considered the conception of accountability to be of importance not
in a lèfgalistic sense, but in terms of anticipation. The other
element is social solidarity which places any action within a
continuing discourse of interaction among persons in a continuing 
51society. Macmurray also utilised all four of these elements. A 
relationship certainly contains a response, and an intentional heter- 
ocentrio approach certainly is an interpretation of the correct 
response. The concept of harmony in the community parallels the 
concept of social solidarity, since both contain continuous inter­
action between persons. The conception of accountability is to be 
found in Macmurray*s and Niebuhr's thought, but the former gives 
it much less attention.
Gordon D. Kaufinan in The Context of Decision also proposed a 
ternary: inteipretation of ethics which is slightly different.
Kaufman*s three categories are humanistic ethics, naturalistic 
ethics and historic ethics, which to a certain extent resemble 
the three categories of Niebuhr and Macmurray. Kaufman considered
50. Henry, Carl F.H. Baker* s Dictionary of Christian Ethics (BakerBook House: Grand Rapids, Michigan, 1973) P*183
51. RS pp.64-65
(a) see footnote 64 p. 243
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the third or historic type of ethics (relational) to he a com- 
hination of the first two categories. Naturalism being the legal­
istic mode and humanism being the social ethic combining to form
historicism which considers right action in terms of * living-as-
52a-person-in-community*. The historic category presupposes one 
is striving to.'.live honestly in response to other persons. Kaufinan 
held that the combination of the first two categories in the rela­
tional Eq>proach meant that "all of humanism's .'awareness of man's 
uniqueness and difference from nature" was included in -the rela­
tional ethic and naturalism's awareness that man must "submit to
that which is greater than, and of which he is a mere product is
55also taken up into this view". Kaufinan without destroying the 
conception of the uniqueness of man offers a way of combining all 
of the types, but subordinating them to the relational. Kaufiman 
unlike Macmurray does not reject the first two categories of ethics 
out of hand.
Kafuman contends that there is a bifurcation to be found within 
the relational view of ethics; one subdivision being the non-theistic 
and the other being the theistic. Edward L. Long also considered 
the possibility of such a split and noted the existence of two types 
of norm-authority at work in relational ethics; this is the distinc­
tive subdivisions of heteronomy and theonomy. The first being 
submission to an external authority; the, second being submission 
to the authority of God. However, Long sees the heteronomous type 
of authority falling under the rubric of o^rganisation authority.
52. Kaufinan, Gordon D. TOie Context of Decision; A Theological Analysis (Abingdon Press: New York, I96I) p.25 hereafter cited as CD
55. CD p . 26
54* Long, op. cit., p. 120
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Macmurray* s hetrocentric approach presupposes an external authority
in the other, >Aiich places his morality within the non-theistic
subdivision with its accompanying organisational elements
Before departing from the field of meta-ethics one should
take note of the relativistic elements in Macmurray* s work* Vos
labelled Macmurray as a "social relativist", although Vos limited
55this to the "paradigm of the personal". Macmurray*s theory of 
heterocentrism does consider a morally right action to be in terms 
of the other, thereby making the other the centre of authority..
One quite rightly might presuppose that one could never have an 
absolute or objective set of moral standards that are applicable 
to all men.^^ This mi^t lead one to assume that Macmurray had 
relativistic tendencies. However, if one wishes to identify heter­
ocentrism as a type of ethical relativism, it would be necessary 
to overlook Macmurray*s absolute principle or norm of 'intending 
universal community'. Although Macmurray did exhibit certain 
relativistic tendencies, he also adhered to an absolute ethical 
norm. Macmurray*s etbical system presents two conflicting views 
in that one can either be guided by a specific other, i.e. a par­
ticular person, or a general Other, i.e. the ccmmunity. Macmurray 
offered no single principle for determining which of these two 
criteria is the primary factor. This stems from his ambiguous and 
incomplete interpretation of the communal. Community as a group 
or community as personal mutual relationships are the two inter­
pretations of community that are in conflict with one another, 
when one tries to pinpoint the primary moral criteria. Consequently,
55* Vos, op. cit., p.Ô54
56. Macquarrie, John (ed.) A Dictionary of Christian Ethics (SCM Press Ltd.: London, 196?) p.289, hereafter cited as DCS
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what authority or guideline is there for making a moral decision? 
Macmurray’s conception of ethics does fit the idea of an autonomous. .■ 
norm-authority, e.g. a theonomous norm-authority, or superempirical 
norm-authority, i.e. a theonomous norm-authority, uneasily, since 
he seemed to he searching for an empirical basis for his theory of 
etkLcs, i.e. the community. Macmurray*s approach vaguely assumed
a heteronomous norm-authority, which presupposes that any prescrip-
• 57 ■tion or norm comes from outside of oneself, i.e. from others or 
the community. However, this does again present the problem of 
deciding whether the main norm is one of intending community or 1 
of being guided by another individual. Macmurray somewhat ambi­
guously held that the harmony of the group motivated he te roc entri cally 
was the norm-authority.^^
Durkheim maintained ihat: "We have often had occasion to prove 
that the rules of morality are norms that have been elaborated by 
society, the obligatory character with which they are marked is
nothing but the authority of society, communicating itself to every-
59thing that comes from it. " The community is the norm-authority 
for Durkheim, but unlike Macmurray, Durkheim seemed to realise that 
within community there is a large degree of conflict between the 
individual and the group. On the one hand the acceptance and love 
of the intimate group are necessary for the well-being of the 
individual. On the other hand the arms- of the group which nourish 
and sustain can also confine, stunt and even suffocate the individual.
If one bases any ethical theory upon the^ ;Community, one must guard 
against the negative collectivistic aspects of the community. This 
ever re-occuring hazard might lead to the destruction of the unique
57. von Wright, Georg Henrick. Norm and Action; A Logic^ Enquiry(Routledge and Kagan Paul: London, I968) pp 75-76
58. PR pp. 119, 112
59. Durkheim, Bnil, On Morality and Society; Selected Writings (TheUniversity of Chicago Press; Chigao and Iondon,1975) P*1^2
60- DCS -0.81 -
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qualities of the individual. One needs to prevent the community 
as a group from dominating the individual and thereby diminishing 
the impact of the mutual personal relationships within the commu­
nity.
Macmurray*8 rêlativistic leanings point to his general agree­
ment with the relational category with its accompanying danger of 
collectivism. Relativism implies "a view that standards differ 
from culture to culture and that any discussion of the intrinsi­
cally valid or permanently good is unjustified". In a very 
profound sense ethical choice for Macmurray which is made in the 
relational context is relative. Macmurray*s communal type of 
morality as Vos has pointed out can be considered to be relative, 
particularly to the situation and the context of the action. There 
seems to be a connection or points of contact between Macmurray* s 
outlook and those of the situational!sts and the contextualists. 
Buber* s Dialogical Theory and Altruism
Arusther area that is of direct interest is Hhe connection 
between Macmurray*s heterooentrism, altruism and Buber* s dialogical 
theory of ethics. Since Macmurray in his autobiographical work 
wrote that Buber influenced his thinking, Buber* s dialogical approach 
may well have close parallels to the communal approach of Macmurray.
Buber*s philosophy of dialogue with its emphasis on wholeness, 
decision, presentness and uniqueness is 'the foundation of his ethics. 
Buber considered response to the other to be central to his ethics 
which parallels Macmurray* s heterocentric,, conception. Buber*s *1- 
Thou* and *I-It* categories correspond to Macmurray*s personal and 
impersonal types of relationships, which contains the basic assump­
tion that this applies to human existence as well as to morality.
6l. Long, op. cit., p. 121
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For Buber the idea of reciprocity and the experience of the 
other is essential. Macmurray considered intention to he cen­
tral to any moral decision. Buher defined conscience in terms 
of a personal call to fulfil personal intention. However, Buher 
saw ethical decisions not only as being basically in terms of 
the immediate situation that confronts one, but also in terms
i: . 62of one’s whole being before God*
As we have already concluded there are definite differences
between Macmurray’s relational conception of man and Buber’s
dialogical conception of man. Macmurray understood man primarily
in terms of the communal, -vdiich may obscure or even threaten the
uniqueness of the individual, when challenged by the collective
conscious of the group. Buber combined the two motifs in his
philosophy, i.e. the motifs of the ’I-Thou’ and ’the single one*.
The Second motif was modified into the "word of authority, the ’myth*
65which is the eternal thou". This combination of elements comes 
from the merging of the two traditional lines of thought that is 
only partially to be found within Macmurray* s thinking. First 
there is the ontological idea of "Mitsein (the combination of 
mutual presence which stems from the idea of Friedrich Henrich
Jacobi that: "Without Thou, the I is impossible" and Ludwig 
Feuerbach’s idea that an I becomes real only through an opposite 
fflbou.^  ^ The second traditional line of"thought is that of Kierkegaard’s 
concept of the * single one*. Buber recognised that the two concepts 
could not walk together on the ’narrow ridge * ; however, he did not
62. Friedman, Maurice, "The Bases of Buber’s Ethics" in The Philosophyof Markin Buber (Cambridge University PressT London, 19^) (ed. ) Schlipp, Paul A. and Friedman, M. hereafter cited as PMB, pp.175-176
63. Idihn, Helmut "Dialogue in Expectation" PMB p. 661
64. Ibid p . 657
65. Ibid
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entirely abandon the second motif, but reinterpreted it, thereby
attempting to save the concept of the unique individual, which
may well be threatened by the collective nature of the community.
Buber recognised the existence of the ’single one’, but made the
moral decision a social one.^^
Macmurray undermined the uniqueness of the individual by
too strongly stressing the inter-relatedness of man. One might 
presuppose quite justificably, from Macmurray’s conception of communal 
ethics,! that any decision made by an individual separated from the 
social or communal matrix is not valid, since all judgements are 
inseparable from man’s interaction with other men. If this is so, 
then the individual is not the moral unit, but the relationship 
of ’I-Thou’ is the minimum moral unit. However, if one is in 
an impersonal relationship, it does not lessen or remove the onus 
of making a moral decision, even though this is outside of the com­
fortable world of the community. One can think in terms of the 
heterocentric, but the decision is in terms of the past experience 
of the individual and not just in terms of the present relational 
encounter. Without the recognition of the concept of the ’single 
one*, one might easily overlook the fact that all decisions and 
judgements are ultimately a matter for the individual even though 
the individual may decide to go along with the group. Although 
one might make a decision because.of the social pressure or com­
munal pressure, the individual still chooses to give into the social 
pressure. One needs to think in terms of a theonomous/heteronomous 
system of thought, it one is to properly/maintain a personal 
relational stance in any ethical decision.
67. Ibid
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The * I-Thou’ relationship with God is an ideal relationship, 
whereas the ’ I—Thou’ human relationship is ever-changing and only 
partial. Without the elenent of the transcendent Thou, i.e. God, 
one cannot even expect to make a lasting or general relational 
decision. Macmurray, although not denying the existence or im- 
poirfcance of God in the dialectical equation, does not seem to 
realise ihe essential part that God must play not only motiva­
tionally, hut intentionally and relationally in order to maintain 
the possibility of making responsive, relational and he tero centric 
ethical choice. One makes moral decisions as an individual, firstly 
in relation to God and then in relation to men, if one wishes to 
realistically apply a heterocentric approach. Within -Uiis sphere 
one encounters the expectations for certain actions frcm other 
human beings. However, do these expectations, even thou^ they 
are heterocentric and communual, have moral force or are these only 
expectations of other human beings? Morality becomes morality with 
the power of God behind that of community. Without the factor of 
the relationship with God the force of the other is only human ex­
pectation. Kuhn concluded that Buber was aware that: "without a 
third reality there is no zwischenmenschlichkeit (interhuman rela­
tion) with a third reality entering between and uniting the partners; 
and this third factor must be more than a ’ sphere *. Without a 
third reality one only advocates a type' of altruism based upon the 
relational model.
Macmurray by only considering the ethical in terms of a hetero­
nomous norm-authority only presents an anthropocentric relational 
ethic which is in danger of becoming nothing more -tiian an organisa-
68. Ibid p.661
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tional morality- At best Macmurray sometimes seems to be presen­
ting a fora of altrustio relationalism. Macmurray is not entirely 
non-theistic, but he seems to separate morality from theistic 
considerations, which means that morality is reduced to an 
altruistic approach to ethics. Macmurray is in danger of reducing 
the communal aspect of Christian ethics into a type of altruism.
One cannot divorce the relational from Gk)d. For Buber the question 
unlike Kierkegaard is not between religion and morality, but between
"a religion and morality wedded to the universal and a religion
69and morality wedded to the concrete".
There are definite problems with Buber’s ethical assumptions
some of which also apply to Macmurray’s ethical Idieories. Marvin
Fox posits that even though culture is a pattern that arises from
the deepest levels of life, that man must seek his own direction
when culture breaks down. According to Buber, the integration of
man into culture is vital. Martin Fox averred that:
Surely Buber would not have us believe that the ideal of every culture is morally acceptable! Must we not distinguish between the moral worth of cultures? What principles, Wiat general criteria shall we employ if we follow Buber’s guidelines?*^
The same doubts surround Macmurray’s interpretation of community as
the basis of morality. Surely Macmurray would not have us believe
that the ideals of a particular community are necessarily morally
acceptable. One cannot distinguish between the moral worth of one
community over against another if such an assumption is made, i.e.
if the only criteria one is offered is that of heterocentrism. Does
any form of altruism give sufficient guidance to make general moral
69. Freidman, op. cit. p. 180
70. Foz, Marvin, "Problems in Buber’s Kbral Philosophy" PMB p.169
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decisions. When one is without the divine aspect of morality, 
does not the final judgement become dependent upon an inadequate 
altruistic ethic? Is Macmurray*s understanding of ethics too 
close /to a purely altruistic approach and in turn does altruism 
equate with a purely relational approach to ethics? One needs 
to again return to Buber’s and G.H. Mead’s understanding of the 
relational aspect of man to understand the basic elements of these 
questions.
Buber seems to have favoured a theocentric form of personalism 
whereas Mead favoured a more heterocentric or anthropocentric per­
sonalism. Pfuetze reasons that Mead’s theory "tends to induce a
false optimism about human nature, while failing to explain the
71development of higher and more universal moral ideas". Pfuetze
in a critical comparison of Mead’s theory of the social self, which
closely resembles that of Macmurray, with that of Buber concluded
that: %an is social yes, but above all, Buber would insist, he is
socially related to God —  and this is tha seozret of all his other 
72relations". If one simplistically characterised Buber’s approach
as Man-God-Man, one would characterise Mead’s approach as Man-society-
Man and Macmurray’s approach as Man-Community-Man.
”In the mutual, reciprocal conditioning" according to Pfuetze,
"of two persons or groups we have only the raw materials of a
unified harmonious moral world of trust and co-operation which can
75become the world of the Thou". However, it only has the possibility 
of becoming the ’I-Thou’ relationship. Pfuetze goes on to point out
71. Pfuetze, Paul, The Social Self (Bookman Associates: New York, 
1954) hereafter cited as SS, p . 264
72. SS p . 264
75. Ibid
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that: "The ideals and interests and claims of persons and groups
n Aclash with one another. " How then can one expect co-operation 
or even ethical decisions to be made. The only solution seems to 
be the acknowledgement of a third and higher claim. In the case 
of Macmurray, although he did not speak directly to this particular 
problem, one can assume that he would consider the Other as the 
third and higher claim. The Generalised Other, although loosely 
associated with the Idea of God in its most universalised form, 
is also closely associated with the idea of ccxnmunity, -which means 
that community can easily be assumed to be the third and higher 
claim.
The difference between Buber’s and Macmurray’s conception of
God in terms of community can be best understood by comparing their
conception of the universal community. For Buber a universal or
general claim for a source of sanction, i.e. norm-authority, upon
which "human relations can be built upon into universal community,
is God, the infinite personal Thou, and that only in knowledge of
and ri^t response to the External Thou can man become fully man
75and human community built." However, Macmurray’s criteria for 
a universal or world-community is different. "If there is to be 
a world-community, it can only be based upon a universal respect 
for all man; on a deep reverence for personality. It is the fun­
ction of religion to create and maintain this reverence,
Macmurray*s anthropocentric as opposed to theocentric approach is. 
evident with its subsequent preclusion of God’s position.
74. Ibid
75. SS p. 265
76. Macmurray, John, "Religion in Transformation" This ChangingWcrld ed. Brumwell, J.R.M. (George Routledge and Sons: London, 1945) p.260
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Since Macmurray* s approach is heterocentric as opposed to 
theocentric does this lead one to believe that Macmurray*s hetero­
centric and communal ethical theory is nothing more than an 
altruism based upon the third and higher claim of community? One 
must find out if altruism fits with the communal category of 
ethics as presented by Macmurray. Is heterocentrism a form of 
altruism or at the very least does it show certain altruistic 
characteristics?
Altruism is normally contrasted with egoism. Altruism is the
desire to live in a certain way that is characterised by a desire
77for the good of others. Altruism is not self-interest, but
interest in others. Macmurray considered negative modes of morality
to be egocentric and opposed to this with his heterocentric mode of
communal morality. One can immediately see that within the general
framework of egoism versus altruism Macmurray would have to classify
the communal as part of the altruistic camp. An altruistic bias in
our moral behaviour is one that requires us to consider the interests
78and inclinations of another in place of our own. • Macmurray stated
that: "The centre of reference for the agent, when he seeks to act
79rightly, is always the personal Other." The primary consideration 
of Macmurray is for the other and the primary concern for altruism is 
the other.
There are several serious objections to altruism. J.J.O. Smart 
has pointed out that: "Pure altruism cannot be made the basis of a 
universal moral discussion in that it would lead different peoplei'
77# ^  Volume 2 p . 466
78. Downie, R.S. and Telfer, Elizabeth, Respect for Persons (GeorgeAllen and Unwin Ltd. : London, 1979) p.81
79. PR p.122
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to different, perhaps incom^Jatihle, courses of action, even
80though the circumstances are identical." Smart pointed out
the example of two men trying to let each other throu^ the
same door, which of course leads to neither going through the
door. Smart concluded that: "If we can make a man try to be
an altruist he may succeed as far as acquiring generalised 
81benevolence." This will only lead to one sliding back into
the morass of goal seeking with benevolence becoming the goal
sought. Altruism does not present a clear third alternative
from teleology and deontology.
Ayn Rand makes several telling criticisms about altruism
that can be also applied to heterocentrism. Rand contends that
two separate moral questions are lumped together by the altruists:
"(l) what are values? ( 2) \^o should be the beneficiary of values?
Altruism substitutes the second for the first; it evades the task
of defining a code of moral values, thus leaving man, in fact,
82without moral guidance." Macmurray does- confuse the other as 
the source of value with the other as the receiver of values, which 
makes the other the value itself, where in fact it should be the 
beneficiary of the values.
Rand equates altruism wi'tii collectivism. : - Reinhold Niebuhr 
was also aware of this connection between collectivism and altruism. 
On the social level Niebuhr pointed out, that; "Patriotism is a high
80. Smart, J.J.O. An Outline of a System of Utilitarian Ethics(Melbourne University Press: Melbourne, I96I) p.21
81. Ibid
82. Rand, Ayn, The Virtue of Selfishness: A New Concept of Egoism(The New American Library of World Literature, Inc.: New York I964) p.viii
83. Ibid p.80
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form of altruism, when compared with lesser and more parochical 
loyalties; but from an absolute perspective is simply another 
form of selfishness."^^ The collectivistic element in altruism 
ultimately leads hack to the egocentric view of the individual.
Such an egocentric view of the individual is contrary to Macmurray*s 
avowed intention.
Nagel was cognizant of the direct link between altruism and
self-interest* "Altruistic reasons are parasitic upon self-
interested ones; the circumstances of the lives of others which
altruism requires us to consider as circumstances vhich those
others already have reason to consider from a self-interested 
85point of view." Heterocentrism also suffers from the same 
weakness in that one must either reason in a self-interested way 
in terms of the other or even worse follow the self-interested 
reasons; and .needs as the other expresses or communicates them. 
Self-interest is removed only one place away from the individual 
consequently the self-interest of the other becomes central. Macmurray 
did in a way try to deal with the underlying self-interest that 
seems to be inherent in heterocentrism, but this is somewhat 
ambiguous since Macmurray assumes that the other and not self- 
interest should be the basis for morality. However, can one really 
have any form of heterocentrism that does not have an element of 
self-interest?
It is obvious that Macmurray*s ternary approach to ethics 
is neither unique nor singular, since it resembles in many ways the 
ethical systems of others before and after him. Also when one 
attempts to extrapolate and interpret Macmurray* s third alternative
84* Niebuhr, Reinhold, Moral Man and Immoral Society (Charles Scribner*s Sons: New York, I960) p.48, hereafter cited as MMIS
85. Nagel, Thomas, The Possibility of Altruism (Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1975) pl6
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to ethics we find that Macmurray* s concentration upon community 
and the*I-Thou* dialogue might cause one to assume that ethics 
can he reduced to altruism wildi all its inherent difficulties.
Not only does Ife.cmurray*s heterocentric and communal alternative 
fail to wrestle with the problems of the collective impulse of 
the group as does his concept of community, but Macmurray depends 
upon community as the Other to be the mediating authority for 
claims. Macmurray*s dependence upon the community as the source of 
authority, for higher claims means that there is no supreme authority 
in one community*s conflict with another. The morals governing 
conflict between groups has no norm-authority beyond the analog 
of personal relations as applied to group activities. Macmurray 
also confuses the other as the beneficiary of values with the 
concept of the other as the source of value. . The source of value 
must be God and not the other, i.e. one other individual, or the 
generalised other, i.e. the community.
Intention
There is one motif that runs throughout Macmurray*s ethic that 
has only lightly been touched upon so far. This was Macmurray*s 
insistence that intention is central to any moral decision. The 
concept of intention is central to Macmurray* s definition of 
morality* Intention is not simply a matter of morality, but is 
something that gives direction to action. It is not part of the 
act. The act in order to be morally good must be intended, however 
intention does not constitute alone the only criteria for a morally 
good act according to Macmurray.
Macmurray was certainly not the first individual to make use 
of the term intention both as a determining factor in the morality of 
the act and in the anticipation of the act. However, it must be 
pointed out that the use of the word * intention* in the way Macmurray
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and others such as the phenomenologists have used it stems from 
an error. An intentio is supposed to he a certain form of repre­
sentation.^^ Because of Brentano * s use of the word * intentional * 
in his doctrine of mental events, which held that all mental events 
are directed on objects, one uses the term intentional in the sense
of being directed towards an object. Bisserl and others have
S7proceeded in the wake of this error. Abailard was one of
the first to hold that the notion or motive (or intention) underlay
ethical thought. Abailard believed that a right action consisted
of a rational assessment of the situation leading to a proper manage-
08ment of human tendencies. The idea of intention or motive as
enunciated by ' Abailard meant that we call an intention good,
because it is right in itself and an action good because it issues
89from good intention.
Macmurray*s conception of intention closely resembles the con-
90ception of intention as expressed by the phenomenologists. i.
Màcanürray understood intention as a conscious act- Bisserl also
understood the intention of an act to be conscious. Not only did
E&isserl consider consciousness to be important in his conception of
intentionality, but also that the other is part of the very essense
91of the conscious act and therefore part of the intention. A point 
of view that is in direct agreement with Macmurray. Hisserl distin-
86. Kheale, William, "Intentionality and Intensionality" TheAristotelian Society Supplementary Volume (I968) XLII p. 74
87. Ibid p.75
88. McCallum, J. Ramsey, Abailard*s Ethics (Basil Blackwell: Oxford,
1935) p.3
89. Ibid p . 46
90. Vos, op. cit., p . 229
91. Kwant, Remy C. The Phenomenological Philosophy of Merle^-Ponty(Buquesne University Press, Pittsburgh, PA, 19&5) p. 154
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guished between the intentionality of the act, which is that of
our judgements and of those occasions in which we voluntarily take
up a position, and the * operative intentionality* which produces
92the natural unity of the world and our. = life. The conception of
direction was an essential part of Bu8serl*8 conception of in ten- 
93tionality* Husserl also underlined the .importance of the object.
The conscious act is seen as being between the two poles, i.e.
*noesis* and *noema* which is the subject and object.
Since , Macmurray considered intention as direction it is 
conceivable that one can choose the wrong goal and an incorrect 
means and still have a good intention in the sense of direction^'
However, the concept of intention can either concentrate upon the 
object of intention such as the other in the * I-Thou* dialogue or 
the consequences of the action. Macmurray considered the other as 
being the important object and the consequences of the act as 
secondary, because if one concentrates upon the objective of the 
event one can easily overlook the other and concentrate upon the 
goal alone.
Intention for Macmurray represented a direction, but he did not
fully define what an intention is, beyond the fact that it is a
particular rationalii conscious and discriminatory experience. Although
one might accept „that these are the properties of intention, one
still is faced with the basic question ’what is intention?*. Anthony
Kenny recognised that the intention is a statement' about- the future, but
■____________________f
92. Merleau-Ponty, M. Phenomenology of Perception (Routledge & KeganPaul; London, 1962) trans. Colin Smith p.xvii
93. Husserl, Edmund, Idea; A General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology(George Allen & Unwin Ltd. 2 London, 1951) trans.W.R. Boyce Gibson, p.121f
94. Kwant, op. cit., pp.154-155
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Kenny also interpreted it as a command uttered to oneself.
Another possible explanation or exegesis of intention is that in­
tention is an inner experience. This explanation is one that was 
favoured by Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein believed that one does not 
remember the words used, "but one can precisely remember the inten­
tion ... Wittgenstein considered the intention of a person as 
something more than words, i.e. an inner experience or feeling.
This is not out of step with Macmurray* s desire to make intention 
something other than a cause or end of an action. However, one 
must question whether one is always and completely aware of inten­
tion. Does one need to have an explicit thought about the event as 
something which will be contrasted to a thought of the event as 
something which might merely happen? Even though one may not have
explicitly been aware of what one was doing one can still feel that
97one had acted intentionally. There is more to intention than its 
particular, conscious, rational and discriminatory elements. Inten­
tion is an inner feeling of the individual; Intention may not always 
be fully conscious or fully rational.
Macmurray has overlooked the inner experience of intention. 
Intention may well be an individual *s inner need to help another 
person in terms of Macmurray*s ethic. Only the individual can 
really determine that he intended to do something, since he sometimes 
is not fully aware of the consequences of his actions or the effect 
this act will have upon the other, even thou^ he recognises that 
there was a definite inner experience. y
95. Kenny, Anthony, Action, Emotion and Will (Routledge & Kegan Paul:London, I963) P*220 "
96. Wittgenstein, Ludwig, Philosophical Investigation (Basil Blackwell:Oxford, 1953) trans. G.E.M. Anscombe p.l63 (section 644-8)
97. Zink, Sidney, The Concepts of- Ethics (Macmillan & Co. Ltd. : London,
1962) p . 265
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Macmurray*8 conception of intention as being separate from
motive is helpful and adequate. His assumption that intention is
necessary for morality is valuable, but one should not try to
accurately define intention in tems of being only a conscious
and rational act* However, by stating that the intention is a
necessary condition of the individual’s moral judgement does help
98to clarify morality.
Intention is not precise and is not easily or always open to 
empirical judgements. Intention is a matter for the individual 
and is rarely a matter for the group. Macmurray by assuming in­
tention to be primarily in terms of the other, i.e. the other as 
the object of intention, has by-passed the importance of the 
Kierkegaard!an concept of the * single one* in intention. By trying 
to make intention accessible to another, Macmurray has reduced in­
tention to the rational and conscious. However, intention is also 
an ’inner experience* that is not easily communicated to the other.
A Critique of the Communal Definition of Morality
The major motif in Macmurray* s definition of morality is the 
community, which is operative in his definition of morality in terms 
of the * I-Thou* dialogue as well as group harmony. Pittinger in his 
review of Persons in Itelation levels the criticism at Macmurray * s 
activist, personalised, relational philosophy which is supposed­
ly in agreement with the Bible’s point-of-view, that it is in reality too 
99simplistic. Macmurray*s insistence upon only a communal view of 
man and consequently only a communal view? of morality does seem to 
over-simplify religion, selfhood and morality. There is something 
more than the community.
98. D ’Aroy. Eric. Bbman: Acts: An Essay in their Moral Evaluation(clarendon Press: Oxford, I963) p.129
99. Pittinger, V. Norman, "Book Review of Persons in Relation"in Anglican Theological Review XbVI (l962) p.239
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Macmurray centred his interpretation of morality upon the 
harmony of the community. Strawson in his essay "Social Morality 
and the Individual Ideal", concluded that seeing morality in terms 
of the expectations of behaviour on the part of the members of a 
group was "a minimal interpretation.of morality". Strawson not 
only saw the expectations of the community to be the minimal inter­
pretation of morality, but the resulting obligations and norms or 
rules as only a part of the minimal obligation. Strawson admitted
that this approach is a "useful analytical idea", but he went on
101to call for a universal approach to all moral rules or norms.
Macmurray*s approach to morality could easily and dangerously
be reduced to the obligation to reciprocate or to react to the
expectation of the other. The vague line between the teleological
and the relational is also illustrated by Barnsley pointing out
that; "The obligation to reciprocate is not always an ethical one—
it may be good manners to do so. Most Christians, for example would
reject the idea that the source of obligation to one’s neighbour
102lies in what he or the other will do in return." What needs 
to be underlined is the intrinsic and unique value of the individual 
which of course includes the intrinsic and unique value of the other, 
For anyone to leave open the possibility that the group in 
any form should become the source of moral authority is a question­
able manoeuvre. Reinhold Niebuhr wrote in his famous work 
Moral Man and Immoral Society that; ."The
100. Strawson, P.F. "Social Morality and Individual Ideal" inThe Definition of Morality by Wallace, Gerald andWalker, A.D.M. (Methuen & Co. Ltd., ; London, 1970)p. 103
101. Ibid
102. Barnsley, John H. The Social Reality of Ethics: The ComparativeAnalysis of Moral Codes (Routledge & Kegan Paul; London and Boston, 1972) p. 140
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more the moral problem is shifted from the relations of 
individuals to the relations of groups and collectives, the more 
the preponderance of the egoistic impulses over the social ones 
is established. Niebuhr called for a compromise between self-
aissertion and the control of the g r o u p . N i e b u h r  called for a *
balance between the purely communal and the purely individualistic, i.e. 
a; combination of the relational approach of Me^ and the single, one of 
Kierkegaard or if you will a combination of the Whiteheadian in­
terpretation of religion and Macmurray*s interpretation of 
religion.
George Simmel wrote that:
The mass does not know the dualism of egotistic and altruistic impulses, a dualism that often renders the individual helpless and makes him embrace a vacuum.Law, the first and essential condition of the life ofthe groups, large and ^all, has aptly been called the ’ethical minimum*.
Macmurray by intimately connecting morals with the community has
overlooked the major problems that have been recognised by many other
thinkers writing about group morality, e.g. that group morality,
no matter:what type of group, tends to be in terms of the ethical
minimum. Simmel pointed out that only the individual, can feel the
pull of egotism and altruism. Without the individual’s altruistic
impulse the heterocentric may not come into being. The connection
of morality with the community at the expense of the individual must
ultimately have a distorting effect.
Macmurray has made the community and not society the centre of
any ethical and moral judgement. However, does this not impose a
good deal of constraint upon most decisions which are made outside
of the community, which is baeically a very limited sphere of activity.
103. MMIS p . 262
104. Ibid pp.261-262
105. Simmel, Georg, The Sociology of Georg Simmel trans. and ed.by Kurt H. Wolff (Collier-Macmillan Ltd. : London,
1950) pp.27-28
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Harris in his hook review of Persons in Relation noted that there 
are problems connected with Macmurray*s interpretation of human 
groups in terms of community ^ d  society. "Indeed one must ask how, even 
in a smaller community ezctending beyond the family group, harmonious 
activities could be established without some body or general recog­
nised rules decided upon, and when necessary altered with changing 
circumstances by some commonly acknowledged procedure. Harris
feels that the only way that the tension between intimacy and in­
clusiveness in a group may be solved even in the community, must 
be in terms of rules. Harris goes on to reason that even among 
a community of friends that some method of interpretation of rules 
and reconciliation methods must be found. Harris ends by concluding
that: "In short, in any community larger than a family, elements of
107government must be present. " The community as the only or 
primary moral unit is very limited and gives a weak foundation for 
a general ethical system.
Harris noted that one "cannot realise community in practice
108nor can we dispense with it". Macmurray*s conception of morality 
is centred around the concept of harmony within the community as 
well as the * I-Thou* relation. However, one will not only have a 
difficult time defining the area in which one operates in terms of 
morality, but also one will have difficulty in isolating any group 
that can be said to be truly a community based on something besides 
blood relationships. As has been noted, Macmurray*s conception of 
ccanmunlty is confusing and not completely# clear. Consequently any 
hope of identifying the particular group on which one should model 
onefe moral behaviour is unlikely. The morals of any group, except




the family or any other group that is severely limited, is based
upon only some elements of the community that may be seen to
exist in any social group. Even worse one must also assume that
real moral decisions are not possible except in only a small
number of cases and that in most social decisions, in Macmurray*s
use of the term, there is no such thing as a true moral choice.
Since one does not always operate in terms of community one does
not always have the possibility of making an adequate heterocentric
decision. Harris noted this inconsistency when he wrote that:
A similar difficulty arises in Macmurray* s moral theory.He asserts that the full character and ultimate condition of human action is the positive relation between (at least two) persons, and this is expressed in love and symboli­cally in the rite of communion in religious ritual. Hut in any wide society involving large numbers of persons such direct positive relationships, with the best will in the world, proves to be impossible. Indirect, negative relations are inevitable in such a society which always contains elements of oommunily (positive relationships) but can never, as a v^ iole, be a community. ^ 09
True community becomes an unreal!sable ideal under these conditions 
which means that true or adequate morality is only an ideal, but 
Macmurray has criticised those philosophers that depended upon the 
ideal and have reduced things to the status of appearance. Macmurray 
did not seem to overcome this defect with his dependence upon 
community as a pivotal point for moral philosophy.
The only solution to this problem lies in either abandoning 
the concept of oommuniiy aà the centre,,of morality, which would of 
course go against the vast majority of Christian thinking about 
ethics or a realignment of Macmurray*s definition of community.
Rader suggests that: "The right solution is to recognise the inter­
dependence of the great and small community. It would be vain to
109. Harris, Errol B. "Review of John Macmurray*s Persons in Relation" The Philosophical Review Volume LXXII11963) p.1.10
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attempt a fundamental reconstruction of human life by operating
110only at the local level*" A definition that might be broad
enough to serve our purpose is that of E.O* Lindeman. "A community
is any process of social interaction which gives rise to a more
intensive or extensive attitude and practice of interdependence,
111co-operation, collaboration and unification."
One must be careful, however, not only to make sure that the 
definition of communily does not warp in some way the definition 
and ideas of morality, but also not to connect too closely the 
concept of morality with the concept of community. Strawson 
reminds us of
.. the diversity of communities to which we may be said to belong, and the diversity of systems of moral demand vrfiich belong to them. To a certain extent though to an extent which we must not exaggerate, the sytems of moral relationships into which we enter are a matter of choice —  or at least a matter in which there are alter­native possibilities; and different systems of moral demand are variously well or ill adapted to the ideal pictures of life.^12
Another weakness that is inherent in too closely connecting the 
community with morality is that one finds oneself open to a collec­
tive bias without the counteractive force of individualism. Collec­
tivism is alwasy a danger in any moral situation of more than two
persons. "Society finds ways to impose its values and enforce its
113will upon individuals." "The Christian doctrine of man-in- 
community emphasises that man becomes human only in personal relations, 
but that the person is a unique self, never simply a fragment of
110. Bader, Melvin, Ethics and the Human Community (Holt, Rinehartand Winston, ; London, 1964) p.589
111. Ibid p . 390
112. Strawson, op. cit., p.115
113. DOE p. 60
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society. The problem lies in placing the person in such
a position that the tension of collectivism and individualism
do not oveipower one another. Macmurray* s approach does not
seem to protect completely the individual from the encroachment
of collectivism. The individual must be interested in morality
outside the confines of the group. The group’s morality should
not in any way control the individual’s moral decision, but it
should guide the individual.
The individual alone must stand upon his own feet and make
the decision. The communal conception of man combines with the
communal conception of morality to make morality a product of
the group and reduce morality to a mere response or reaction to
the other members of the group with nothing making this action
more than just a reaction to iJie expectations of the other person
and the group of other persons.
One needs to find a balance between the individual sense of
morality and the moral community or one might be in danger of falling
into the morass of collectivism. Strawson notes that the interplay
between the individual ethical ideal and. social obligation is an 
115intricate one. Strawson recognised the connection between
the individual’s need to have a moral ideal and to exist in a moral
community, however, Strawson does not attempt to limit the meaning 
1 *1 éof community.
One cannot underestimate the individual’s impact in the moral 
equation, since wi'thout a proper balance between the individual and 
the ccmnunity one might tend to fall into the collective morass.
114. Ibid
115. Strawson, op. cit., pp.106-10?
116. Ibid pp.114-115
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Macmurray seemed to conclude that morality is a matter of 
community although he did not completely dismiss the individual. 
Niebuhr pointed out that the highest point at which a group 
might aspire is one of wise self-interest, whereas the indivi­
dual is able to transcend the group and also transcend the
morality of a group, which enables the individual to attain a
117higher form of morality. Nietszche also thought that the
individual was important to morality. Nietszche wrote in The
Will to Power that: "All altruism is the prudence of the private
118man; societies are not mutually altruistic. " It must be rec­
ognised that the community is only a factor in morality and not 
morality itself. One can consequently object to Macmurray*s 
term ccmmunal vdien applied to the only form of true or positive 
morality. Macmurray starts with the heterocentric and its 
accompanying demand for altruism between individuals but he seems to 
loose sight of the individual’s isolated moral striving in favour 
of a completely communal view of . man’s search for morality.
Walgrave pointed out that:
The source of authentic morality is the conscience,i.e. the free acceptance of a call to generosity and unselfishness. The object of this unselfish existence is the person. This call is rooted in the autonomous value of the person as such, a value of which we are aware as soon as we express this call in our life, ing every genuine encounter, in every genuine dialogue. ^
117. Niebuhr, Reinhold, The Self and The Dramas of History. (Faberand Faber Ltd.: London, 1956) p.24
118. Nietszche, Friedrich, The Will to Power: An Attempted Trans­valuation oF~ all Values ( ,T.N. Foulis: Edinburghand London, I9IO) trans. Ludovici, Anthony M. Volume IIp.183
119. Walgrave, John H. Persons and Society: A Christian View(Duquesne University Press: Pittsburgh, PA., I965)PP-55-56
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The two aspects of morality are the person and the person in
dialogue* Neither the person nor the person in dialogue can
be overlooked when investigating the nature of morality.
The Christian centre of morality lies around the concept
of agaoe or overpowering and universal love. Buber has been
120criticised for reducing love to a relational matter. Macmurray 
also seeas to have reduced love to a matter of interhuman rela­
tionships. Fellowship, not God, seems to be the basic ingredient 
in love for Macmurray. However, this is a direct contradiction 
of the Christian ethic.
Bonhoeffer’s thinking before his death, which went beyond 
his Ethics, tended to discard some of iiie apparatus of traditional 
’religion* and certain images of God. Recent theologians, that 
have followed in the footsteps of Bonhoeffer, • have tended to reduce
Christian eihics to nothing more than the inteipersonal relations,
121which was not Bonhoeffer’s intent. Macmurray also seems to 
have reduced the Christian ethic to a matter of interpersonal 
relations. The area that warrants investigation is a comparison 
of Macmurray’s approach to morality and the Christian concept of 
agape.
120. Evans, Donald, "Love, Situations and Rules" in Outka, G.H.Norm and Christian Ethics (SCM Press Ltd. ; London, 
1968) p.376 '
121. Olafson, Frederick A. Ethics and Twentieth Century Thought(Prentice-Hall, Inc.: Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 
1975) p. 37
CHAPTER 14
An Examination and Critique of Macmurray’ s 
Approach to Christian Ethics
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The focus of this study is Macimm?ay*s understanding of 
community and the affect of this understanding upon his inter­
pretation of Christian ethics* Macmurray dealt extensively with 
Christian ethics in two of his works. His first analysis of 
Christian ethics is to he found in the work The Clue to History 
in the Chapter entitled "The Works of Jesus". The second analysis 
of Christian ethics is to be found in the article "Prolegomena to 
a Christian Ethic".
In the article "Prolegomena to a Christian Ethic" Macmurray 
presented his basic thesis about ethics. Firstly, Macmurray out­
lined his ternary approach to ethics, by introducing the 
now familiar three modes of apperception, which include the two 
negative modes of apperception, which represent the aesthetic 
approach to ethics (teleological approach) and the pragmatic approach 
to ethics (deontological approach). Macmurray limited the term 
moral to the positive mode of apperception, i.e. the third category 
or communal category of ethics, which perceives things only in terms 
of human co-operation motivated by love which he terms either fellow­
ship or community. The concept of community is for Macmurray the 
defining or essential factor in his interpretation of the positive 
mode of apperception. Macmurray noted that: "The positive appercep­
tion, because it provides a motive for realising personal relations 
of trust and confidence, is itself constitutive of fellowship in 
community. Moreover, Macmurray rejected the two negative modes 
of apperception because of their detrimental affect upon fellowship.
"The two negative apperceptions tend to the destruction of fellow-
2ship; as they are inherently self-centred." Macmurray*s approach
1. Macmurray, John, "Prolegomena to a Christian Ethic", ScottishJournal of Theology. (1956) IX, p.9, hereafter cited as POE
2. PCE p.9
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to Christian ethics is consequently centred upon the concept 
of fellowship or community.
Macmurray defined "the good life" in teims of fellowship.
"The good life is neither a life which exhibits a harmonious 
unity of structure, nor one which conforms to certain eternal 
principles. It is the life of fellowship and actions are right 
as they contribute to the creation, the extension and the main- 
tenance of fellowship. Macmurray "tiien pointed out that since 
fellowship is good that: "Christian ethics cannot be egocentric, 
as the negative types of ethic are. Thus setting his interpre­
tation of Christian ethics firmly within the field of heterocentric 
ethics, i.e. the relational, Macmurray rejected the concept of the 
*isolated-I* and favoured the *I~Thou* conception of man when 
speaking of Christian ethics. This is in line with his thinking 
about ethics in general. "It would be more correct to say that 
from the Christian point of view the individual has no value in 
himself as an individual, but only in relation to God and there-
5fore in relation to his fellows." Macmurray has unerringly 
rejected the individual when separated from the Other. Man’s 
value comes only partially from relationships, since a totally 
relational approach undermines the intrinsic value of the indivi­
dual. Macmurray also assumes that man’s relationship with God 
resembles man’s relationships with others. &)wever, the ’I-Thou’ 
relationship with God is eternal and ideal, while one’s rela­
tionships with man are only temporal and/ partial. Macmurray 
went on to note that: "In any personal relation the bond of 
unity lies in the fact that we behave to one another in the way 
that expresses our care for one another. The centre of
5. POE p. 11
4. PCS p. 11
5. PCS p. 11
Pf!in -n-19
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Macmurray* s ethic or the touchstone of Macmurray* s ethic is 
man’s relationship with man, and throu^ this relationship man 
can confront God.
Macmurray has firmly asserted that the nature of ethics is 
anthropocentric. Macmurray identified Jesus’ ethic with "his
7realisation of the nature of human existence". Macmurray be­
lieved that most people differentiate between the apocalyptic and 
the ethical. The ethical is reduced to the spiritual. "It sets 
before us an ideal of human conduct. It reveals how we ought to
Qbehave. It provides us with a theory of the good life." The 
apocalyptic is "about this world, and what will happen to it in
9the end". .However, Macmurray refused to differentiate between
the apocalyptic and the ethical. Macmurray saw the ethical in
terms of man’s activities. The relation between ’the ethic’ and
’the apocalyptic’ in the teachings of "Jesus is the same as the
10relation between theory and prediction in science". Macmurray
went on to note that: "The one is the basis of the other, and the
truth of the ethic is manifested, and can only be manifested, in
the realisation of the prediction which it makes possible, which,
11in fact, is its meaning. " The lack of differentiation reveals 
firstly that Macmurray could not separate eihics from this world, 
and consequently was forced to reduce the ideal to nothing more 
than a prediction. Secondly, this reveals again the already sus­
pected teleological under-current in Macmurray’s thinking; this 
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Ethics as Anthropology
Macmurray in his inteipretation of Christian ethics applied
the same communal criterion as he has in his work on general
ethics. Macmurray reduced ethics to a communal, personal set of
relations which determines and is the goal of the individual’s
search for an ideal. Ethics for Macmurray threatens to be reduced
to an examination of co-operative human activity.
Macmurray’s identification of the ethical and the apocalyptic
led him into making several revealing conclusions- Macmurray
noted that: "what is called the ’ethic’ of Jesus is, in fact,
his anthropology. It is his formulation of the principles gov-
12eming the behaviour of personal life." Macmurray went on to
state that: "The ’apocalyptic’ is simply the prediction about the
future development of the personal life in the world which follows
13from these principles." Macmurray considered the anthropology 
to be a ’religious anthropology’ and the prediction to be a 
’religious prediction’. Macmurray quite correctly noted that 
Jesus abandoned any ethical form in terms of ’ought’ statements. 
Jesus for Macmurray avoided deliberately the ethic form without 
abandoning ethics. Jesus fulfilled in this way his mission as 
religious genius.
Macmurray’s interpretation of Jesus’ ethic revolved around 
man’s nature and in particular the relational aspect of his nature. 
However, this limits any interpretation of ethics to an anthropo­
centric approach. Even though the anthropocentric approach does 
confortably accommodate the hetero centric approach of Macmurray 
it does not completely or accurately represent the ethic that Jesus
12. CH p . 88
15. CH p . 88 
14. CH p . 88
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proposed* However, Macmurray* s understanding of the self in 
teims of the ’I-Éhou* and the accompanying rejection of the 
*isolated-I* makes any interpretation by necessity a matter 
of man and man, which might well overshadow the encounter of 
God and man and in doing so threaten man’s unique and intrinsic 
value. Ethics is more than anthropology and man’s encounter with 
God is more than an extension of man’s relationship with man, nor 
can God’s relà'Hon to man be extended to man’s relation with man.
Vos in his comparison of H* Richard Niebuhr and John Macmurray
made a revealing division between the thinkers : "Niebuhr makes his
anthropology subservient to his theology, while Macmurray makes
15theology subservient to his anthropology." This dominance of 
theology by anthropology must inevitably affect Macmurray’s con­
ception of not only religion but also his conception of ethics 
and in particular Christian ethics. Does Macmurray’s approach 
lead to the deification of the communal life of man?
Macanurray in his summary of Marx’s criticism of Feuerbach 
wrote that: "Marx said that Feuerbach deified the love-life of 
man. Haa Macmurray in some ways followed in the footsteps of 
Feuerbach by deifying the love-Hoaotivated, personal relationship 
or if you will the extended form of the ’I-Thou’, i.e. the personal 
'community’.
Macmurray certainly followed in the footsteps of Buber, but 
there is also reason to believe that some of Macmurray’s thinking 
is foreshadowed by Ludwig Feuerbach. Feuerbach advanced the 
humanist interpretation that: "God is a hypostatisatioi or unconscious
15* Vos, Kenneth Duane, "The Contribution of Edmond Cahn, H. Richard Niebuhr and John Macmurray to the Ethics of Responsi­bility" (unpublished Doctoral Thesis : Columbia- University, 1972) p. 245
16. CSp.117
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symbol of the human community", which resembles Macmurray*s
universal Other. "The theistic interpretation, later formulated
by Martin Buber (1878- ) is that the fulfilment of community
17requires allegiance to God." Feuerbach saw the being of man as 
existing "only in community, in the unity of man with man —  a
18unity that rests solely on the distinction between I and Thou". 
Feuerbach’s transition is from theism to humanism. Love is redu­
ced to a human bond and the community becomes the basis of human
exiAtence, The essence of religion is the relation of "man to his
19own nature ", but not towards self but towards that of another.
Martin Buber was greatly influenced by the ideas of Feuerbach and
he hailed Feuerbach’s doctrine of community as "the Copemican
20revolution of modem thought". Barth wrote about Feuerbach that
he held that: "Only the distinction of the I and Thou is real. And
it is precisely in the experienced unit of this distinction that
21man’s essence is to be found." For Feuerbach the being of man
is "achieved only in community, in the union of man with man a
unity depends on the reality of the (difference between the I and 
22Thou...". Feuerbach fits God into the mold.' ’Man with man,
23the unity of I and Thou is God] " Feuerbach is not denying God 
or the validity of theology, but he is denying the existence of an
17» Rader, Melvin, Ethics and the Sman Community (Holt, Rinehart and Winston, London, I964) p.425
18. llbid
19. Ibid p . 424
20. Ibid p . 425
21. Barth, Karl, From Rousseau to Hits chi trans. of Die ProtestantisoheTheologie Im 19. Jahrhundert (11 chapters) trans. by Brian Cozens (SOM Press Ltd.: London, 1952) p.556, hereafter cited as FRTR
22. Barth, Karl, Theology and the Church trans. Louie P. Smith (SCMPress Ltd.: London, I962) p.220, hereafter cited as TC
23. Ibid
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abstract divine Being which is divorced from man’s nature. God’s
nature is reduced to man’s nature. Anthropology becomes the only
true study for theology. Feuerbach in The Essence of Christianity
stated that: "The consciousness of "Wie world is mediated for the I
through the consciousness of the Thou. Hence man is the God of 
25man! " Feuerbach concluded in The Essence of Religion that:
"Theology is anthropology, that is to say in the object of religion
in what we call Theos in Greek and Gott in Geman, nothing is speci-
26fied except the essence of man."
It is glaringly obvious that reducing theology to anthropology
means that the knowledge of God is nothing more than the knowledge
of man. Such a system leans towards the deification of man and finds
its logical conclusion in the Supermen of Nietszche and August Comte’s
27religion of humanity. Martin Buber tried to overcome this diffi­
culty by identifying the relation of man with man at its deepest
28level with the relation to the eternal Thou. Buber certainly 
recognised the danger of too closely identifying anthropology with 
theology. Macmurray certainly has not been as careful in his differ­
entiation between theology and anthropology.
John A.T. Robinson in his well known work Honest to God noted
that the Christian Humanism of Macmurray was similar to that of
29Feuerbach in his identification of God and man. Macmurray certainly
did not clearly separate theology from ^thropology; in fact Macmurray
went as far as to identify Christian ethics with anthropology. This
identification can be detected in his statements about fellowship 




27. Robinson, John A.T. Honest to God (SCM Press'Ltd: London, I963) p.50
28. Reader op. cit., p.426
29. Robinson op; cit., p.51
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of fellowship, i.e. in terms of man and, the community of men.
Such a close identification meant that one might easily question 
whether religion has a separate existence outside anthropology. 
However, is Christian ethics reducible to the relationships between 
men in the community, i.e. fellowship?
Barth was suspicious of an ’ anthropological underpinning* to 
theology and saw it merely, as an attempt to set up alongside the
revelation of God a second human court to which one might appeal.
31Barth parted from Gogarten over this very issue. Barth condemned 
Feuerbach’s use of the ’I-Thou’.
Barth quoted Han Ehrerber’s comment about Feuerbach:
’As a true child of his century, he was a man who ’did not know death’ and who ’misunderstood evil’. Truly any man who knew that we all die, would know that the illusion of all illusions is the/ notion that the being of God is the being of man. Even if he held God to be a dream he would certainly leave him free of any iden­tification with such as we.
Feuerbach tended according to Barth, when speaking of the individual
or group "to make the two largely interchangeable, so that he speaks
of individual man as if he were man in general, and thus dares to
attribute divinity to the individual, is evidently connected with
the fact that he does not seen sincerely and earnestly to have taken
33cognizance either must surely die." Barth recognised the fragility 
of the individual and its affect upon the ’I-Thou’ relationship. One 
needs to recognise the interdependence,of the ’isolated-I* and the 
’I-Thou’. Feuerbach’s approach becomes suspect when one totally 
defines man in terms of the ’I-Thou’. ÎJacmurray’s tendency to
51. Zahmt, Heinz, The Question of God: Protestant Theology in the Twentieth Century (Harcourt. Brace & ¥orld. Inc. : New York, 1966) p.58, hereafter cited as QG
32. TC p . 235
35. FRTR pp. 360-361
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identify man in terms of the other makes his general approach 
suspect, since it overlooks the * isolated-I* and also the indi­
vidual’s fragility and intrinsic worth* Macmurray’s identifica­
tion of ethics with the ’I-Thou’ relation, which confines ethics 
to the field of anthropology, makes.his whole approach limited 
and suspect as well as making his interpretation of Christian 
ethics suspect.
Tillich pointed out, that in the face of radical doubt and 
total meaninglessness, purely personal categories such as the 
’I-Thou’ and ’encounter’ become inadequate. One needs the balan­
cing factor of the transcendent, transpersonal presence of God.^^
One needs to admit that there are concrete and personal symbols 
for God, but one should admit that these are only symbols and should 
not look to them for the final answer, but to God as Being.
Macmurray,-by defining religion and ethics in terms of the 
personal relationships between man'and man, comes close to deifying 
communal activity, i.e. relationships and fellowship. By removing 
or understressing the mortality of man one can speak purely in terms 
of the relational, but man’s mortality forces any ethical decision 
to be partially teleological. Macmurray by reducing God to a uni­
versal Other has set man’s activities too closely to those of God. 
One needs to make the mystical unknowableness of God part of any 
assertion about religion and consequently about Christian ethics. 
Does not the limitation of Christian ethics to personal relations 
distort the ethical inquiry?
There seems to have been a widespread agreement that Christian
faith is manifested in the ’I-Thou’ relations, i.e. in the personal
35relationship with one’s neighbour, but this is not the only factor
54. QQ p. $64
35. QG p.174
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that needs to he taken into account. The problems begin to 
arise when one turns to the suprapersonal spheres of life such 
as politics, economics, technology, law, etc. One cannot ex­
clude the suprapersonal field from the field of ethics nor can 
one dismiss or undervalue it by claiming that since it is im­
personal one cannot make a ’moral’ decision.
A communal view of ethics tends to focus all interest upon 
the interpersonal and interhuman relation, while excluding the 
suprapersonal ethical question. Christian ethics has a serious 
stake in the transformation of nature and consequently it must 
not consider the technical mastery of nature to be morally neutral. 
Macmurray’s heterocentric approach considers man only in terms of 
man and not in terms of nature and the world. Macmurray has been 
criticised for personalising experience to such an extent that 
man’s responsible relation to nature is denied.
Thielicke labelled or offered three areas of ethical validity. 
Thielicke labelled these as man’s relation to himself, the ’I-Thou’ 
relation and the ’I-World’ relation. Macmurray concentrated his 
attention upon the ’I-Thou’ while overlooking the ethical decisions 
one must make when confronting such things as money, wisdom and 
power. Macmurray in concentrating upon the ’I-Thou’ relation 
overlooked the way that man confronts himself and the accompanying
questions that deal with the isolated self, for example one’s own 
39sexuality.
36. Piper, Otto A. Christian Ethics (Thomas Nelson and Sons Ltd, :London, 1970) p.143
37. Ibid
38. Vos, op. cit., p . 250
39. Thielicke, Helmut, Theological Ethics Vol.1 Foundations (Adam& Charles Black: London, 1966) PP.465-471
37
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Melvin Eader has pointed out.that: "Individuality pitted 
against community, is a dangerous half-truth, while community, 
if considered total and absolute, is no less d e l u s o r y . O n e  
should not think of man totally in terms of his relational 
aspects nor in terms of his individual or isolated aspects. 
Socially, i.e. the relational part of the personality, must pre­
suppose the unique potential of every individual. If one thinks 
only in terms of the * I-Thou*, one is forced into thinking of 
ôther human beings as basically alike and the individuality of 
each as epiphenomenal. Consequently, Buber went out of his way 
to underline the uniqueness and totality of the individual in 
terms of the community. If one only concentrates upon the 
sociality of man, then one’s individuality becomes nothing more 
than numerical.
One must attempt to do justice to the many sides of the 
person in that one needs to take into account the communal and the 
individual aspects of each human being. Max Scheler in the work 
On the Eternal in Man pointed out that: "The essence of the person 
is found in the fact that his whole spiritual being and. activity 
is rooted both in individual reality and in membership in a commu­
nity."^^ Christian ethics cannot just be concerned with that part 
of man that can be labelled communal. Christian ethics must view 
the person both in terms of the ’I-Thou’ and the ’Isolated-I’.
40. Eader op. cit., pp.299-289
41* Norton, David, Personal Destinies: Philosophy of EthicalIndividualism (Princeton University Press: Princeton, N.J., 1976) p .505
42. Itid p . 306
43. Soheler, Max, On the Eternal in Man (SCM Press Ltd: London,1950) p . 476
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Any attempt to place man at the centre of religion or at
the centre of ethics must be avoided. "The Christian religion
as personal fellowship with God cannot tolerate man as the centre
and focal point of ethic. Bernard Earing goes on to point out
that: "Viewed in the perspective of religion, the human person
can be understood only from the standpoint of personal community
45and fellowship with God. " Ethics cannot be seen only in terms 
of the relational aspects of man, i.e. heterocentrically. Man 
cannot be seen only as a product of reciprocal relationships. A 
person is not reducible to mere fellowship; no matter how impor­
tant fellowship is. Nor is God reducible to merefellowship.
Paul Ramsey in Faith and Ethics differentiates between in­
trinsic and instrumental values, which shows the dependence of 
communal ethics’ instrumental valuation upon the intrinsic valua­
tion of the individual. When applied to ethics one can either 
view man in terms of his instrumental value and/or in tems of his 
intrinsic value. Man is more than something that is related to 
another; something more than a value which is determined and 
originates outside of himself. Ramsey makes the point that:
"The instrumental values which a friend has as a friend is predi­
cated upon his intrinsic value, the value which he has as a 
self-existent being. Man’s valuation of others and his con­
comitant ethical decision goes beyond the relational. Ramsey 
points out that: "The distinction between intrinsic and instrumental
44* Haring, Bernard, "Essential Concepts of Moral Theology" in . Gustafson, James M. and Laney, James T. On Being Responsible: Issues in Personal Ethics (SOM Press Ltd.: london, 1969) p.92
45. Ibid
46. Ramsey, Paul, Faith and Ethics: The Theology of H. RicardNiebuhr (Harper and Brothers : New York, 195?) p.199 hereafter cited as FE
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value is not absolute. Yet it seems to be necessary to make 
a fairly firm distinction between those values which depend 
entirely upon relations for their appearance and those which 
have their sufficient ground in non-relational existence.
Man’s ethical decisions about another human being depends upon 
not only relational aspects, but also non-relational aspects. 
Ramsey avers that: "The paradoxical fact which must not be over­
looked, is that only a being which had value in and for itself. 
in short a person, could satisfy the need for friendship.
The relational^is not idtie only area in which ethics operates, 
ethics is more than the instrumental values of fellowship. Al- 
thou^ Macmurray may have assumed that the person has intrinsic 
value, he failed to fully admit the consequences of such an- 
assumption. Macmurray as has been noted, tended to overlook the 
unique aspects of the individual in his rush to take note of the 
relational and communal part of man, i.e. the ’I-Thou’. The 
’isolated-I’ tended to be overlooked. The ’isolated-I, however, 
is the focus of the individual’s intrinsic value, i.e. non-rela- 
tionally oriented value. Onefe humanity is not dependent upon 
others, but upon onés God given intrinsic value. One should not 
relate to other persons simply because he ais mutually necessary 
or part of what one is, but because the other person is a person 
and is unique. Moreover, one should not only be motivated by the 
communal, but also by the theological realisation that the other 
person is the same in God’s sight as oneself, which underscores 
the intrinsic humanity of a person. There is something beyond 
the communal that lays behind the intrinsic worth of the other, 
i.e. God. Heterocentrism is forced to make an ’instrumental’
47. Ibid
48. Ibid
(a) see footnote 64 p. 243
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value judgement, since one is constantly aware of one’s dependence 
upon others. Christian ethics should not have an anthropological 
foundation, but a divine support, i.e. one that considers God as 
central to the ethical equation. Baring points out that: "The 
greatest hazard to genuine religious life arises from making man 
its centre, from viewing all divine worship and all communion 
with God primarily from the standpoint of the profit it brings 
man.
By making ethical decisions revolve around the other, one makes 
fellowship the centre of any ethical decision without taking into 
account God’s pivotal role in Christian ethics. By making relation­
ships and/or the community central to the ethical equation one tends 
to overlook the intrinsic and unique value of the individual. Finally 
and most strikingly one must not substitute anthropological intei>- 
pretations of man for theological interpretations of the world, nor 
can man be understood only in terms of the ’I-Thou* relation without 
the inclusion of the '’isolated-I’. Religion cannot be understood in 
terms of just its affect upon man. Macmurray has only presented a 
one-sided view of man and religion,
Macmurray’s inteipretation of ethics as a form of anthropology 
is at the very best debatable. Macmurray’s rejection of the concep­
tion of the * isolated-I’ is connected with or is at least implied in his 
communal conception of God, which interprets God in terms of man, 
i.e. the univers ali s ed community. This means that any conception 
of God is dependent upon anthropological reasoning. Macmurray by
50assuming that the "individual has not value in himself as individual," 
assumes that all value is ’instrumental’, i.e. in terms of what value 
it has for the other. God is reduced to being thought of in terms of
49. Haring, op. cit.,'p.93
50. PCE p. 11
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his relation to man, thus the unique and intrinsic humanity of
the individual is only supported by other men.
Communal Morality and the Teachings of Jesus
However, Macmurray*s understanding of Christian ethics as a
type of communal morality with its focus upon fellowship is not
in agreement with other thinkers* intepretations of Jesus* approach
to ethics. Reinhold Niebuhr noted that Jesus* ethic was a personal
ethic. Nevertheless, Niebuhr considered the ethic to be a twofold
ethic. "His (Jesus) ethic was an ethic of love, and it therefore
implied social relationships. But it was an individual ethic in
the sense that his chief interest was in the quality of life of an 
51individual. " • Ernest F. Scott in The Ethical Teaching of Jesus also 
noted that the balance between the individualism and collectivism in 
the ethic of Jesus was not weighed toward collectivism. Scott wrote ' 
that:
Jesus was the first who asserted the rights of human personality which are always in danger of being sacri­ficed to the interests of the group. He insisted that men are accountable to God, and must have room to serve him freely, and that the community whatever form it may assume must not crush the individual soul. It cannot be maintained then, that Jesus aimed at a social reorgani­sation; much less that he made the social motive the primary one in the moral life. To be sure he insists continually on the need for service and sacrifice. He requires that as he came himself not to be ministered unto but to minister, so his followers must look to the good of others.52
Jesus certainly would not have recognised the motive of social or
communal harmony. However, Jesus did not think just in terms of
denying himself for a greater good and jupt in terms of other men.
51. Niebuhr, Reinhold, Love and Justice (Meridian: Cleveland andNew York, 1957) p.50
52. Scott, Ernest ,F. The Ethical Teaching of Jesus (Macmillanand Co., Limited; London, 1924) P P *59-60
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"He (Jesus) thinks of life always in relation to God. Man’s
supreme duty is to serve God, and all his other duties have
worth and reality, only as they are hound up with this one."^^
Jesus certainly understood the interdependence of all human
beings, (Jesus) was aware that no action can be confined in
its effects to the person who does it, and that a man can live
his own true life only be the exercise of love, mercy, justice,
helpfulness towards his fellows, " However,' Scott maintained
that Jesus recognised "that in the last analysis man is not a
social unit but a soul responsible to God, and that the sense
54of this must determine all his thought and action." ^
If one reads closely the Great Commandment which appears in 
all of the synoptic Gospels, one is immediately struck by the order 
of the two commandments, and the relation of the two components of 
the Great Commandment. "And he said to him, ’You shall love the 
Lord your God with all your heart, and with all your soul, and 
with all your mind. This is the gî^at and first commandment.
And a second is like it, You shall love your neighbour as yourself*." 
The first thing that is obvious is that the treaiaaertt of your fellow 
human beings is a consequence of your love for God. One’s percep­
tion and approach to God is the determining factor in one’s rela­
tionship with man. The first commandment is the necessary precursor 
to -the second. To put it in the terms,that Macmurray might use, 
one might say that the theocentric is the producer of the hetero- 
oentric idea. B. Clin-ton Gardner in Biblical Faith and Social Ethics 
asserted that: "There have been many attempts to reduce the two 
commandments of Jesus to a single requirement of love for God or 
love for neighbour. But, in the main, traditional Christianity
55. Ibid p. 61
54. Ibid p. 61
55. Matthew 22: 57-59 Revised Standard Version (Collins’ Clear-TypePress; New York and Glasgow, 1952)
55
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has recognised that every such attempt inevitably misrepresents
56the essential nature of Christian love." The Christian ethic
rests upon the fact that: "God has taken the initiative in revea-
57ling his love to man." Christian love is directed towards two 
objects. If one equates the love of God with the love of man then 
one could hold the view that fellowship was at the centre of 
Christian ethics. However, such a view would depend to a large 
extent upon a theology that was subordinated by anthropology.
Christian love is directed according to Jesus’ teaching in the 
Great Commandment towards two objects, not towards the one object 
or even towards two similar objects, since man’s love for his 
neighbour differs from man’s love of God.
Barth in his Dogmatics offers three explanations of the rela­
tion of the two distinct components of the Great Commandment.^^
Barth made the point that the "commandment to love our neighbour 
is that as God’s children, and therefore as those who love Him with 
all our heart, soul, mind, and strength, we are summoned... . "
Barth continued by maintaining that: "The second commandment has no
other meaning and content apart from and in addition to: ’Bless the
59Lord, 0 my Soul, and all that is wiidiin me bless his Holy name’."
Barth asserted that if one places the first and second commandment 
alongside one another that it is possible that instead of having 
one absolute demand; we have two absolute demands "in the strict 
and proper s e n s e . T h e  second possibility is that: "There are 
not really two demands at all, but one absolute demand. This
56. Gardner, B Clinton, Biblical Faith and Social Ethics (Harper& Brothers: New York, 1960) p.174, hereafter cited as BFSE
57. BFSE p. 175
58. Barth, Karl The Doctrine of the Word of God part of Church DomaticsVol. I Part II (T & F. Clark: Edinburgh, 1956) p. .401, hereafter cited as DOG
59. BOG p . 401
60. DOG p . 402
. UfYl
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would imply that love of God and love of neighbour are identical. 
The third possibility is that: "There is only the one absolute 
demand of love to God, and the demand of love to the neighbour 
approximates to it as the first and most important of the par- 
ticuleur, relative and subordinate commands within which, as in 
Luther’s catechism, the commandment to love God forms the real 
nerve and content, the commandment in the commandments and the
62commandment of all commandments."
Barth rejected the first two alternatives-because they are 
not exegetically legitimate. In the case of the first possibility, 
i.e. the assumption that there are two absolute commandments side 
by side, one would have to assume that one could or would in con­
sequence love-two Gods. The second solution, i.e. the onetiat 
regards the two loves as identical, leads to confusion since it 
makes God the neighbour and the neighbour God. "If we try to 
intepret love to God as love to the neighbour and love to the 
neighbour as love to God, we have to make certain anthropologico- 
theological presuppositions which are illegitimate because they 
cannot be based on the biblical witness to revelation, and are 
in fact contrary to it. In order to regard the two loves as 
identical one would have to ascribe an inherent value firstly "to 
the neighbour as representing the human race, and secondly "to 
our relationship to him as the fulfillment of individual humanity,
to the human thou, and therefore to the human ego in its relation- 
65ship to the thou." This value must be autonomous, and "therefore 
has to be brought into a more or less direct connection with God
62. DOG p . 402
63. DOG p.403
64. DOG p . 403
65. DOG p . 403
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or with something divine. Barth rejected the identification
of man’s fellowship with man with the. fellowship of Ck)d with man.
However, there are distinctive features to the love of God for
man.
It is because of this twofold value, because of the self-based sanctity and dignity and glory both of man in himself and also of the fellowship between man and man as such, that according to this conception religion is also humanilqr and love to God is love to the neigh­bour (meaning love to man). Of course, it is usually more or less strongly emphasised that humanity must also be religion and love to man must also be love to God. But it is inevitable that the distinctive features of love to God which cannot be seen should be known and therefore necessarily determined by a love to man which is very much seen and supposedly^known. Love to God is, then, quintessence and hypostasise"d expression of what we know in a concretely perceptible and practical form as love to man. Love to God is the idea, the supreme norm of this known love to' man. But it is clear that in these circumstances love to God cannot be what it is in Holy Scriptures, the response of man to the being and activity of One who has first loved us. The con­verse, that true love to man must also be love to God, comes too late to be a/real converse. The statement has no importance, if the real cardinal interpretative prin­ciple of love is in the preceding statement, that true love to God will have to be love to man. It is too late for love to God- to be decisive and meaningful in the Biblical sense. There is no praise of the God who has first loved us, breaking forth in love to the neighbour. Instead, there is praise of the sanctity and dignity and glory of man, what a somewhat equivocal love for God created according to the likeness of this man. The mean­ing and place given by the Holy. Scripture to love to God are quite different. Holy Scripture speaks of man always and exclusively from the standpoint of his sin ,and re­conciliation. It addresses man only in the name of Jesus Christ. It does not, therefore, participate in this praise of man. As Scripture sees it, man as such has no dignity''Of his own, nor has the fellowship of man with man. What he is as an individual and in fellowship, he is under judgement and as a new creation of the love of God. The only humanity there is is this lost humanHy, founded anew by the Word and Spirit of God, revealed in Jesus Christ and to be grasped in faith him Him. There is no humanity based on itself. If such a humanity has to be presupposed in order to identify love to God and love to the neighbour, then the identification cannot be made. Love to God in the sense of Holy Scripture, and this love to the nei^bour, are opposites which mutually exclude each other. *
66. DOG p . 405
67. DOG pp.403-404
- 353 -
Barth is shy of any hint of an anthropological underpinning to 
man’s love of neighbour. Barth prefers with reservations the 
third solution to the connection between the two commandments 
within the Great Commandment. Barth did seem to be aware of 
the dangers of subordinating ttie second commandment to the first. 
Barth did not wish to leave the impression that the third inters v 
pretation might convey the possibility that neighbour-love was 
a secondary decision, or a secondary consideration.^^
Barth saw elements of truth in each of the three possible 
connections between the two commandments. The first solution, 
which assumes that both commandments are absolute, is correct 
in so far as both commandments are from the one God. There are 
two commandments but one absolute Iiord, "so that they both have ab­
solute significance for the same man as God has determined and 
without competing one with another." The second solution is 
correct in so far as there is an identical claim on the whole 
man by God. Barth recognised the two-fold claim upon the indivi­
dual as being central to the understanding of the Great Commandment. 
The third solution is correct in that: "The commandment to love God 
refers us to our existence in the time and world which comes and 
remains, the commandment to love the neighbour in the time which 
now is and peases, we are in fact dealing with a first and second 
commandment, a primary and secondary, a superior and a subordinate,
70an eternal and a temporary." Although there are two aspects of 
the Great CommaMment they do not balance each other and the first 
does not prevail over idie second. "It is therefore quite right that
68. Outka, Gene, Agape: An Ethical Analysis (Yale University Press:London and New Haven, 1972) p. 220
69. BOG p . 409
70. DOG p . 410
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in the text of Matthew the commandment to love God would, he 
described not only as the first, but also as the ’great’ command­
ment. It is in fact the basic and comprehensive commandment, the
greater circle which includes in itself the lesser commandment of
71love to the neighbour."
Macmurray’s emphaeis upon the communal aspect of Christian 
ethics and his definition of Christian ethics as a matter of 
fellowship between man. and man as well as between. God and man, 
only takes into account the temporary human conception of relations.; 
Macmurray *s anthropo centri c/he te ro centri o approach to ethics tends 
to place man’s relation to man at the summit, thereby subordinating 
the relation of God as the Supreme Being. Macmurray did not take into 
.account man’s complete.subordination to God and dependence upon God as 
Creator. Everything is subordinated to God’s Love both man as 
•isolated-I* and man as part of the ’I-Thou*. God’s transcendent 
Love means that one no longer must intepret man’s activities in a 
limited individual or collective sense.
Macmurray only treats part of the man, i.e. the ’I-Thou’ 
aspect of a person, as being of importance. Nevertheless, the Great 
Commandment treats both the * I-Thou* and the ’isolated-I’, i.e. the 
total person as being of importance. Not only is the total person 
confronted, but the competition between the relational and the 
individual is not present. Barth might have concluded that the 
competition between man’s relationships to other men and his en­
counter with God as an individual has b^en resolved by one absolute 
Lord. The most significant area of divergence between Macmurray 
and the Great Commandment must be in the order and significance .of 
man’s relationship with man. Barth’s exegesis of the Great Command­
ment does not overlook the subordination of the relation of man to 
man to the encounter of God and man. It must be emphasised that
71. DOG p.410
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the encounter with God by man is not identical with man’s rela­
tionship with another man, since the encounter of a finite being 
with an infinite being by deflation differs from the relation­
ship between two finite similar beings. To subordinate God’s love 
to man’s love is to subordinate the continuing and ever present 
to the now, i.e. subordinating the eternal to the temporary. The 
man-man relation does not equate with the man-God relation, but 
only sheds light upon it.
Ethics are a matter of eternal factors and a matter of rela­
tional factors. The now must be viewed not only in terms of present 
needs but also in terms of God’s love and God’s intentions, and not 
just in terms of man’s ongoing temporary intentions. Although 
Macmurray considered general intentions to be important he did not 
• fully take into account the fact that these must be subordinate to 
the general and ongoing eternal will of God which is not the product 
of man’s relational nature.
Gardner pointed out that:
Finally, those who interpret Christian ethics exclusively in terms of personal relationships, neglect the radical meaning of the Christian understanding of God both as Creator and as Redeemer. They fail to see the goodness that there is in corrupt society as in sinful individuals and also the possibility of its being redeemed..., God is the Lord of society as of individuals, and men contin­ually confront both His creative and His transforming Will in the social institutions and for the neighbours to whom they are related through these institutions as well as for the neighbours whom they meet directly face to face.All of the foregoing criticisms,may be summarised by saying that those who limit Christian ethics to personal rela­tionships fail to take seriously the implications of the radical monotheism of Christian faith which rests upon the conviction that everywhere man is confronted with the will and the purpose of the One God who is active simultaneously as Creator, as Judge, and as Redeemer. He alone is the Creator; He alone is ultimately sovereign over all, and His will is to redeem and renew all that has been corrupted by sin. Men, therefore, are responsible to God in all of the relationships of oneself with other selves, no matter how indirect these relationships may be and no matter how much this responsibility may be shared by other persons or selves.
72. BFSE pp. 251-252
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By confining morals to community and personal relations Macmurray 
has limited Christian ethics to merely one set of human social 
activities, while in reality it is something that must be applied 
to the whole of human society and all things connected with human 
life. Macmurray has overlooked the importance of the redeeming 
character of God. God will redeem all that has been corrupted 
by sin both personal and impersonal. Man alone can never reach 
the ideal that he strives for, but God will forgive and correct 
this inevitable shortcoming. If God is not part of the equation 
of a moral decision, then an individual or a group of individuals 
will soon realise that the ideal towards which they strive will 
never be reached. God in purely pragmatic terms supplies the 
individual not only with the ideal, but also with the assurance 
that the ideal is more than a mythical and unobtainable phantom 
in the ever receding future, Man knows with his imperfect­
ions that ideals cannot be reached. One can only make ideals 
a reality if one allows God to be part of the equation. Christ 
not only gave us norms to follow, but his presence gave us 
clear evidence of the reality of the ideal which we strive to 
reach.
Macmurray*s insistence upon making fellowship and community 
the centre of Christian ethics is correct up to a point, but it 
does not take into account the whole of human activities or needs. 
Macmurray’s initial rejection of the ’isolated-I’ and his concen­
tration upon the ’I-Thou’, i.e. fellowship or community, has made
i
him draw away from the theocentric nature of Christianity and it 
has caused him to come periously close to the yawning abyss of 
anthropology. The encounter between God and the ’isolated’ individ- 
and the salvation that this promises not only from isolation, but 
from sin, lies at the centre of Chris tain thought.
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A practical objection to Macmurray*s limitation of Christian 
ethics to fellowship may be found in his failure to account adequate­
ly for the co-operation between peoples within the fellowship, 
i.e. the community, and those peoples outside of the community.
In fact the relations of ’Christians* and ’non-Christians’ cannot 
be a possible area for moral discussion, since those not involved 
in a communal "^ ype relationship must be considered in an impersonal, 
noiMnoral way. "Far more attention needs to be given to an analysis 
of the nature of man as a moral being and to the significance of
natural revelation. The final nom for the Christian is the agape 
75of God in Christ. " Macmurray has fallen into some of the same 
pitfalls that have bedevilled the contextualists and the situation- 
lists.
Agape and God’s Existence
Christian ethics cannot be reduced to a mere anthropo centri c 
study of man’s fellowship and his reciprocal relationships, which 
in turn leads to an empirical basis for God and morals. Christian 
ethics has as its central tenet the will of God for man. The central 
motif of Christian ethics is not man’s relation to man or man’s love 
for man, but God’s agape for man and man’s attempt to love God and 
his fellow men.
It WEIS not love as some kind of cosmic principle of force, but 
the love of God ( agape ) which motivated, Je sus* conduct both in his 
relationship to God and in his relationship to man, i.e. his neighbours. 
Jesus’ ethic was theocentric and consequently Christian ethics rests 
upon the fact: "That God has taken the initiative in revealing
His love to man. However, God is not some transcendent Other that
75. BFSE pp.189-190 
74. BFSE p. 175
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represents the group or* for that matter is part of the human
group* God not man lies at the centre of Christian ethics*
Ramsey pointed out that: "To he is ontologically prior to
to-be-for, God’s existence is prior to any relations he may
have to other beings. The relations may alter his self-meaning
and his nature, but this again is possible only if He is self- 
75existenti" One might argue that the ’isolated-I’, i.e. the
to-be. must be prior to the to-be for or the ’I-Thou*. Certainly
God must be prior to any relationships either man-man or God-mian,
since God is the Creator. If one wishes to reason ethically
within the framework produced by assuming the existence of God,
the assumption about the existence of God demands that any attempt
to find God and conceive of God only through man is dangerous.
There is a tendency in the approach advocated by Macmurray to think
first and foremost in terms of one’s relations with the other
76persons and through this to speak of God. The encounter between 
man and God is different from the relationship between men; "It 
is the uniqueness of the special relation involved in man’s encoun­
ter with God which makes it impossible to treat all value and all
77relations as fundamentally alike. " Macmurray has been accused of
describing God "solely in analogies drawn from personal relation 
78and action", because of his concern to recover the centrality 
of the personal in our experience.
John 0, Bennett in Christian Realism pointed out the danger of 
trying to understand God through man’s actions in the world. Macmurray 
reasoned that: "When man set out to realise an intention which is con-
75. FBp.191
76. Vos op. cit., p . 246
77. PE p.182
78. Vos op. cit., p . 265
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trary to the divine intention, they do not achieve it..79
Macmurray believed it impossible to act in defiance of the will 
of God. Macmurray assumed that history is the action of God.^^ 
However, he also assumed that when man opposes this action that 
it is only self—frustrating. Bennett saw such an interpretation 
as being over-simplified. üfhis leads, according to Bennett, to 
an over optimitistic version of the way in which divine intention 
(God's Will) corrects human intention* Bennett asserted that: *I 
am not sure that he is right in saying that, against their wills, 
men always realise the divine intention. He (Macmurray) gives too 
little scope to human freedom to resist God and he does not see 
the full tragedy of life.*' What seems to be true is that while 
men may not for long realise an intention that is against the will 
of God, in fact they may flounder around in the 'taidst of divine
81judgement without realising in a positive way the intention of God". 
Macmurray did not fully accept the isolation of man from God and 
from his fellow beings by accounting for man and God only in terms 
of personal relationships. God cannot be understood in terms of 
man's actions alone. It is unreasonable to expect a man to under­
stand fully God's intention and to act in terms of it, since man 
is not even able to act in concert with his group's activities and 
intentions. Man should not be expected to act in terms of God's 
■ wishes since the encounter is far more .complex and difficult.
Since man cannot understand God fully in terms of the relational, 
and in terms of the other, does he have ^ clue to God's intention? 
Tillich held that man finds himself out of tune with himself, i.e.
79. CH p.95
80. CH p.94
81. Bennett, John C. Christian Realism (Student Christian MovementPress: London, 1941) p.51
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estranged when he goes against the intention of God which is
part of his essential nature. Tillich wrote that: "Every valid
ethical commandment is an expression of man's essential relation
82to himself, to others and to the universe." Certainly God 
must he seen in terms of the world ,and in terms of der Einzige 
as well as the 'I-Thou' relation, but can one assume that one 
finds more than anthropocentric factors?
One cannot assume that one can find God by observing the 
totality of human existence and experience. God is not only more 
than fellowship, &  is more than man, and holds the key to what 
man is. Consequently one must vlthout question approach ethics 
theocentrically because the assumption of an antecedent God is 
necessary in order to understand man and his consequent relations 
to other men. The 'I-Thou* and ' der Einzige becomes clarified 
when one refers to the absolute love of God. Man's complex nature 
can only be understood and clarified from the perspective of the 
one absolute God. The spark for man and man's relationships is 
God's love, i.e. agape. The key for understanding the world of 
man and nature lies not in man's love of man or God, but God's love, 
Macmurray certainly has presented an enlightening study of 
certain aspects of Christian ethics, such as the importance of 
community and fellowship in Christian thought and morals, but 
Macmurray has failed to account adequately for the Christian as 
an isolated individual who believes in God, The Christian as an 
isolated individual must make the decision. The 'I-Thou' relational 
approach, aliJiough explaining certain parts of the process of a moral 
decision and certainly clarifying the essence of the environment of 
moral decision, still fails to appreciate and provide a ground for
82. Tillich, Paul, Love. Power and Justic: Ontolotical Analysesand Ethical Applications (Oxford TTniversity Press: London, 1954) P*76, hereafter cited as LPJ
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the judgement of the single. ; individual. One needs to under­
stand not only Idie unique', judgement of the individual, hut \ 
also the continuous judgement of the individual to act or not
to act. The decisions, although they are in terms of the other
and sometimes for the other, are still made by individuals in 
terms of their feelings and experiences and with the guidance 
of God. Morality is not only the intention to act and the act
itself, but it is primarily the decision to intend and to act
in a way that is directed by the decision. The decision can 
be made in response, but is not simply a matter of response; 
it is an expression of the totality of the person in terms of 
fellowship and isolation and in terms of man and God. Friend­
ship with its anthropocentric bias cannot and should not be sub­
stituted for the guidance of God as witnessed by the life of Jesus 
Christ. Although the other person is important, the final guide 
is not the other, but the love of God. The fellowship of man 
with man is transcended and overshadoxzed by man’s 
encounter with God as Creator and Redeemer. Morality is a matter 
of community, but it goes far beyond conmuni'ty.
The Christian ethics has been called the 'ethic of love' or 
more accurately the 'ethic of agape'. The conception of love or 
agape is central to any understanding of Christian ethics. In 
order to conclude our examination of Jfecmurxay's understanding 
of Christian ethics in li^t of his relational approach, an investi­
gation of Macmurray* s conceptualisation of love will prove helpful.
Macmurray defined love in terms of the * I-Thou* human relation. 
Macmurray understood love solely in terms of human relations and 
human feelings. Macmurray betrayed his anthropological approach 
as well as his relational orientation when he attempted to answer 
the question he put to Jesus: ’’Why should I love people who do not
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love me?" Macmurray concluded that Jesus would answer that this
would be "the only way to establish a human relation between you 
85and them", Macmurray held that: "My knowledge of another person 
is a function of my love for him; Love for Macmurray is
directly tied up with and defined in terms of the other# Macmurray 
maintained that: "Love as the positive ground-motive of personal 
activity, can best be defined as the capacity for self-transcendence, 
or the capacity to care for others. Love is, for the other: fear 
is for the self Macmurray did not disassociate love from the 
realities or limits of human existence. Macmurray even defined 
the love of God in human terms. "Love becomes a sentiment or a 
feeling or the exaltation that accompanies the contemplation of an 
idea. The love of God beccanes a feeling that suffuses our conscious­
ness in solitary medication when we imagine the infinite power and 
majesty and knowledge which our mind ascribes to our idea of God. 
Macmurray assumed that one should not disassociate love from the 
realities of man and the human mind. However, such a definition 
of love has the danger of blinding one to the other aspects of love 
that are not responsive or reciprocal in character.
The responsive assumption that underlies Macmurray* s understan­
ding of love is starkly revealed when one looks at the work of Ian
L. Suttie. Macmurray was directly influenced by Suttie's work The
87Origins of Love and Hate. Suttie saw. love as primarily a social 
feeling. Macmurray considered love to be a feeling that was part 
of the community. Suttie defined love as an "overture demanding
85. CH p.68
84. PR p. 170
85. CF p. 57
86. CSp .152
87. PR p.45, Vos Op. Cit. p .199
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88response from the other". The absence of response is the 
origin of anxiety and rage. Macmurray expressed a supposition 
that paralleled Suttie*s conception of love as responsive.
"Love is fulfilled only when it is reciprocated. If the re­
sponse is refused, the action which expresses the positive
89motive is frustrated." Macmurray believed that love brou^t
about love. "The principle upon which he (Jesus) worked was that
love tends to beget love, and that mutual love creates mutual
90trust and conquers fear." Love becomes love in response to
love. Macmurray in his interpretation of Jesus* ethic held
that: "Jesus was putting his trust in the natural reciprocity of 
91love." Macmurray, however, did not limit his interpretation of
love to natural reciprocity.
Macmurray felt that Jesus had removed the limits to the natural
recriprocity of love. Macmurray considered love to be intention,
92specifically the intention to achieve universal community.
Macmurray added the element of intention to the natural reciprociiy 
of love. However, both are communal in character. Macmurray assert 
ted that: "More prosaically, the basis of a free human community 
must be '.the intention to enter into community with others." Macmurray 
then significantly pointed out that: "It is in Idiis way that love, 
which is always the basis of whatever human community there is, is 
raised in Jesus to the level of intention, so that it becomes the 
motive force behind the intention to create the Kingdom of Heaven
88. Suttie, Ian D. The Origins of Love and Hate (Kegan Paul, Trench,Tiubner & Co. Ltd., 1955) p.54
89. PRp.75
90. Macmurray, John, To Save From Fear (London, I964) p.10, hereaftercited as TSFF
91. TSFF p . 6
92. Mooney, Philip, "The Notion of Religion in John Macmurray"(Unpublished Doctoral Thesis: Fordham University,
1970) p.210
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the community of mankind. Love is the motive force behind
community, which clearly shows Macmurray’s assumption that love
should be thought of in terms of its human manifestations.
Macmurray has always asserted that love is mutual and that: "It ;
(love) integrates human beings in a way which is positive and
absolute." Macmurray then asseverated that: "for in its very
nature it is unconditional, since love is in its essence the
mutual affirmation by a community of human beings of one another’s
existence. It is thus the positive and absolute condition of 
94community." Macmurray interpreted love in terms of community.
In fact Macmurray thou^t of love in terms of the community, 
which paradoxically does impose a condition upon love. Macmurray 
undoubtedly defined aikL understood love in terms of personal/communal
relations. Macmurray has starkly stated that: "Love is indeed, the
95sense of community,..."
Macmurray defined love anthropologically and he closely associa­
ted love with response and reciprocity. However, one might legit­
imately question that all love, particularly love in the sense of the 
love of God, i.e. a^pe. which is the Christian sense of love, can 
be defined in terms of community and response. Is God’s love some­
thing more than universal human reciprocity and is love something 
more than one person’s willingness to respond to another? Itist love 
be tied to human activity?
Any discussion of the subject of love needs to be made more 
precise by recognising that there are different types or categories 
of love that one might use to clarify and qualify the tern^  ’love’. 





four categories of love are libido (love as desire), philia 
(friendship), eros (drive towards beauty and value), and finally 
agape (the religious dimension of love).^^ Tillich is not satis­
fied just to introduce a fourfold divison between the different 
types of love, Tillich also identified three aspects of love
which he labelled love as emotion, love as ontological power,
97and love as an ethical principle. Another common division of
the different types of love is the threefold one of eros. philia
and agape, which are theromantic, brotherly and universal categories 
98of love. Tillich in his discussion of the different qualildes
of love tended to consider eros and philia to be related wiiiiin
his schema. Tillich remarked that: "The eros quality of love is
in a polar way related to what could be called the philia quality
of love. While eros represents the trans-personal pole, philia
represents the personal pole. ... Love as philia presupposes some
99amount of familiarity with the object of love. " The love that 
Macmurray speaks of could easily be equated to the philia qualiiy 
of love with its relation to eros.
However, up to this point we have overlooked the type of love 
known els agape. Tillich saw agape as entering into all aspects of 
the lives of man. Tillich held that: "agape enters from another 
dimension into the whole of life and into all qualities of love.
One could call agape the depth of love pr love in relation to the 
ground of life. One could say that in agape ultimate reality mani­
fests itself and transfoms life and lovq* " Ultimately the con-
96. LPJ pp.5f
97. Johann, Robert 0. "Love and Justice" in Ethics and Society ed.by Richard T. De George (Macmillan: London, 1968) p.27 hereafter cited as LJ




trast is between philia as human brotherly love and the transcen­
dent quality of the agape type of love. The love of God is the 
motivating and transcending love of agape \^ch is the love of 
Jesus.
. . JAnders %-gren in his monumental study entitled Agape and Eros
considered the difference between agape as God’s love and eros as
self-love, \4iich sharply differentiates the two types of love.
However, such a sharp differentiation means that man ceases to
be a moral agent in relation to his fellowman, since the love of
one’s neighbour which is included in the eros type of love is no
101longer motivated by the love of God (agape). Macmurray has 
failed to note the transcendent and all prevading character of 
agape in all love which means that neighbourly love is confined 
to an extension of self-love. H(ygren recognised a factor of ex­
treme importance when he noted that man’s love of his fellow man 
is directly linked and part of eros which is self-love. Within 
the area of natural affection, i.e. eros and philia. the self needs 
a response. Macmurray’s definition of love revolved around the con­
cepts of reciprocity and response although he attempted to link love 
with universal intention through CQmmuniiy. Macmurray’s only 
differentiation between natural love and Christian love is inten­
tion, i.e. the intention of universal communiiy. Macmurray’s 
definition of agape, i.e. God’s love, revolved around.the communal 
even though God is more than the Universal Other. Macmurray’s under­
standing of Christian ethics in terms of ^ fellowship and friendship 
within community tends to reduce and limit the scope of Christian 
love to that of philia. However, agape and philia are entirely 
different aspects of love. H(ygren in his insistence upon an abso­
101. BFSBp.181
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lute difference between eroa and aggpe has made man as a moral 
agent when not inspired by God’s love an impossibility, which 
makes morals a matter solely concerned with God. However,
Macmurray in his identification of friendship with Christian 
love threatened to go to the opposite extreme by identifying 
ethics as something that is to be seen only in terms of the 
other and their consequent response to the self, i.e. eros and 
philia are seen as the basis of love; thereby eliminating the 
possibility of transcendent love and God as the basis of ethics. 
Without God’s transcendent love one cannot turn to a concrete 
ideal and love which would inspire and lead to an understanding 
of the possible actions which makes up Christian activity based 
upon Christian ethics.
What is the difference between philia and agape? The diff­
erence between agape and philia revolves around the fact that agape 
does not demand a response, i.e. it is not tied to man and his 
activities and self-concem. Agape is not selective but inclusive 
and gives without expecting anything in return, and continues to 
give without return. Philia needs a response in order to exist 
and therefore has an underlying egoism. Friendship tends to die
when it is not returned. Friendship not only springs from our affec-
102tions for others, but also from our need of others. The differ­
ence between philia and agape parallels the distinction that St. 
Thomas made between the love of benevolence and the love of friend­
ship. Friendship assumes explicit reciprocity vdiich is not to be
105found in the love of benevolence. ■ Agape in the same way does not 
den and a reciprocal response, nor is it merely something that can 
be reduced to selfless charity.
102. Thomas, George F. Christian Ethics and Mbraly Philosophy(Charles Scribner’s Sons: New York, 1955) p.584
105, Johann, Robert 0. The Meaning of Love (Geoffrey Chapmen Ltd. : London, 1954) P*57 ., .
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Agape is more than merely response; it is the love of God
and the manifestation of the love of God in man and in all other
types of love. Agape is spontaneous and ’uncaused^. Agape
does not demand nor expect a response. Agape is in the form of
105a divine command that is addressed to the whole person* Agape 
is directed towards not only the person in relation, hut also to 
the isolated self. Agape is different from philia in its lack 
of dependence upon the mutuality and reciprocity of the rela­
tional. Agape is not only an activity of God and man, it is also 
a norm that has its ideal in God. Agape does have normative 
characteristics as well as personal selfless characteristics.
Gardner has recognised the fact that agape is more than man’s 
feelings of love from God.
...love (agape) is itself both a law and a gift. It partakes of the character of law in that it places an  ^ unconditional demand upon man, but it also partakes of the character of a gift in that man knows that he is loved before it is required of him that he shall love and also in that he must know himself to be loved with agape before he is able to love his neighbour with agape rather than with eros. Love may thus be spoken of as a law or a command although it is above all other moral laws. It is unconditional or absolute in the sense that there are no exceptions to it, and hence it is unlike all other ’ absolute ’ laws and. prin­ciples. It is related to idie needs of the neighbour in every specific situation, but it is not therefore relativistic.
Agape is adaptable to all situations and by definition cannot be 
limited to any particular set of circumstances such as relationships 
within a communal setting. Agape is more than just God’s love of 
man that is manifested in neighbour-love ^ it is the love of God which 
is an ideal and a reality given as a gift and a command to lead us.
10A. Ifygren, Atiders, Agape and Eros trans. A.G. Herbert (Societyfor promoting Christian Knowledge: London, 1952) p.66
105. BPSE p. 196
106. BPSE p.197
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Reinhold Niebuhr questioned the fact that one can reduce
agape to mutual love, i.e. the love between man and man or even
the love between man and God* Niebuhr undoubtedly admitted that
mutual love is a genuine sort of love, but he defined it as the
sort of "love which calculates its relations to others from the
107standpoint of its own need of others. " Niebuhr held that
mutual love could not avoid calculations in terms of the self.
Macmurray* s definition of all personal and communal relationships
are in terms of mutuality and reciprocity. Macmurray has not
fully taken into account the problems connected with the self-
interested element of reciprocity which must enter into any hete- .
rocentric decision. Niebuhr held that: "sacrificial love (agape)
completes the incompleteness of mutual love (eros). for the latter
is always arrested by reason of the fact that it seeks to relate
life from the standpoint of the self and for the sake of the self’s 
108own happiness." Macmurray’s inability to recognise the reality
of the isolated individual caused him to underestimate the impor­
tance of the self-interest of the individual. The individual 
because of his isolation is not able to overcome his self-love. 
Macmurray*s definition of love in terms of the other, consequently, 
is not a true reflection of agape, but a form of love that is close 
to that of eros and philia. Macanurray’s understanding of divine 
love in terms of intended universal comnrunity favours a philia and/ 
or eros type of love without giving thought to the necessary trans­
cendent aspects of unconditional agape. , When one intends community 
even universal community, there is the presupposition of mutual love
107. Ramsey, Paul, "Love and Law" in Kegley, Charles W. and Bretall,Robert W. Reinhold Niebuhr: His Religious. Social and Political Thought (The Macmillian Co. : New York, I96I p. 107
108. Niebuhr, Reinhold, The Nature and Destiny of Man Vol.II (CharlesScribner’s Sons: New York, 1945) P-®2, hereafter cited as NDM vll
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between persons, but there is no immediate assumption of agape.
The idea of love must be connected with the agape of God which is 
spontaneous and unconditional*
God must always be the ’middle—term* in a relationship that 
will be moral in Christian terms, therefore, the communal is not 
the essence of Christian morality. One is only moral in Christian 
terms when one’s actions are motivated by agape even though this 
also includes eros and philia. Agape safeguards the character and 
intensity of neighbour-love. Kierkegaard in the Works of Love 
noted that:
When God is the middle term in judging love,... the judgement is this: divinely understood, is it really love to show devotion such as is demanded by the object of love? Next, is it love, divinely understood, on the part of the object of love to demand such devo­tion? Every man is God’s servant, therefore he dare not belong to anyone in love unless in the same love he belongs to God, and he dare not possess anyone in love unless he and the other belong to God in this same love; a man dare not belong to another human being as if the other were everything to him; a man dare not pennit another to belong to him in such a way that he is everything to the other. ^ 9^
On the practical level one needs the love of God to modify the rela­
tionship between persons. Love in terms of equal regard may become
110one of unquestioning obedience or even adoration of the other.
God’s love is necessary in man’s love for man in order to modify 
man’s love of the other, since without it man cannot hope to love 
man.in an unqualified and unconditional ,way. Man’s love of the other 
may easily turn towards self-love or adoration of the other. The 
modifying love of God keeps man from slipping towards either of these 
extremes. Agape is surely more than just mutual love and the universal 
intention of community, i.e. the universal brotherhood of man, even 
though this is an important manifestation of agape.
109*Kierkegaard, Soren, Works of Love, trans. Howard and Edna Hong (Harper and Brothers: New York, 1962) p. 113
110. Outka op. cit. p.53
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Kierkegaard considered love in terms of the other to he a
dangerous concept without the modifying love of God, Kierkegaard
wrote about eternal love that: "such a love stands and falls not
by some accidental circumstance of its object; it stands and falls
by the law of eternity - but then it never falls; such a love does
not depend upon this or that, it depends only on the one liberating
111force; consequently it is eternally independent." Agape is by
definition independent of the object of its regard, therefore agape
cannot be only a communal/personal type of love, vdiich depends on
the existence of the other.
Max Scheler in On the Eternal in Man rejected the notion of
love which is found only within a social setting. Scheler completely
dismissed the Nineteenth Century idea identifying altruism and love.
This reduced love to the notion that the other had to be loved as
112the other, which reduced love into a love of humanity alone, which 
completely eliminates the central standing of God. Heterocentrism 
certainly favours the anthropocentric in place of the theocentric 
outlook, Scheler considered such an approach to love as mere abstrac­
tion which will identify the inclination to go help or improve others
115with the essence of love. The other is not the essence of ethics 
for a Christian, who must base his ethics upon God’s love. Stated 
simply love is more than charity, but charity is part of love.
Scheler noted that one should "love God first above all things". 
Scheler reasoned that the enlightenment and the classical renaissance 
had over-emphasised neighbour-love at the^ , expense of the love of God.
111. Kierkegaard, Soren.A Kierkegaard Anthology ed. by Robert Bretall(The Modem Library: New York, 1946) p.502
112. Scheler op. cit., p.477
115. Ibid
114. Ibid p . 567
- 552 -
Such an emphasis envisages man as an external phenwaenon yAich
means that man’s soul and spirit and even his salvation is ig- 
115nored. This could be translated into valuational terms as 
meaning that man’s worth is not intrinsic but instrumental* This 
might have a far-reaching effect if one’s concern tended to be 
for the one that one has responded to and not to the long term 
consequences of one’s actions. If one only concentrates upon 
the immediate external other, such a view makes truly far reaching 
judgements impossible. Man when involved in ethical decisions 
based upon the abstraction of the intentional universal community 
or anything else that places man’s external welfare at the pinnacle 
might well ignore the underlying intangible factors in a person’s 
make up as well as ignoring the Creator. Bodily welfare, i.e. 
that which is easily observable in the other, • is not the goal to­
wards which one should aim, since such humanitarian views easily 
lead to people being forced to die in an institution such as a 
hospital with no thought for their dignity or individual identity.
Scheler held that: "The new humanitarian love of man (and only 
man) is as much a principle of levelling and disintegration as the
116Christian commandment of love is one of edification and organisation. "
Scheler asserted that: "It is in and through God that for the first
time we are bound in spirit to one another. This is exactly the
meaning of the ’first* and ’greatest* commandment (Mark 12: 5®-5l)
vdiich merges self-santification and love of one’s neighbour in their
117common root, the love of God." ^
115. Ibid
116. Ibid p . 569
117. Ibid p.575
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Garnett pointed out that there is thoughtfulness and goodness
in both philia and agape. Agape means "thoughtful, good will, pure
and simple,unpossessive and independent of the response of its 
118object". Philia implies a joy in the other and a mutual sharing
of interest, but it does demand reciprocity. Love in the Christian
sense is more than just fellowship, it ià a mutual existence in God.
i.e. love shifts its focus from the field of philia to the field of
agape. Christian ethics cannot be reduced to merely a matter of
fellowship and love of the other, without God as ’the middle-term’,
the concept of heterocentrism becomes reduced to one’s love of other
men without the binding force of God.
A love which seeks only the good of the other has several
basic problems. Niebuhr noted that: "a love which seeketh not its
own is not able to maintain itself in historical society. Not only
may it fall victim to excessive forms of self-assertion of the others,
but even the most perfectly balanced system of justice in history is
a balance of competing wills and interests. and must therefore worst
119anyone who does not participate in the balance." One of the 
basic problems of reducing Christian ethics to the concern for the 
other is that there is no brake upon the self-assertion of the other.
Another problem that stalks the concept of fellowship and 
community as the basis of Christian ethics is the close relationship 
that develops "into what might be called an egoisme a deux, an ex­
clusive mutuality that is indifferent and even hostile to the
interests and claims of the larger community in which we find our- 
120selves,..*" The inwardness of the communal approach on the small 
scale is a very dangerous element in any relationship which will 
always have a corrupting influence upon the community.
118. Garnett, A. Campbell, Ethics: A Critic^ Introduction (TheRonald Press Co.: New York, 1960) p.83
119. NDM vll p.72
120. U  p.39
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When Christian ethics is reduced to fellowship and the 
accompanying intention of universal community the assertion of 
the other, the adoration of the other, and .egoisme a deux become 
problems. God needs to be the first part of the Christian ethical 
decision process. God is needed as the modifying force in human 
relationships. One cannot base one’s ethical decisions only upon 
how one ascertains the other and in terms of the intended univer­
sal community. One needs to be constantly aware of God as Creator 
and his part in personal relationships and the ideal and reality 
of His existence.
Justice
The final area of interest centres around Macmurray*s under­
standing of justice with its pragmatic overtones in light of his 
understanding of morality, Christian ethics and love. However,
Macmurray’s understanding of justice is ambiguous and shows the 
inconsistency caused by over-emphasising the relational.
Macmurray considered justice to be an ampral ideal, however he 
defines justice from two different standpoints. Justice can be
121deemed as an aspect of morality along with generosity and benevolence. 
However, in the case of justice one can demand for oneself justice 
from others. When one reflects upon justice from this standpoint it
becomes "essentially negative; a kind of zero or lower limit of 
122moral behaviour". However, from the, other standpoint justice
"can appear as the very essence of morality without which the higher
125virtues lose their moral quality". From this standpoint Macmurray 
claimed that: "Justice seems to be the sine qua non of all morality,
124the very essence of righteousness, in a sense the whole of morality."





Macmurray viewed justice both as a minimum factor within morality 
as well as the essence of morality* This ambiguity stems from 
the two factors within justice that are necessary for Macmurray*s 
interpretation of justice and ethics* Macmurray considered 
justice to be "the negative aspect of morality which is necessary
125to the constitution of the positive, though subordinate within it. "
Macmurray defined morality in terms of its positive aspect, but
holds that it can only be realised through its own negative such .
as justice. Macmurray averred that: "Without justice, morality
becomes illusory and sentimental, the mere appearance of morality.
Macmurray deaned justice to be the safeguard against the evils of
communal self-interest. Macmurray held that justice safeguards
"the inclusiveness of the moral reference and so the unity of the
Other. To be generous without being just is to be generous to some
at the expense of dthers; and so to produce a minor mutuality which
is hostile to the interest of the larger community. It is to create
and defend a corporate self-interest, and this destroys the universality
127of the moral reference." Vos regarded justice as a corrective
to the excess emphasis placed upon mutuality. Justice in terms of
the impersonal does seem to be at odds with the concept of justice
in terms of the personal/communal.
Macmurray certainly has a twofold perception of justice.





and functioning as a differentiating force within it.In the relation of two agents, this means that each remains himself and differentiated from tltô other; there must he no self-identification of one with the other, or the reciprocity will be lost and the het- erocentricity of the relation will only be apparent.'... To maintain equality of persons in relation is justice; and without it generosity becomes purely sentimental and vdiolly egocentric. My care for you is only moral if it includes the intention to pre­serve your freedom as an agent, which is your inde­pendence of me. ... But now, if the negative aspect of morality which is justice, is considered by itself, it appears as the minimum requirement of morality in all personal relations, Aether positive or negative, direct or indirect, ••• There is no more than the minimum required to recognise, in the intentionality of action, that you are also a person, and that the struggle is itself, however negative, a relation of persons. But the requirement of justice in our ~ actions has a wider sweep; it is the bond, not of community indeed —  because for community much more is required —  but of society; of any form of co-op­eration which is co-operation of persons. ... Now in my direct relations with others, whether these are personal or impersonal, I can hope to secure justice in my dealings with them by limiting my activities for the sake of their interests, providing they will do the same in their dealings with me. For I am in communication with them, and we can consult together and come to an agreement about what is fair to each of us, so far as our separate courses of action affect one another and impinge upon one another. This can be achieved by a common consent to general principles by reference to which each of us can determine what would or would not be fair to the other person if we did it.^^®
Justice for Macmurray is not merely a matter for community, but also 
a matter for society. This forces justice to be both ’positively 
moral’ as well as ’negatively moral’, since morality can only be 
a matter for the community, i.e. personal relations, and cannot 
enter into social, i.e. impersonal, relations. Macmurray considered 
justice to be essential to personal relationships, which means it is 
the essence of morality. However, justice at the same time is the 
maintenance of co-operation by means of general principles within 
a society, which is a minimal interpretation of morality. Macmurray’s 
interpretation of justice is amphibolous.
128.. Ibid pp. 189-191
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This ambiguity has its origins in Macmurray’s insistence
upon a communal limitation to morality with its sharp division
between society and the communal/personal. Justice is certainly
an aspect of morality, but it must certainly operate outside of
the "moral sphere of the community" which means that one either
offers two different forms of justice, one which is moral and
one which is not moral, or one has a definition of justice that
is broad enough to encompass both the communal and the social.
The best definition, however, should be one that is simple and
applicable to all events and relationships.
Macmurray*s restriction of morality to the sphere of reciprocal
love, which is a threat to the unconditional Christian motion of
love, contributes to his amphibolous interpretation of justice.
What is the relationship between love and justice? For Macmurray
justice is an aspect of morality, which intends that ’toy claim
shall not take precedence over the claims of others. Justice is
129an obligation that each of us has to other people." Macmurray 
further underlines his personal/communal definition of justice as 
a matter of trust by maintaining that: "without justice, co-opera­
tion becomes impossible. If the co-operation is compulsory it must
150then become a co-operation in mutual self-destruction." Justice 
is only positively moral in terms of the personal/communal sphere. 
Macmurray held that justice was not enough and it is "only the 
negative aspect of morality, and itself is for the sake of friend­
ship". ^
129. Ibid p.201
130. Ibid p . 204






of personal relations must be docamecL to failure if it fries to } 
exclude or differentiate between the personal and the impersonal 
type of justice. Even if it is possible for one to hide behind 
the functions of a role it is also possible for one’s most intimate 
personal qualities to be exhibited by one’s adherence to a role.
The sharp distinction between the impersonal e.g. a role, and the 
personal is the underlying cause of the confusion and unnecessary 
dualism in Macmmrray’s approach to justice. This is not.necessary 
since one must have the same understanding of justice both for 
personal and impersonal relations, since one cannot clearly iden­
tify the two relations, nor easily divide the social from the communal, 
Macmurray in his refusal to understand man in terms of the 
’isolated-I’ as well sis the ’I-Thou’ ultimately reduces justice to 
a matter of personal relationships since the impersonal approach to 
justice demands something beyond the communal.
Love and justice are mutually interdependent. "Love unites;
159justice preserves what is to be united." . Justice is not a matter 
of impersonal or personal relations, but a single manifestation of 
agape. Love is not just a matter of the ’I-Thou’ relation, but a 
manifestation of God’s love, i.e. agape, in all human actions. 
Christian ethics is not a matter of just friendship or fellowship, 
but man’s encounter with God and God’s lové which is manifested in 
man’s action, and God’s creation as well as man’s actions towards 
other men, groups of men and the world.
— — —— — —
159. LPJ p . 71
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Macmurray confined justice to the negative aspect of personal 
relationships in terms of equality in the ’I-Thou* or as a matter 
of agreed upon recognition of personhood and the bond of society ' 
and co-operation. However, man must make more than just ’iHKiou’ 
or ’social’ decisions. Justice is the expansion of love beyond 
the bounds of egoisme a deux.
Macmurray’8 presupposition that there is a division between 
society and community has caused a false and confusing picture of 
justice to develop; with justice becoming either a-minimum and/or 
essential part of a moral action, which is determined by how one 
perceives the relationships that are involved. Justice is a moral 
factor in society and community since it is not determined by one’s 
interpretation of human relationships, but by God’s transcending 
love, i.e. agape.
Justice may be thought to have an element of self-interest 
which caused Macmurray to assume that it is sometimes only a lower 
limit to morality. Macmurray’s insistence-upon considering man in 
terms of the relational means that self-interest is regarded as some­
thing that is foreign to true human nature. Dorothy Bnmett in Bales. 
Holes and Relations criticised Macmurray* s sharp distinction between 
*role relations and personal relations".Bnmett maintained that 
role relations, which are a type of impersonal relations, are intei>- 
woven with personal type of relations. Macmurray has failed to 
realise that in most situations, even in the family, the role rela­
tion, such as mother or husband, is intereoven or blended with the 
personal relation # Any attempt at making moral decisions in terms
138. Bnmett, D. Rules. Roles and Relations (Macmillan: London, 196?) 
P-171
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of the self and the ’others* and (o) finally from obligations, discerned by the individual self, to the wider obligations which the community defines from its more impartial perspective#^ 35
Justice should not be interpreted as the mediating factor between 
the ’I’ and ’Thou’ or the minimum negative limit of morah-ty. It 
is a manifestation of God’s love between individuals as seen in 
the community, and between the person and the group as well as 
between one group and another. One should not try and limit posi­
tive justice to the personal relationship between the ’I-Thou’.
Justice is not just the maintenance of "equality of persons in 
156relation", but it is the extension of man’s relationship beyond 
the limits of egoisme a deux. The norm for justice is agape, and 
the manifestation of love is justice in all situations. Indirect 
relationships can be a manifestation of God’s love when undertaken 
in the spirit of agape. Morality as well as justice should be able 
to extend beyond the limits of ’I-Thou’ with its debilitating 
possibility of egoisme a deux. Justice cannot be defined in terms 
of personal relations and society, but it must be defined in terms 
of agape.
However, this is not an attempt to substitute personal love for 
justice, i.e. justice is not just for the sake of friendship or 
philia. but because of God’s love. Justice is a manifestation of 
God’s love for man because man’s love of man should reflect and be 
created by God’s love of man. Justice offers a framework of prin­
ciples in which one may try to work out God’s love and will for man 
when man deals with man. "Justice is a necessary instrument of love. 
Justice is a manifestation of love which makes it possible for a man 
to make a moral decision in both a direct and indirect relationship.
135. Ibid
136. PIRp .190
137. Winter, Gibson, Social Ethics (SGM Press Ltd.; London, I968)P.72
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be moral is dangerous. It is "a dangerous sentimentality to 
exalt pure and unmediated meeting of subjects in the I-rThou 
relationship as the only true good".^^^ Man in his encounter 
with the other encounters him on more than just the ’I-Thou* 
plane. Man encounters his neighbour or his fellowman as a person 
and as a member of a social institution. If one only confronts 
the other morally as a member of a community, then one is not con­
fronting the total individual. One must question the assumption 
that indirect and impersonal relationships, vi«.ei-the minimum scope 
of justice, are non-^ noral or amoral relationships, i.e. they are 
outwith or less in the scope of God’s redeeming love.
Justice .is a manifestation of man’s love. Niebuhr saw justice 
as extending the communal aspects of man as did Macmurray but he 
had reservations about "Wiis process. Niebuhr asserted that: ”A 
relation between the self and one other may be partly ecstatic; 
and in any case the calculation of relative interest may be reduced 
to a minimum. But as soon as a third person is introduced into the 
relation even the most perfect love requires a rationale estimate of
154.conflicting needs and interests." This is true even in the smallest
community, i.e. the family with one child. Justice is a manifestation
of love, since it tries to extend the love of God as manifested in the
community. Niebuhr held that:
Systems and principles of justice ^ e  the servants and instruments of the spirit of brotherhood in so far as they extend the sense of obligation towards the other,(a) from an immediately felt obligation promoted by obvious need to a continued obligation expressed in fixed principles of mutual support; (b) fifom a simple relation between a self and one ’ other’ to the complex relations
133. BSFB p.263
134. NDM vll p . 248
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In order to understand Macmurray*s concept of justice in 
terms of Christian ethics, one needs to view the idea of justice 
in the li^t of God’s love. Christian ethics is basically a 
matter 6f agape, whereas Macmurray’s conception of ethics is 
basically a matter of philia. Macmurray*s way of understanding 
society in moral terms is to expand society into a universal 
community. Society in order to be moral must be reduced to the 
communal or became like the community, neither of which can be 
considered to be completely possible, because of the limiting 
factor of egoisme a deux. Social justice for Macmurray is not a 
matter that can be considered in positive moral terms, but only 
communal justice can be considered in moral terms. However, 
social justice should be an aspect of God’s love and consequently 
must be a matter of importance for Christian ethics.
In view of Macmurray* s tendency to restrict his view of 
Christian ethics to idie personal/communal, one sees the demand 
for social justice weakened. To emphasise personal relations at 
the expense of social justice is very dangerous. In 1937» the 
Oxford Conference on the Church, Community and State issued a 
warning that: "Undue emphasis upon the higher possibilities of 
love - in personal relations, within the limits of a given system 
of justice or an established system may tempt Christians to allow 
individual acts of charity to become a screen for injustice and a 
substitute for j u s t i c e . J u s t i c e  is subject to God’s love and 
is a manifestation of God’s love on all çlanes of human existence, 
both in society and community as well as within the ’I-Thou’ and 
the ’isolated-I’. To consider man in purely personal terms and 
to consider only those decisions made in personal/communal terms to
152. BFSBp .262
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upon which the uniqueness and intrinsic value of the individual 
can he anchored without it heing completely dependent upon the 
idea of the community* I have argued in Chapter 10 that by aban­
doning the concept of the existence of the self in isolation, 
i.e* the ' antecedent self, Macmurray has undermined'the uniqueness 
and intrinsic value of the individual. The concept of der Elnzige 
or the single'one is essential, since it takes into account ..the 
actual isolation of each-individual, because of the limitations ,of 
any form of communication, i.e. because of.the fact that each of 
us can be said to be * trapped in his own skull*. The concept of - 
der Einzige emphasises the intrinsic value of each individual.
In my view unalloyed collectivism in the form of a completely 
communal approach threatens tie intrinsic value of the individual, 
since the self becomes nothing more than a product of the relations 
within the community, thereby wholly subject to the values of the 
community. I have argued that there is an * original endowment* 
that precedes the *I-Thou* relation, and that this * original endow­
ment* is then shaped by the community into what may be called 
*personali1y*. I have argued that Macmurray has placed too much 
emphasis upon the community by defining the self only in terms of 
the other. By depending upon a communal definition of the self, 
one is forced to confine one*s definition primarily to the collec­
tive, although the collective is only one component or part of 
human nature* Consequently, if the self is defined only in terms of 
the personal other and the community, i.e. collectively, it leads to 
the dominance of the community which thereby threatens to make_the
individual incidental.
By utilising exclusively the idea of community to interpret and to
define the self, I have argued that Macmurray has reduced the con­
cept of the unique individual to an extension of the collective
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in Chapter 10, the definition of the self totally in terms of 
its relationship with the other is inadequate, since it only 
provides at best a definition of personality* Macmurray assumed 
erroneously t^t the self as subject did. not exist, thereby only 
allowing for the possibility of the self as one term in a relationship, 
;i.e, something that is. dependent upon the other or the Thou^^for its 
existence. Moreover, even though one may not know the self as 
subject, this does not necessarily imply that the self as subject 
does not exist* Macmurray*s rejection of the self as subject, 
which is directly linked to his rejection of the self as der Einzige 
led to his misrepresentation of the self as a product of only 
the *I-Thou*,- i.e. something that is totally dependent upon the 
community for its existence.
In my view a consequence of Macmurray*s rejection of the 
single one is the implication that the common life is the sub­
stratum for the individual. Consequently, the self may easily be 
thought of in terms of, or even reduced to, external factors, i.e. 
those things that are accessible to other persons. By making the 
community, i.e. one*s personal relationships, the basic phenomenon, 
the individual is in danger of being reduced to a mere epiphenomenon* 
This has far-reaching ethical ramifications, since the assumption 
that the individual is a secondary phenomenon may easily lead to the 
assumption that the community comes befçre the individual* Moreover, 
by concentrating upon the communal aspects of human nature, one may 
fail to deal with the problems of mutual exclusion between individuals 
and the isolation that exists no matter how intimate, in the rela­
tionship.
By recognising the existence of *an original endowment* that 
precedes one*s relationship with other persons, a base is provided
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society axe to be utilised as principles or ideals, then the 
internal contradictions within the principle of community comes . 
into the picture* One is also confronted by the inexactness of 
the two contrasting categories with society's constant drive to­
wards community and community's constant drive towarch society.
I have argued that one can neither realise community in 
practice nor can one afford-to dispense entirely with community as 
an ideal* Bbwever, if community is used exclusively as a starting 
point for understanding the self, religion and ethics, one can 
expect to confront seme problems because of its internal contra­
dictions and its inexactness. Communityr when used exclusively, 
threatens to become an unrealisable, enigmatic and unbalanced ideal.
My analysis of Macmurray*sconcept of community revolves around 
its application to three different areas, i.e. the self as a product 
of community and/or more specifically the 'I-Thou* relationship, 
religion defined in terms of its communal functions and ethics en­
tirely in terms of the other and the community. My analysis of 
Macmurray*8 application of the concept of community has revealed 
certain doubts about the unalloyed use of the idea of community 
when defining and analysing the areas of the self, religion and 
ethics. Stated simply, I have argued that the basic assumption, 
that the concept of community and its constituent parts alone is 
sufficient to explain and define the self, religion and ethics, 
is only partly correct*
%  initial conclusion is that the idea of community by itself 
is inadequate when used to explain completely and to define the self. 
In my view Macmurray*s insistence upon reducing the self to a 
dependent part of the * I-Thou* relation with its conconitant rejec­
tion of der'Einzige is an oversimplification. As I have argued
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which is the tendency within the ’I-Thou* relation to exclude 
any third person from the relationship. The second of "Wiese 
contradicting factors is the need for openness within a community 
i.e. the need to always include other persons. Consequently, 
within any community there is the constant conflict between inti­
macy and growth and/or between inclusiveness and exclusiveness.
This ancmialy was noted in Chapter 8 and elsewhere. Macmurray did 
not adequately deal with the problems presented by the internal 
contradictions that exist within any community. The idea of commu- 
ni*ty is not invalid simply because there are two competing factors 
always to be found within it, but the competition between exclusive­
ness and inclusiveness within the community clearly shows that an 
actual community is a fragile structure. The idea of community eis 
well as any actual community has an inherent weakness, which points 
to the questionable nature of any analysis based exclusively upon 
the idea of community.
The concept of communi-ty as presented by Macmurray not only 
contains an ever present internal contradiction, but it also fails 
to offer a clear-cut alternative to Wie impersonal world of society. 
Macmurray did not indicate whether the two categories he identified,
i.e. community and society or the personal and impersonal groups, 
are principles that can be applied to all human groups or actual 
divisions between groups. The difficulties of viewing human groups 
in terms of two contrasting categories,^ i.e. in terms of either 
community or society, is discussed in Chaptér 9 Section 2. By 
assuming that the two categories are meant to be actual divisions
into which a particular group must be placed, one immediately, 
confronts the impossibility, of determining the. classification 
of any particular group, since each group will display both personal 
and impersonal facets, which makes any rigid classification question­
able. Moreover, if one assumes that the categories of community and
-  $64
Macmurray has placed the concept of community at the very 
centre of his definition and thinking about religion, the self 
and ethics. One of his basic assumptions is that the idea of 
community provides a solid foundation upon which one can build 
a complete analysis and working hypothesis, not only about the 
self, but also religion and ethics and about Christian ethics in 
particular. This assumption is clearly in evidence in Macmurray* s 
presentation andiutilisation of the three modes of apperception.
The analysis in Chapter $ Section 5 of Macmurray*s religious mode 
of apperception illustrated that the concept of community is at 
the very centre of his understanding of all human experience and 
reflection, since community is the focal point of the religious 
mode of apperception and the religious mode of apperception is 
the focal point for all human experience and reflection.
However, I have argued that a completely communal or relational^ 
view does not represent adequately or explore fully the concepts of 
the self, religion and ethics. By using the communal as his only 
starting-point and denying the validity of the person in isolation, 
Macmurray failed to represent satisfactorily the depth and the many 
sides of human nature and existence. In my view the concept of 
community does not by itself provide a satisfactory foundation 
because of its internal contradictions and because it fails to 
provide an. adequate and complete definition and explanation of 
the self, religion and ethics.
I have argued that Macmurray *s dependence upon the idea of 
community and his utilisation of the concept of community is 
threatened by a serious internal contradiction within the ‘ concept 
of community. There is a contradiction within every community 
•fâiat cannot be resolved, i.e. two opposing factors or tendencies.
The first of these factors may be labelled as Egiosme a deux.
(a) see footnote 64 p. 243 i
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interpretation of the individual. Moreover, the idea of community 
'does not by itself provide a completely satisfactory representation 
or interpretation of the self. . The idea of community as well as 
the reality of community provides only a partial basis for under­
standing And analysing the self and human nature.
As in the case of Macmurray^ s definition of the self in terms 
of the community, his interpretation of religion in terms of commu­
nity alone is not adequate since it may well lead to a completely 
social interpretation of religion. Macmurray concluded that reli- 
gion is about communily. In my view such a conclusion leaves 
open the possibility of religion being reduced to a merely, social 
phenomenon. .This is also applicable to the idea of God as the 
Universal Other, since the assumption that God is the Universal 
Other may easily lead to the assumption that God is nothing more 
than a symbol of community or at the very best God is the general­
ised experience of other persons. It, thereby threatens to reduce 
the idea of God merely to a collective idea or ideal. One may 
easily conclude that God is nothing more than a product of the 
matrix of society and religion.
I have argued in Chapter 11 that Macmurray*s approach threatens 
to reduce religion to nothing more than a constituent of society, by 
overlooking the solitary aspects of reli^on, i.e.the individual, as a lone 
seeker after God. Macmurray rejected the Whiteheadian thesis
2that the individual is a primary source in the religious experience, 
i.e. religion is not only the art and theory of one’s relationships 
with other men, but it is also the art and theory of one’s internal 
struggle and quest. The communal view of religion cannot fully come 
to terms with the fact that the person as ’the single one’
1. PRp.159
2. RE p. 225
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is partially separated from his fellow man in his quest to find 
faith and that one’s actions towards others depend upon the individ­
ual's own judgements and internal convictions. In my view Macmurray's 
failure to take into account the solitary aspects of religion, has 
distorted his concept of religion in the same way that it distorted 
his analysis of the self by overstressing the communal. By over­
stressing the communal aspect of religion Macmurray failed to account 
fully for the spiritual aspect of religion. Religion is not only a 
matter of man’s communal drive, but the recognition of man’s deep 
internal solitary quest after God. One’s spiritual growth is not 
only in terms of one’s social or communal awareness, but a matter 
of one’s internal quest for faith. One encounters God both as an 
individual and as a part of a group. If one assumes that religion 
is completely interwoven into the fabric of human nature as Macmurray 
has done, then religion must be conceived of as a fundamental fact 
both in the social and the solitary components of life, I would 
argue that religion is imitimately interwoven with the community, 
as did Macmurray, but I would also argue that the individual’s 
drive to come to terms with his isolation within the birth/death 
cycle is also intimately interwoven into religion.
Macmurray be assuming that the self is fundamentally a product 
of communal relations has consequently concentrated only upon the 
communal aspects of religion. Furthermore, since Macmurray has
argued that the 'a priori self’ does not exist, the solitary aspect
/of religion becomes a questionable area of inquiry. However, the 
solitary quest or the individual seeker after God can deal with 
the mutual exclusion and isolation that is present within the lives 
of all men no matter how intimate their relationships with other 
persons. The solitary religious quest is an essential aspect of 
religion as well as the relationship within the community.
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In my view Macmurray failed to utilise correctly and, to recognise 
the importance of isolation in the life of each individual, despite 
his participation in a community, in his definition of religion and 
the self, and also in his analysis of ethics. Macmurray stated that 
the only truly moral mode of apperception was the communal. Macmurray 
defined a morally right action as one thât intends community, with 
the additional presupposition that the communal approach is essen­
tially heterocentric. In other words the basis of any moral action 
is the intention to put the other before the self, i.e. the other 
becomes the focal point of the moral inquiry. However, one is imme­
diately faced with the difficulty of trying to understand the other 
fully enough to be able to make the correct ethical decision, i.e. 
the constant inpenetrable aspects of every man, because of every 
man’s isolation, becomes an immediate factor, •
I have argued in Chapter 1$ that a heterocentric, i.e. communal, 
view of ethics is over-simplified and will lead to questionable 
conclusions. Macmurray by contrasting egocentrism with heterocentrism 
has basically advocated a form of altruism as opposed to egoism as a 
basis for making an ethical decision. However, ar^ form of altruism 
can lead different people into making different and incompatible 
decisions and to consequently undertake incompatible decisions and to 
consequently undertake incompatible courses of action. This is clearly 
evident in the example of two people trying to let each other through 
the same door. Unalloyed heterocentrism, vhich is basically the out­
come of an unalloyed dependence upon the opmmunal conception of the 
self and religion, like altruism does not necessarily lead to a 
practical or workable form of ethics.
Another-practical problem with heterocentrism and the communal 
mode of morality is that the other person becomes the source of value. 
However, the other person should be the beneficiary of the value not
$. PR p.119
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the source of value. Heterocentrism is paradoxically parasitic 
upon the concept of self-interest since it must consider morality 
from the perspective of the self-interest of the other. Hetero­
centrism only succeeds in removing self-interest away one place, 
thereby hiding it but not coming to terms with the consequences 
of self-interest. Heterocentrism unmodified by a clear recogni­
tion of the part played by self-interest and the unworkable aspects 
of altruism is a questionable ethical approach.
A communal apperception of morality may also lead to dangerous 
presuppositions being applied to any ethical décision, since one 
may only consider the harmony of the communily when making an 
ethical decision thereby applying only a minimal interpretation 
of morality. The interpretation is minimal, since one is only in­
fluenced by the expectations of the group, which is itself limited 
and guided by the lowest common denominator within the group. Since 
the obligation to reciprocate cannot be viewed as strictly an ethical 
requirement, then the expectations of the group cannot be viewed as 
strictly an ethical requirement upon which an entire ethical theory 
may safely be built.
As in the case of the communal view of the self and religion, 
the communal view of ethics without the counteracting force and 
recognition of the isolation of the individual presents a distorted 
and inaccurate view. The individual is the final source of every 
moral decision, even though he may be influenced by the group or 
make the decision as part of a group. Ethical decisions may be taken 
while one person is in dialogue with another person or persons, but 
the final decision is taken by each persons as an individual. The 
decision is not taken by a nebulous other which is the product of 
interpersonal relations- Such a view has obvious dangers, since it
- 573 “
may be interpreted to mean that each individual is not accountable 
for his decision.
An unalloyed heterocentric view of the person does not provide 
a clear or adequate valuation of the individual. I have argued 
that Macmurray did not provide adequate support for the intrinsic 
Value of each individual since he placed too much emphasis upon 
the relational, i.e. the instrumental value of each person. A 
person’s instrumental value is predicated upon a person’s intrinsic 
Value. Only a being that has value in himself can in turn feel a 
need to value another. Macmurray*s communal view of morality assumes 
that a person’s intrinsic value is dependent upon a person’s instru­
mental value, i.e. his relationship with the other, which completely 
reverses the correct order.
In Chapter 14 Section 1 I have argued that Macmurray’s idea of 
community when applied to ethics and in particular to Christian ethics, 
threatens to reduce Jesus’ teachings about ethics to simply an anthro­
pological study. In my view Macmurray came ' close on occasions to 
reducing ethics to anthropology as had Feuerbach. However, such a 
definition or interpretation of Christian ethics is totally at odds 
with the God centred teachings of Jesus Christ. If Christian ethics 
had a strictly anthropological foundation, the genuine religious life 
would have man at its centre and all worship and communion with God 
would be judged solely in terms of the profit that it brings to man­
kind. However, the basic thrust of Christian ethics is theocentric 
and neither anthropocentric nor heterocent^c.
As I have argued in Chapter 14 Section $ Macmurray’s interpreta­
tion of Christian ethics implies that the Great Commandment basically 
stresses the love of neighbour, which threatens to make the love of 
God secondary. However, the Great Commandment has as its primary
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thrust the love of God with the love of neighbour as ■jiie result 
of the love of God. I have argued that the love of our fellow 
man is not the primary consideration, hut this does not mean that 
the love of man for man is a secondary factor. What needs to be 
recognised is that the eternal is primary, i.e. God’s love, and 
that the temporary, i.e. man’s love, is a factor within the 
eternal. Man’s love is a part and a direct result of God’s love.
Macmurray by limiting his definition of love to its human 
dimensions confined love to its responsive and reciprocal charac­
teristics. However, God’s love, i.e. agape, goes beyond response 
and reciprocity. Agape is not only the love of God manifested 
in man’s love of man, but it is also the love that transcends all 
things. The concept of agape is also demonstrated in that God is 
the ’middle termin any relationship. Love in terms of equal 
regard, which closely corresponds - to Macmurray’s view of love, 
i.e. phi lia and/or eros. may easily be reduced to an unquestioning 
obedience of the other or adoration of the other. Agape as the 
modifying love of God keeps the ’I-Thou* relation from degenerating 
into unquestioning obedience or adoration. If one’s ethical approach 
is basically theocentric as opposed to heterocentric one is less 
likely to reduce love to adoration or to a mere response.
!Hie main thrust of my argument has been that Macmurray’s con­
cept of community does not by itself prpvide a satisfactory or adequate 
interpretation of Christian ethics. By concentrating upon the 
communily, i.e.upon personal relations, man’s intrinsic worth is 
threatened with reduction to a merely instrumental value. Each man’s 
Value should not be dependent only upon external factors that are 
available toother persons. Another problem with assuming that the 
community is the essence of morality is that when confronted by 
collectivism one does not have the necessary counteracting force
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of individualism, which means that the community may impose its 
values upon the individual. The Christian doctrine of man-in- 
community emphasises that the human being is a part of personal 
relationships as a unique person, and is not simply a fragment 
of society.
In my view communal ethics, which is one-sided, may easily 
become reduced only to a matter of the morality of organisation, 
but Christian ethics is more than just one’s relationships with 
other men. Man’s actions should echo not the will of others, 
but the transcendent and all encompassing love of God that is 
the basic ingredient of Christian ethics. Christian ethics is 
centred upon the love of God that binds man to man. God’s modi­
fying love as opposed to neighbour love, makes it possible for 
one man to seek the good of another man without the other being 
put above or over against the self.
In conclusion a summary of my criticisms of Macmurray*s de­
pendence upon the concept of community to describe and/or define 
the self, religion and general ethics is that he oversimplified 
each of these areas by abandoning certain essential and related 
considerations. I would argue that Macmurray failed to satisfactorily 
and completely'deal with the self as 'the single one’, with the solitary 
religious quest and with the individual’s necessity to make an 
ethical decision, because of his rejection of anything outside 
of the relationship between men which includes its extension
the community. The dangers of such an^oversimplication is illu­
strated by Macmurray’s one-sided communal interpretation of Christian 
ethics, vdiich placed too much emphasis upon the community and man’s 
personal relationships, i.e. upon mankind, vdiile overlooking the
centrality of God. This led to Macmurray’s anthropocentric inter­
pretation, ' which abandons or overlooks.the theocentric interpretation
i.e, that God’s love makes the love of one man for another
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possible. It also led to Macmurray’s false assumption that 
Christian ethics is basically heterocentric, which is to say that 
it is basically altruistic since it is advocating that ethical 
decisions should be made only in terms of other persons, which 
ignores the central and modifying love of God.
However, this is not to say that Macmurray*s approach is with­
out merit or interest to the student of Christian ethics. Macmurray 
has offered a immber of enlightening and worthwhile insights into 
the three major areas of concern that have been examined in this 
study.
Firstly, in Macmurray*s discussion of the self, one is made 
to realise the importance of other persons in the formation and 
existence of personality. Macmurray clearly and correctly argued 
that the community provides a significant input into what becomes 
the personality. He admirably succeeded in emphasising the impoiv 
tance of the other in our individual development and throughout 
each person’s lives. also admirably succeeded in underlining 
the centrality of personal relationships and the community in person- 
hood and religion.
Secondly, Macmurray’s discussion of religion is of great and 
lasting value. He drew the startling, but well founded conclusion 
that man’s whole life is rooted in religious experience. He reached 
this conclusion by assuming that religious experiences are those 
experiences focused upon the personal, mutual and reciprocal rela­
tionships that are to be found within the ^ community. Macmurray 
pointed out that the concept and reality of community provides a 
starting point for a clear, solid and basic explanation of religion. 
A distinct advantage of viewing religion in terms of community is 
that religion ‘ cannot be reduced to >a matter of rare mystical exper-
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ience, i.e. confined to a few rare and unique experiencesj but 
it makes religion a part of everyday experience. Religion for 
Macmurray is not something that is understood only after much 
study and meditation, i.e. something that is far removed, but 
something that is part of the very fabric of life. He has placed 
religion at the very centre of life with his thesis that religion 
is the mode of apperception that focuses upon the personal * I-Thou* 
relationships within a community. Macmurray has without question 
demonstrated that religion does not have to be understood just in 
terms of subjective and rare experiences, while ignoring the ob­
jective and mutual experiences of each man during each day.
Macmurray*s presentation of the communal aspects of religion is 
very efficacious, since it makes one realise that religion is bene­
ficial on the practical level in that it contributes the rituals 
and other activities of the group that directly contribute to a 
community’s self-awareness that provides the link and unity, that 
is necessary, between -tiie members of the present community and the 
past and future members of the community. Religion gives to the 
community a sense of self-awaruess and to each member of the commu­
nity something that is beyond the self and the present, whereas 
community gives to religion a solid and physical foundation.
Within the third area, that of ethics, Macmurray has convincingly 
argued that one should not base an ethibal theory upon ’goal-seeking* 
or upon ’rule-obeying’, which is in direct agreement with his general 
rejection of the mechanical and contemplative modes of apperception. 
Macmurray*s basic thesis is that Christian morality is to be found 
outside of these two negative categories. . Macmurray, along with 
several other thinkers, has presented a strong case for Christian 
ethics in that it needs to be considered as a third and separate 
category of ethics.
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SUMMARY
Macmurray*s basic understanding of religion and the self as 
well as ethics in terms of community, although enlightening and 
valuable, does present definite problems. The concept of community 
itself does not provide a completely satisfactory basis for 
analysing the self, religion and ethics firstly because of its 
internal contradictions. Secondly, because by concentrating upon 
the community and the personal relationships that contribute to 
the community, one may easily overlook the isolation of each indi­
vidual. Consequently, Macmurray does not confront the total possible 
constituents of the self, religion and ethics. The concept of the 
community needs to be modified in the light of the insights provided 
when one closely examines man as an individual, i.e. man as , . 
der Einzige ', as well as manias a part of the * I-Thou*.
This study has a general application in that it underscores 
the difficulties produced when one tries to understand religion and 
particularly Christianity empirically at the expense of the spiritual 
quest, r By concentrating upon the empirically valid aspects of 
Christianity, i.e. the community, one may be able to integrate 
religion more firmly into a general schema that contains science and 
art, but one might also overlook the spiritual quest. An adequate 
interpretation of Christianity and Christian ethics must never rely 
solely upon an empirical investigation unless one is willing to 
abandon Christianity as a religion and consider it only as a philosophy 
and/or anthropology.
In conclusion, Macmurray*s basic thesis is invaluable for anyone 
wishing to identify the empirical base of religion and ethics, but 
one should be fully aware that anthropology alone does not provide 
an adequate means of analysing Christian ethics, nor does it provide
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completely the necessary analytical tools. The danger of viewing 
things only in terms of conmrunity is that the community may well 
become the principle phenomenon to be investigated, the individual 
consequently being reduced to an epiphenomenon, which is in direct 
disagreement with Christ’s concern for each man’s salvation. In 
summary, one might say that Christian ethics and the Christian 
religion is not merely a matter of community, but that the commu­
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